dismissed L-1B Case: Equestrian

identifYing data deleted to 
prev~nt clearly :mwarranted 
InvasIOn of personal privacy 
l'UBLlC COpy 
DATE: Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: 
JUL 1 4 2011 
IN RE: Petitioner: 
Beneficiary: 
PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker under Section 10 1 (a)(lS)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.c. § IlOl(a)(lS)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents 
related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that 
any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional 
information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The 
specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.S. All motions must be 
submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form 1-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, 
with a fee of $630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.S(a)(J)(i) requires that any motion must be filed 
within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen. 
Thank you. 
• 
Perry Rhew 
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office 
www.uscis.gov 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office ("AAO") on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the 
appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant visa petition seeking to employ the beneficiary an L-IB intracompany 
transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 101 (a)(l S)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
("the Act"), US.c. § II0I(a)(IS)(L). The petitioner, a California limited liability company, is engaged in horse 
training and boarding. It claims to be the parent company of the beneficiary's employer in Germany. The 
petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary in the position of "Manager, Assistant Rider" for a period of three 
years. 
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge or that she has been or will be employed in a capacity involving specialized 
knowledge. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel indicates that the petitioner is submitting an 
expert opinion letter from equestrian Olympic Champion who "states unequivocally that 
this beneficiary has 'unique qualifications'" and "highly specialized knowledge of the horses in her owner's 
stable and the individual style of the championship rider." 
I. The Law 
To establish L-I eligibility under section IOI(a)(lS)(L) of the Act, the petitioner must demonstrate that the 
beneficiary, within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, has 
been employed abroad in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a capacity involving specialized 
knowledge, for one continuous year by a qualifying organization. The petitioner must also demonstrate that the 
beneficiary seeks to enter the United States temporarily in order to continue to render services to the same 
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized 
knowledge. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (I)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
Page 3 
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himlher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
Under section IOI(a)(15)(L) of the Act, an alien is eligible for classification as a nonimmigrant if the alien, 
among other things, will be rendering services to the petitioning employer "in a capacity that is managerial, 
executive, or involves specialized knowledge." Section 214(c)(2)(8) of the Act, 8 U.S.c. § I I 84(c)(2)(8), 
provides the statutory definition of specialized knowledge: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special knowledge 
of the company product and its application in international markets or has an advanced level of 
knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(D) defines specialized knowledge as: 
[S]pecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
II. Specialized Knowledge 
The sole issue addressed by the director is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary has been 
and will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity and whether the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge. 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2(1)(3)(ii) and (iv). 
The petitioner filed the Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker, on December 4,2008. In a letter dated 
December 3, 2008, counsel for the petitioner briefly described the beneficiary's experience, qualifications and 
proposed position as follows: 
Please note that is a respected horse trainer and rider. She does business 
through her limited liability company which is well financed with her personal funds, as well as 
trust and family resources. [The beneficiary] has been working for_ in Germany, 
where_ keeps some of her horses. Now, [the petitioner] has offered the position of US 
Manager, Assistant Rider to [the beneficiary]. This position requires an experienced individual 
who is intimately familiar with [the petitioner's] proprietary equestrian technique and with her 
very spirited horses. It is precisely in order to avail itself of [the beneficiary'S] specialized 
knowledge that [the petitioner] is filing the within petition. While we are dealing with a small 
highly specialized enterprise, this is a classic Ll 8 employment situation. 
Page 4 
In a letter dated December 2, 2008, the petitioner stated that is expecting a child and requires the 
beneficiary to provide "extensive assistance both in maintaining daily business operations and transferring several 
competition horses from Germany to America." 
The petitioner described the proposed position as follows: 
[The beneficiary] was offered a position of Manager, Assistant Rider. This position requires 
experience in all aspects of Bam Management, including training and riding competition horses, 
arranging veterinary care, maintaining health, training and travel records, making travel 
arrangements for participation in competitions and trade shows as well as accompanying horses 
during international travel, transport (both air and ground) and quarantine. 
