dismissed L-1B Case: Food Retail

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
MATTER OF M-AA- LLC 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
DATE: FEB. 27,2017 
APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER DECISION 
PETITION: FORM I-129, PETITION FOR A NONIMMIGRANT WORKER 
The Petitioner, a specialty ice cream retailer, seeks to temporarily employ the Beneficiary as an ice 
cream maker under the L-1 B nonimmigrant classification for intracompany transferees. See 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 101(a)(l5)(L), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(l5)(L). The L­
IB classification allows a corporation or other legal entity (including its affiliate or subsidiary) to 
transfer a qualifying foreign employee with "specialized knowledge" to work temporarily in the 
United States. 
The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition. The Director concluded that (1) the 
Beneficiary does not have the requisite 1 year of continuous employment abroad with a qualifying 
entity and (2) the Petitioner did not establish that the Beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or 
that he was employed abroad and that he would be employed in the United States in a specialized 
knowledge capacity. 
The matter is now before us on appeal. In its appeal, the Petitioner submits additional evidence and 
asserts that the Director misapplied guidance set forth in a 2015 United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) policy memorandum regarding the adjudication of L-1 B petitions. 1 
In reviewing the evidence of record, we find that the Petitioner provided sufficient evidence to 
establish that the Beneficiary was employed abroad in a full-time capacity for 1 continuous year in 
the 3 years preceding the filing of the petition. As such, we hereby withdraw the Director's adverse 
finding on this issue. 
Upon de novo review; we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the 
criteria outlined in section 101 ( a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must 
have employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized 
1 
USCIS Policy Memorandum PM-602-0 Ill, L-1 B Adjudications Policy (Aug. 17, 20 15), https://www.uscis.gov/laws/ 
policy-memoranda. 
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Matter of M-AA- LLC 
knowledge capacity, for 1 continuous year within the 3 years preceding the beneficiary's application 
for admission into the United States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the U.S. 
temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or 
affiliate. 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(B), provides the statutory definition of 
specialized knowledge: 
For purposes of section 101 (a)(l5)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level ofknowledge of processes and procedures of the company . . 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(D) defines specialized knowledge as: 
[S]pecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's 
product, service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its 
application in international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in 
the organization's processes and procedures. 
An individual L-IB petition filed on Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker, must be 
accompanied by evidence that the beneficiary's prior year of employment abroad was in a position 
that was managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge, evidence that the beneficiary's 
prior education, training and employment qualifies him/her to perform the intended services in the 
United States, and a detailed description of the services to be performed in a specialized knowledge 
capacity in the United States. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3). ' 
II. EMPLOYMENT IN A SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE CAPACITY 
The issue to be addressed is whether the Petitioner established that the Beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge and whether he has been employed abroad and will be employed in the 
United States in a specialized knowledge capacity. 
A. Evidence of Record 
The Petitioner is a specialty ice cream retailer, established in 2009, that operates 10 stores in the 
area. On the Form I-129, the Petitioner claimed 125 U.S. employees and a gross income of 
over $2.8 million. In a supporting statement signed by president of the U.S. entity, 
1 the Petitioner stated that it "is in need of knowledgeable and experienced ice cream makers to 
oversee and assist with preparation of the food items sold at retail by the company." 
stated that the Beneficiary's role as ice cream maker would include the following job duties: (1) 
training employees how to mix, prepare, cook, store, and serve the Petitioner's specialty ice cream 
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Matter of M-AA- LLC 
products; (2) overseeing how the ice cream is prepared and served; and (3) creating new recipes, 
menus, and products. 
claimed that the ice cream maker position requires several years of training and 
experience in preparing ice cream that is based on "unique Belizean regional recipes" and requires 
knowledge of the Petitioner's "specific preparation and sales methods." She indicated that the 
Beneficiary is an ideal candidate for the U.S. position because "he has been intimately involved with 
ice cream preparation and sales at company retail locations for over one year" and possesses "an 
irreproducible understanding" of the practices and methods to make and sell the company's food 
products as well as the best strategies for growing the business. indicated that the U.S. 
position is "identical" to the one the Beneficiary currently holds in his position with 
its claimed affiliate located in Belize. She emphasized that workers who can perform the proposed 
duties "are not available outside of the region of Belize [sic], and outside of our 
organization." 
