dismissed L-1B

dismissed L-1B Case: Engineering

๐Ÿ“… Date unknown ๐Ÿ‘ค Company ๐Ÿ“‚ Engineering

Decision Summary

The appeal was dismissed because the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary was employed abroad in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. The petitioner also did not sufficiently demonstrate that the beneficiary possesses the required specialized knowledge of the petitioning organization's products or processes for the proposed role in the United States.

Criteria Discussed

Specialized Knowledge Employment Abroad In A Specialized Knowledge Capacity

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U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rrn. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
File: WAC 07 204 505 1 1 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: AU6 0 1 200% 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1101(a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
Thls is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
Robert P. Wiemann, Chief 
Adrninis trative Appeals Office 
WAC 07 204 505 1 1 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonirnmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to employ the beneficiary in the position of "quality 
liaison engineer" as an L-1B nonimmigrant intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to 
section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. $ 1101(a)(15)(L). The 
petitioner, a Delaware corporation, describes its business in the Form 1-129 as "engineering and commercial 
services for foundry products supplier." The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary for a period of three 
years. 
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish (1) that the beneficiary was 
employed abroad in a capacity involving specialized knowledge; or (2) that the beneficiary has specialized 
knowledge of the petitioning organization's products or processes. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the petitioner has satisfied the criteria for establishing that 
the beneficiary has been employed in a specialized knowledge capacity and that the beneficiary has 
specialized knowledge of the petitioning organization's "foundry manufacturing process and resolution of 
foundry-casting defects." 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)( 1 )(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
WAC 07 204 505 1 1 
Page 3 
The primary issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary was 
employed abroad in a specialized knowledge capacity and whether the beneficiary has specialized knowledge 
of the petitioning organization's products or processes. 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(ii) and (iv). 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1184(c)(2)(B), provides: 
For purposes of section 101 (a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. $214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
The petitioner describes the beneficiary's duties abroad in the Form 1-1 29 as follows: 
[The beneficiary] currently serves as Quality Engineer with [the foreign employer]. In this 
position he serves as the direct contact between engineering and quality departments on 
issues involving [the petitioning organization's] castings. He is responsible for co-design 
activities with the customer's engineering department, participating in product development 
teams, to allow for the proper design of castings within the customer's product environment. 
This includes analyzing engineering changes proposed by the customer and preparing reports 
on the customer's product applications. He also prepares technical forecasts related to future 
development of products. He has held this position since April 2007. 
Prior to this, from October 2005 through April 2007, [the beneficiary] served as Quality 
responsible for overseeing the quality assurance of Pipe Fittings, Flanges, and Nipples 
commercialized by This includes following up on the procedures and tests to approve 
new product development, overseeing quality control of the machining process of Fluida Pipe 
Fittings, and coordinating the packing and repair of damaged or non-conforming parts. 
The petitioner also describes the beneficiary's proposed duties in the United States in the Form 1-129 as 
follows: 
Responsible for the direct contact with engineering and quality departmentsllabs of 
Caterpillar regarding any applicable communication with [the petitioning organization's] 
Technical Departments in Mexico and with [the petitioner's] customer service function in 
Auburn Hills, MI. This activity also involves meetings, video and teleconferences with 
WAC 07 204 505 1 1 
Page 4 
multi-company teams; 
Responsible for the co-design activity with the Customer Engineering, participating of 
[sic] product development teams, to allow the proper design of castings within the 
Customer's product environment; 
Analyzes the engineering changes proposed by the Customer Engineeringlpurchasing in 
order to give suggestions while discussing the matters; and submits them to [the 
petitioning organization's] Commercial department for estimate on costs and other 
required price changes related to the changes; 
Participates of [sic] 6-Sigma joint programs ([the petitioning organizationl-Caterpillar) to 
improve quality of supplied engine blocks and heads, as well as to lower the associated 
quality costs; 
Reports on Customer product applications and technical forecasting related to future 
developments of products/applications of products, to enable the Commercial department 
to conduct basic marketing discussions; 
Follows up the procedures and tests to approve or homologate samples/prototypes/pilot 
lots; 
Follows up the machining of [the petitioning organization's] castings at Caterpillar - 
Mossville, IL plant when needed, identifying foundry defects and sending quality 
performance reports to [the petitioning organization's] Quality Engineering. Coordinates 
the repair of damaged or non-conforming parts; 
Responsible for searchng and developing local sources to provide services of 
transportation, casting reworkisalvage and screening of parts with defect or considered 
non-conforming; 
Supports [the petitioning organization's] Commercial and Logistics Departments. 
