dismissed L-1B Case: Fashion Design

MATTER OF LCELC-, INC. 
APPEAL OF VERMONT SERVICE CENTER DECISION 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
DATE: SEPT. 9, 2016 
PETITION: FORM I-129, PETITION FOR A NONIMMIGRANT WORKER 
The Petitioner, a fashion design and manufacturing enterprise, seeks to temporarily employ the 
Beneficiary as a director of marketing under the L-1 B nonimmigrant classification for intracompany 
transferees. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) § 101(a)(15)(L), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(15)(L). The L-IB classification allows a corporation or other legal entity (including its 
affiliate or subsidiary) to transfer a qualifying foreign employee with "specialized knowledge" to 
work temporarily in the United States. 
The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition. The Director. concluded that the 
Petitioner did not establish that the Beneficiary was employed abroad for one year in a managerial, 
executive, or specialized knowledge capacity and that he would not be employed in the United States 
in a specialized knowledge capacity. 
The matter is now before us on appeal. In its appeal, the Petitioner additional evidence and asserts 
that it provided sufficient evidence to establish by the preponderance of the evidence that the 
Beneficiary was employed abroad in a managerial capacity and would be employed in the United 
States in a specialized knowledge capacity. 
Upon de novo review, we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the 
criteria outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must 
have employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized 
knowledge capa~ity, for one continuous year within the three years precedingthe beneficiary's 
application for admission into the United States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the 
U.S. temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or 
affiliate. · 
If the beneficiary will be serving the United States employerin a managerial or executive capacity, a 
qualified beneficiary may be classified as an L-1 A nonimmigrant alien. If a qualified beneficiary 
Matter of LCELC-, Inc. 
will be rendering services in a capacity that involves "specialized knowledge," the beneficiary may be 
classified as an L-1 B nonimmigrant alien . . I d. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will 
employ the alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph 
(l)(l)(ii)(G) ofthis section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or 
specialized knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the 
services to be performed. 
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time 
employment abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years 
preceding the filing of the petition. 
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position 
that was managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the 
alien's prior education, training and employment qualifies him/her to perform 
the intended services in the United States; however the work in the United 
States need not be the same work which the alien performed abroad. 
II. EMPLOYMENT ABROAD IN A MANAGERIAL OR EXECUTIVE CAPACITY 
The first issue to be addressed in this proceeding is whether the Beneficiary has the requisite one 
year of experience abroad in a qualifying capacity. Although the Director provided a hybrid analysis 
assessing the Beneficiary's position abroad within the context of the requirements for managerial 
capacity and specialized knowledge capacity, the Petitioner expressly claims that the Beneficiary has 
been employed, in a managerial capacity. It does not claim that the Beneficiary was employed 
abroad either in an executive capacity or in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. Therefore, 
we will withdraw the portion of the Director's analysis that does not reflect the Petitioner's claim 
and we will restrict our analysis to whether the Beneficiary was employed abroad in a managerial 
capacity. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" 
as "an assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily": 
(i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or 
component 'of the organization; 
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Matter of LCELC-, Inc. 
(ii) supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the 
organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the 
authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel 
actions (such as promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee 
is directly supervised, functions' at a senior level within the organizational 
hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and 
(iv) exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or 
function for which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not 
considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the 
supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are 
· professional. 
A. Evidence of Record 
On the Form I-129, the Petitioner identified the Beneficiary's foreign employer as 
On page three of the supporting statement, which was submitted with the 
Form I-129, the Petitioner stated that the Beneficiary was employed abroad as general manager of 
since March 16, 2014. The Petitioner stated that the Beneficiary was "charged with 
overseeing the scouting out, acquisition, coordinating investments in and maintenance of properties 
in Costa Rica." The Petitioner explained that was registered as a limited partnership 
on June 27, 2014 and stated that the company was formed as a "collaboration" among the 
Beneficiary and two other individuals. The Petitioner stated that the Beneficiary assumed the 
position of vice president of marketing of which shares office space with 
where the Beneficiary assumed the position of general manager and reported only to the 
company's CEO and president. 
