dismissed L-1B Case: Engineering

identieing data deleted to 
vent clearly unw-td 
hrvagion of pe"0nal Privacy 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. A3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
FILE: SRC 05 071 50231 Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: OCr 0 4 2006 
IN RE: 
Beneficia 
PETITION: Petition ection 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101 (a)(] 5)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
- --.- 
+--- - -9. -- 
/ ." - -,/$ 
~ob*. Wiemann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
SRC 05 07 1 5023 1 
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DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The matter 
is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. 
The petitioner is engaged in the business of deep water riser design and engineering. It seeks to temporarily 
employ the beneficiary as an engineer in the United States and filed a petition to classify the beneficiary as a 
nonirnmigrant intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge. The director determined that the 
petitioner had not established that the beneficiary possessed the requisite specialized knowledge nor that the 
intended employment required specialized knowledge, and specifically noted that the beneficiary did not hold 
a "key personnel" position within the organization. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director 
erred in denying the petition, claiming that the beneficiary did in fact have unique and specialized experience 
with the company's processes that other engineers did not possess. In support of these contentions, counsel 
submits a brief and additional evidence. 
To establish L-1 eligibility, the petitioner must meet the criteria outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S .C. $ 1 10 1 (a)( 15)(L). Specifically, within three years 
preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, a qualifying organization must 
have employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized 
knowledge capacity, for one continuous year. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States 
temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof 
in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
This matter presents two related, but distinct, issues: (1) whether the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge; and (2) whether the proposed employment is in a capacity that requires specialized knowledge. 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 11 84(c)(2)(B), provides the following: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
SRC 05 071 5023 1 
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knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
In a letter dated December 23, 2004, the petitioner claimed that as a company, it is committed to developing 
and providing riser engineering solutions for deep water covering depths up to 10,000 feet. With regard to the 
beneficiary, the petitioner stated that he held both a Master's degree and Bachelor's degree in Engineering. 
With regard to his proposed duties in the United States, the petitioner stated that they would "mirror" the 
beneficiary's duties abroad, which were described as: 
Holds responsibility for the engineering design and analysis of deep water 
name1 and a variety of 
systems. 
Utilizes knowledge of finite element analysis programs, both in-house and commercial 
programs, and industry practices and standards. 
Holds responsibility for client liaison on assigned projects[.] 
Conduct[s] technical presentations and meetings. 
In his position as Engineer, [the beneficiary] has acquired special knowledge of [the 
petitioner's] deep water riser system products and the company's in-house finite element 
analysis programs, which he has utilized for complex engineering design and analysis. 
Additionally, [the beneficiary] has acquired specialized knowledge of the company's 
research, equipment, techniques, and management. 
The director found the initial evidence submitted with the petition insufficient to warrant a finding that the 
beneficiary possessed the required specialized knowledge. Consequently, a detailed request for evidence was 
issued on January 28,2005, which requested more detailed evidence that the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge that was uncommon, noteworthy or distinguished by some unusual quality and not generally 
known by practitioners in the field. Additionally, the director requested evidence that the beneficiary's 
knowledge of the processes and procedures of the company is apart from basic or elementary knowledge 
possessed by others in the company. Finally, the director requested information with regard to the 
beneficiary's training, in addition to a specific explanation as to why the beneficiary's knowledge was so 
uniquely different from other similarly trained engineers in the same project areas. 
The petitioner responded on February 9, 2005. In response to the director's request, the petitioner explained 
that with regard to training, the beneficiary continuously worked with deep water riser analysis and had 
attended weekly in house training seminars for the past 18 months. With regard to the training, the petitioner 
indicated that these sessions were held "to broaden specialist knowledge of riser systems within the 
company." No training records were available according to the petitioner. 
In addressing how the beneficiary's knowledge was different from that of other engineers, the petitioner 
claimed that the beneficiary had completed three projects in the last twelve months which dealt with 
SRC 05 07 1 5023 1 
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completion risers. The petitioner continued by stating that no other engineers had experience in this area, and 
further stated: 
[The beneficiary] has unique and specialized knowledge that other [engineers employed by 
the petitioner] do not possess. In articular the beneficiary] has gained specific and unique 
knowledge experience wit D 
[The beneficiary1 is considered key personnel in that he possesses this specific experience 
which is currently lacking in the company's Houston office. We need [the beneficiary's] 
specialized expertise in the area of n order to assist with the 
future growth of the company. Please note that [the beneficiary's] experience in this area not 
only distinguishes him from his peers within [the petitioner] but is also considered knowledge 
that is specialized above and beyond the common knowledge of a typical Engineer in the riser 
engineering industry as a whole. 