Finally, the petitioner describes the beneficiary's quality assurance and engineering training in a letter dated 
June 18,2007 as follows: 
IS0 TS-16949 Interpretation 
Advanced product quality planning APQP 
Automatic centrifugal casting machines 
Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) 
Auditors formation 
a Iron and Steel Metallurgical 
a Metallurgical and materials international Congress Instituto Technologico Saltillo, 
XXI, XXII, XXIII, XXIV 
a Industrial software application 
Clean Technologies 
Aluminum technology 
Materials Engineering 
a Knowledge administration 
On July 6, 2007, the director requested additional evidence. The director requested, inter alia, evidence that 
WAC 07 204 505 1 1 
Page 5 
the beneficiary possesses knowledge above that which is normally possessed by other workers in the 
beneficiary's field of endeavor. The director also requested that the petitioner submit evidence establishing 
that the beneficiary's knowledge is related to the petitioning organization's products or processes and not to 
the products or processes of its client, Caterpillar. 
In response, the petitioner submitted a letter dated September 12, 2007 in which the petitioner further 
describes its relationship with Caterpillar and the beneficiary's purported specialized knowledge as follows: 
[The petitioning organization] has a contract with Caterpillar Inc[.] to supply engine blocks 
and heads [citation omitted] in the "as cast" state. This means that after they are delivered 
from the [petitioning organization's} foundry to the Caterpillar plant in Mossville [Illinois], 
the parts must be machined at this facility before the engine can be built. The machining 
process involves small-scale cutting and drilling and other minor modifications to the parts to 
ensure they fit together smoothly for engine assembly, with the correct tight tolerances. 
During the machining process defects which are caused by the casting process at our foundry 
in Mexico appear sub-superficially. The Qualify Liaison Engineer is needed on-site at the 
Caterpillar plant to guarantee that any production quality issues revealed during the 
machining process are quickly and successfully resolved so that Caterpillar does not 
experience major inconvenience to the machining lines caused by the products [the 
petitioning organization] is supplying. In other words, the Quality Liaison Engineer is there 
to resolve any problems that might be attributable to [the petitioning organization's] casting 
or production, so that our customer - Caterpillar - remains satisfied with [the petitioning 
organization] as a supplier. 
The specialized knowledge we are talking about for the Quality Liaison Engineer is 
knowledge of the foundry manufacturing process and resolution of foundry-casting defects. 
[Tlhe Quality Liaison Engineer must have advanced knowledge of [the petitioning 
organization's] foundry production system (including the design of tooling from 3D 
mathematical models and the metals used in the casting process), quality standards as applied 
to the manufacture of engine parts, and the processes for identieing and resolving production 
defects that appear during the machining process. 
An engineer lacking [the beneficiary's] background would be unable to perform this job. 
Because there are no independent large series diesel engine foundries in the United States, 
and because someone unfamiliar with [the petitioning organization's] system for designing 
engine parts, procuring materials, and creating castings would be slow and ineffective in 
WAC 07 204 505 1 1- 
Page 6 
identifying and resolving problems, we cannot simply hire and train another engineer to fill 
this position. The Quality Liaison Engineer must understand the product specifications and 
technical requirements of the engine parts produced for Caterpillar. In addition, because the 
position involves managing industrial production processes - including quality control, 
inventory control, materials flow and logistics, and the work of other engineers - experience 
or training in industrial processes is necessary. [The beneficiary] has this specialized 
knowledge from hs years of experience in quality control with our affiliates in Mexico and 
his numerous courses in manufacturing processes. 