The Petitioner provided a document titled' 
Employee Information" listing the following five employees and their respective position 
titles: (1) as "CEO/Co-owner"; (2) as "President/Co-owner"; 
(3) the Beneficiary as director of marketing; ( 4) as sales manager; and 
(5) as secretary/sales assistant. 
The Petitioner also provided a document titled "Certification of Income," dated March 23, 2015, 
which contained statements from a certified public accountant (CPA) claiming that he personally 
"observed in detail the wire transfers" and the Beneficiary's personal bank account summary such 
that he was able to verify that the Beneficiary was compensated a total of $17,128 during the one­
year time period of March 31, 2014 through April 2, 2015 in exchange for professional services that 
he provided to The Petitioner did not provide a description of the Beneficiary's 
duties abroad for the three '',years preceding' the filing of the petition. The CPA stated that the 
Beneficiary's "income corresponds to administrative services" he provided to The 
CPA did not mention the Beneficiary's alleged employment with in the positon of 
vice president of marketing. 
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Matter of LCELC-, Inc. 
In the RFE, the Director instructed the Petitioner to submit evidence to establish that the Beneficiary 
was employed abroad on a full-time basis in a managerial or executive ·capacity. The Director found 
that the CPA's certification was not sufficient to establish that the Beneficiary was employed abroad 
on a full-time basis or that the irregular bank deposits to the Beneficiary's account were the result of 
wages paid for his claimed employment with the foreign entity. The Director suggested that the 
Petitioner may submit pay and/or personnel records to establish that the Beneficiary was employed 
abroad as claimed. The Director further questioned whether an entity comprised of five employees, 
including the entity's two owners, was sufficient to support the Beneficiary in a managerial capacity. 
The Director noted an inconsistency concerning the Beneficiary's position title during his purported 
employment abroad, pointing out that the Petitioner's initial supporting statement indicated that the 
Beneficiary was employed in the position of general manager, which is inconsistent with the 
employee list document, where the Beneficiary was identified as the director of marketing. 
In response to the RFE, the Petitioner submitted a statement acknowledging that the job description 
it original provided was only a summary of the Beneficiary's job duties. Accordingly, the Petitioner 
provided the following supplemental job description of the Beneficiary's position as general 
manager of 
[The Beneficiary] interviews, hires, manages and terminates company employees and 
all independent contractors (interviewing, hiring, and terminating employees is an 
irregular occurrence, but the management of employees is regular - 2-3 hours a 
day[)]; 
Establishes and defines the scope, duties and employment of each employee hired by 
the company, employee performance evaluations, wages & benefits, leave of absence, 
sick time and other human resource matters (2 hours a day); 
I 
Calls and holds daily, weekly, biweekly and monthly meetings to discuss purchases, 
property management issues, and human resources matters as need; 
Reports and directing [sic] the reporting of activities periodically to upper 
management as needed (1 hour a day). 
May negotiate and sign contracts for purchases, supplies and equipment on behalf of 
upper management (2 hours per day); 
Direct activities of all independent contractors hired by the company, including 
general contractors, architects, building maintenance, and other vendors (2-3 hours 
daily). 
The Director denied the petition concluding, in part, that the Petitioner did not establish that the 
, Beneficiary had been employed abroad in a managerial capacity. In denying the petition, the 
Director found that the Petitioner did not establish that the foreign entity's staffing of five employees 
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· Matter of LCELC- , Inc. 
was sufficient to support the Beneficiary in a managerial capacity. The Director once again pointed 
to the discrepancy in the ~Beneficiary's position titles and found that the Petitioner provided a 
deficient job description that lacks sufficient specificity to lead to the determination that the 
Beneficiary was employed in a managerial capacity. 
On appeal, the Petitioner challenges the Director's conclusion, asserting that it provided sufficient 
evidence to meet its burden of proof. The Petitioner contends that the Beneficiary was employed in 
a real estate acquisition business where his only superiors were the company's two owners. 
B. Analysis 
Upon review of the petition and the evidence of record, including materials submitted in support of 
the appeal, we conclude that the Petitioner has not established that the Beneficiary was employed in 
a managerial capacity abroad. 
