dismissed L-1B Case: Flooring Installation

PUBLIC COPY 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Mass. Ave. N.W. Rm. A3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
FILE: SRC 05 002 53351 Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: SEP 0 8 
PETITION: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 
 1 10 1 (a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: SELF-REPRESENTED 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
--7* 
* Ro Gann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
SRC 05 002 53351 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The matter 
is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. 
The petitioner is engaged in the sale and installation of wood and laminate floors. It seeks to temporarily 
employ the beneficiary as an installations specialist in the United States and filed a petition to classify the 
beneficiary as a nonimrnigrant intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge. The director determined 
that the petitioner had not established that the beneficiary possessed the requisite specialized knowledge nor 
that the intended employment required specialized knowledge, and specifically noted that the beneficiary did 
not hold a "key personnel" position within the organization. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. On appeal, counsel submits a brief and asserts that the denial was 
erroneous in that the director failed to see that the beneficiary was in fact coming to the United States as a key 
employee and that, although the director failed to find that the beneficiary possessed specialized knowledge, 
such knowledge was recognized as being present in the beneficiary by the petitioner. 
To establish L-1 eligibility, the petitioner must meet the criteria outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 9 1101(a)(15)(L). Specifically, within three years 
preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, a qualifying organization must 
have employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized 
knowledge capacity, for one continuous year. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States 
temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof 
in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the alien 
are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment abroad 
with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies hirnlher to perform the intended services in 
the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the same work 
which the alien performed abroad. 
This matter presents two related, but distinct, issues: (1) whether the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge; and (2) whether the proposed employment is in a capacity that requires specialized knowledge. 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. fj 1184(c)(2)(B), provides the following: 
SRC 05 002 53351 
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For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
In a letter submitted with the petition dated August 12, 2004, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary began 
worlung for the foreign company in January 200 1 as an installations specialist, and that he had been employed 
by a different branch of the foreign entity in the same position since 1995. The petitioner alleges that due to 
his nine years of experience as an installation specialist, the beneficiary was well qualified for the transfer to 
the United States, since he was familiar with the petitioner's product and could "execute the floor installation 
process and direct the work of others from knowing the product to be installed, the surface, floor features and 
company procedures." 
In a document entitled "Addendum Specialized Knowledge," dated September 12, 2004 and prepared by 
, the foreign entity's president, the beneficiary's qualifications were described as follows: 
During his experience with us [the beneficiary] has gained the specialized knowledge in how 
our companies, dedicated to the sale and installation of wood and laminated floors, operate as 
wood and laminated floor installers. [The beneficiary's] specialized knowledge can be 
resumed [sic] in the following factors: 
Products 
Wood: Mahogany - Specific Wood - Place of storage - Maintenance 
Laminated: [Foreign Entity] - Own trademark - Measures - Treatment 
recommendations 
Processes and Techniques: 
Conditions: Humidity analysis and definition of piece separation based on it 
Furniture moving: Analysis of weight, size of available space in customers premises 
and in [Foreign Entity] available spaces 
[Foreign entity's] Machinery set up and 
Frames installation in doors and requests 
Installation: Determine conditions for Sound Proof and or Unde-layment Plastic or 
fiber 
Quality control before installation 
Fix system to be applied: Click, Glue Down or other 
Revision: Check list and quality on Borders, comers, attachment, separations, frames 
Walk through with customer. Signature 
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Management of Floor Installations: 
Budget. Time consumption estimation of the whole work including installers and 
subcontractors as electricians and other. 
Organization: Assignation of functions in project: cutters, installers, framers, and 
others 
Relation with customers: Programmed communications, Attendance of requests and 
claims 
Control over material consumptions 
With regard to the beneficiary's proposed duties in the United States, the petitioner provided an undated 
document entitled "Addendum: Job Description." 
 ment, which claimed that the beneficiary would 
work as an installations specialist in the petitioner's 
 ranch, stated: 
The position involves the organization, coordination and execution of the installations of 
the branch including but not limited to the following: 
Professional opinion of wood or laminated floor to be install[ed] as per customer 
convenience 
Active participation in the costs and expenses budget of each installation project: 
time and materials consumption, workforce, etc 
Organize the installation works : Sound proof, woods, floors, cuts, frames, 
materials 
Decide materials and attachment system to be used 
Analysis of weather conditions to determine installation conditions about piece 
separation, installation materials to be used 
Organize the workplace set up during the project after arrangement with 
customer: moving of furniture and other customers features, arrange with 
customer, placing of company's tools and materials 
Direction and execution of installation works 
Quality control over installation works and materials 
Revision: Check list and quality on Borders, comers, attachment, separations, 
and frames. 