On October 9, 2007, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner failed to 
establish (1) that the beneficiary was employed abroad in a capacity involving specialized knowledge; or (2) 
that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge of the petitioning organization's products or processes. The 
director determined that the beneficiary instead appears to have knowledge, even if specialized, relating to the 
petitioner's customer, Caterpillar, and not to the petitioning organization. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the petitioner has satisfied the criteria for establishing that 
the beneficiary has been employed in a specialized knowledge capacity and that the beneficiary has 
specialized knowledge of the petitioning organization's "foundry manufacturing process and resolution of 
foundry-casting defects. " 
Upon review, the petitioner's assertions are not persuasive in demonstrating that the beneficiary was 
employed abroad in a specialized knowledge capacity as defined at 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). 
In examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's 
description of the job duties. 
 See 8.C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(3). 
 The petitioner must submit a detailed job 
description of the services performed sufficient to establish specialized knowledge. 
 In this matter, the 
petitioner fails to establish that the foreign position required an employee with specialized knowledge or that 
the beneficiary has specialized knowledge. 
Although the petitioner repeatedly asserts that the beneficiary's position in Mexico requires "specialized 
knowledge" and that the beneficiary has been employed abroad in a "specialized knowledge" capacity, the 
petitioner has not adequately articulated any basis to support this claim. The petitioner has failed to identify 
any specialized or advanced body of knowledge which would distinguish the beneficiary's role from that of 
other similarly experienced and educated engineers employed by the petitioning organization or in the 
industry at large. Going on record without documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the 
burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Sofici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter 
of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comrn. 1972)). Specifics are clearly an important 
indication of whether a beneficiary's duties involve specialized knowledge; otherwise, meeting the definitions 
would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. See Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724, F. Supp. 1 103 
(E.D.N.Y. 1989), am, 905, F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
The petitioner asserts that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge of the petitioning organization's 
"foundry manufacturing process" and the "resolution of foundry-casting defects" as this howledge relates to 
WAC 07 204 505 1 1 
Page 7 
the provision of engine blocks and heads in the "as cast" state to the petitioner's customer, Caterpillar. 
However, despite this claim, the record does not establish how, exactly, the beneficiary's knowledge of the 
petitioning organization's foundry manufacturing and defect resolution process in the context of 
manufacturing diesel engine parts to Caterpillar's specifications is so materially different from the 
manufacture of "as cast" parts at foundries in general that a similarly experienced and educated engineer 
employed by the petitioning organization or at other foundries, both those which produce parts for diesel 
engines and those whlch do not, could not perform the duties of the position. The petitioner never establishes 
the difference between the petitioner's products, processes, and procedures and those products, processes, and 
procedures related to other foundries which requires noteworthy or uncommon knowledge not possessed 
generally by similarly educated and experienced engineers. The fact that the record indicates that the 
beneficiary only began working with the petitioning organization's diesel related division approximately three 
months prior to the filing of the instant petition significantly undermines the petitioner's claim that the 
knowledge necessary to do the beneficiary's job in Mexico is not shared generally throughout the industry by 
similarly employed engineers. 
Overall, the record does not establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is substantially different fi-om the 
knowledge possessed by engineers experienced in manufacturing parts in foundries generally throughout the 
industry or by other employees of the petitioning organization. The fact that few other engineers possess very 
specific knowledge of certain aspects of the design and specifications of the parts being made for Caterpillar 
does not alone establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is indeed uncommon or noteworthy. All employees 
can be said to possess uncommon and unparalleled skill sets to some degree; however, a skill set that can be 
imparted to another similarly educated and generally experienced engineer without significant economic 
inconvenience is not "specialized knowledge." Moreover, the proprietary or unique qualities of the 
petitioner's product do not establish that any knowledge of it is "specialized" or "advanced." Rather, the 
petitioner must establish that qualities of the product require this employee to have knowledge beyond what is 
common in the industry. This has not been established in this matter. The fact that other engineers may not 
have very specific, proprietary knowledge regarding the petitioner's product, or its inspection, is not relevant 
to these proceedings if this knowledge gap could be closed by the petitioner by simply revealing the 
information to a newly hired, generally experienced engineer with a background in foundry processes and 
procedures. 