As a threshold matter, we concur with the Director in finding that the record does not establish that 
the Beneficiary was employed abroad on a full-time basis, as required by regulation. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(1)(3)(iii). First, looking squarely at the hourly breakdown that the Petitioner provided in 
regard to the Beneficiary's employment abroad, the Petitioner indicated that the Beneficiary worked 
no more than 11 hours per week, which is clearly not indicative of a full-time position. Second, as 
the Director pointed out, the Petitioner compared the Beneficiary's salary abroad to the salary he 
would receive in his proposed U.S. position, which, according to Part 5, Nos. 7 and 8 of the petition, 
would be a part-time position to which the Beneficiary would devote 20 hours per week. Given this 
salary comparison, it is illogical to conclude that the Beneficiary worked full-time but received a 
salary that was commensurate with part-time employment. Thus, when the Beneficiary 's salary 
information is considered in light of the number of hours the Petitioner assigned to the totality of the 
Beneficiary's claimed set of job duties, there is no basis upon which we can conclude that the 
Beneficiary was employed abroad on a full-time basis. 
Further, we find that the Petitioner did not provide sufficient evidence to establish that the 
Beneficiary was employed by the foreign entity, as claimed. While the Director indicated that 
payroll and/or personnel records would be an adequate form of documentation for establishing that 
the Beneficiary was employed by as claimed in the petition, the Petitioner responded 
with a second-hand account from a CPA, whose basis for corroborating the Beneficiary's claimed< 
employment abroad was his review of wire transfers, which he claimed originated from the 
Beneficiary's employer, and the Beneficiary's bank records, which he claimed reflected the wired 
funds. It is unclear why the Petitioner , did not provide actual payroll or personnel records; nor is 
there any explanation as to why the wire transfer documents, which the CPA claims to have 
reviewed, were not made available to USCIS in the course of these proceedings. 
On appeal, the Petitioner contends that in addition to the statement of a CPA, it provided evidence in 
the form of "financial records of wages and documents filed within government entities listing the 
[B]eneficiary as a manager" and claims that the statements of the CPA corroborate such evidence. 
However, a review of the record does not show that any such documents were submitted with proper 
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Matter of LCELC-, Inc. 
English language translations to establish that the Beneficiary was employed by as 
claimed. Further, while the record contains copies of bank statements, all documents were in 
Spanish and were not accompanied by certified English language translations. See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 103.2(b)(3). This mitranslated evidence is minimally probative and will be accorded little to no 
weight in this proceeding. Therefore, considering the salary information, lack of payroll or 
personnel records, and the untranslated evidence, we find that the record does not establish that the 
Beneficiary was employed abroad for one year of continuous full-time employment with the claimed 
qualifying entity. 
Notwithstanding our findings regarding the Beneficiary's one year of employment abroad, we will 
next evaluate whether the position held abroad was in a qualifying capacity. Again, the Petitioner 
does not assert that it was a specialized knowledge or executive position; therefore, we will restrict 
our analysis to whether the Beneficiary was employe9 in a managerial capacity. When examining 
the managerial capacity of the Beneficiary, we look first to the Petitioner's description of the job 
duties. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The Petitioner's description of the job duties must clearly 
describe the duties performed by the Beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are in a 
managerial capacity. ld. 
The definition of managerial capacity has two parts. First, the Petitioner must show that the 
Beneficiary performed certain high-level responsibilities. Champion World, Inc. v. INS, 940 F.2d 
1533 (9th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision). Second, the Petitioner must prove that the 
Beneficiary has been primarily engaged in managerial duties, as opposed to ordinary operational 
activities alongside the foreign entity's other employees. See Family Inc. v. USCIS, 469 F.3d 1313, 
1316 (9th Cir. 2006); Champion World, 940 F.2d 1533. 
The statutory definition of "managerial capacity" allows for both "personnel managers" and 
"function managers." See sections 101(a)(44)(A)(i) and (ii) of the Act. Here, the Petitioner's focus 
is on the Beneficiary's role as a personnel manager. Personnel managers are required to primarily 
supervise and control the work of other supervisory·, professional, or managerial employees. The 
statute plainly states that a "first line supervisor is not considered to be acting in a managerial 
capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are 
professional." Section 101(a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(B)(4). If a petitioner 
claims that a beneficiary directly supervises other employees, those subordinate employees must be 
supervisory, professional, or managerial, and the beneficiary must have the authority to hire and fire 
those employees, or recommend those actions, and take other personnel actions. 1 Sections 
101(a)(44)(A)(ii)-(iii) ofthe Act; 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(B)(2)-(3). 
