dismissed L-1B Case: Engineering

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
File: WAC 07 230 50343 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: MAY 2 0 2~8 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101 (a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
7 Administrative Appeals Office 
WAC 07 230 50343 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to employ the beneficiary in the position of "electrical 
field engineer" as an L-1B nonimrnigrant intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to 
section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L). The 
petitioner, a Delaware corporation, describes its business in the Form 1-129 as "engineering and construction." 
The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary for a period of three years. 
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish: (1) that the beneficiary 
possesses specialized knowledge; or (2) that the beneficiary has been employed abroad, or will be employed 
in the United States, in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the petitioner has satisfied the criteria for establishing that 
the beneficiary has been and will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity. Counsel also argues that 
the director applied an overly restrictive and outdated definition of "specialized knowledge." 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101(a)(l5)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The primary issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary has been 
WAC 07 230 50343 
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and will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity and whether the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge. 8 C.F.R. tj 214.2(1)(3)(ii) and (iv). 
Section 2 14(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1 184(c)(2)(B), provides: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 
 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
The petitioner describes the beneficiary's duties abroad, proposed duties in the United States, and claimed 
specialized knowledge in a letter dated July 25,2007 as follows: 
[The beneficiary] will utilize his specialized knowledge of [the petitioning organization's] 
proprietary technologies, processes, and procedures in support of project activities. [The 
beneficiary] will be responsible for providing technical direction and assistance to Electrical 
Superintendents. He will continuously perform inspections of all electrical work in progress 
and complete a final checkout of electrical installations to ensure quality and conformance to 
[the petitioning organization's] specifications and codes. He will assist in the establishment 
of detailed work plans and schedules in line with [the petitioning organization's] Engineering 
Department Procedures. [The beneficiary] will coordinate with Technical Advisors and 
Engineering to resolve drawings and [The petitioning organization] Setroute issues. He will 
review vendor drawings, Engineering documents, wiring details, and cable schedule and 
schematic diagrams to ensure compliance with [the petitioning organization's] proprietary 
procedures. Furthermore, [the beneficiary] will be responsible for preparing, reviewing, and 
interpreting calculations and specifications to meet project milestones. Additionally, [the 
beneficiary] will assist with quality assurance schedules and prepare project specific designs 
and procedures to meet [the petitioning organization's] standards. 
These job duties require not only [the beneficiary's] academic background in Electrical 
Engineering, but also his specialized knowledge of [the petitioning organization's] proprietary 
processes, procedures, and technologies such as Bechtel Engineering Department Procedures, 
Bechtel Design Guides and Standards, Bechtel Standard Application Programs, Bechtel 
Setroute, Bechtel Infoworks, Bechtel Teamworks, Bechtel Electrical Installation Procedures, 
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Bechtel Document Processing Tools, and other internal and external proprietary processes 
and procedures that [the beneficiary] gained as an employee of [the petitioning organization]. 
[The beneficiary's] advanced knowledge of [the petitioning organization's] processes and 
procedures cannot be easily duplicated, and it is not possible to easily or quickly train a U.S. 
worker to undertake the proposed job duties in the United States. 
The petitioner also asserts that the beneficiary's proposed duties in the United States will "closely mirror" his 
duties abroad. 
On August 11, 2007, the director requested additional evidence. 
 The director requested, inter alia, 
explanations addressing how the beneficiary's duties differ from those of other workers and how the 
beneficiary's training or experience is uncommon, noteworthy, or distinguished by some unusual quality not 
generally known by practitioners in the beneficiary's field of endeavor. 
In response, the petitioner submitted a letter dated September 24, 2007 in which it further describes the 
beneficiary's duties and claimed specialized knowledge as follows: 
The most important experiential knowledge involved in the position regards [the petitioning 
organization's] proprietary procedures and technologies. [The petitioning organization's] 
proprietary procedures and technologies have required significant investment of [petitioning 
organization] work hours to develop, create, enhance and maintain. The applications are not 
available outside of [the petitioning organization]. These proprietary applications are written, 
developed, and/or customized internally, and exclusively, within [the petitioning 
organization]. Cumulatively, many thousands of [petitioning organization] man-hours have 
been expended to develop, create, enhance and maintain such applications. Because of their 
complexity, their unique features, and the demand for performance, the Electronic Field 
Engineer position that utilizes these applications could not possible by entrusted to parties 
who did not have significant experience with our organization's proprietary processes, 
procedures, and technologies. 
