dismissed L-1B Case: Floral Design

PUBLIC COPY 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Room 3000 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
MAIL STOP 2090 
FILE: 
 EAC 08 029 5 13 14 
 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER 
 Date: NO y 2 6 2~08 
PETITION: 
 Petition for a Nonirnrnigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 3 1 10 1 (a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned 
to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
3phn F. Grissom, Acting Chief 
t 
dministrative Appeals Office 
EAC 08 029 51314 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition for a nonirnrnigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the 
appeal. 
The petitioner is a retail and wholesale florist. It seeks to temporarily employ the beneficiary as its chief 
floral designer, and filed a petition to classify the beneficiary as a nonimrnigrant intracompany transferee 
with specialized knowledge. The director denied the petition, finding that the petitioner had not 
established that the beneficiary possessed specialized knowledge or that the proffered position required 
specialized knowledge. 
On appeal, counsel submits a brief and asserts that the director's decision was erroneous. Specifically, 
counsel contends that the petitioner needs top quality designs to distinguish its products from other 
competitors. Therefore, counsel asserts that the services of the beneficiary, who is an artist by virtue of 
his experience, training and exposure to other designers, is necessary to allow the petitioner to meet this 
goal. 
To establish L-1 eligibility, the petitioner must meet the criteria outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. tj 1101(a)(15)(L). Specifically, within three years 
preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, a qualifying organization 
must have employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized 
knowledge capacity, for one continuous year. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United 
States temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or 
affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. fj 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall 
be accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the alien 
are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment abroad 
with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended services in 
the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the same work 
which the alien performed abroad. 
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Page 3 
This matter presents two related, but distinct, issues: (1) whether the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge; and, (2) whether the proposed employment is in a capacity that requires specialized 
knowledge. 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1184(c)(2)(B), provides the following: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. tj 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its 
application in international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the 
organization's processes and procedures. 
As stated above, the petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary temporarily in Puerto Rico as its chief 
floral designer. On Form 1-129, filed on November 7, 2007, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary 
"designs flower arrangements for special events and oversees and trains [a] team of four florist[s]." A 
letter of support from the petitioner dated October 19, 2007 further described the nature of the 
beneficiary's knowledge and the requirements of the proposed position. Regarding the specialized 
knowledge of the proposed position in the United States, the petitioner stated: 
[The petitioner] wishes to employ [the beneficiary] as Chief Floral Designer. His principal 
duties and responsibilities will include: selecting and training flower designers for the 
Company's two stores in Puerto Rico, meeting with corporate and individual clients to plan 
the decorations for special events, submitting design and cost estimate to clients, preparing 
samples of flower arrangements for store displays and for meetings with clients planning 
special events, supervising installation of flower arrangements and quality of flowers and 
other materials used in decoration of special events to ensure that Company standards as an 
executive florist and leader in the market are maintained. 
Regarding the beneficiary's knowledge and experience, the petitioner stated: 
Since 2005, [the beneficiary] has been employed as Chief Floral Designer at [the foreign 
entity]. In this capacity he was responsible for the training and supervision of florists in the 
stores located in Bogoti. The training provided included [the petitioner's] signature flower 
designs and cut flower preservation techniques and consisted of floral designs; flower quality 
and handling; combination of colors and shapes of flowers; preparation of special 
arrangements and events such as conventions, receptions, fairs, debutante balls, weddings, 
etc.; preparation of exhibits, window decorations and displays. Special floral design styles 
EAC 08 029 51314 
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include bouquet, fan, roses, horizontal, tropical, topiary, etc. [The beneficiary] is also an 
expert designing and preparing Christmas decorations. 
The petitioner also submitted a document entitled "Personal Profile" of the beneficiary, which listed the 
beneficiary's educational background, professional background and work experience. It indicated that the 
beneficiary had completed courses in flower dCcor and arrangements with international decorators in the 
city of Bogoth, and currently had eleven years of experience in flower arranging with various companies. 
The petitioner also submitted translated copies of certificates evidencing the beneficiary's attendance at 
the Second International Congress of Florists on July 25 and July 26, 2000, as well as certificates 
verifying his employment history. 
The director found this evidence insufficient to establish the beneficiary's eligibility, and issued a request 
for additional evidence on November 16, 2007. Specifically, the director requested information 
establishing the beneficiary's specialized knowledge, and requested evidence such as a description of a 
typical work week for the beneficiary, the manner in which he gained his specialized knowledge such as 
the amount of classroom or on-the-job training he received and the minimum amount of time required to 
train a person in the proposed position. Additionally, the director requested evidence demonstrating that 
the beneficiary's position in Puerto Rico required specialized knowledge. Finally, the director asked for 
evidence that the beneficiary's knowledge is uncommon, noteworthy, or distinguished, and not generally 
known by practitioners in the field or that his advanced knowledge of the company's processes and 
procedures is apart from the basic knowledge possessed by others. 