Walk through with customer. Signature 
Time control estimation of the whole work including installers and 
subcontractors as electricians and other for budget purposes 
Control over material consumptions 
The director found the initial evidence submitted with the petition insufficient to warrant a finding that the 
beneficiary possessed the required specialized knowledge. Consequently, a detailed request for evidence was 
issued on October 14,2004, which requested more detailed evidence that the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge of the petitioner's product, service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests 
and its application in international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the 
organization's processes and procedures, and that such knowledge was not general knowledge held commonly 
through the industry. Furthermore, the director requested information regarding classroom training and/or 
on-the-job training received by the beneficiary and the amount of time necessary to receive such training as 
SRC 05 002 53351 
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well as a description of how the beneficiary's training compared to other employees of the petitioner 
performing similar duties. 
The petitioner submitted a detailed response dated January 8, 2005. The petitioner submitted literature 
showing the company's capabilities regarding the installation of laminated and wood flooring, and claimed 
that the designs contained therein could only be produced as a result of the expertise of their installations 
specialists. The petitioner further explained that it used special machines, called "Fresadoras," which could 
produce several types of cuts in their materials with difficult angles. With regard to the beneficiary's 
training, the petitioner stated: 
To reach the grade of expertise that we need to fill the position the minimum amount of time 
of training will be three to four years depending [on] the ability of the candidate if the 
candidate has the necessary skills to develop the needed techniques to achieve special floor 
installation assignments. 
 In addition to the owners, there are only two workers in ow 
in Chile in this position and with this expertise, the beneficiary and Mr. 
There is a difference between these two installation specialists and it is t I a 
is much more prepared to produce and control budgets over difficult installation 
- - 
jobs. The rest of the floor installers that work in our organization have the position of 
Installers. The beneficiary and Mr. 
P 
ave received the same training from the owners 
of the company during their work an none of the rest of employees has received the same 
training basically because they did not show the ability to acquire the mentioned expertise. 
With regard to the manner in which the beneficiary received this training, the petitioner stated: 
[The beneficiary] gained [his] specialized knowledge through the course of the on-the-job 
experience and the beneficiary was selected to receive this training because of his particular 
abilities and expertise with the final product, the machinery, the techniques, tools and 
materials used in these special installations works. 
The petitioner then referred to a training outline, which set forth the differences between the beneficiary's 
training and that of a standard installer, and stated: 
Please note that the knowledge attained by the Installation Specialist was different because in 
the first part of his work-training he was taught more techniques in less time than the other 
installers and in the second part he was taught the different techniques for more complex 
jobs. 
The director determined that the record neither established that the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge nor that the intended position in the U.S. is one that requires specialized knowledge, and 
concluded that the beneficiary was not "key personnel." The director specifically noted that the petitioner had 
failed to show that the beneficiary's duties and training were significantly different from other similarly- 
qualified installers. The director concluded that the evidence submitted did not establish that the beneficiary's 
knowledge was uncommon or distinct and distinguished from other practitioners in the field, and consequently 
denied the petition. 
On appeal, the petitioner submits a brief in support of its assertions that the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge. No additional documentary evidence was submitted. 
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On review, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge nor that the intended position requires an employee with specialized knowledge. 
When examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3)(ii). As required in the regulations, the 
petitioner must submit a detailed description of the services to be performed sufficient to establish specialized 
knowledge. Id. 
In the present matter, the petitioner provided an abbreviated description of the beneficiary's employment in the 
foreign entity, his intended employment in the U.S. entity, and his responsibilities as a technical consultant. 
Despite specific requests by the director, namely, whether the beneficiary had worked abroad on specific projects 
such as the American Stock Exchange project, the petitioner failed andlor refused to provide such information. 
The petitioner has not sufficiently documented how the beneficiary's performance of the proposed job duties 
distinguishes his knowledge as specialized. The petitioner repeatedly states throughout the record and again on 
appeal that only two persons, the beneficiary and his co-worker, have the necessary training to perform the duties 
of the proposed position. The petitioner continually asserts that the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge as a result of his more than three years of experience as an installations specialist and that such 
knowledge is far beyond that commonly found throughout the industry. Finally, the petitioner concludes by 
contending that the petitioner's natural abilities and his training received in the profession have given the 
beneficiary specialized knowledge. 