The petitioner indicated that the beneficiary has 3.5 years of experience as a Bam Manager and Assistant Rider of 
international, championship-level competition horses, and "extensive experience in all aspects of managing top 
level horses and the business of training and maintaining competition horses." The petitioner described the 
beneficiary'S current duties for_ as the following: 
[The beneficiary] is currently responsible for the daily care of horses, including riding, feeding, 
exercise and basic veterinary care. She rides both the top-level international horses, and the up 
and coming young horse prospects. She makes all shoeing and veterinary appointments. She 
manages the worming and vaccination schedules for the competition horses. She inventories and 
orders all supplies, equipment, medication and supplements. 
[The beneficiary] is responsible for setting an exercise and fitness regiment for all horses. [The 
beneficiary] is an accomplished and capable rider, on whom [the petitioner] relies to exercise and 
train all the horses currently in training for international competition in Europe. During the 
pregnancy of the proprietor of this company, [the beneficiary] has managed all European 
operations completely on her own. 
[The beneficiary] also manages all travel arrangements. She has an International Driving 
License (non-expiring) for trucks and lorries, and is qualified to drive a full size trailer 
( articulated vehicle). She also has experience flying with horses overseas, which is essential for 
the upcoming transfer of horses from Germany to America. 
[The beneficiary'S] education and experience render her essential to the ongoing operations of 
[the petitioner]. Her unique combination of skills and knowledge are central to ... [the 
petitioner's] achievement of her professional and competitive aspirations for the next four years, 
specifically qualification for the 2012 Olympic Games in London. 
The petitioner submitted a copy of the beneficiary'S resume. She indicates that she has been employed as 
Assistant Rider and Manger in Thedinghausen, Germany since January 2007, where she is 
responsible for "management, riding and training of International competition and sales horses for Championship 
Rider " According to the beneficiary'S resume, she previously worked as bam manager for 
Page 5 
Gennan Olympic team member and top-ranked rider •••••••••••• in Thedinghausen, Gennany, 
from July 2004 until December 2005. 
The petitioner also submitted resume and athletic record as an equestrian rider. indicates 
that from 2006 until 2008, she trained as a professional show jumping rider with Olympic Team member 
in Thedinghausen, Gennan, during which time she represented Israel in international events, 
including qualification for the 2007 European Championships. 
The director issued a request for additional evidence ("RFE") on December 12,2008. The director requested that 
the petitioner explain how the duties the beneficiary perfonned abroad and those she will perfonn in the United 
States, are different from those of other workers employed by the petitioner or by other U.S. employers in the 
same type of position. The director also instructed the petitioner to explain in more detail exactly what is the 
equipment, system, product, technique or service of which the beneficiary has specialized knowledge, and to 
explain how the beneficiary's training or experience is distinguished by some unusual quality and not generally 
known by practitioners in her field. Finally, the director requested additional infonnation regarding the size and 
structure of the U.S. and foreign entities. 
In a response dated December 23, 2008, counsel for the petitioner emphasized that "the position offered to [the 
beneficiary] requires an experienced individual who is intimately familiar with_ proprietary equestrian 
technique and with her very spirited horses." Counsel noted that the beneficiary previously worked for 
:
:::~: where _ personally studied, and highlighted the fact that "the stables of 
fielded the distinguished Gennan Olympic Team." Counsel asserted that "it is not possible to fill this 
critical job with any horseman or stable boy." Finally, counsel stated that the beneficiary's "unique experience 
renders her a critical component in the anticipated success of this noble venture." 
The petitioner's response also included a letter 
horses in its stables in Gennany. This letter states: 
which boards the petitioner's 
In connection with the employment of [the beneficiary] by [the petitioner], [the beneficiary] has 
acquired intimate knowledge of the training techniques used by this enterprise. This is 
confidential, proprietary infonnation which is of substantial significance to the continued 
competition success of [the petitioner]. 
Because of our contractual relationship with [the petitioner] we are privy to the internal workings 
and equestrian training regimen utilized by [the petitioner]. We are aware of the specialized 
knowledge which [the beneficiary] possesses and understand that [the petitioner] wishes to use 
her expertise at the finn's US operation in California. 
The director denied the petition on January 3, 2009, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the 
beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that she has been or would be employed in a capacity requiring 
specialized knowledge. The director detennined that the beneficiary's knowledge and experience in training, 
caring for and riding horses is no different from that of any experienced horse trainer, and noted that the petitioner 
had not explained why the beneficiary's duties could not be perfonned by a similarly trained and experienced 
worker. 