With regard to the director's request for more specific details about the beneficiary's specialized knowledge, 
the petitioner stated: 
The work that [the petitioner] undertakes on a day-to-day basis is in a highly specialized 
field. 
 is an emerging discipline. which has only really become 
a necessity in the past 5-'/ years due to the requirement to search and develop oil and gas 
reserves in water depths greater than 3,000 ft water depth. There are very few companies, 
and consequently very few experienced engineers, whd are corn etent in this 
 e of work. 
[The beneficiary] has spent 18 months working on the field o *sign and 
analysis on a daily basis, which equips him- with an advanced level of knowledge and 
expertise in this field and is also considered uncommon in an engineering graduate of 18 
months. 
As you can see from [the beneficiary's] resume, he has gained highly specialized knowledge 
and experience as an Engineer with our UK company. In less than two ears time he has 
held r 
 hangoff, operation and fatigue analysis of system 
il development in the North Sea; for operation and fatigue analysis of a 
tring for the Schiehallion oil development in the North Sea; for all 
VIV fatigue anal sis of the bp 
 n the Gulf 
of Mexico; for repeat analysis of th 
 non-ri id lockdown wellhead; for the finite 
element analysis of pile driven conductors *- or th evelopment in th 
and optimization of the Kissanje East umbilical 
Angola; for the sizing and extreme storm loading 
vessel in offshore Angola; for assessment 
" - 
casing interaction point for th 
 development offshore An ola; for finite element 
analysis using ANSYS on a cran e owspool ' for t 
 development in the 
preliminary sizing of drilling and production Risers for m~ 
evelopment offshore Indonesia. 
SRC 05 071 50231 
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It would take over one (1) year for a new hire to develop the same proficiency with these 
programs that [the beneficiary] possesses. We have important projects out of our Houston 
office that require the expertise of [the beneficiary]. It would not be feasible to hire an 
Engineer who was not proficient in the use of our analysis programs. Helshe would not be 
able to conduct the sophisticated engineering design and analysis of deep water riser systems 
that our US projects demand. 
The director determined that the record neither established that the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge nor that the intended position in the U.S. is one that requires specialized knowledge, and 
concluded that the beneficiary was not "key personnel." The director specifically noted that the petitioner had 
failed to show that the beneficiary's duties and training were significantly different from other 
similarly-qualified engineers. The director concluded that the evidence submitted did not establish that the 
beneficiary's knowledge was uncommon or distinct and distinguished from other practitioners in the field, and 
consequently denied the petition. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner submits a brief in support of its assertions that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge. Counsel insists that the petitioner has shown that the beneficiary's knowledge and 
skills were distinguishable from other 
 as a result of his work on three 
projects in the last twelve months dealing with 
 further asserts, pursuant to the 
February 9, 2005 letter in response to 
 that it was clearly shown that 
another  engineer, without experience working for the ~~-com~an~, would not have the requisite experience 
needed to fill the position. Counsel concluded by requesting a more thorough look at the response to the 
request for evidence, and alleged that upon doing so, it would be determined that the beneficiary was in fact 
key personnel and possessed specialized knowledge. 
On review, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge nor that the intended position requires an employee with specialized knowledge. 
When examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). As required in the regulations, the 
petitioner must submit a detailed description of the services to be performed sufficient to establish specialized 
knowledge. Id. 
In the present matter, the petitioner provided an abbreviated description of the beneficiary's employment in 
the foreign entity, his intended employment in the U.S. entity, and his responsibilities as a engineer. Despite 
specific requests by the director, namely, what specifically set apart the beneficiary's knowledge from other 
similarly trained analysts in the field, the petitioner failed to provide such information. The petitioner has not 
sufficiently documented how the beneficiary's performance of the proposed job duties distinguishes his 
knowledge as specialized. Despite the petitioner's detailed discussion of the various projects that the 
beneficiary has worked on, the record contains no definitive evidence supporting the contention that the 
beneficiary's knowledge is uncommon and more advanced than similarly trained professionals in the field. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(viii) states that the director may request additional evidence in 
appropriate cases. Although specifically and clearly requested by the director, the petitioner failed to provide 
documentary evidence to support its claims that the beneficiary obtained a specialized level of knowledge 
through his work with the UK petitioner. No documentation has been submitted that distinguishes the 
petitioner from other engineering companies, and neither has the petitioner submitted any evidence of what 
other engineers under its employ do on a daily basis. It seems unlikely that the beneficiary is the only 
engineer that worked on the mentioned projects, or that the beneficiary handled them solely by himself. 