1 
To determine whether the Beneficiary manages professional employees, we must evaluate whether the subordinate 
positions require a baccalaureate degree as a minimum for entry into the field of endeavor. Cf 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2) 
(defining "profession" to mean "any occupation for which a United States baccalaureate degree or its foreign equivalent 
is the minimum 
requirement for entry into the occupation"). Section IOI(a)(32) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(32), 
states that "[t]he term profession shall include but not be limited to architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, 
and teachers in elementary or secondary schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries." 
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(b)(6)
Matter of LCELC-, Inc. 
In the present matter, the Petitioner provided an hourly breakdown indicating that the Beneficiary 
devoted anywhere from nine to eleven hours to his claimed position as general manager of 
Of those nine to eleven hours, the Petitioner indicated that the Beneficiary spent six to eight 
hours, or approximately 67%-72% of his time, carrying out job duties that were associated with 
managing personnel. However, given that the Petitioner listed only two employees as part of the 
staff, aside from the company's two co-owners to whom the Beneficjary was 
subordinate, the Petitioner's claim that an overwhelming majority of the Beneficiary's time was 
spent managing two employees - a sales manager and a secretary who assisted with sales· - is 
unreasonable and is not corroborated by the specific list of tasks that comprised such management. 
The Petitioner does not explain whether the latter employee was subordinate to the sales manager or 
to the Beneficiary himself. If the Beneficiary himself was directly managing both employees, we 
find that there is insufficient evidence to establish that these subordinates were supervisory, 
professional, or managerial employees. Given that the sales manager's job description indicates that 
she carried out the foreign entity's sales function, it does not appear that she was truly a managerial 
or supervisory employee as her position title indicates. Further, while the Petitioner stated that 
educational levels for both the sales manager and the secretary/sales assistant is "senior college," it is 
not clear that this level is equiyalent to a baccalaureate degree or that the jobs require a degree, such 
that either individual can be considered to be a professional employee. r 
Regardless, the Petitioner did not provide sufficient information about the foreign entity's hierarchy 
or specify precisely whom the Beneficiary is claimed to have been managing; nor does the record 
contain sufficient evidence to support the claim that the Beneficiary managed the work of 
independent contractors , as the Petitioner did not provide documents to establish that such 
contractors had actually been hired. As previously stated, goiQg on record without supporting 
documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these 
proceedings. Matter ofSoffici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. 
We further note that the staffing chart - where the Beneficiary was assigned the position title of 
director of marketing' - is inconsistent with the claim that the Beneficiary was employed in the 
position of general manager. While the chart seemingly indicates that the Beneficiary was 
simultaneously employed by both and by the job description that the 
Petitioner provided applies to the Beneficiary's claimed position with as the 
company's general manager. It is not clear, however, whether the staffing chart, which indicates that 
the Beneficiary assumed the position of director of marketing, was applicable to both entities. The 
implication that the set of job duties the Beneficiary carried out as general manager of a real estate 
entity were the same as those he carried out as director of marketing at a clothing retail business is 
dubious without further explanation. The Petitioner has not resolved these unexplained anomalies 
with independent, objective evidence pointing to where the· truth lies. See , Matter of Ho, 19 I&N 
Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). As such, the record remains unclear as to whom the Beneficiary 
managed and whether his subordinates were, indeed, supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees. Section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) ofthe Act. 
Matter of LCELC-, Inc. 
Based on the deficiencies and anomalies discussed above, the Petitioner has not established that the 
Beneficiary was employed abroad as claimed. In fact, even if the Petitioner had provided sufficient 
evidence to establish the Beneficiary's foreign employment, the record lacks sufficient evidence to 
establish that such employment was on a full-time basis and that the primary portion of the 
Beneficiary's time was allocated to job duties in a managerial capacity. 