Page 6 
On appeal, counsel indicates that the petitioner is submitting an expert opinion report from of 
the United States Equestrian Federation, as well as supplemental information regarding the beneficiary's 
"specialized activities. II 
••• l- is an Olympic gold medalist (2008) and is High Performance 
Committee. In a letter dated January 29, 2009, he indicates that_ is his friend and colleague, and that he 
is personally familiar with both and the beneficiary based on their competitive record in top-level 
European competitions. He further states: 
I am aware of [the beneficiary's] unique qualifications, and of the skills necessary to perform her 
job. Her work with [the petitioner] has been integral to her employer's success in the sport. As 
and I know how important it is that [the beneficiary] 
continue to manage those horses relocation to California. I understand that she 
has been employed by [the petitioner] in Germany since January of2007, as a bam manager and 
exercise rider, and that her employer now seeks to employ [the beneficiary] in the United States. 
A manager and rider of show jumping horses acquires highly specialized knowledge of the 
horses in her owner's stable and of the very individual style of the championship rider. It is 
simply not possible to plug in any willing, able-bodied bam worker. The manager knows the 
particular strengths and follows a strict daily routine of feeding, care, exercise and maintenance 
to maximize each horse's ability. The manager also must adapt the horses to the personal 
techniques of the competition rider, by following that rider's training program in the rider's 
absence. He or she must accompany horses on trips to competition destinations in order to calm 
and assure horses, and to decrease the stress of travel. 
Additionally, the manager must be able to provide both routine and emergency care, not only at 
horne, but also at competitions and during travel to competitions, including bandaging, first aid 
and the administration of intravenous medications in an emergency. These are highly 
specialized skills developed only after years of practice and experience. It is an art form to mold 
a winning combination of horse and rider. 
The petitioner also submits a list of international competitions at which the beneficiary has worked for the 
petitioner for the period January 2007 through May 2008, as well as a revised resume for the beneficiary in which 
she has added her experience as Bam Manager for for the period April 200 I 
through October 2002. 
Counsel asserts that _ expert opinion, considered with the evidence already submitted, warrants a 
reversal of the director's decision and approval of the petition. 
Upon review, and for the reasons discussed herein, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary 
possesses specialized knowledge or that she has been or would be employed in a capacity requiring 
specialized knowledge. 
The Standard for Specialized Knowledge 
Page 7 
Looking to the language of the statutory definition, Congress has provided USCIS with an ambiguous definition 
of specialized knowledge. In this regard, one Federal district court explained the infeasibility of applying a 
bright-line test to define what constitutes specialized knowledge: 
This ambiguity is not merely the result of an unfortunate choice of dictionaries. It reflects the 
relativistic nature of the concept special. An item is special only in the sense that it is not 
ordinary; to define special one must first define what is ordinary .... There is no logical or 
principled way to determine which baseline of ordinary knowledge is a more appropriate reading 
of the statute, and there are countless other baselines which are equally plausible. Simply put, 
specialized knowledge is a relative and empty idea which cannot have a plain meaning. Cj 
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 537 (1982). 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. 9, 14-15 (D.D.C., 1990).1 
While Congress did not provide explicit guidance for what should be considered ordinary knowledge, the 
principles of statutory interpretation do provide some guidance as to the intended scope of the L-IB specialized 
knowledge category. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987) 
(citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207,94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987». 
First, the AAO must look to the language of section 214(c)(2)(B) itself, that is, the terms "special" and 
"advanced." Like the courts, the AAO customarily turns to dictionaries for help in determining whether a word in 
a statute has a plain or common meaning. See, e.g., In re A.H Robins Co., 109 FJd 965, 967-68 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(using Webster's Dictionary for "therefore"). According to Webster's New College Dictionary, the word "special" 
is commonly found to mean "surpassing the usual" or "exceptional." Webster's New College Dictionary, 1084 
(3rd Ed. 2008). The dictionary defines the word "advanced" as "highly developed or complex" or "at a higher 
level than others." Id. at 17. 