Nearly six years of experience, let alone knowledge of, [the petitioning organization] is 
extremely rare in the [petitioning] organization, and there are no employees outside of the 
[petitioning] organization who would have equivalent qualifications. This company-specific 
knowledge is unique within the industry and cannot be duplicated by peers with similar levels 
of education or training who will not have any experience working with these [petitioning 
organization] proprietary technologies. 
It would take well over a year of training investment to match the specialized knowledge [the 
beneficiary] gained at [the petitioning organization] abroad in Bechtel Setroute, Infoworks, 
Teamworks, Procurement Tracking System, Bechtel Procurement System, Bechtel Standard 
Application Programs, and other internal and external proprietary technologies, which is why 
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he was selected for the U.S. position. 
The petitioner also specifically described projects on which the beneficiary has worked abroad. It is alleged 
that the beneficiary used his claimed specialized knowledge of the petitioning organization's processes and 
procedures while working on these projects. For example, concerning a project in Kazakhstan, it is alleged 
that the beneficiary utilized his claimed specialized knowledge of the organization's "proprietary technologies, 
processes, and procedures" in leading the installation of electrical equipment, instrument cabling, and pre- 
commissioning of the power generation area. 
The petitioner further described the beneficiary's acquisition of his claimed specialized knowledge in the 
September 24, 2007 letter as follows: 
Putting aside [the beneficiary's] rare and directly relevant experience with [the petitioning 
organization's] proprietary processes, procedures, and technology, he also has a strong palette 
of experience gained working for over five years and nine months with [the petitioning 
organization's] proprietary tools, processes and, [sic] procedures that [are] also not available 
outside of our organization. The value of this background cannot be underscored as it takes 
significant time for [the petitioning organization] to train its Electrical Field Engineers, even 
those entering [the petitioning organization] with prior engineering background, to, for lack 
of better words "speak our language" and perform Advanced Engineering tasks we can 
entrust to an Electrical Field Engineer at the level of [the beneficiary]. We use internal tools 
and procedures that take several months to a year to develop a sufficient understanding of, 
such as Bechtel Electrical Installation Procedures, Bechtel Standard Application Programs, 
and Bechtel Design Guides and Standards. This company-specific knowledge is unique 
within the industry and cannot be duplicated by peers with similar levels of education or 
training who have not gained experience working at [the petitioning organization] or its 
subsidiaries. 
To better illustrate, [the beneficiary] has been trained in, and shown considerable expertise in 
the following [petitioning organization] internal proprietary technologies: 
Bechtel's Setroute: An electrical commodity tracking tool that engineering uses for raceway 
input, cable routing and cable terminations. Same tool is used to track the progress of both 
engineering and construction. 
Bechtel's Infoworks: [The petitioning organization's] enterprise document and 
configuration management system. It manages the life cycle of documents from creation, 
review, approval, distribution, revision, and archiving through customer turnover for projects 
and other work groups. 
Bechtel Teamworks: [The petitioning organization's] interlinked software with 3D 
modelingipiping & Instrumentation Diagrams and Materials. Tracks the status of the 
individual entities in projects where materials are to be bought form other vendors. 
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Bechtel Procurement Tracking System: 
 Effectively tracks material through engineer 
design specifications to vendor sourcing, bid evaluations and placement of orders, expediting, 
inspection, shipment and reception. 
Bechtel Procurement System: This system is a front-to-back tracking program used for 
Material Requisitions. It allows the forecast of material needs and deliveries to ensure arrival 
when needed. 
Electrical Transient Analyzer Program: A software tool used to analyze electrical system 
characteristics and perform a variety of calculations including load flow, short circuit, motor 
starting, transient stability, harmonic, underground raceway system analysis, and ground grid 
sizing. 
Finally, the petitioner claims that "there are no employees outside of [the petitioning] organization" who share 
the beneficiary's level of experience and knowledge of its processes and procedures and that his knowledge 
"cannot be duplicated by peers with similar levels of education or training who will not have any experience 
working with these Bechtel proprietary technologies." The petitioner described the beneficiary's training in 
its processes and procedures as follows: 
[The beneficiary] has spent significant time and energy to develop his specialized knowledge 
of [the petitioning organization's] processes and procedures. In addition to his on the job 
training, he has utilized Online Bechtel University to complete the following: Electrical 
Equipment Installation, Cathodic Protection, Electrical Heat Tracing, Lighting Installation, 
Construction Surveying, Construction Project Site Setup, Construction Project Site Close-out, 
Request for Information, Lessons Learned, and Performance Based Leadership. [The 
beneficiary] has been recognized for his completion of Introduction to Rigging Workshop, 
and received certificates in "Permit to Work," "Safety Task Analysis," and "Lockout and 
Tagout Verification." Additionally, his support of [the petitioning organization's] projects 
has also allowed his to gain insight into [the petitioning organization's] operations 
internationally in Holland, Turkey, Kazakhstan, and India. 