Furthermore, while the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary acquired his purported "specialized knowledge" 
through both work experience and formal training, the record is not persuasive in establishing that either of 
these methods truly imparted "specialized knowledge" to the beneficiary. First, the record is devoid of 
persuasive evidence establishng that the beneficiary's experience with the petitioning organization abroad 
instilled him with specialized knowledge. The petitioner fails to explain what specific knowledge of the 
foundry manufacturing process is uncommon or to establish how long it would take to impart this knowledge 
to a similarly employed person and under what conditions. 
Second, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the training courses listed in the record imparted 
specialized knowledge to the beneficiary. The training regimen outlined by the petitioner does not appear to 
relate specifically to the beneficiary's purported specialized knowledge. To the contrary, this training appears 
to relate generally to casting, metallurgy, and engineering and more likely than not imparted knowledge 
WAC 07 204 505 1 1 
Page 8 
common to engineers employed by foundries. Absent evidence establishing that the know ledge imparted by 
the training sessions is not possessed by other similarly employed workers, the knowledge gained would not 
be uncommon, advanced, or noteworthy. 
It is noted that both the director's decision and the Request for Evidence could be interpreted as requiring the 
petitioner to establish that the knowledge in question is "proprietary" to the petitioning organization in order 
to establish that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. Counsel argues on appeal that a product 
need not be "proprietary" to a petitioner in order for knowledge of this product to be "specialized." See 
Memorandum from Acting Executive Associate Commissioner, Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge, CO 214L-P (March 9, 1994). The AAO 
agrees with counsel that the petitioner was not obligated to establish that the product or process in question 
was "proprietary'l in order to establish that the beneficiary's knowledge of the product or process constitutes 
"specialized knowledge," and the director's decision will be withdrawn to the extent that the director's 
decision imposes a requirement to establish that the knowledge is "proprietary." However, as noted above, 
the petitioner nevertheless failed to establish that the beneficiary's knowledge constitutes "specialized 
knowledge" because it has not been established that beneficiary's knowledge is substantially different from 
the knowledge possessed by foundry engineers generally throughout the industry or by other employees of the 
petitioning organization. Crucially, the petitioner never establishes the material difference between the 
pertinent products and manufacturing processes and other products made at foundries, which requires 
noteworthy or uncommon knowledge not possessed generally by similarly employed engineers. The fact that 
the knowledge is proprietary, or not, is largely irrelevant to the analysis. 
Beyond the decision of the director, even assuming that the beneficiary has "specialized knowledge" as 
defined by the Act and regulations, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary was employed in 
a specialized knowledge capacity abroad for at least one year. 8 C.F.R. ยง 214.2(1)(3)(iv). The petitioner 
asserts that the beneficiary began working for his current foreign employer in April 2007. Prior to April 
2007, the petitioner claims that the beneficiary worked for an affiliated company where he "was responsible 
for overseeing the quality assurance of Pipe Fittings, Flanges, and Nipples commercialized by" the the 
affiliated company. The beneficiary also followed up "on the procedures and tests to approve new product 
development, overseeing quality control of the macluning process of Fluida Pipe Fittings, and coordinating 
the packing and repair of damaged or non-conforming parts." However, the record is devoid of evidence 
establishing that the beneficiary's purported specialized knowledge of "foundry manufacturing process and 
resolution of foundry-casting defects" was involved in the performance of these duties. Once again, going on 
record without documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these 
proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165 (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N 
Dec. 190). 
Beyond the decision of the director, and for the same reasons set forth above, the petitioner has failed to 
establish that the beneficiary will be employed in the United States in a specialized knowledge capacity. 8 
C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner has failed to identify any specialized or advanced body of knowledge 
which would distinguish the beneficiary's role fi-om that of other similarly experienced and educated 
engineers employed by the petitioning organization or in the industry at large. Accordingly, the petitioner 
may not be approved for this additional reason. 