Second, looking at the term's placement within the text of section 101 (a)(15)(L) of the Act, the AAO notes that 
specialized knowledge is used to describe the nature of a person's employment and that the term is listed among 
the higher levels of the employment hierarchy together with "managerial" and "executive" employees. Based on 
the context of the term within the statute, the AAO therefore would expect a specialized knowledge employee to 
occupy an elevated position within a company that rises above that of an ordinary or average employee. See 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 14. 
Third, a review of the legislative history for both the original 1970 statute and the subsequent 1990 statute 
indicates that Congress intended for USCIS to closely administer the L-IB category. Specifically, the original 
drafters of section 10 l(a)(15)(L) of the Act intended that the class of persons eligible for the L-I classification 
would be "narrowly drawn" and "carefully regulated and monitored" by USCIS. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91-
851 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.CAN. 2750, 2754,1970 WL 5815. The legislative history of the 1970 Act 
Although 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General was decided prior to enactment of the statutory definition of 
specialized knowledge by the Immigration Act of 1990, the court's discussion of the ambiguity in the legacy 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) definition is equally illuminating when applied to the definition 
created by Congress. 
Page 8 
plainly states that "the number of temporary admissions under the proposed 'L' category will not be large." Id. In 
addition, the Congressional record specifically states that the L-l category was intended for "key personnel." 
See generally, id. The term "key personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "[o]f 
crucial importance." Webster's New College Dictionary 620 (3,d ed., Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing 
Co. 2008). Moreover, during the course of the sub-committee hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically 
questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualifY under the proposed "L" category. In response 
to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that they understood the legislation would allow 
"high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, and that it would not include "lower 
categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." See H.R. Subcomm. No.1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration 
Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445, 91" Congo 210, 218, 223, 240, 248 (Nov. 12, 1969). 
Neither in 1970 nor in 1990 did Congress provide a controlling, unambiguous definition of "specialized 
knowledge," and a narrow interpretation is consistent with so much of the legislative intent as it is possible to 
determine. H. Rep. No. 91-851 at 6,1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2754. This interpretation is consistent with legislative 
history, which has been largely supportive of a narrow reading of the definition of specialized knowledge and the 
L-l visa classification in general. See 1756, Inc. V. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 15-16; Boi Na Braza 
Atlanta, LLC V. Upchurch, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 2372846 at *4 (ND.Tex., 2005), affd 194 
Fed.Appx. 248 (5th Cir. 2006); Fibermaster, Ltd. V. INS., Not Reported in F.Supp., 1990 WL 99327 (D.D.C., 
1990); Delta Airlines, Inc. V. Dept. of Justice, Civ. Action 00-2977-LFO (D.D.C. April 6, 2001)(on file with 
AAO). 
Further, although the Immigration Act of 1990 provided a statutory definition of the term "specialized 
knowledge" in section 214(c)(2) of the Act, the definition did not generally expand the class of persons eligible 
for L-1B specialized knowledge visas. Pub.L. No. 101-649, § 206(b)(2), 104 Stat. 4978, 5023 (1990). Instead, 
the legislative history indicates that Congress created the statutory definition of specialized knowledge for the 
express purpose of clarifYing a previously undefined term from the Immigration Act of 1970. H.R. Rep. 101-
723(1) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6749,1990 WL 200418 ("One area within the L visa that 
requires more specificity relates to the term 'specialized knowledge.' Varying interpretations by INS have 
exacerbated the problem."). While the 1990 Act declined to codifY the "proprietary knowledge" and "United 
States labor market" references that had existed in the previous agency definition found at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(1)(1 )(ii)(D) (1988), there is no indication that Congress intended to liberalize its own 1970 definition of 
the L-1 visa classification. 