The director's request for evidence was extremely specific. For example, the petitioner was requested to 
clarify how the petitioner's unique methodologies and tools were different from the methodologies and tools 
used by other companies. In addition, while the petitioner did note the use of special machines called 
"Fresadoras," the petitioner failed to explain what made this machine unique, and further failed to discuss 
whether other companies or competitors used this type of a machine or other similar devices. Other than 
stating that the machine was able to cut difficult angles, no further information was provided. Finally, 
although a list of the training elements the beneficiary received was provided, the petitioner disregarded or 
overlooked the director's request for specific documentation from the petitioner's human resources 
department attesting to the exact type, nature, and duration of the beneficiary's training. Although 
specifically requested by the director, the record contains no definitive evidence of the beneficiary's training, 
experience, daily duties, or level of expertise. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(3)(viii) states that the 
director may request additional evidence in appropriate cases. Although specifically and clearly requested by 
the director, the petitioner refused to provide documentary evidence to support its claims that the beneficiary 
obtained a specialized level of knowledge through his training and work experience with the foreign entity. 
The failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying 
the petition. See 8 C.F.R. tj 103.2(b)(14). 
 In this case, the petitioner relies on the AAO to accept its 
uncorroborated assertions that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge, both prior to adjudication and 
again on appeal. However, these assertions do not constitute evidence. Going on record without supporting 
documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. 
Matter of Sofici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 
I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
It is also appropriate for the AAO to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the 
beneficiary's knowledge of the business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making 
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process. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. 1 17, 120 (Comm. 1981) (citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 61 8 
(R.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. 816 (R.C. 1971)).' As stated by the Commissioner in 
Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 52 (Comrn. 1982), when considering whether the beneficiaries possessed 
specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find that the occupations inherently 
qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have 
unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. Id. The Commissioner also provided the 
following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or 
her to produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed 
primarily for his ability to carry out a key process or function which is important or 
essential to the business firm's operation. 
Id. at 53. In the present matter, the evidence of record demonstrates that the beneficiary is more akin to an 
employee whose skills and experience enable him to provide a specialized service, rather than an employee 
who has unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. 
It should be noted that the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the AAO to make 
comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The term "specialized 
knowledge" is not an absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed in 1756, Inc. v. Attorney 
General, "[slimply put, specialized knowledge is a relative . . . idea which cannot have a plain meaning." 745 
F. Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990). The Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended 
for "key personnel." See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. 
 The term "key 
personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." Webster's 11 New 
College Dictionary 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). 
 In general, all employees can reasonably be 
considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic 
success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. An employee of 
"crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average employee. 
Accordingly, based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record related to that 
term, the AAO must make comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge employee and 
the general labor market, but also between that employee and the remainder of the petitioner's workforce. 
Here, the petitioner's only contention that the beneficiary's knowledge is more advanced than other installers 
in the field is its assertion that the beneficiary's training and abilities have allowed him to gain an expertise in 
his field in an accelerated period of time, unlike other installers whose training has taken longer due to their 
inferior natural abilities. Again, the petitioner has not provided any information pertaining to the exact 
1 
 Although the cited precedents pre-date the current statutory definition of "specialized knowledge," and 
counsel raises that very argument with regard to the director's reliance on Matter of Penner in support of the 
denial, the AAO finds them instructive. Other than deleting the former requirement that specialized 
knowledge had to be "proprietary," the 1990 Act did not significantly alter the definition of "specialized 
knowledge" from the prior INS interpretation of the term. The 1990 Committee Report does not reject, 
criticize, or even refer to any specific INS regulation or precedent decision interpreting the term. The 
Committee Report simply states that the Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of 
"[vlarying [i.e., not specifically incorrect] interpretations by INS," H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I), at 69, 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. Beyond that, the Committee Report simply restates the tautology that became section 
214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Id. The AAO concludes, therefore, the cited cases, as well as Matter of Penner, 
remain useful guidance concerning the intended scope of the "specialized knowledge" L-1B classification. 
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day-to-day duties of the beneficiary, an installations specialist, in comparison to the daily duties of the 
standard installers. Nor did the petitioner distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge, work experience, or 
training from those of other employees, aside from saying that he received accelerated training in the same 
field. The lack of tangible evidence in the record makes it impossible to classify the beneficiary's knowledge 
of wood and laminated floor installation as advanced and precludes a finding that the beneficiary's role is of 
crucial importance to the organization. As previously stated, simply going on record without supporting 
documentary evidence is not sufficient for the purpose of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. 
Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. The claim that the beneficiary has been employed by the petitioner for 
over three years and that during.this entire period he worked as an installations specialist does little to 
establish that the beneficiary is equipped with specialized knowledge, for the petitioner has provided no 
independent evidence that sets the beneficiary apart from all other employees who have gained a similar 
"expertise" after working for the petitioner for a three to four year period. While the beneficiary's slulls and 
knowledge may contribute to the successhlness of the petitioning organization, this factor, by itself, does not 
constitute the possession of specialized knowledge. Therefore, while the beneficiary's contribution to the 
economic success of the corporation may be considered, the regulations specifically require that the beneficiary 
possess an "advanced level of knowledge" of the organization's process and procedures or a "special knowledge" 
of the petitioner's product, service, research, equipment, techniques, or management. 8 C.F.R. 
214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). As determined above, the beneficiary does not satisfy the requirements for possessing 
specialized knowledge. 
Additionally, in Matter of Penner, the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of 
the specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. 49. The decision noted that the 1970 House Report, H.R. 
No. 91-851 stated that the number of admissions under the L-1 classification "will not be large" and that 
"[tlhe class of persons eligible for such nonimmigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be carefully regulated 
by the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id. at 5 1. The decision further noted that the House Report 
was silent on the subject of specialized knowledge but that, during the course of the sub-committee hearings 
on the bill, the Chairman specifically questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify under the 
proposed "L" category. In response to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that they 
understood the legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, and 
that it would not include "lower categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." Id. at 50 (citing H.R. 
Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445, 91st Cong. 210, 218, 
223,240,248 (November 12, 1969)). 
Reviewing the Congressional record, the Commissioner concluded in Matter of Penner that an expansive 
reading of the specialized knowledge provision, such that it would include skilled workers and technicians, is 
not warranted. The Commissioner emphasized that the specialized knowledge worker classification was not 
intended for "all employees with any level of specialized knowledge." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 53. 
Or, as noted in Matter of Colley, "[mlost employees today are specialists and have been trained and given 
specialized knowledge. However, in view of the House Report, it can not be concluded that all employees 
with specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
intracompany transferees." 18 I&N Dec. at 119. According to Matter of Penner, "[sluch a conclusion would 
permit extremely large numbers of persons to qualify for the 'L-1' visa" rather than the "key personnel" that 
Congress specifically intended. 18 I&N Dec. at 53; see also 1756, Inc., 745 F. Supp. at 15 (concluding that 
Congress did not intend for the specialized knowledge capacity to extend to all employees with specialized 
knowledge, but rather to "key personnel" and "executives."). 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
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should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc., 745 F. Supp. at 16. Based on the evidence presented, it is concluded that the 
beneficiary does not possess specialized knowledge; nor would the beneficiary be employed in a capacity 
requiring specialized knowledge. For this reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has not shown that a qualifying relationship exists between 
the petitioner and the foreign entity. Although the director noted that this requirement had been proven, the 
AAO finds the evidence in the record to be insufficient to establish this relationship. 
The regulation and case law confirm that ownership and control are the factors that must be examined in 
determining whether a qualifying relationship exists between United States and foreign entities for purposes 
of this visa classification. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593 (BIA 1988); see also 
Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986); Matter of Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 
(Comm. 1982). In the context of this visa petition, ownership refers to the direct or indirect legal right of 
possession of the assets of an entity with full power and authority to control; control means the direct or 
indirect legal right and authority to direct the establishment, management, and operations of an entity. Matter 
of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 595. 
In this matter, the petitioner claims that the foreign entity owns 50% of the U.S. entity, and has submitted a 
copy of its stock certificate number 1, noting that the foreign entity owns 50 shares out of the 100 shares 
authorized. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. $214.2(1) provides that a parent-subsidiary relationship can exist when 
a parent owns, directly or indirectly, half of the entity and controls the entity. As general evidence of a 
petitioner's claimed qualifying relationship, stock certificates alone are not sufficient evidence to determine 
whether a stockholder maintains ownership and control of a corporate entity. The corporate stock certificate 
ledger, stock certificate registry, corporate bylaws, and the minutes of relevant annual shareholder meetings 
must also be examined to determine the total number of shares issued, the exact number issued to the 
shareholder, and the subsequent percentage ownership and its effect on corporate control. Additionally, a 
petitioning company must disclose all agreements relating to the voting of shares, the distribution of profit, 
the management and direction of the subsidiary, and any other factor affecting actual control of the entity. 
See Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362. Without full disclosure of all relevant 
documents, CIS is unable to determine the elements of ownership and control. For this additional reason, the 
petition may not be approved. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the 
AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), agd, 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
director's decision will be affirmed and the petition will be denied. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.