WAC 07 204 505 1 1 
Page 9 
The AAO does not dispute the possibility that the beneficiary is a skilled and experienced employee who has 
been, and would be, a valuable asset to the petitioning organization. However, it is appropriate for the AAO 
to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the beneficiary's knowledge of the 
business's product or service, management operations, or decision-malung process. Matter of CoNey, 18 I&N 
Dec. 1 1 7, 120 (Comm. 198 1) (citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 6 1 8(R.C. 1 970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 
13 I&N Dec. 816 (R.C. 1971)). As stated by the Commissioner in Matter of Penner, when considering 
whether the beneficiaries possessed specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find 
that the occupations inherently qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." 18 I&N Dec. at 52. 
Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled 
worker. Id. The Commissioner also provided the following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or her to 
produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed primarily 
for his ability to carry out a key process or function which is important or essential to the 
business firm's operation. 
Id. at 53. 
It should be noted that the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the AAO to make 
comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The term "specialized knowledge" 
is not an absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed in 1756, inc. v. Attorney General, 
"[slimply put, specialized knowledge is a relative . . . idea which cannot have a plain meaning." 745 F. Supp. 
9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990). The Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended for "key 
denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." Webster's I1 New College 
Dictionary 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). In general, all employees can reasonably be considered 
"important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic success of 
an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. An employee of "crucial 
importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average employee. Accordingly, 
based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record related to that term, the AAO 
must make comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge employee and the general labor 
market, but also between the employee and the remainder of the petitioner's workforce. While it may be 
correct to say that the beneficiary in the instant case is a highly skilled and productive employee, this fact 
alone is not enough to bring the beneficiary to the level of "key personnel." 
Moreover, in Matter of Penner, the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of the 
specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comm. 1982). The decision noted that the 1970 House 
Report, stated that the number of admissions under the L-1 classification "will not be 
large" and that "[tlhe class of persons eligible for such nonimmigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be 
carefully regulated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id. at 5 1. The decision further noted that 
the House Report was silent on the subject of specialized knowledge, but that during the course of the sub- 
committee hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary 
to qualify under the proposed "L" category. In response to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses 
WAC 07 204 505 1 1 
Page 10 
responded that they understood the legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts," individuals with 
"unique" skills, and that it would not include "lower categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." Matter 
of Penner, 18 I&N at 50 (citing H.R. Subcornrn. No. 1 of the Jud. Cornm., Immigration Act of 1970: Hearings 
on H.R. 445,9lSt Cong. 210,218,223,240,248 (November 12,1969)). 
Reviewing the Congressional record, the Commissioner concluded in Matter of Penner than an expansive 
reading of the specialized knowledge provision, such that it would include skilled workers and technicians, is 
not warranted. The Commissioner emphasized that the specialized knowledge worker classification was not 
intended for "all employees with any level of specialized knowledge." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 53. 
Or, as noted in Matter of Colley, "[mlost employees today are specialists and have been trained and given 
specialized knowledge. However, in view of the House Report, it can not be concluded that all employees 
with specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
intracompany transferees." 18 I&N Dec. at 1 19. According to Matter of Penner, "[sluch a conclusion would 
permit extremely large numbers of persons to qualify for the 'L-1 ' visa" rather than the "key personnel" that 
Congress specifically intended. 18 I&N Dec. at 53; see also 1756, inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F. Supp. at 
1 5 (concluding that Congress did not intend for the specialized knowledge capacity to extend to all employees 
with specialized knowledge, but rather to "key personnel" and "executives.") 