SRC 05 071 5023 1 
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Although the petitioner asserts on appeal that the February 9, 2005 letter provided sufficient evidence to 
establish the beneficiary's qualifications for the benefit sought, the fact remains that there is no other evidence 
to compare it against in terms of the qualifications of other engineers in the industry andlor employed by the 
petitioner. The failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds 
for denying the petition. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(14). In this case, the petitioner relies on the AAO to accept 
its uncorroborated assertions that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge, both prior to adjudication 
and again on appeal. 
 However, these assertions do not constitute evidence. 
 Going on record without 
supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these 
proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comrn. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of 
California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
It is also appropriate for the AAO to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the 
beneficiary's knowledge of the business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making 
process. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. 1 17, 120 (Comm. 198 1) (citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 6 18 
(R.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. 816 (R.C. 1971)).' As stated by the Commissioner in 
Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 52 (Comm. 1982), when considering whether the beneficiaries possessed 
specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find that the occupations inherently 
qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have 
unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. Id. The Commissioner also provided the 
following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or her to produce a 
product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed primarily for his ability to cany out 
a key process or function which is important or essential to the business firm's operation. Id. at 53. In the 
present matter, the evidence of record demonstrates that the beneficiary is more akin to an employee whose 
skills and experience enable him to provide a specialized service, rather than an employee who has unusual 
duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. Moreover, the petitioner's failure to submit a 
more detailed discussion of the beneficiary's day-to-day duties or the nature of the training he received creates 
a presumption of ineligibility. The petitioner acknowledged that it offered its employees weekly training 
sessions. However, no specific details were provided, and no documentation that such training was actually 
offered to the beneficiary exists. What remains unclear is why the beneficiary's knowledge is so specialized 
and unique, as alleged by the petitioner, despite the fact that his colleagues appear to have attended the same 
training sessions. 
It should be noted that the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the AAO to make 
comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The term "specialized 
Although the cited precedents pre-date the current statutory definition of "specialized knowledge," and 
counsel raises that very argument with regard to the director's reliance on Matter of Penner in support of the 
denial, the AAO finds them instructive. Other than deleting the former requirement that specialized 
knowledge had to be "proprietary," the 1990 Act did not significantly alter the definition of "specialized 
knowledge" from the prior INS interpretation of the term. The 1990 Committee Report does not reject, 
criticize, or even refer to any specific INS regulation or precedent decision interpreting the term. The 
Committee Report simply states that the Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of 
"[vlarying [i.e., not specifically incorrect] interpretations by INS," H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I), at 69, 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. Beyond that, the Committee Report simply restates the tautology that became section 
214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Id. The AAO concludes, therefore, the cited cases, as well as Matter of Penner, 
remain useful guidance concerning the intended scope of the "specialized knowledge" L-1B classification. 
SRC 05 071 50231 
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knowledge" is not an absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed in 1756, Inc. v. Attorney 
General, "[slimply put, specialized knowledge is a relative . . . idea which cannot have a plain meaning." 745 
F. Supp. 9, 15 {D.D.C. 1990). The Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended 
for "key personnel." See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key 
personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." Webster's II New 
College Dictionary 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). In general, all employees can reasonably be 
considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic 
success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. An employee of 
"crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average employee. 
Accordingly, based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record related to that 
term, the AAO must make comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge employee and 
the general labor market, but also between that employee and the remainder of the petitioner's workforce. 
Here, the petitioner's only contention that the beneficiary's knowledge is more advanced than other engineers 
in the field is its assertion that the beneficiary's experience, specifically his work on the three Completion 
Riser projects, have allowed him to gain an expertise in his field. Again, the petitioner has not provided any 
information pertaining to the exact day-to-day duties of the beneficiary as compared to the daily duties of 
other engineers, both working for the petitioner and in the industry in general. Nor did the petitioner 
distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge, work experience, or training from those of other employees. 