On October 12, 2007, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner failed to 
establish: (1) that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge; or (2) that the beneficiary has been 
employed abroad, or will be employed in the United States, in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the petitioner has satisfied the criteria for establishing that 
the beneficiary has been and will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity and that the beneficiary 
has specialized knowledge. Counsel also argues that the director applied an overly restrictive and outdated 
definition of "specialized knowledge" in her adjudication of the petition. Specifically, counsel argues that the 
director used a definition of specialized knowledge which predates the inclusion of the current statutory 
definition in the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1990 which is inconsistent with subsequent policy 
memoranda interpreting "specialized knowledge," in particular a 1994 memorandum issued by the legacy 
Immigration and Naturalization Service. Memorandum from James A. Puleo, Acting Executive Associate 
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Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge, CO 214L-P 
(March 9, 1994). 
Upon review, the petitioner's assertions are not persuasive in demonstrating that the beneficiary has 
specialized knowledge or that he was employed abroad, or will be employed in the United States, in a 
specialized knowledge capacity as defined at 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). 
In examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's 
description of the job duties. 
 See 8.C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3). 
 The petitioner must submit a detailed job 
description of the services performed sufficient to establish specialized knowledge. 
 In this matter, the 
petitioner fails to establish that either the foreign position or the proffered United States position requires an 
employee with specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge. 
Although the petitioner repeatedly asserts that the beneficiary's positions abroad required "specialized 
knowledge," and that the beneficiary will be employed in the United States in a "specialized knowledge" 
capacity, the petitioner has not adequately articulated any basis to support this claim. The petitioner has 
failed to identify any specialized or advanced body of knowledge which would distinguish the beneficiary's 
role from that of other similarly experienced and educated electrical field engineers employed by the 
petitioning organization or in the industry at large. Going on record without documentary evidence is not 
sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. 
158, 165 (Cornm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 
1972)). Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties involve specialized 
knowledge; otherwise, meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. See 
Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724, F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905, F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
The petitioner asserts that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge of the petitioning organization's 
"proprietary" processes, procedures, and technologies such as "Bechtel Engineering Department Procedures, 
Bechtel Design Guides and Standards, Bechtel Standard Application Programs, Bechtel Setroute, Bechtel 
Infoworks, Bechtel Teamworks, Bechtel Electrical Installation Procedures, Bechtel Document Processing 
Tools, and other internal and external proprietary processes and procedures" that the beneficiary gained as an 
employee of the petitioning organization. 
However, despite this claim, the record does not establish how, exactly, the these "proprietary" processes, 
procedures, and technologies are so materially different from the processes, procedures, and technologies 
utilized by electrical field engineers in general that a similarly experienced and educated engineer employed 
by the petitioning organization or in the industry at large could not perform the duties of the position. Simply 
asserting that the processes and technologies are proprietary will not suffice. The petitioner never establishes 
the difference between the petitioner's processes, procedures, and technologies and those processes, 
procedures, and technologies used in the construction and engineering industry which requires noteworthy, 
distinguished, or uncommon knowledge not possessed generally by similarly educated and experienced 
electrical field engineers. Although the petitioner claims that the processes, procedures, and technologies are 
"complex" and have "unique features," the petitioner never clearly explains what complexities and unique 
features make this knowledge inconvenient to impart to another similarly educated and generally experienced 
engineer without significant economic inconvenience to the petitioning organization. Once again, going on 
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record without documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these 
proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165 (citing Matter of Treasure Crafi of California, 14 I&N 
Dec. 190). 