III. U.S. EMPLOYMENT IN A SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE CAPACITY 
The first issue to be addressed in this proceeding is whether the Petitioner established that the 
Beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge an~d whether he· will be employed in the United States 
in a specialized knowledge capacity. 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(B), provides the statutory definition of 
specialized knowledge: 
For purposes of section 101 (a )(15)(L ), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized kno\Vledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level ofknowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(D) defines specialized knowledge as: 
[S]pecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's 
product, service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its 
application in international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in 
the organization's processes and procedures. 
A. Evidence of Record 
. The Petitioner filed the Form 1-129 on July 16, 2015. The Petitioner operates in the fashion industry 
as a clothing designer and manufacturer. On the Form 1-129, the Petitioner indicated that it has 21 
employees in the United States and a gross annual income of $10 million. 
The Petitioner stated that the Beneficiary will be working as a director of marketing. In support of 
the petition, the Petitioner provided a statement indicating that the Beneficiary is "a fitness expert" 
who will use his knowledge of fitness to assist in the creation and marketing of a new line of 
swimwear and athletic products. The Petitioner stated that the proposed position "requires an 
individual with a business or marketing background of at least 4 years experience" and referr~d to 
the Beneficiary's "business acumen and fitness background" when discussing his prior experience as 
an owner of a spa and fitness center and an operator of "a small hotel and fitness center" in Costa 
Rica. The Petitioner stated that the Beneficiary's positive attitude coupled with his "employment 
background and education ... make him an ideal fit for this position. The Petitioner provided the 
following description of the Beneficiary's job duties and role in his proposed position: 
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Matter of LCELC-, Inc. 
[The Beneficiary] will meet with management to conceptualize this line of products, 
collaborating with design, marketing and advertising professionals to produce, brand 
and market the product not only to Central and South American markets, but the U.S. 
market. More specifically, [the Beneficiary] will introduce his background, education 
and experience in the fitness field to fuse a prototype of the products we wish to 
market, which will allow us to bring our product to life for the first time and test it in 
its market. . . . We will be selecting appropriate personnel to perfect our new 
products and [the Beneficiary] will be the executive responsible for managing and 
coordinating the product development and delivery process. He will be responsible 
for maintaining a practical, informative schedule and project plan that details tl;le 
steps involved in developing the product prototypes and running our market testing. 
[The Beneficiary] will also be involved with and [will] contribute to hiring outside 
product development specialists in order that we streamline the process and avoid 
costly mistakes. This will include the commissioning of consultants who specialize 
in apparel product design and graphic designers, product quality consultants, and 
fashion/merchandising computer-aided design (CAD) specialists .... 
[The Beneficiary] will oversee the marketing of the products, including managing 
marketing personnel as they identify the characteristics that are most important to [the 
Petitioner]' s customers (in conjunction with his fitness expertise) by testing those 
attributes repeatedly. To this end, he will enlist the help 'of a market research 
consultant company or personnel to facilitate a focus group that will help to gauge the 
response of our sample target market. Marketing personnel and/or consultants will 
interview consumers and take our prototype to as many informed people as possible. 
[The Beneficiary] will oversee improvements to the product line based on customer 
feedback, which we will use to increase our products' chances of success .... 
[He] will also attend industry events and trade or consumer expos to get feedback on 
our prototype. He will take this opportunity to generate market interest and capture 
details of interested customers. who want to hear about our product launch or even 
place advance orders .... 
The Petitioner's · supporting evidence also included the following documents pertaining to the 
Beneficiary's education credentials: (1) a diploma for with no issue date; (2) an 
for "Muscle Monitoring" with an issue dat.e of January 14, 2008; and (3) a 
diploma for' with an issue date of March 20, 2008. 