Moreover, there is no independent evidence corroborating the claims of the petitioner. The lack of tangible 
evidence in the record makes it impossible to classify the beneficiary's knowledge of deepwater riser design 
and technology as advanced and precludes a finding that the beneficiary's role is of crucial importance to the 
organization. As previously stated, simply going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not 
sufficient for the purpose of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soflci, 22 I&N Dec. 
at 165. The claim that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge remains unsupported due to the failure to 
submit any documentation of the training he received or the manner in which the beneficiary, who holds 
degrees in engineering, essentially became an expert in the petitioner's technologies within a period of 
eighteen months. In addition, although a limited discussion of the petitioner's products or services is 
submitted, it is somewhat hard to understand, thereby precluding the AAO from clearly understanding the 
actual role of the beneficiary in the petitioner's organization. While the beneficiary's slulls and knowledge 
may contibute to the successfulness of the petitioning organization, this factor, by itself, does not constitute 
the possession of specialized knowledge. Therefore, while the beneficiary's contribution to the economic 
success of the corporation may be considered, the regulations specifically require that the beneficiary possess 
an "advanced level of knowledge" of the organization's process and procedures or a "special knowledge" of 
the petitioner's product, service, research, equipment, techniques, or management. 8 C.F.R. @ 
214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). As determined above, the beneficiary does not satisfy the requirements for possessing 
specialized knowledge. 
Counsel's appeal essentially claims that the previously-submitted letter dated February 9, 2005 clearly 
outlines the beneficiary's unique and uncommon knowledge, and thus qualifies the beneficiary as an 
intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge. Once again, counsel and the petitioner overlook the fact 
that the beneficiary is undoubtedly one of many engineers in the workforce today. It is fair to conclude that 
most people employed in this line of work must also have an understanding of the basic premise of 
engineering despite specializing in different areas. The petitioner seems to focus on this aspect of the 
beneficiary's background as the key element of the beneficiary's qualifications. The petitioner does not, 
SRC 05 071 5023 1 
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however, offer any evidence that the beneficiary has uncommon, advanced, or proprietary knowledge of the 
petitioner's unique processes or procedures.2 
Merely claiming that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge without distinguishing the beneficiary from 
other engineers in the field is insufficient for satisfLing the burden of proof in this matter. It appears that at 
best, the beneficiary is akin to a professional or slulled worker as opposed to an employee possessing 
specialized knowledge. 
Additionally, in Matter of Penner, the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of 
the specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. 49. The decision noted that the 1970 House Report, H.R. 
No. 91-851 stated that the number of admissions under the L-1 classification "will not be large" and that 
"[tlhe class of persons eligible for such nonimmigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be carefully regulated 
by the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id. at 5 1. The decision further noted that the House Report 
was silent on the subject of specialized knowledge but that, during the course of the sub-committee hearings 
on the bill, the Chairman specifically questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify under the 
proposed "L" category. In response to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that they 
understood the legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" slulls, and 
that it would not include "lower categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." Id. at 50 (citing H.R. 
Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445, 91st Cong. 210, 218, 
223,240,248 (November 12,1969)). 
Reviewing the Congressional record, the Commissioner concluded in Matter of Penner that an expansive 
reading of the specialized knowledge provision, such that it would include skilled workers and technicians, is 
not warranted. The Commissioner emphasized that that the specialized knowledge worker classification was 
not intended for "all employees with any level of specialized knowledge." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 
53. Or, as noted in Matter of Colley, "[mlost employees today are specialists and have been trained and given 
specialized knowledge. However, in view of the House Report, it can not be concluded that all employees 
with specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
intracompany transferees." 18 I&N Dec. at 1 19. According to Matter of Penner, "[sluch a conclusion would 
permit extremely large numbers of persons to qualie for the 'L-1' visa" rather than the "key personnel" that 
Congress specifically intended. 18 I&N Dec. at 53; see also 1756, Inc., 745 F. Supp. at 15 (concluding that 
Congress did not intend for the specialized knowledge capacity to extend to all employees with specialized 
knowledge, but rather to "key personnel" and "executives."). 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc., 745 F. Supp. at 16. Based on the evidence presented, it is concluded that the 
beneficiary does not possess specialized knowledge; nor would the beneficiary be employed in a capacity 
requiring specialized knowledge. For this reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
* Although the fact that a beneficiary has experience with a proprietary product or procedure does not serve as 
prima facie evidence that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge, when such a claim is made, 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) must carefully evaluate the claimed knowledge and the depth of 
the beneficiary's experience in order to determine whether it rises to the level of specialized knowledge as 
contemplated by 8 C.F.R. 
 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). Thus, while a beneficiary is no longer required to have 
proprietary knowledge, such knowledge can still be a basis for this determination. 
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In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
director's decision will be affirmed and the petition will be denied. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.