dismissed L-1B Case: Food Service

U.S. Departmel~t of Homeland Seclrrity 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
,aentlfyia@j cicktPxl Ut U. S. Citizenship 
prevelrt clearly u nw arrante 
and Services Immigration 
tnvdo~ of oersonal prlvact 
PUBLIC COPY 
File: WAC 04 058 52479 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: SEP 0 5 2W6 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 10 1(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
WAC 04 058 52479 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: 
 The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seelung to employ the beneficiary as an L-1B nonimmigrant 
intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a corporation organized in the State of 
Delaware that operates a chain of fast food restaurants in California. The petitioner claims that it is the 
subsidiary of, located in the Philippines. The beneficiary has been employed in 
the United States in L-1B status by the petitioner's affiliate since January 2001. The petitioner filed the instant 
petition to request an amendment of the beneficiary's status pursuant to an upcoming merger between the 
petitioner and the beneficiary's current L-1B employer. The petitioner now seeks to employ the beneficiary as 
its "Operations Manager I" for a two-year period. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has been and would be employed in a capacity that requires 
specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded it to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (CIS) approved three previous petitions filed on behalf of the beneficiary for the same 
position and contends that the director erred in denying the instant petition absent a finding that there was a 
material error with regard to the previous approvals, a substantial change in circumstances, or new material 
information that adversely impacts the petitioner's or beneficiary's eligibility. Counsel relies on an April 23, 
2004 CIS interoffice memorandum from William R. Yates, Associate Director for Operations, in support of 
her assertion that the director was required to give deference to the prior approved petitions. 
Counsel further asserts that the director considered "outdated and impermissible factors in defining 
specialized knowledge," and specifically questions the director's citation to 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 
745, F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1990); Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Cornrn. 1982); and Matter of Colley, 18 
I&N Dec. 117 (Comm. 1981). Counsel argues that the director failed to apply the proper and regulatory 
criteria, and current interpretations of specialized knowledge as outlined in two legacy Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS, now Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS)) policy memoranda issued in 
1994 and 2002, respectively. Counsel further asserts that the director erred by malung comparisons between 
the beneficiary's knowledge and that of other employees within the petitioner's organization and the 
petitioner's industry. Counsel contends that only an examination of knowledge possessed by the beneficiary is 
necessary under current standards. Counsel concludes that under current definitions and interpretations, the 
totality of the record establishes the beneficiary's eligibility for the benefit sought. Counsel submits a detailed 
brief and copies of the beneficiary's previous Form 1-797 Approval Notices in support of the appeal. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimrnigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L). Specifically, a qualifying 
organization must have employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a 
specialized knowledge capacity, for one continuous year within the three years preceding the beneficiary's 
application for admission into the United States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United 
WAC 04 058 52479 
Page 3 
States temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate 
thereof in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himlher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
This matter presents two related, but distinct issues: (1) whether the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge; and (2) whether the beneficiary's employment abroad and proposed U.S. employment is in a 
capacity that requires specialized knowledge. 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1184(c)(2)(B), provides the following: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines specialized knowledge as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes or procedures. 
The nonimrnigrant petition was filed on December 23, 2003. In a December 22, 2003 letter submitted in 
support of the petition, the petitioner indicated that the beneficiary would continue to serve as an "Operations 
Manager I," a position requiring "specialized knowledge of the products, presentation and service techniques 
that constitutes the trade secrets of the parent corporation." Specifically, the petitioner indicated that the 
beneficiary would perform the following duties: 
WAC 04 058 52479 
Page 4 
(1) Direct, coordinate the manner food service is presented in accordance with the 
processes, procedures established worldwide by [the foreign entity] to enable the [the 
petitioner's] food chain to compete in the market; 
(2) Educate the store crew team regarding the characteristic[s] of the company's unique 
product lines and processes; 
(3) Coordinate, train and manage the activities of the store crew as well as prospective 
managers in [the petitioner's] products, service techniques; 
(4) Direct, train U.S. employees of the corporation with established company policies, 
procedures and standards; 
(5) Impart [the foreign entity's] operational procedures to the new store crew and 
prospective managers in the various food chain activities unique to the company's 
standards and policies. 
The purpose of his important mission is to develop consistent service and product standards 
worldwide and to increase awareness of unique services and food products that have been 
uniquely developed by the mother company . . .. 
To perform these duties, the Operation Manager I must have knowledge 
presentation and services techniques that constitutes trade secrets of 
Corporation. The production methods, the quality services, the superior-tasting food, 
presentation and taste which result in superior quality products and high level of customer 
satisfaction are all as ects of the company that are unique to th-food chain which 
constitutes the culture." It is important to the success of this effort to transfer to the 
United States a mana er with the unique knowledge gained only from years of prior 
experience with th I& food chain. This knowledge of which is termed as the Iollibee 
culture and its superior unique quality pr 
 services cannot be duplicate 
general labor market and are proprietary to 
 It is knowledge that is unique t 
Foods Corporation's employees who have been involved in key position[s] in the 
development, production, promotion, of the product and operation of the food chain. 