If any conclusion can be drawn from the enactment of the statutory definition of specialized knowledge in section 
214(c)(2)(B), it would be based on the nature of the Congressional clarification itself. By not including any strict 
criterion in the ultimate statutory definition and further emphasizing the relativistic aspect of "special knowledge," 
Congress created a standard that requires USCIS to make a factual determination that can only be determined on a 
case-by-case basis, based on the agency's expertise and discretion. Rather than a bright-line standard that would 
support a more rigid application of the law, Congress gave the INS a more flexible standard that requires an 
adjudication based on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. Cj Ponce-Leiva V. Ashcroft, 331 FJd 
369, 377 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89, 91 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
To determine what is special or advanced, USCIS must first determine the baseline of ordinary. As a 
baseline, the terms "special" or "advanced" must mean more than simply "skilled" or "experienced." By 
Page 9 
itself, work experience and knowledge of a finn's technically complex products will not equal "special 
knowledge." See Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 53 (Comm. 1982). In general, all employees can 
reasonably be considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the 
overall economic success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. 
An employee of "crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average 
employee. In other words, specialized knowledge generally requires more than a short period of experience; 
otherwise special or advanced knowledge would include every employee in an organization with the 
exception of trainees and entry-level staff. If everyone in an organization is specialized, then no one can be 
considered truly specialized. Such an interpretation strips the statutory language of any efficacy and cannot 
have been what Congress intended. 
Considering the definition of specialized knowledge, it is the petitioner's, not USCIS's, burden to articulate 
and establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" 
knowledge. Section 2l4(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.c. § 1 1 84(c)(2)(B). USCIS cannot make a factual 
detennination regarding the beneficiary's specialized knowledge if the petitioner does not, at a minimum, 
articulate with specificity the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, describe how such knowledge is 
typically gained within the organization, and explain how and when the beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
Once the petitioner articulates the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and type of 
evidence which establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized knowledge. A 
petitioner's assertion that the beneficiary possesses advanced knowledge of the processes and procedures of 
the company must be supported by evidence describing and distinguishing that knowledge from the 
elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others. Because "special" and "advanced" are comparative 
tenns, the petitioner should provide evidence that allows USCIS to assess the beneficiary's knowledge 
relative to others in the petitioner's workforce or relative to similarly employed workers in the petitioner's 
specific industry. 
Analysis 
Upon review, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary possesses knowledge that may be 
deemed "specialized" or "advanced" under the statutory definition at section 2l4(c)(2)(B) of the Act. The 
decision of the director will be affinned as it relates to this issue and the appeal will be dismissed. 
In examining the specialized knowledge of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's description of 
the job duties and the weight of the evidence supporting any asserted specialized knowledge. See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 2l4.2(l)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed job description of the services to be perfonned sufficient to 
establish specialized knowledge. Merely asserting that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" 
knowledge will not suffice to meet the petitioner's burden of proof. 
The petitioner in this case has failed to establish either that the beneficiary's position in the United States or 
abroad requires an employee with specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge. 
Although the petitioner repeatedly asserts that the beneficiary has been and will be employed in a "specialized 
knowledge" capacity, the petitioner has not adequately articulated or documented any basis to support this 
claim. The beneficiary has been and would be charged with the daily care of the petitioner's horses, including 
Page 10 
riding, feeding, exercise, basic veterinary care, scheduling appointments, maintaining equipment and 
medication supplies, and managing travel arrangements by trailer and air. The petitioner has failed to 
specifically identify any special or advanced body of knowledge which would distinguish the beneficiary's 
role from that of other similarly experienced horse trainers or bam managers employed in the petitioner's 
industry. Going on record without documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden 
of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r. 1998) (citing Matter of 
Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm'r. 1972)). Specifics are clearly an important 
indication of whether a beneficiary's duties involve specialized knowledge; otherwise, meeting the definitions 
would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. See Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd v. Sava, 724, F. Supp. 1103 
(E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905, F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
The petitioner failed to articulate, with specificity, the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge and how 
the beneficiary acquired such knowledge. Counsel indicates that the position requires an individual who is 
"intimately familiar with _ proprietary equestrian technique and with her very spirited horses." 
Counsel has repeated this language times throughout the record, but neither counsel nor the petitioner has 
elaborated as to exactly what this "proprietary" technique involves. While it is evident that different riders 
have their own individual riding styles and preferences for the training of their animals, and horses have their 
own individual temperaments, the petitioner has not established how knowledge of trammg 
routines and horses constitutes specialized knowledge. All horse trainers working at the higher levels of the 
equestrian sport are reasonably expected to acquire such familiarity with the animals and riders with whom 
they work. However, the petitioner has not differentiated its techniques or training methods from those of 
any other horse bam. Merely claiming that the beneficiary is familiar with internal or even "proprietary" 
techniques is insufficient if those standards are not materially different from those that are generally known 
and used by similarly experienced workers. 