In a separate statement, who identified himself as co-owner of the foreign 
entity, stated that the Beneficiary's "knowledge of ice cream preparation and service methods is 
critical to [the Petitioner]'s competitive advantage." further stated that the Beneficiary 
has "an incomparable understanding of our regionally-based products, processes, and goals that 
cannot be easily transferred or taught to another individual." 
The Director reviewed the Petitioner's submission and issued a request for evidence (RFE). The 
Director instructed the Petitioner to provide, in part, a letter from the foreign entity's authorized 
representative and from the U.S. Petitioner describing the Beneficiary's specialized knowledge job 
duties, explaining how the Beneficiary's knowledge is special or advanced, how the required 
knowledge compares to others within the same company and within the same industry, and the 
minimum time and training required to obtain such knowledge. 
In response to the RFE, the Petitioner provided a statement discussing the regional origins of its ice 
cream products as well as the specific steps and technique required to prepare them, pointing out that 
the "general techniques" for making this ice cream originated in the Mexican state of and 
that workers who make the ice cream need experience and knowledge in how to make adjustments 
without having to consult guides or recipes. The Petitioner stated that its stores are losing business 
because it does not currently have the personnel to make the ice cream products correctly. 
The Petitioner stated that the Beneficiary has been employed by the foreign entity and its 
predecessor for over 2 years and claimed that the Beneficiary's knowledge is both special and 
advanced. In explaining how the Beneficiary's knowledge is special, the Petitioner stated that the 
Beneficiary "acts as a trained expert" in the company's ice cream products, which he prepares by 
using the company's proprietary recipes and methods and which he then teaches to other employees 
whom he oversees as they prepare and serve the products to customers. With regard to the 
Beneficiary's claimed advanced knowledge, the Petitioner stated that the Beneficiary develops new 
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Matter of M-AA- LLC 
recipes, menus, and products and that he possesses knowledge of the company's ice cream products 
that only few other employees within the company also have. 
The Petitioner also compared itself to the petitioner in Fogo De Chao Inc. v. DHS, 769 F.3d 1127 
(D.C. Cir. 2014), a circuit court decision in which the court held that a beneficiary's cultural 
exposure to regional food preparation and serving techniques over a period of time should be 
considered in determining whether the Beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. The Petitioner 
stated that its recipes are "a proprietary subset of an already regionally-specific type of food 
product" and claimed that it would take "several years of training for any external employee to 
become a comparable expert" in the Petitioner's products. The Petitioner also differentiated the 
Beneficiary's knowledge from that of other employees performing similar work within the industry, 
claiming that the Beneficiary's duties are "more sophisticated" and "require knowledge that can be 
gained only through experience within the organization," given that such knowledge includes 
proprietary recipes and methods of creating the ice cream products. 
The Petitioner also provided the Beneficiary's employment record, which was created by 
predecessor, where the Beneficiary started working as an ice cream maker in 
December 2013.2 The job description for an ice cream maker with indicates that the 
position called for an employee with a minimum of 1 year of experience and a good memory such 
that the individual would be able to make over 100 flavors of popsicle/ice cream, know the exact 
amounts and ingredients for each product, and know the different temperatures for the popsicle/ice 
cream machine and refrigerator. The "additional notes" section of the record indicates that the job 
candidate was required to complete 52 hours of weekly training for a period of 3 months. The 
employment record contains the Beneficiary's signature, indicating an employment start or 
acceptance date of December 13, 2013 as well as the signature of the trainer, 
indicating that the Beneficiary completed his training by March 15, 2014, approximately 3 months 
after the date the Beneficiary commenced employment at 
In a separate sworn statement, restated the Beneficiary's job duties and 
indicated that the Beneficiary's position "[r]equires unique knowledge of regional methods for the 
cooking of paletas and nieves and of our unique recipes and varieties" in order to train other 
employees to assist in creating the ice cream products that are sold by the foreign entity. 
claimed that the Beneficiary possesses advanced knowledge of regional methods and recipes and 
that his "knowledge of foreign operating conditions ... will be of significant value to the U.S. 
Petitioner." He further claimed that the Beneficiary "has many years of experience," which "sets 
him apart from the vast majority of his colleagues" to whom referred as "simple salesmen 
and saleswomen." He asserted . that the Beneficiary "significantly enhanced [the company's] 
competitiveness and 
financial position" in that he "perfected the manufacture of [the company's 
2 The Petitioner indicated that its claimed foreign affiliate, purchased a previously 
existing ice cream business, where the Beneficiary was employed prior to the change in ownership and which specialized 
in making and selling similar ice cream products. 