The Director issued a request for evidence (RFE) on July 24, 2015, instructing the Petitioner to 
submit evidence that the Beneficiary has specialized knowledge and that the proposed position in the 
United States will be in a specialized knowledge capacity. Specifically, the Director asked that the 
Petitioner provide a letter from an authorized representative of the U.S. entity disclosing the 
following information: (1) the Beneficiary's specialized knowledge job duties and the percentage of 
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Matter of LCELC-, Inc. 
time spent on each job duty; (2) how the Beneficiary's knowledge for the proposed position is 
different from that of similar positions within the industry; (3) how the Petitioner's products are 
"special" within the scope of the international marketplace; ( 4) why someone else in this field cannot 
perform the job duties assigned to the Beneficiary; (5) a description of the product, tool, process, or 
procedure that the Beneficiary uses that involves specialized knowledge; and ( 6) an explanation of 
how the Beneficiary's role in significant assignments has enhanced the Petitioner's productivity, 
competitiveness, or financial position. 
In response to the RFE, the Petitioner provided a letter containing a job description that is nearly 
identical to the one previously provided in the Petitioner's original supporting statement. The 
Petitioner also claimed that the Beneficiary's background in fitness along with his "outstanding work 
ethic, excellent communication skills, eyen temper and clean demeanor, his understanding of Latin 
thinking and personalities, extraordinary efficiency when working, excellent command of both 
English and Spanish languages" were all factors that were considered in making the decision to offer 
the Beneficiary the current position with the U.S. entity. 
The Director denied the petition on October 29, 2015, concluding, in part, that the Petitioner did not 
establish that the Beneficiary has specialized knowledge and that he would be employed in the 
United States in a specialized knowledge position. In denying the petition, the Director considered 
the Beneficiary's proffered wage of $12,000 per year as an indicator that the Beneficiary does not 
possess specialized knowledge, given that wages for a marketing manager in New York range from 
$90,500 per year on the lower end of the scale to $187,200 per year at the higher end of the scale. 
The Director also found that the Petitioner provided a vague job description and did not clarify how 
the Beneficiary's education and background in fitness provide him with specialized knowledge or 
explain how such'knowledge relates to the Beneficiary's proposed position. 
On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the Direqtor erred in considering the Beneficiary's salary as an 
indicator of whether the Beneficiary's proposed position is in a specialized knowledge capacity and 
claims that such consideration "unfairly prejudice[d]
1 
the entire case." The Petitioner contends that 
the Beneficiary's knowledge will lead to his input in the ultimate creation of a unique product, which 
the Petitioner seeks to market to existing and potential buyers. 
B. Analysis 
Upon review, the Petitioner's assertions are not persuasive. The record does not establish that the 
Beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that he would be employed in the United States in a 
specialized knowledge capacity as defined at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(D). 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden is on the petitioner to establish eligibility. Matter of 
Brantigan, 11 I&N Dec. 493 (BIA 1966). The Petitioner must prove by a preponderance of 
evidence that the Beneficiary is fully qualified for the benefit sought. Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N 
Dec. 369, 376 (AAO 2010). In evaluating the evidence, eligibility is to be determined not by the 
quantity of eyidence alone but by its quality. !d. The Director must examine each piece of evidence 
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Matter of LCELC-, Inc. 
for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality 
of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true. 
In order to establish eligibility, the Petitioner must show that the individual will be employed in a 
specialized knowledge capacity. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The statutory definition of specialized 
knowledge at Section 214( c )(2)(B) of the Act is comprised of two equal but distinct subparts. First, 
an individual is considered to be employed in a capacity involving specialized knowledge if that 
person "has a special knowledge of the company product and its application in international 
markets." Second, an individual is considered to be serving in a capacity involving specialized 
knowledge if that person "has an advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the 
company." See also 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(D). The Petitioner may establish eligibility by 
submitting evidence that the Beneficiary and the proffered position satisfy either prong of the 
definition. 
Once a Petitioner articulates the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and 
type of evidence which establishes whether or not the Beneficiary actually possesses specialized 
knowledge. USCIS cannot make a factual determination regarding the beneficiary's specialized 
knowledge if the petitioner does not, at a minimum, articulate with specificity the nature of the its 
\ 
products and services or processes and procedures, the nature of the specific industry or field 
involved, and the nature of the beneficiary's knowledge. The Petitioner should also describe how 
such knowledge is typically gained within the organization, and explain how and when the 
Beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
As both "special" and "advanced" are relative terms, determining whether a given beneficiary's 
knowledge· is "special" or "advanced" inherently requires a comparison of the beneficiary's 
knowledge against that of others. With respect to either special or advanced knowledge, the 
petitioner ordinarily must demonstrate that the beneficiary's knowledge is not commonly held 
throughout the particular industry and cannot be easily imparted from one person to another. The 
ultimate question is whether the petitioner has met its burden of demonstrating by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the beneficiary's knowledge or expertise is advanced or special, and that the 
beneficiary's position requires such knowledge. 