As cited above, a 1994 Immigration and Naturalization Service (now Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(CIS)) memorandum written by the then Acting Executive Associate Commissioner also directs CIS to 
compare the beneficiary's knowledge to the general United States labor market and the petitioner's workforce 
in order to distinguish between specialized and general knowledge. The Executive Associate Commissioner 
notes in the memorandum that "officers adjudicating petitions involving specialized knowledge must ensure 
that the knowledge possessed by the beneficiary is not general knowledge held commonly throughout the 
industry but that it is truly specialized." Memorandum from Acting Executive Associate 
Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge, CO 21 4L-P 
(March 9, 1994). A comparison of the beneficiary's knowledge to the knowledge possessed by others in the 
field is therefore necessary in order to determine the level of the beneficiary's skills and knowledge and to 
ascertain whether the beneficiary's knowledge is advanced. In other words, absent an outside group to which 
to compare the beneficiary's knowledge, CIS would not be able to "ensure that the knowledge possessed by 
the beneficiary is truly specialized." Id. The analysis for specialized knowledge therefore requires a test of 
the knowledge possessed by the United States labor market, but does not consider whether workers are 
available in the United States to perform the beneficiary's job duties. 
As explained above, the record does not distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge as more advanced than the 
knowledge possessed by other people employed by the petitioning organization or by engineers experienced 
in foundry manufacturing employed elsewhere. As the petitioner has failed to document any materially 
unique qualities to the beneficiary's knowledge, the petitioner's claims are not persuasive in establishing that 
the beneficiary, while perhaps hghly skilled, would be a "key" employee. There is no indication that the 
beneficiary has any knowledge that exceeds that of any other similarly experienced engineer or that he has 
received special training in the company's methodologies or processes which would separate him from other 
professionals employed with the petitioning organization or elsewhere. It is simply not reasonable to classify 
this employee as a key employee of crucial importance to the organization. 
WAC 07 204 505 1 1 
Page 11 
The legislative history of the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, supra at 16. Based on the evidence presented, it is concluded 
that the beneficiary will not be employed in the United States, and was not employed abroad, in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge. For these reasons, the director's decision will be affirmed and the petition 
will be denied. 
Beyond the recommended decision of the director, the petition will also be denied because the petitioner 
failed to establish that the beneficiary, who will be stationed primarily at the worksite of an unaffiliated 
employer, will be controlled and supervised principally by the petitioner. Section 214(c)(2)(F) of the Act, 8 
U.S.C. 5 1184(c)(2)(F). 
As amended by the L-1 Visa Reform Act of 2004, section 2 14(c)(2)(F) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 184(c)(2)(F), 
provides: 
An alien who will serve in a capacity involving specialized knowledge with respect to an 
employer for purposes of section 1101(a)(15)(L) and will be stationed primarily at the 
worksite of an employer other than the petitioning employer or its affiliate, subsidiary, or 
parent shall not be eligible for classification under section 1 10 1 (a)(15)(L) if - 
(i) 
 the alien will be controlled and supervised principally by such unaffiliated 
employer; or 
(ii) the placement of the alien at the worksite of the unaffiliated employer is 
essentially an arrangement to provide labor for hire for the unaffiliated 
employer, rather than a placement in connection with the provision of a product 
or service for which specialized knowledge specific to the petitioning employer 
is necessary. 
Section 2 14(c)(2)(F) of the Act was created by the L-1 Visa Reform Act of 2004 and is applicable to all L- 1 B 
petitions filed after June 6,2005, including extensions and amendments involving individuals currently in L-1 
status. See Pub. L. No. 108-447, Div. I, Title IV, 118 Stat. 2809 (Dec. 8, 2004). In evaluating a petition 
subject to the terms of the L-1 Visa Reform Act, the petitioner bears the burden of proof. Section 291 of the 
Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1361; see also 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(l). If a specialized knowledge beneficiary will be 
primarily stationed at the worksite of an unaffiliated employer, the statute mandates that the petitioner 
establish both: (1) that the alien will be controlled and supervised principally by the petitioner, and (2) that the 
placement is related to the provision of a product or service for whch specialized knowledge specific to the 
petitioning employer is necessary. Section 214(c)(2)(F) of the Act. These two questions of fact must be 
established for the record by documentary evidence; neither the unsupported assertions of counsel or the 
employer will suffice to establish eligibility. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998); Matter 
of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988). If the petitioner fails to establish both of these elements, 
the beneficiary will be deemed ineligible for classification as an L-1B intracompany transferee. 