Counsel for the petitioner addressed these requests in a response dated January 30, 2008. First, counsel 
provided the following overview of the beneficiary's qualifications: 
[The beneficiary] has been Chief Floral Designer for [the foreign entity] in Colombia since 
2005 responsible for designing the concept that distinguishes their flower arrangements from 
those of the hundreds of flower shops in Bogoth. This is a very significant achievement since 
it requires not only knowledge of the stringent corporate standards required to maintain [the 
petitioner's] position in the market, but also entails a vast knowledge of flowers, their 
appropriate combinations, color schemes, new trends, but most importantly, excellent taste 
and artistic ability. One can teach a person how to handle flowers and even how to mix 
different types of flowers and colors, but artistic ability and taste are innate. That means that 
some people are born with it, but most are not. During the three years that [the beneficiary] 
has been with [the foreign entity] he has been a significant asset. . . . 
The petitioner, through counsel, also submitted an overview of a typical work week for the beneficiary 
abroad, and a typical work week for the proposed position in Puerto Rico. It appears fiom review of these 
documents that the work weeks would be very similar in both companies. Specifically, in a typical week, 
the petitioner indicated that the beneficiary is responsible for verifying that flowers and flower 
arrangements already made meet specific standards; preparing designs and pending orders; purchasing 
flowers; and meeting with clients to discuss arrangements for special occasions such as weddings. 
EAC 08 029 51314 
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Finally, the petitioner submitted a certificate from the Employee Fund "Flores del Bosque" stating that 
the beneficiary has offered training courses in the subject of floral design to the associates of the 
Employee Fund since 1995. 
On February 15, 2008, the director denied the petition. Specifically, the director found that the petitioner 
failed to specifically document how the beneficiary's knowledge of the processes and procedures of the 
petitioner's organization is substantially different from, or advanced in relation to, any individual 
similarly employed by the petitioner. The director also noted that the record contained no evidence 
demonstrating the floral designs of the petitioner and their claimed uniqueness. 
On appeal, counsel focuses on the reputation of the petitioner for excellence and uniqueness in floral 
design, and fails to specifically address the key reasons for the director's denial. Instead, counsel states 
that the foreign entity provided the beneficiary with an advanced knowledge of flower varieties, flower 
handling, flower type combinations and design trends, and that this experience, coupled with his 
creativity and gift for design, has qualified him for the benefit sought. Counsel submits a copy of the 
2002 Economic Census of Island Areas, as well as two testaments from clients, in support of the 
contention that the petitioner's enterprise is well established in the industry. 
Upon review, the MO concurs with the director's decision. 
As enacted by the Immigration Act of 1990, section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1184(c)(2)(B), 
provides the statutory definition of specialized knowledge: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Loolung to the plain language of the statutory definition, Congress has provided USCIS with an ambiguous 
definition of specialized knowledge. Although 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General was decided prior to 
enactment of the Immigration Act of 1990, the court's discussion of the ambiguity in the former INS 
definition is equally illuminating when applied to the definition created by Congress: 
This ambiguity is not merely the result of an unfortunate choice of dictionaries. It reflects 
the relativistic nature of the concept special. An item is special only in the sense that it is not 
ordinary; to define special one must first define what is ordinary. . . . There is no logical or 
principled way to determine which baseline of ordinary knowledge is a more appropriate 
reading of the statute, and there are countless other baselines whch are equally plausible. 
Simply put, specialized knowledge is a relative and empty idea which cannot have a plain 
meaning. Cf Westen, The Empty Idea ofEquality, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 537 (1982). 
745 F.Supp. 9, 14-15 (D.D.C., 1990). 
EAC 08 029 51314 
Page 6 
In effect, Congress has charged the agency with malung a comparison based on a relative idea that has no 
plain meaning. To determine what is special, USCIS must first determine the baseline of ordinary. 
While Congress did not provide explicit guidance for what should be considered ordinary knowledge, the 
canons of statutory interpretation provide some clue as to the intended scope of the L-1B specialized 
knowledge category. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 123 
(1987) (citing INSv. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207,94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)). 
First, it is instructive to look at the common dictionary definitions of the terms "special" and "advanced." 