In the present case, the Petitioner's claims are based on the first prong of the statutory definition, 
asserting that the Beneficiary has a special knowledge of how to create unique swimwear and 
athletic clothing that the Petitioner ultimately seeks to offer its buyers. 
Because "special knowledge" concerns knowledge of the petitioning organization's products or 
services and its application in international markets, the Petitioner may meet its burden through 
evidence that the Beneficiary has knowledge that is distinct or uncommon in comparison to the 
knowledge of other similarly employed workers in the particular industry. 
In the present matter, the Petitioner seeks to design and offer for sale "a new line of swimwear and 
athletic products," which it claims will be "designed from a different approach." On appeal, the 
Petitioner submits a brief asserting that the Beneficiary will direct a marketing team that will work 
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Matter of LCELC- , Inc. 
within the scope of a concept that is unique to the Petitioner's athletic product lines. The Petitioner 
contends that the Beneficiary's "approach" to "fus[e] various bodily/athletic aesthetics" and his 
knowledge of the science of body massaging, muscle monitoring, gymnastics, and soccer "is what 
[the Beneficiary] brings to the design and presentation table," which will be beneficial in marketing 
the Petitioner's product~. 
Based on the vague information conveyed in the Petitioner 's statement, it is not clear what the 
"different approach" actually is or that the approach is anything more than the Beneficiary 's idea for 
a new product. Further, other than repeatedly claiming that the new products the Petitioner seeks to 
create and market are unique, the Petitioner does not specifically ·describe its new products or 
explain what specific characteristics account 
for their claimed uniqueness such that knowledge of the 
product could be deemed as uncommon or distinct compared to knowledge held by similarly 
employed workers in the industry. 
Further, while the Petitioner claims that the Beneficiary ' s education and experience in the field of 
fitness is integral to the creation of the desired line of clothing: the Petitioner does not specify 
precisely what knowledge the Beneficiary gained in the acquisition of his three diplomas in 
and or how that knowledge 
relates specifically to the Petitioner's "different approach" and its end goal of using this approach to 
create a unique line of swimwear and athletic clothing. The Petitioner also claims that the 
Beneficiary "can be said to have jumpstarted" its "unique approach to the marketing and sale. of our 
products." While it is clear that the Petitioner assigns great value to the Beneficiary's input into the 
creation of its new product line, his value as an employee is not sufficient to establish that his 
knowledge is special or uncommon. There is no evidence to suggest that the Beneficiary 's idea for a 
new product line derived from any special knowledge the Beneficiary gained of the Petitioner's 
existing products. 
We also note that other than pointing out that the Beneficiary came up with a good business concept, 
the Petitioner draws no distinction between the · knowledge that the Beneficiary possesses and the 
knowledge possessed by others within the Petitioner's organization or others within the industry to 
establish that the Beneficiary's knowledge about the Petitioner's products is truly special. In fact, 
the Petitioner indicates that the Beneficiary will be responsible for hiring outside product 
development specialists, some of whom specialize in apparel product design and graphic design, to 
assist in the creation of the final product, thus leading us to further question what specialized 
knowledge the Beneficiary actually possesses, given that other specialists will be hired to actually 
make the products. While the Petitioner refers to the Beneficiary 's experience in operating a spa and 
fitness center as well as a 
hotel and fitness center in Spain and Costa Rica, respectively, 
there is no evidence that such experience resulted in 
the acquisition of specialized knowledge or that 
the knowledge the Beneficiary did gain from operating other businesses relates in any way to the 
specialty clothing that the Petitioner seeks to create and market to its existing and potential 
customers. In other words, the Petitioner did not establish precisely what specialized knowledge the 
Beneficiary acquired or discuss when and how he actually .acquired such knowledge. Generally 
stating that the Beneficiary has former business experience and acquired diplomas many years prior 
to the Petitioner's conceptualization of the prototype it seeks to create is not sufficient to establish 
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Matter of LCELC-, Inc. 
that the Beneficiary acquired specialized knowledge of the Petitioner's products. Going on record 
without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of 
proof in these proceedings. Matter ofSoffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (quoting Matter 
ofTreasure Craft ofCal(fornia, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg'l Comm'r 1972)). 