Overall, the record does not establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is substantially different from the 
knowledge possessed by electrical field engineers generally throughout the industry or by other employees of 
the petitioning organization. The fact that few other engineers possess very specific knowledge of certain 
aspects of the petitioning organization's "proprietary" processes, procedures, and technologies does not alone 
establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is indeed uncommon, advanced, distinguished, or noteworthy. All 
employees can be said to possess uncommon and unparalleled skill sets to some degree; however, a skill set 
that can be imparted to another similarly educated and generally experienced engineer is not "specialized 
knowledge." Moreover, the proprietary or unique qualities of the petitioner's processes, procedures, or 
technologies do not establish that any knowledge of these is "specialized" or "advanced." Rather, the 
petitioner must establish that qualities of the processes, procedures, and technologies require this employee to 
have knowledge beyond what is common in the industry. This has not been established in this matter. The 
fact that other engineers may not have very specific, proprietary knowledge regarding the petitioner's 
processes, procedures, or technologies is not relevant to these proceedings if this knowledge gap could be 
closed by the petitioner by simply revealing the information to a newly hired, generally experienced electrical 
field engineer. 
Furthermore, while the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary acquired his purported "specialized knowledge" 
through both work experience and training, the record is not persuasive in establishing that either of these 
methods truly imparted "specialized knowledge" to the beneficiary. First, the record is devoid of persuasive 
evidence establishing that the beneficiary's experience with the petitioning organization abroad instilled him 
with specialized knowledge. The petitioner fails to explain what specific knowledge of the petitioning 
organization's processes, procedures, or technologies is advanced or to establish why it would take "well over 
a year of training investment" to impart this knowledge to a similarly employed person and under what 
conditions. The petitioner's claim that it would take "significant time" to teach a newly hired electrical field 
engineer to "speak our language" is simply not persuasive in establishing that knowledge of the petitioning 
organization's processes, procedures, and technologies constitutes specialized knowledge which cannot be 
imparted to a similarly educated electrical field engineer without significant economic inconvenience to the 
petitioning organization. 
Second, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the training courses listed in the record imparted 
specialized knowledge to the beneficiary. The "online" training courses outlined by the petitioner do not 
clearly relate to the beneficiary's purported specialized knowledge. Instead, this training appears to relate 
generally to construction and engineering matters. Also, the record is devoid of evidence establishing how 
long this training lasts, the expense to the company, and whether other employees are provided with similar 
training. The petitioner has not established that the provision of the training is necessary to impart the 
specialized knowledge, that a substantial number of other similarly employed workers do not also have the 
specialized knowledge, or, crucially, that the provision of the training to other similarly educated and 
employed workers would be economically inconvenient to the petitioning organization. Absent evidence 
establishing that the knowledge imparted by the training sessions is not possessed by other similarly 
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employed workers, the knowledge gained would not be uncommon, advanced, or noteworthy. 
The AAO does not dispute the possibility that the beneficiary is a skilled and experienced employee who has 
been, and would be, a valuable asset to the petitioning organization. However, it is appropriate for the AAO 
to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the beneficiary's knowledge of the 
business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making process. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N 
Dec. 117, 120 (Comm. 1981) (citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 61 8 (R.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 
13 I&N Dec. 816 (R.C. 1971)). As stated by the Commissioner in Matter of Penner, when considering 
whether the beneficiaries possessed specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find 
that the occupations inherently qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." 18 I&N Dec. at 52. 
Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled 
worker. Id. The Commissioner also provided the following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or her to 
produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed primarily 
for his ability to carry out a key process or function which is important or essential to the 
business firm's operation. 
Id. at 53. 
It should be noted that the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the AAO to make 
comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The term "specialized 
knowledge" is not an absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed in 1756, Inc. v. Attorney 
General, "[s]imply put, specialized knowledge is a relative . . . idea which cannot have a plain meaning." 745 
F. Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990). The Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended 
for "key personnel." See generally, H.R. REP. NO. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key 
personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." Webster's I1 
New College Dictionary 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). In general, all employees can reasonably be 
considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic 
success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. An employee of 
"crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average employee. 
Accordingly, based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record related to that 
term, the AAO must make comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge employee and 
the general labor market, but also between the employee and the remainder of the petitioner's workforce. 
While it may be correct to say that the beneficiary in the instant case is a highly skilled and productive 
employee, this fact alone is not enough to bring the beneficiary to the level of "key personnel." 
Moreover, in Matter of Penner, the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of the 
specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comm. 1982). The decision noted that the 1970 House 
Report, H.R. REP. NO. 91-851, stated that the number of admissions under the L-1 classification "will not be 
large" and that "[tlhe class of persons eligible for such nonimmigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be 
carefully regulated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id. at 5 1. The decision further noted that 
the House Report was silent on the subject of specialized knowledge, but that during the course of the sub- 
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committee hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary 
to qualify under the proposed "L" category. In response to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses 
responded that they understood the legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts," individuals with 
"unique" skills, and that it would not include "lower categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." Matter 
of Penner, 18 I&N at 50 (citing H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration Act of 1970: Hearings 
on H.R. 445, 91St Cong. 210,218,223,240,248 (November 12, 1969)). 