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Matter of M-AA- LLC 
product] based upon his experience and his sense of the appropriate proportions, temperatures, and 
"ingredients" and that he increased the company's sales by creating new flavors and menu items. 
In addition, the Petitioner provided photocopies of various articles published in local and 
area publications that discussed the Mexican-style ice cream shops that serve similar 
products as the Petitioner. 
In denying the petition, the Director found that the Beneficiary ' s job duties were those typical of an 
ice cream maker and the Petitioner had 
not established that such duties require special or advanced 
knowledge. The Director pointed out that an employee's familiarity with and use of the company's 
products, processes, and goals does not necessarily equate to specialized knowledge. The Director 
questioned how the Beneficiary's education , training, and experience resulted in specialized 
knowledge of his employer's product or techniques or an advanced level of knowledge of or 
expertise in the company's processes and procedures. 
On appeal, the Petitioner disputes the Director's conclusion , asserting that the Beneficiary ' s 
knowledge ofthe company's "specialized process for making dozens of ice cream recipes based on a 
unique regional product and process" qualifies as specialized knowledge. The Petitioner asserts that 
the Beneficiary's knowledge goes beyond mere memorization of recipes, claiming that his 
knowledge is specialized because it enables him to "personally create, develop, and make over 100 
flavors of ice cream" by using "the nuanced, specific, and finicky process of creation involving 
constant monitoring, calculation, and re-calculation to ensure the appropriate flavor and 
consistency." The Petitioner again compares the Beneficiary in this instance to the beneficiary in 
Fogo De Chao, asserting that he "has been exposed for a significant period of time to cultural and 
culinary environments and techniques that distinguish him from other" employees who make ice 
cream. The Petitioner again contends that the Director's decision constitutes a misapplication of 
USCIS' 2015 L-1B adjudications policy memorandum. 
B. Analysis 
Upon review, we agree with the Director ' s decision. The record does not establish that the 
Beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that he has been employed abroad or would be 
employed in the United States in a specialized knowledge capacity as defined at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(1)( 1 )(ii)(D). 
The statutory definition of specialized knowledge at Section 214(c)(2)(8) of the Act is comprised of 
two equal but distinct subparts. First, an individual is considered to be employed in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge if that person "has a special knowledge of the company product 
and its application in international markets." Second, an individual is considered to be serving in a 
capacity involving specialized knowledge if that person "has an advanced level of knowledge of 
_.., processes and procedures of the company." See also 8 C.P.R. § 214.2(1)(1 )(li)(D). The petitioner 
may establish eligibility by submitting evidence that the beneficiary and the proffered position 
satisfy either prong of the definition. 
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Matter of M-AA- LLC 
Once a petitioner articulates the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and 
type of evidence which establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized 
knowledge. USCIS cannot make a factual determination regarding the beneficiary's specialized 
knowledge if the petitioner does not, at a minimum, atiiculate with specificity the nature of its 
products and services or processes and procedures, the nature of the specific industry or field 
involved, and the nature of the beneficiary's knowledge. The petitioner should also describe how 
such knowledge is typically gained within the organization, and explain how and when the 
beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
As both "special" and "advanced" are relative terms, determining whether a given beneficiary's 
knowledge ·is "special" or "advanced" inherently requires a comparison of the beneficiary's 
knowledge against that of others. With respect to either special or advanced knowledge, the 
petitioner ordinarily must demonstrate that the beneficiary's knowledge is not commonly held 
throughout the particular industry and cannot be easily imparted from one person to another. The 
ultimate question is whether the petitioner has met its burden of demonstrating by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the beneficiary's knowledge or expertise is advanced or special, and that the 
beneficiary's position requires such knowledge. 
In the present matter, the Petitioner's claims are based on the first and second prongs of the statutory 
definition, asserting that the Beneficiary has both special knowledge of the company's products and 
their application in international markets and that he has an advanced level of knowledge of the 
company's methods for making those products. 
A. Special Knowledge 
Because "special knowledge" concerns knowledge of the employing organization's products or 
services and its application in international markets, the petitioner may meet its burden through 
evidence that the beneficiary has knowledge that is distinct or uncommon in comparison to the 
knowledge of other similarly employed workers in the particular industry. · 
Here, the Petitioner asserts that the Beneficiary has special knowledge of the company's products 
and techniques that are distinct from those found in the industry at large. However, the Petitioner 
has not thoroughly explained its position or provided sufficient evidence to support its claims. 