In addition, when examining the specialized capacity of the Beneficiary, we will look to the 
Beneficiary's job duties, which the Petitioner is required to describe in detail to establish the services 
that the Beneficiary will perform. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii). 
In the present matter, the job description the Petitioner provided initially in support of the petition 
was deficient in its lack of adequate details about the Beneficiary's specific daily tasks. Although 
the Director noted that the Petitioner's description of the Beneficiary's proposed position was vague 
and instructed the Petitioner to provide a list of the Beneficiary's specialized knowledge job duties 
and the percentage of time the Beneficiary would allocate to each task, the Petitioner did not comply 
with that request in its RFE response and, instead, provided a nearly identical job description as the 
one that was originally submitted. Failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material 
line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(14). 
We further note that instead of listing the Beneficiary's individual job duties and their respective 
time allocations, the Petitioner provided a job description stating, in part, that the Beneficiary "will 
meet with management to conceptualize" the Petitioner's line of products and collaborate with 
designers and marketing and advertising professionals to create a product prototype. The Petitioner 
did not specify precisely what specialized knowledge or expertise the Beneficiary will offer or 
explain how his knowledge will affect the end product. The Petitioner also stated that the 
Beneficiary will be responsible for "managing and coordinating the product development and 
delivery process." However, the Petitioner did not specify what daily tasks constitute management 
and coordination within the scope of product development and delivery. 
Moreover, the Petitioner did not provide evidence to establish that any of the Beneficiary's listed job 
duties- including managing and coordinating the product development and delivery process, hiring 
specialists and consultants to assist in creating and marketing the Petitioner's products, managing 
marketing personnel, and attending industry events - require the Beneficiary to possess or utilize 
specialized knowledge. Rather, the list of proposed job duties indicates that the Beneficiary would 
guide and oversee the various moving parts that are involved in the overall process of creating a 
prototype for the Petitioner's new line of products. While we do not dispute the potential 
significance of the Beneficiary's role in this process, there is no evidence to suggest that any aspect 
of the Beneficiary's proposed position requires specialized knowledge. 
Lastly, while the Petitioner disputes the Director's reference to the Beneficiary's proposed salary, 
contending that the Director "unfairly prejudice[d]" the Petitioner's claim, we find no reason why 
the Beneficiary's salary cannot be considered as one of several factors to determine whether a 
particular work assignment can be deemed as one requiring specialized knowledge. There is no 
evidence that the Director solely relied on the Beneficiary's proposed salary as the only basis for his 
conclusion. Furthermore, the above discussion points to a number of serious evidentiary 
13 
Matter of LCELC-, Inc. 
deficiencies that preClude a favorable finding, regardless of the Beneficiary's proposed salary. As 
discussed, the Petitioner did not establish the specific nature of the knowledge that is claimed to be 
specialized or establish how and when the Beneficiary gained such knowledge. In other words, the 
Petitioner did not provide sufficient evidence to establish that the Beneficiary's knowledge is distinct 
or uncommon or that the position offered to the Beneficiary requires that the Beneficiary possess 
such knowledge. 
For the reasons discussed above, the evidence submitted does not establish that the Beneficiary 
possesses specialized knowledge and will be employed in. a specialized knowledge capacity with the 
Petitioner in the United States. See Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Accordingly, the appeal will be 
dismissed. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The petition will be denied and the appeal dismissed for the above reasons with each considered as 
an independent and alternative basis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of 
proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 
U.S.C. § p6; Matter ofOtiende, 26 I&N Dec. 127, 128 (BIA 2013). Here the Petitioner has not met 
, that burden. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
Cite as Matter of LCELC-, Inc., ID# 18143 (AAO Sept. 9, 2016) 
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