The AAO acknowledges the expert opinion letter from which is submitted on appeal. 
Although _ is well-credentialed in the beneficiary'S equestrian field, his letter does not speak 
directly to the beneficiary'S claimed specialized knowledge and how such knowledge qualifies her for the 
requested classification in light of the statutory and regulatory definitions, pertinent case law, and USCIS 
policy guidance, nor does he indicate that he is familiar with the requirements for L-l B classification. Rather, 
he speaks in general terms about the relationship between horse, rider and trainer/manager, thus lending 
support to the view that the type of knowledge possessed by the beneficiary is typical of trainers who work 
with competitive professional riders. _ does not discuss with any specificity the beneficiary'S 
specialized knowledge that is particular to the petitioning organization. He notes that "[tJhe manager knows 
the particular strengths and weaknesses of each horse, and follows a strict daily routine of feeding, care, 
exercise and maintenance to maximize each horse's ability." 
However, it is unclear why information regarding a particular horse's strengths and weaknesses and its strict 
daily routines could not be conveyed to a similarly experienced trainer who possesses general knowledge of 
the feeding, care, exercise and maintenance of championship-caliber show jumpers. While_ 
validly states that "any willing, able-bodied barn worker" could not step into the role of a manager or trainer 
for top-caliber show horses and riders, it is also evident that the beneficiary's occupation is not that of a mere 
"bam worker" and therefore, comparisons to this occupation are not persuasive in supporting the petitioner's 
claim that the beneficiary possesses comparatively advanced and specialized knowledge. i also 
Page II 
indicates that trainers/managers must be able to provide routine and emergency veterinary care and describes 
these as "highly specialized skills"; however, such skills cannot be considered specific to the petitioning 
organization. 
The AAO may, in its discretion, use as advisory opinion statements submitted as expert testimony. 2 See 
Matter of Caron International, 19 I&N Dec. 791, 795 (Commr. 1988). However, USCIS is ultimately 
responsible for making the final determination regarding an alien's eligibility for the benefit sought; the 
submission of expert opinion letters is not presumptive evidence of eligibility. Jd.; see also Matter of V-K-, 24 
I&N Dec. 500, n.2 (BIA 2008) ("[E]xpert opinion testimony, while undoubtedly a form of evidence, does not 
purport to be evidence as to 'fact' but rather is admissible only if'it will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue."'). 
As explained above, the record does not distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge as specialized compared to horse 
trainers or managers employed elsewhere. The petitioner has failed to document any materially distinct qualities 
of the beneficiary's knowledge other than vague claims of a "proprietary technique" used by or the 
individual personalities and temperaments of her horses. There is no indication that the beneficiary has any 
knowledge or training that exceeds that of any other similarly experienced horse trainer/manager. The petitioner 
indicates that the beneficiary began assisting in international competitions immediately upon being 
hired as her barn manager and assistant rider in Germany. Further, the petitioner indicates that_ was a 
student of Olympic during the beneficiary's entire period of employment 
abroad, and it is reasonable to believe that she followed the training regimen to some degree. The 
beneficiary gained her experience as the barn manager prior to the formation of the petitioning 
company and such knowledge therefore is not specific to company. 
In sum, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary's training, work experience, or knowledge of 
horse training, riding and maintenance is specialized compared to other similarly employed workers in the 
industry who have not worked with the petitioning organization. It is clear that the petitioner considers the 
beneficiary to be a skilled and important employee of the organization, and the AAO does not question the 
2 Letters may generally be divided into two types of testimonial evidence: expert opinion evidence and 
written testimonial evidence. Opinion testimony is based on one's well-qualified belief or idea, rather than 
direct knowledge of the facts at issue. Black's Law Dictionary ISIS (8th Ed. 2007) (defining "opinion 
testimony"). Written testimonial evidence, on the other hand, is testimony about facts, such as whether 
something occurred or did not occur, based on the witness' direct knowledge. Id. (defining "written 
testimony"); see also id at 1514 (defining "affirmative testimony"). 