Specifically, while the Petitioner claims that the Beneficiary has proprietary knowledge of the 
company's recipes and of the "specialized process for making" different flavors of ice cream and 
popsicles, the Petitioner does not establish that such knowledge is special. Knowledge that is 
company-specific or proprietary must still be shown to be distinct or uncommon compared to that 
generally found in the particular industry, and does not qualify as special knowledge if it can be 
easily imparted from one person to another. Therefore, we must look at the means by which the 
claimed specialized knowledge was gained by the Beneficiary and . the amount of training or 
experience required fqr the position. 
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Matter of M-AA- LLC 
While the Beneficiary's employment record with indicates that the Beneficiary was 
required to have "[ m ]inimum 1-year experience" to qualify for the position of ice cream maker, the 
job description does not specify what specific type of experience is required. As such, it is unclear 
whether the Beneficiary was required to have a year of experience as a maker of Mexican-style ice 
cream or whether he was merely required to have a year of experience in the work force or in the 
food industry in general. In fact, the record lacks evidence to establish that the Beneficiary had any 
experience as an ice cream maker prior to joining in December 2013, as the 
Petitioner has not described his employment history. 
Also, while the same employment record indicates that the Beneficiary completed 3 months of 
weekly training sessions, the Petitioner did not provide a training manual, specifically describe the 
nature or content of the training sessions to establish what skills or information the training sessions 
conveyed to the Beneficiary, or specify how the training pertained directly to the Petitioner's 
specialized knowledge claim. Again, it is unclear whether any previous experience in ice cream 
making or the food industry is required for the position , so we cannot assume that the entire 3 
months was devoted to proprietary or company-specific information , as opposed to general food 
handling procedures. Absent a detailed description or documentation of its training program, the 
Petitioner has not provided evidence to support its claim that the Beneficiary ' s employment involves 
"trade secrets requiring 'extensive training.'" 
Although the Petitioner referred to the supporting document as an employment agreement, a review 
of the evidence shows that it is not, in fact, an employment agreement, but rather that it is the above 
referenced employment record, which shows the Beneficiary's original position with 
the dates the position was opened and closed to applicants, the position requirements, and 
confirmation of the Beneficiary ' s . training completion . While the document indicates that each 
flavor has its own recipe, it neither mentions "trade secrets" nor specifically states that the 
Beneficiary's position would involve working with "proprietary and unique knowledge." 
Further, although the Petitioner refers to the Beneficiary's proprietary knowledge of company 
processes and recipes, we note that the Petitioner's claimed qualifying relationship with the 
Beneficiary's foreign employer did not exist prior to June 2016, approximately 1 month prior to the 
filing of the petition. The Petitioner has not stated that its chain of stores, which was established in 
Illinois in 2009, is using the same recipes and techniques of the previously unrelated business in 
Belize with which it now claims an affiliate relationship. Therefore , it is reasonable to believe that 
the Beneficiary's services are being sought primarily based on his general knowledge of Mexican ice 
cream making techniques, rather than on any company-specific knowledge he acquired with 
or its predecessor. 
On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the Beneficiary's knowledge does not need to be narrowly 
held within the organization as indicated in the 2015 L-1 B policy memorandum. However, the same 
document clearly interprets specialized knowledge as a relative term, as it states that regardless of 
whether a petitioner's specialized knowledge claim is based on special or advanced knowledge , the 
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Matter of M-AA- LLC 
petitiOner ordinarily must demonstrate that the beneficiary's knowledge is not commonly held 
throughout the particular industry. Here, the Petitioner has not made 
this distinction. 
The Petitioner provided magazine and newspaper articles 
which indicate that there is a trend of 
similar Mexican ice cream stores opening in and other major metropolitan areas such as 
The Petitioner has not distinguished the Beneficiary's knowledge of its products as 
uncommon when compared to the knowledge of other ice cream makers who work at other Mexican 
ice cream stores, which are increasingly prevalent in the United States. Moreover, other than 
claiming that its techniques and recipes are "regional," the Petitioner has not attempted to 
differentiate the knowledge required to make Mexican varieties of ice cream from the knowledge 
required to make other types of ice cream and similar products. 