According to Webster's New World College Dictionary, the word "special" is commonly found to mean "of a 
lund different from others; distinctive, peculiar, or unique." Webster's New World College Dictionary, 1376 
(4th Ed. 2008). The dictionary defines the word "advanced" as "ahead or beyond others in progress, 
complexity, etc." Id. at 20. 
Second, loolung at the term's placement withn the text of section 101(a)(15)(L), the AAO notes that 
specialized knowledge is used to describe the nature of a person's employment and that the term is listed 
among the higher levels of the employment herarchy with "managerial" and "executive" employees. Based 
on the context of the term withn the statute, the AAO would expect a specialized knowledge employee to be 
an elevated class of workers withn a company and not an ordinary or average employee. See 1756, Inc. v. 
Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. 9, 14 (D.D.C., 1990). 
Third, the le~slative history indicates that the origmal drafters intended the class of aliens eligble for the L-1 
classification would be "narrowly drawn" and "carehlly regulated and monitored" by USCIS. See generally 
H.R. Rep. No. 91-851 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750, 2754, 1970 WL 5815. The legislative 
history of the 1970 Act plainly states that "the number of temporary admissions under the proposed 'L' 
category will not be large." Id. This legislative hstory has been widely viewed as supporting a narrow 
reading of the definition of specialized knowledge and the L-1 visa classification in general. See 1756, Inc. v. 
Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 15-16; Boi Na Braza Atlanta, LLC v. Upchurch, Not Reported in 
F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 2372846 at *4 (N.D.Tex., 2005), aj'd 194 Fed.Appx. 248 (5th Cir. 2006); American 
Auto. Ass'n v. Attorney General, Not Reported in FSupp., 1991 WL 222420 (D.D.C. 1991); Fibermaster, 
Ltd. v. INS., Not Reported in F.Supp., 1990 WL 99327 (D.D.C., 1990); Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Dept. of 
Justice, Civ. Action 00-2977-LFO (D.D.C. April 6,2001)(on file with MO). 
Although the Immigration Act of 1990 provided a statutory definition of the term "specialized knowledge," 
the definition did not expand the class of persons eligble for L-IB specialized knowledge visas. Pub.L. No. 
101-649, tj 206(b)(2), 104 Stat. 4978, 5023 (1990). Instead, the legislative history indicates that that 
Congress created the statutory definition of specialized knowledge for the express purpose of clarifLing a 
previously undefined term from the Immigration Act of 1970. H.R. Rep. 101-723(I) (1990), reprinted in 
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710,6749, 1990 WL 200418 ("One area within the L visa that requires more specificity 
relates to the term 'specialized knowledge.' Varying interpretations by INS have exacerbated the problem."). 
While the 1990 Act declined to extend the "proprietary knowledge" and "United States labor market" 
references that had existed in the existing agency definition, there is no indication that Congress intended to 
liberalize the L- 1 B visa classification. 
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If any conclusion can be drawn from the ultimate statutory definition of specialized knowledge and the 
changes made to the legacy INS regulatory definition, the point would be based on the nature of the 
Congressional clarification itself Prior to the 1990 Act, legacy INS pursued a bright-line test of specialized 
knowledge by including a "proprietary knowledge" element in the regulatory definition. See 8 C.F.R. $ 
214,2(1)(l)(ii)(D) (1988). By deleting ths element in the ultimate statutory definition and further 
emphasizing the relativistic aspect of "special knowledge," Congress created a standard that requires USCIS 
to make a factual determination that can only be determined on a case-by-case basis, based on the agency's 
expertise and discretion. Rather than a bright-line standard that would support a more rigid application of the 
law, Congress gave legacy INS a more flexible standard that requires an adjudication based on the facts and 
circumstances of each individual case. Cf Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 369, 377 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(quoting Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89, 91 (9th Cir.1988)). 
Accordingly, as a baseline, the terms "special" or "advanced" must mean more than simply skilled or 
experienced. By itself, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically complex products will not 
equal "special knowledge." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 53 (Comm. 1982). Specialized 
knowledge requires more than a short period of experience, otherwise "special" or "advanced" knowledge 
would include every employee in an organization with the exception of trainees and entry-level staff. If 
everyone in an organization is specialized, then no one can be considered truly specialized. 