Depending on the specificity, detail, and credibility of a letter, USCIS may give the document more or less 
persuasive weight in a proceeding. The Board of Immigration Appeals (the Board) has held that testimony 
should not be disregarded simply because it is "self-serving" See, e.g., Matter of S-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 1328, 
1332 (BIA 2000) (citing cases). The Board also held, however: "We not only encourage, but require the 
introduction of corroborative testimonial and documentary evidence, where available." Id. If testimonial 
evidence lacks specificity, detail, or credibility, there is a greater need for the petitioner to submit 
corroborative evidence. Matter ofY-B-, 211&N Dec. 1136 (BIA 1998). 
Page 12 
beneficiary's qualifications for the position offered or the petitioner's preference to transfer her to the United 
States along with her horses. The AAO does not dispute the fact that the beneficiary's knowledge has allowed her 
to successfully perfonn her duties for the petitioner overseas. However, the successful completion of one's job 
duties does not distinguish the beneficiary as an employee possessing advanced knowledge of the petitioner's 
processes and procedures, nor does it establish employment in a specialized knowledge capacity with the foreign 
entity. 
The legislative history for the tenn "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive interpretation 
of the tenn. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary should be considered a 
member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized knowledge. See 1756, Inc. v. 
Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 16. Based on the evidence presented, it is concluded that the beneficiary does 
not possess specialized knowledge, nor would the beneficiary be employed in a capacity requiring specialized 
knowledge. For this reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
III. Qualifying Relationship 
Beyond the decision of the director, a remaining issue to be discussed is whether the petitioner has established 
that a qualifying relationship exists between the petitioner and the beneficiary'S overseas employer. To 
establish a "qualifYing relationship" under the Act and the regulations, the petitioner must show that the 
beneficiary's foreign employer and the proposed U.S. employer are the same employer (i.e. one entity with 
"branch" offices), or related as a "parent and subsidiary" or as "affiliates." See generally section 
101(a)(l5)(L) ofthe Act; 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1). 
The petitioner indicated on the Form 1-129 that the beneficiary'S foreign employer is 
and that it is the parent company of the foreig~ letter dated December 2, 2008, the 
petitioner stated that "for the past two years, _____ has been based in Thedinghausen, 
Germany during the qualification period for the 2008 Olympics in Beijing." The petitioner stated that • 
••• plans to transfer a portion of the European operations to California, where she will train for the 20 I 0 
World Equestrian Games and 2012 Olympic Games. 
In the request for evidence issued on December 12, 2008, the director requested that the petitioner submit 
additional evidence to establish that the U.S. and foreign entities have a qualifYing relationship, including the 
foreign and U.S. companies' articles of organization. 
In response, the petitioner submitted evidence that it was established as a California limited liability company 
on August 25, 2006 and maintains an active status in the State of California. With respect to the foreign 
operations, counsel stated that her limited liability company" and "keeps 
some of her horses at the stables operated by in Gennany pursuant to contract." 
Counsel indicated that the beneficiary is the only employee abroad and noted that "the employer 
does not have a separate corporate existence in the Gennan Federal Republic." 
The pertinent regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(1 )(ii) define the tenn "qualifYing organization" and related 
terms as follows: 
Page 13 
(G) Qualifying organization means a United States or foreign firm, corporation, or other 
legal entity which: 
(1) Meets exactly one of the qualifYing relationships specified in the definitions 
of a parent, branch, affiliate or subsidiary specified in paragraph (I)(I)(ii) of 
this section; 
(2) Is or will be doing business (engaging in international trade is not required) 
as an employer in the United States and in at least one other country directly 
or through a parent, branch, affiliate or subsidiary for the duration of the 
alien's stay in the United States as an intracompany transferee[.] 
(H) Doing business means the regular, systematic and continuous provision of goods 
andlor services by a qualifYing organization and does not include the mere presence 
of an agent or office of the qualifYing organization in the United States and abroad; 
(I) Parent means a firm, corporation, or other legal entity which has subsidiaries. 
(J) Branch means an operating division or office of the same organization housed in a 
different location. 