WAC 07 204 505 1 1 
Page 12 
In this matter, the petitioner claims to employ seven people and that its principal place of business in the 
United States is in Auburn Hills, Michigan. However, as the petitioner claims that the beneficiary will 
physically perform his job duties at the workplace of the petitioner's client, Caterpillar, in Mossville, Illinois, 
the petitioner checked "yes" in response to the query in the L Classification Supplement to the Form 1-129 
which asks whether the beneficiary will be stationed "offsite." The petitioner describes its supervision and 
control of the beneficiary while working within the Caterpillar facility in the L Classification Supplement as 
follows: 
All of [the beneficiary's] work at the Caterpillar plant will be directed and controlled by [the 
petitioning organization]: Caterpillar will not direct, control or supervise any of [the 
beneficiary's] work. 
The petitioner also describes the beneficiary's proposed employment within the Caterpillar facility in the June 
18,2007 letter as follows: 
All of [the beneficiary's] work at the Caterpillar plant will be directed and controlled by [the 
petitioning organization], since the sole purpose of his presence at their facility is to ensure 
that [the petitioning organization's] products meet all engineering standards and quality 
specifications for this customer. Caterpillar derives no benefit and receives no payment for 
his assignment on-site. Caterpillar will not direct, control or supervise any of [the 
beneficiary's] work. 
As noted above, the beneficiary will perform duties at the Caterpillar facility which pertain to the inspection 
and design of the petitioning organization's products being produced in Mexico. The petitioner asserts that 
the beneficiary will report to the petitioner's "customer service and techcal manager" on a daily basis 
regarding any defects in the petitioning organization's products. The petitioner also claims that the 
beneficiary will engage in "co-design" activities with caterpillar's engineers, participate on "product design 
teams," analyze changes proposed by Caterpillar's engineers and purchasing workers, participate in "joint" Six 
Sigma programs to improve quality of products, and "follows up" the machining of the castings by 
Caterpillar. 
Upon review, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary, who will be stationed primarily 
at the worksite of an unaffiliated employer, will be controlled and supervised principally by the petitioner. 
Section 214(c)(2)(F) of the Act. While the petitioner claims that the beneficiary will be supervised and 
controlled by the petitioner's employees in Auburn Hills, Michigan, and in Mexico and that the beneficiary 
will report on a daily basis to the petitioner's "customer service and technical manager," the petitioner fails to 
specifically address the supervision and control of the beneficiary while participating in programs, activities, 
and teams administered by Caterpillar. Once again, going on record without documentary evidence is not 
sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Sof$ci, 22 I&N Dec. at 
165 (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190)). It appears that the beneficiary would, 
for all practical purposes, be under the control of Caterpillar during hs participation in "co-design" activities 
with Caterpillar's engineers, on Caterpillar "product design teams," and in "joint" Six Sigma programs. Given 
that the beneficiary will be employed at the workplace of the unaffiliated employer, it is imperative under the 
WAC 07 204 505 1 1 
Page 13 
L-1 Visa Reform Act that the petitioner clearly establish that the beneficiary will be principally, rather than 
nominally or indirectly, supervised and controlled by the petitioning organization while working at 
Caterpillar. 
Accordingly, as it cannot be concluded that the beneficiary will be principally controlled and supervised by 
the petitioner during his employment at the unaffiliated employer's workplace, the petition will be denied for 
this additional reason. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identi@ all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afd, 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can 
succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's 
enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, he., 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
director's decision will be affirrned and the petition will be denied.' 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
1 
It is noted that the director also denied the petition because the petitioner failed to establish that the 
beneficiary has specialized knowledge of the petitioning organization's products or processes. The director 
determined that the beneficiary instead appears to have knowledge, even if specialized, relating to the 
petitioner's customer, Caterpillar, and not to the petitioning organization. Upon review, the AAO will 
withdraw this portion of the director's decision. While the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary 
has specialized knowledge, or that he will be, or has been, employed in a specialized knowledge capacity, the 
petitioner's description of the beneficiary's purported specialized knowledge (foundry manufacturing process 
and resolution of foundry-casting defects) appears to relate to the petitioning organization and not specifically 
to Caterpillar. 
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