The Petitioner points to the Beneficiary's ability to become proficient in the specific technique for 
making Mexican-style ice cream products; however, the fact that its RFE response includes the 
complete 6-step process for making a lime-flavored Mexican-style ice cream without distinguishing 
its own process from that used by other stores that make and sell similar products undermines the 
claim that the Beneficiary's knowledge of the Petitioner's process is uncommon within the Mexican 
ice cream-making industry, or within the ice cream industry in general. The Petitioner's claim that 
the Beneficiary has the ability to make adjustments during the ice cream-making process through 
"constant monitoring, calculation, and re-calculation to ensure the appropriate flavor and 
consistency" does not establish that the type of adjustments the Beneficiary makes or the way he 
makes them is distinct when compared to other ice cream makers within the Mexican ice cream­
making industry. 
The Petitioner again refers to the federal court case of Fogo De Chao, asserting that, like the 
beneficiary in the cited court case, the Beneficiary in the instant case "has been exposed for a 
significant period of time to cultural and culinary environments and techniques that distinguish him 
from other [i]ce [c]ream [m]akers .... " The Petitioner has not established, however, that the facts 
and circumstances in the matter at hand are analogous to those in the cited court case, as the 
Petitioner offers no evidence to establish that the Beneficiary's knowledge was "gained through ... 
upbringing" or that it was "acquired over time through cultural exposure." 769 F.3d at 1140. 
Instead, the Petitioner claims that it would take "several years of training for any external employee 
to become a comparable expert" and contends that the Beneficiary's duties are "distinct from and 
more sophisticated that those of other employees performing similar work." However, the record 
contains insufficient evidence to support these assertions. 
As discussed, the, Beneficiary's work history with does not establish that the 
Beneficiary had prior experience as an ice cream maker. As stated above, the job requirements for 
the Beneficiary's position are unclear as to whether the minimum 1 year of prior employment must 
have been in the position of ice cream maker. Further, while the employment record indicates that 
the Beneficiary received some form of training, the Petitioner offered no supporting documentation 
to establish the nature of the training, such that we can reasonably conclude that the Beneficiary 
spent 3 months actually learning how to make ice cream within the context of the employer's 
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Matter of M-AA- LLC 
proprietary recipes and according to techniques that were specific to the employer. Nowhere in the 
record did the Petitioner provide evidence to corroborate the claim that the Beneficiary's knowledge 
took "several years" to acquire such that the Petitioner would be economica!Jy disadvantaged if the 
Beneficiary was not granted the desired nonimmigrant classification. 
The Petitioner has not explained what characteristics the Beneficiary possesses that set his 
knowledge apart as "more sophisticated" than that of other employees. As indicated in the 
Beneficiary's job description, one of his job duties includes training others who work under him to 
make ice cream using the same recipes and techniques as the Beneficiary himself uses. There is no 
evidence in the record to indicate that it has taken and would take the Beneficiary years to complete 
the training of subordinate employees to pass on his knowledge of making pal etas and nieves, much 
like there is little evidence to indicate that it took the Beneficiary years to acquire that same 
knowledge. The Petitioner must support its assertions with relevant, probative, and credible 
evidence. See Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. at 3 76. 
Moreover, we note that the circuit court holding in Fogo De Chao is not binding on us in our 
determination of the Petitioner's eligibility in the instant matter, which does not fall within same 
circuit as the cited case. In contrast to a practice of acquiescence to the holdings of a circuit court in 
cases arising within the jurisdiction of that circuit, we are not required to accept an adverse 
determination by one circuit court of appeals as binding throughout the United States. Matter of 
Anselmo, 20 I&N Dec. 25, 31 (BIA 1989); cf "Matter of K-S-, 20 I&N Dec. 715, 719 (BIA 1993). 
Although the reasoning underlying a circuit court's decision will be given due consideration, as we 
have done in the matter at hand, when the decision is properly before us, the analysis does not have 
to be followed as a matter of law. See Afatter of Anselmo, 20 I&N Dec. at 31. . . . 
B. Advanced Knowledge 
Next, we will address the Petitioner's claim that the Beneficiary has advanced knowledge. Because 
"advanced knowledge" concerns knowledge of an organization's processes and procedures, the 
Petitioner may meet its burden through evidence that the Beneficiary has knowledge of or expertise 
in the organization's processes and procedures that is greatly developed or further along in progress, 
complexity and understanding in comparison to other workers in the employer's operations. Such 
advanced knowledge must be supported by evidence setting that knowledge apart from the 
elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others . 
.. 