(K) Subsidiary means a firm, corporation, or other legal entity of which a parent owns, 
directly or indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, 
directly or indirectly, half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, directly or 
indirectly, 50 percent of a 50-50 joint venture and has equal control and veto power 
over the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, less than half of the entity, but in fact 
controls the entity. 
(L) Affiliate means 
(/) One of two subsidiaries both of which are owned and controlled by the same 
parent or individual, or 
(2) One of two legal entities owned and controlled by the same group of individuals, 
each individual owning and controlling approximately the same share or 
proportion of each entity. 
Based on counsel's assertion that the petitioning organization "does not have a separate corporate existence in 
the German Federal Republic" it appears that the petitioner seeks to establish that it has a branch office in 
Germany. Probative evidence of a branch office would include the following: a business license or 
registration establishing that the U.S. company is authorized to conduct business as a foreign corporation in 
Germany, copies of German tax documents confirming the U.S. company's activities in Germany, or any 
other documentation establishing that the petitioning U.S. limited liability company is recognized as a legal 
Page 14 
entity in Gennany. The petitioner has not submitted this type of evidence, or comparable evidence that it is 
doing business as a legal entity in Gennany. 
Based on the evidence submitted, the petitioner claims to have a contractual arrangement whereby it boards 
some of its horses at the stables of The petitioner also indicates that this 
German company directly pays the beneficiary's salary and benefits, while the U.S. company claims to 
reimburse for the beneficiary's services, thus suggesting that the petitioner does 
not directly employ anyone in Germany. The petitioner has not established that it operates a bona fide branch 
office in Gennany. 
Moreover, the petitioner must establish that it is or will be doing business as an employer in the United States 
and in at least one other country directly or through a parent, branch, affiliate or subsidiary for the duration of 
the beneficiary's stay in the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)( 1 )(ii)(G)(2). The petitioner seeks to transfer its 
sole claimed foreign employee and its horses to the United States by filing the instant petition. Upon 
completion of the transfer, the scope of the German operations would be limited to the boarding of some 
horses at the barn Therefore, even if the petitioner had established that it 
currently operates a qualifying branch office in Germany, the petitioner has not established that the U.S. entity 
would continue to do business in Germany or any other foreign country for the duration of the beneficiary's 
stay in the United States. Therefore, the AAO must conclude that there is no qualifying organization abroad. 
For this additional reason, the petition cannot be approved. 
IV. Employment Abroad 
Another issue not addressed by the director is whether the petitioner submitted evidence that the beneficiary 
has at least one continuous year of full-time employment abroad with a qualifying organization within the 
three years preceding the filing of the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(iii). 
The petitioner indicated that it has employed the beneficiary in Gennany since January 2007. In response to 
the director's request for the beneficiary's payroll records with the foreign entity, the petitioner provided a 
letter from who indicates that she hired the beneficiary in Germany, and notes that "[b ]ecause it 
was necessary to employ such an individual with full insurance liability and health coverage, [the petitioner] 
monthly for the expense of [the beneficiary's] salary and benefits." 
The petitioner indicated that it was providing "all receipts for payment." The petitioner attached what appears 
to be a Gennan bank statement for an account owned by . The document is not translated and 
reflects no apparent payments to the beneficiary or The petitioner did not 
provide the requested payroll evidence or comparable evidence, an explanation as to why it could not directly 
pay the beneficiary's salary, or sufficient evidence to support its claim that it has been paying the beneficiary's 
salary during her claimed period of employment in Germany. Failure to submit requested evidence that 
precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l4). Going 
on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of 
proof in these proceedings. Matter of Sojjici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r. 1998) (citing Matter of 
Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm'r 1972)). 
Page 15 
While the AAO does not doubt that the beneficiary has experience working with_ during the time 
. she was training in Germany, the petitioner has failed to submit requested corroborating evidence that it 
served as the beneficiary's employer abroad during the requisite time period. For this additional reason, the 
petition may not be approved. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the 
AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afj'd. 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Soltane v. DOJ, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the AAO conducts 
appellate review on a de novo basis). 
V. Conclusion 
The petition will be denied and the appeal dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an 
independent and alternative basis for the decision. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative 
grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with 
respect to all of the AAO's enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 
at 1043, afj'd. 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003). 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 u.s.c. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.