Considering the definition of specialized knowledge, it is the petitioner's fundamental burden to articulate 
and prove that an alien possesses "special" or "advanced" knowledge. Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 
U.S.C. 3 1184(c)(2)(B). USCIS cannot make a factual determination regarding the beneficiary's 
specialized knowledge if the petitioner does not, at a minimum, articulate with specificity the nature of 
the claimed specialized knowledge, describe how such knowledge is typically gained within the 
organization, and explain how and when the beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
After articulating the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and type of evidence 
which establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized knowledge. A petitioner's 
assertion that the alien possesses an advanced level of knowledge of the processes and procedures of the 
company must be supported by evidence describing and setting apart that knowledge from the elementary 
or basic knowledge possessed by others. Because "special" and "advanced" are comparative terms, the 
petitioner should provide evidence that allows USCIS to assess the beneficiary's knowledge relative to 
others in the petitioner's workforce or relative to similarly employed workers in the petitioner's industry. 
In examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's 
description of the job duties and the weight of the evidence supporting any asserted specialized knowledge. 
See 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed job description of the services to be 
performed sufficient to establish specialized knowledge. In this case, the petitioner fails to establish that the 
beneficiary's proposed position in Puerto Rico requires an employee with specialized knowledge or that 
the beneficiary has specialized knowledge. 
In the present matter, the petitioner has provided a generic description of the beneficiary's intended 
employment with the Puerto &can entity. Specifically, the petitioner asserts that the main functions of the 
EAC 08 029 51314 
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beneficiary's proposed position are training other floral designers on staff and arrangng and assembling 
arrangements for various events and functions. The petitioner, however, has not sufficiently documented 
how the beneficiary's performance of the proposed job duties distinguishes hs knowledge as specialized. 
The petitioner repeatedly states throughout the record that the beneficiary is inherently an artist, and through 
his own creativity and the experience he gained with the foreign entity by worlung with flower varieties and 
design trends, is thus instilled with special and advanced knowledge of the petitioner's procedures with 
regard to flower arranging and handling. 
As stated above, it is the petitioner's fundamental burden to articulate and prove that an alien possesses 
"special" or "advanced" knowledge. Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1184(c)(2)(B). CIS 
cannot make a factual determination regarding the beneficiary's specialized knowledge if the petitioner 
does not, at a minimum, articulate with specificity the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, 
describe how such knowledge is typically gained within the organization, and explain how and when the 
beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
No details were provided regarding the type of specific training, if any, the beneficiary received during 
his employment with the foreign entity. Moreover, the petitioner on appeal relies upon a certificate 
affirming that the beneficiary has conducted floral arranging workshops since 1995 as a basis for his 
specialized knowledge; however, no discussion of how he learned the skills necessary to conduct these 
courses, or the manner in which his skills are substantially different fiom other employees of the 
petitioner, is submitted. Essentially, the petition is based on the petitioner's claim that the beneficiary is 
inherently artistic and creative and thus possesses specialized knowledge not normally possessed by the 
petitioner's other employees or floral arrangers. Specifically, counsel claims in the response to the 
request for evidence that "some people are born with it, but most are not." This statement is simply 
insufficient to overcome the well-reasoned conclusions cited by the director as a basis for the denial. The 
beneficiary's artistic ability does not equate to, nor is it relevant to, the issue of whether he possesses 
specialized knowledge specific to the petitioning organization. 
In this matter, the petitioner has omitted any discussion of the nature of the beneficiary's knowledge. For 
example, what truly distinguishes the beneficiary's shlls from other floral arrangers or colleagues? Are there 
types of unique or exotic flowers implemented in the petitioner's designs that distinguish these designs from 
competitors, and if so, what type of training is required to work with such arrangements? The petitioner 
provides no details regarding any aspects of the petitioner's business which would distinguish the petitioner's 
processes as uncommon or distinctive and thus lead to a conclusion that the beneficiary's knowledge was 
likewise uncommon or distinctive. The Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not 
sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N 
Dec. 158, 165 (Cornm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. 
Comm. 1 972)). 
In the present matter, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary's training, work experience, 
or knowledge in the floral business is more special or advanced than the knowledge possessed by others 
employed by the petitioner, or in the industry. It is clear that the petitioner considers the beneficiary to be an 
important employee of the organization. The AAO, likewise, does not dispute the fact that the beneficiary's 
EAC 08 029 5 13 14 
Page 9 
knowledge has allowed him to competently perform his job in the foreign entity. However, the successful 
completion of one's job duties does not establish possession of specialized knowledge or establish 
employment that requires specialized knowledge. 
For this reason, the proposed Puerto Rican position does not appear to require specialized knowledge. 