In the present matter, the Petitioner originally claimed that the Beneficiary has "an iiTeproducible 
understanding and grasp" of its "practices and methods" as well as "optimal strategies and 
approaches" for selling the products and growing the company. However, as indicated above, given 
that one of the Beneficiary's key responsibilities is to train other employees to make the ice cream 
products that the Petitioner sells is inconsistent with the claim that his knowledge is 
"iiTeproducible." Further, the Petitioner did not specify any practices or methods that are specific to 
its organization and not commonly found within the industry; nor did the Petitioner specifically 
identify what strategies and approaches the Beneficiary has created to ensure optimal sales and 
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Matter of M-AA- LLC 
company growth. Finally, as discussed, the Petitioner has not established that the "practices and 
methods" used by are the same as those used by the petitioning entity, as the two 
companies were unrelated up until 1 month prior to the filing of the petition. 
In its RFE response statement, the Petitioner did not reassert these claims, but rather contended that 
the Beneficiary's advanced knowledge rests on 
his key job duties, which include training employees, 
overseeing their preparation and service of the company's products, and developing new recipes, 
menus, and products for sale. However, the Petitioner has not established that the Beneficiary ' s 
performance of these job duties is somehow uncommon within the industry and that the 
Beneficiary's ability to perform these job duties is an indication that his knowledge is greatly 
developed or further aiong in progress, complexity and understanding than that generally found 
within the employer. In fact, the Petitioner did not provide evidence or information that would allow 
us to compare his knowledge and experience to that held by other employees of the foreign entity or 
the petitioning enti~y. Rather, it appears that the Beneficiary's job duties, and the knowledge 
required to perform such duties, have been and will be typical of an ice cream maker in the Mexican 
ice cream industry. 
Accordingly, we find the evidence submitted does not establish that the Beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge and that he was and will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity. 
See Section 214(c)(2)(B) ofthe Act. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed. 
III. QUALIFYING RELATIONSHIP 
Although not addressed by the Director, the Petitioner has not submitted sufficient evidence to 
establish that it has a qualifying relationship with the Beneficiary ' s foreign employer. To establish a 
"qualifying relationship" under the Act and the regulations, the Petitioner must show that the 
Beneficiary's foreign employer and the proposed U.S. employer are the same employer (i.e. one 
entity with "branch"· offices), or related as a "parent and subsidiary" or as "at1iliates." See section 
101(a)(l5)(L) of the Act; see also 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l)(ii) (providing definitions of the terms 
"parent," "branch," "subsidiary," and "affiliate"). 
The Petitioner states that it has an affiliate relationship with the Beneficiary ' s 
employer in Belize. Specifically , the Petitioner stated that it is 100% owned by 
while the foreign entity is "1 00% owned by and 
As evidence of its ownership, the Petitioner provided a screenshot from the Illinois Secretary of 
State website showing as the sole member on the company's "LLC Members" page. 
As evidence of the foreign entity's ownership, the Petitioner submitted a photograph of a 
"Certificate of Registration of Change of Name in Particulars Registered" issued by the Belize 
Companies and Corporate Affairs Registry on June 7, 2016. According to this certificate, a 
statement of change of ownership and address was filed by and on 
that date. 
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Matter of M-AA- LLC 
The Petitioner also stated it was submitting "wire transfers documenting transfer of 
funds to the foreign employer." This evidence documented that transferred a total of 
$4000 to in February 2016 and a total of $6500 to between April and June 
2016. The Petitioner did not provide any further details or evidence related to her claimed 
acquisition of an ownership interest in the foreign entity, such as a purchase agreement, operating 
agreement, or partnership agreement specifying the resulting ownership structure of the foreign 
entity. 
Upon review, the submitted evidence is insufficient to establish the ownership of either the U.S. 
Petitioner or the foreign entity. While the minimal evidence submitted suggests that 
may be the sole owner of the U.S. entity as claimed, the Petitioner has not specifically identified her 
claimed ownership interest in the foreign entity, other than stating that she is a "part-owner." In 
order for the two entities to qualify as affiliates, the Petitioner must establish through submission of 
documentary evidence that owns at least a majority interest in both entities and 
controls both entities. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(L). The Petitioner has not met that burden. For 
this additional reason, the petition cannot 
be approved. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the. benefit sought remains entirely 
with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 136. Here the Petitioner has not met that 
burden. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
Cite as Matter of M-AA- LLC, ID# 227582 (AAO Feb, 27, 2017) 
II