Reviewing the Congressional record, the Commissioner concluded in Matter of Penner than an expansive 
reading of the specialized knowledge provision, such that it would include skilled workers and technicians, is 
not warranted. The Commissioner emphasized that the specialized knowledge worker classification was not 
intended for "all employees with any level of specialized knowledge." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 53. 
Or, as noted in Matter of Colley, "[mlost employees today are specialists and have been trained and given 
specialized knowledge. However, in view of the House Report, it can not be concluded that all employees 
with specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
intracompany transferees." 18 I&N Dec. at 1 19. According to Matter of Penner, "[s]uch a conclusion would 
permit extremely large numbers of persons to qualify for the 'L-1' visa" rather than the "key personnel" that 
Congress specifically intended. 18 I&N Dec. at 53; see also 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F. Supp. at 
15 (concluding that Congress did not intend for the specialized knowledge capacity to extend to all employees 
with specialized knowledge, but rather to "key personnel" and "executives.") 
As cited above, a 1994 Immigration and Naturalization Service (now Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(CIS)) memorandum written by the then Acting Executive Associate Commissioner also directs CIS to 
compare the beneficiary's knowledge to the general United States labor market and the petitioner's workforce 
in order to distinguish between specialized and general knowledge. The Executive Associate Commissioner 
notes in the memorandum that "officers adjudicating petitions involving specialized knowledge must ensure 
that the knowledge possessed by the beneficiary is not general knowledge held commonly throughout the 
industry but that it is truly specialized." Memorandum from James A. Puleo, Acting Executive Associate 
Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge, CO 2 14L-P 
(March 9, 1994). A comparison of the beneficiary's knowledge to the knowledge possessed by others in the 
field is therefore necessary in order to determine the level of the beneficiary's skills and knowledge and to 
ascertain whether the beneficiary's knowledge is advanced. In other words, absent an outside group to which 
to compare the beneficiary's knowledge, CIS would not be able to "ensure that the knowledge possessed by 
the beneficiary is truly specialized." Id. The analysis for specialized knowledge therefore requires a test of 
the knowledge possessed by the United States labor market, but does not consider whether workers are 
available in the United States to perform the beneficiary's job duties. Furthermore, and as applied above, it is 
crucial that the petitioner establish that the beneficiary's knowledge would be difficult to impart to another 
individual without significant economic inconvenience and that the knowledge be set apart fiom elementary 
or basis knowledge. In this matter, the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary's knowledge of the 
petitioning organization's processes, procedures, and technologies would be difficult to impart or that this 
knowledge can be set apart from that possessed by other electrical field engineers. 
As the petitioner has failed to document any materially unique qualities to the beneficiary's knowledge, the 
petitioner's claims are not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary, while perhaps highly skilled, would 
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possess a special or advanced level of knowledge. There is no indication that the beneficiary has any 
knowledge that exceeds that of any other similarly experienced engineer or that he has received special 
training in the company's methodologies or processes which would separate him from other engineers 
employed with the petitioning organization or elsewhere. It is simply not reasonable to classify this employee 
as a key employee of crucial importance to the organization. 
The legislative history of the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, supra at 16. Based on the evidence presented, it is concluded 
that the beneficiary will not be employed in the United States, and was not employed abroad, in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge. For these reasons, the director's decision will be affirmed and the petition 
will be denied. 
Although the above cited precedents pre-date the current statutory definition of "specialized knowledge," the 
AAO finds them instructive. Other than deleting the former requirement that specialized knowledge had to be 
"proprietary," the 1m.migration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101 -649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1 990), did not significantly 
alter the definition of "specialized knowledge" from the prior Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
interpretation of the term. The 1990 Committee Report does not reject, criticize, or even refer to any specific 
INS regulation or precedent decision interpreting the term. The Committee Report simply states that the 
Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of "[vlarying [i.e., not specifically incorrect] 
interpretations by INS," H.R. REP. No. 101-723(I), at 69, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. Beyond that, the 
Committee Report simply restates the tautology that became section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Id. The AAO 
concludes, therefore, that the cited cases, as well as Matter of Penner, remain useful guidance concerning the 
intended scope of the "specialized knowledge" L-1B classification. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. fj 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
director's decision will be affirmed and the petition will be denied. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.