While the position of Chief Floral Designer may require a comprehensive knowledge of the manner in 
which to choose, assemble and arrange flowers and instruct others in such methods, there is no 
documentation, other than counsel's assertions, that the beneficiary must possess advanced, "specialized 
knowledge" as defined in the regulations and the Act. On appeal, counsel asserts that "the uncommon 
combination of skills and art that the Beneficiary has cannot be easily transferred or taught to another 
individual." This statement alone is insufficient to establish that the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge or that the proposed position requires specialized knowledge. As previously stated, without 
documentary evidence to support the claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's 
burden of proof. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 
19 I&N Dec. at 534; Matter of Laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1; Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. at 
506. 
Based on the evidence presented, it is concluded that the beneficiary does not possess specialized 
knowledge, nor would the beneficiary be employed in a capacity requiring specialized knowledge. For 
this reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has failed to establish that a qualifying relationship 
exists between the foreign entity and the Puerto Rican company. The petitioner claims on Form 1-129 
that the petitioner in this matter is the subsidiary of the foreign entity. However, it also states that two 
individuals, and his wife, are the owners of both companies. 
Therefore, the proper analysis is this matter is whether the two companies are affiliates. 
Pursuant to the regulation at 8 C.F.R. fj 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(L), "affiliate" means 
(I) One of two subsidiaries both of which are owned and controlled by the same parent or 
individual, or 
(2) One of two legal entities owned and controlled by the same group of individuals, each 
individual owning and controlling approximately the same share or proportion of each entity, 
or 
(3) In the case of a partnership that is organized in the United States to provide accounting 
services along with managerial andlor consulting services and that markets its accounting 
services under an internationally recognized name under an agreement with a worldwide 
coordinating organization that is owned and controlled by the member accounting firms, a 
partnership (or similar organization) that is organized outside the United States to provide 
accounting services shall be considered to be an affiliate of the United States partnership if it 
markets its accounting services under the same internationally recognized name under the 
EAC 08 029 51314 
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agreement with the worldwide coordinating organization of which the United States 
partnership is also a member. 
In this matter, the petitioner has submitted documentation to demonstrate that the foreign entity is owned 
In support of the contention that these two 
individuals also own the petitioner in equal amounts, the petitioner has submitted copies of ten stock 
certificates. Certificates one through nine are marked "canceled," and certificate ten is issued to 
ten, and the petitioner's submission of a marriage 
, the petitioner contends that the affiliate relationship has been 
satisfied. The AAO disagrees. 
The regulation and case law confirm that ownership and control are the factors that must be examined in 
determining whether a qualifying relationship exists between United States and foreign entities for 
purposes of this visa classification. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593 (BIA 
1988); see also Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986); Matter of 
Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 (Comm. 1982). In the context of this visa petition, ownership refers to the 
direct or indirect legal right of possession of the assets of an entity with full power and authority to 
control; control means the direct or indirect legal right and authority to direct the establishment, 
management, and operations of an entity. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 
595. 
The petitioner's assertions that a qualifying relationship exists are flawed for two reasons. First, as 
general evidence of a petitioner's claimed qualifying relationship, stock certificates alone are not 
sufficient evidence to determine whether a stockholder maintains ownership and control of a corporate 
entity. The corporate stock certificate ledger, stock certificate registry, corporate bylaws, and the minutes 
of relevant annual shareholder meetings must also be examined to determine the total number of shares 
issued, the exact number issued to the shareholder, and the subsequent percentage ownership and its 
effect on corporate control. Additionally, a petitioning company must disclose all agreements relating to 
the voting of shares, the distribution of profit, the management and direction of the subsidiary, and any 
other factor affecting actual control of the entity. See Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N 
Dec. 362. Without full disclosure of all relevant documents, USCIS is unable to determine the elements 
of ownership and control. 
In this matter, the petitioner relies upon stock certificate number 10, which indicates that the beneficiary 
is the owner of 750 shares of the foreign entity. However, it is noted for the record that this certificate is 
not dated, which leads to questions regarding the validity of this document. Moreover, the petitioner has 
failed to submit evidence pertaining to the actual dates of transfer of the canceled certificates. As stated 
above, this is the reason that all relevant documents, including the stock ledger, must be examined to 
determine the validity of the petitioner's claims of ownership and control. Since the petitioner has failed 
to sufficiently document the ownership of the foreign entity, a qualifying relationship cannot be 
concluded. For this additional reason, the petition may not be approved. 
EAC08 02951314 
Page 11 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied 
by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial 
decision. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), 
affd. 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting 
that the AAO reviews appeals on a de novo basis). 
When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a challenge 
only if she shows that the AAO abused it discretion with respect to all of the AAO's enumerated grounds. 
See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), affd. 345 
F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit 
sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden 
has not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.