In a letter dated December 22,2003, counsel for the petitioner referenced these duties and stated: 
The duties described above are different or unique from those performed by other workers of 
the petitioner. The [foreign entity's] fast food chain in [sic] expanding in the U.S. and the 
established characteristics of the company's unique business may be performed only by an 
individual with the "specialized knowledge" on [sic] the petitioner's business. The product 
and services of which the beneficiary has specialized knowledge may not be obtained from 
other U.S. employees considering the fact that this fast food chain is just starting its 
operations in the U.S. and that there are no available U.S. employees that are familiar with 
the unique product and trademark services of the [petitioner's] food chain. 
The beneficiary's training is exclusive and significantly unique in comparison to any other 
person in the field as operations manager. The beneficiary has been trained with th 
m 
WAC 04 058 52479 
Page 5 
Food Services and has obtained the manner and trademark for selling the type of products and 
services that are exclusive only to She has participated in the foreign company in 
various capacities and has been actually responsible in giving training, setting up systems for 
the food chains in the Philippines. . . . The knowledge obtained by the beneficiary 
can be gained only through extensive prior experience with the Jollibee. 
The petitioner indicated that immediately prior to his transfer to the United States, the beneficiary held the 
position of shift manager with the foreign entity, where he performed the following duties: 
(1) Leads lutchen crew to achieve highest standards of product quality and ensure that 
product is always available during shift; Leads counter and dining crew to achieve the 
highest standards of customer service and speed of service levels]; 
(2) Ensures that "clean as you go" is practiced by all crew; Ensures that cleanliness, 
orderliness and sanitation levels are maintained by all crew on shift. Makes sure that 
cleaning and preventive maintenance schedules are implemented as scheduled; 
(3) Implements travel path regularly and directs store crew to attend to identified food, 
service and cleanliness needs; Implements management activity checklists consistently 
that shift requirements are attended to; 
(4) Ensures that store is opened on time and that closing activities are not implemented 
prior to official store close; Ensures that proper shift endorsement is accomplished at all 
times for each incoming or outgoing Shift Manager; 
(5) Ensures that scheduled crew training are accomplished during shift; Provides coaching 
whenever necessary; 
(6) Ensures that discipline is maintained during shift; 
(7) Ensures that proper manning and positioning are implemented and that adjustments are 
done to achieve high food service cleanliness levels. 
The petitioner further noted that the beneficiary joined the foreign entity in 1990, and stated: 
[The beneficiary] has been strategically placed in the key 
 entity] to 
gain first hand knowledge essential to the successful promotion o 
 food products in 
the United States. 
This experience, through which [the beneficiary] developed this specialized knowledge of 
[the petitioner's] food chain's products and services, makes him a viable candidate for the 
position of Operations Manager for the new stores to be opened by [the petitioner]. Without 
the knowledge and skills of [the beneficiary], a person with general managerial expertise 
could not adequately fill the position in question. 
The director found the information submitted insufficient to establish that the beneficiary has specialized 
knowledge or that he has been and will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity. Accordingly, on 
May 4, 2004, the director requested the following additional documentation and information: (1) the total 
number of employees working at the location that employed the beneficiary and an organizational chart 
depicting the beneficiary's position in the staffing hierarchy; (2) the total number of employees working at the 
U.S. location that employs the beneficiary and an organizational chart showing the beneficiary's proposed 
WAC 04 058 52479 
Page 6 
position in the company's staffing hierarchy; (3) the number of foreign nationals employed at the U.S. 
location where the beneficiary will work, including their position titles and visa status; (4) the number of 
persons holding the same or similar positions at the U.S. location that will employ the beneficiary; (5) an 
explanation regarding how the duties the beneficiary performed abroad and those she will perform in the 
United States are different or unique from those of other workers employed by the petitioner or other U.S. 
employers in this type of position; (6) a more detailed explanation regarding exactly what is the equipment, 
system, product, technique or service of which the beneficiary has specialized knowledge, and whether it is 
used or produced by other employers in the United States and abroad; (7) an explanation as to how the 
beneficiary's training is exclusive and significantly unique in comparison to that of others employed by the 
petitioner or another person in this particular field; (8) an explanation regarding the training to be provided by 
the beneficiary to other workers, if applicable; and (9) the impact on the petitioner's business if the petitioner 
is unable to obtain the beneficiary's services, and the alternative action to be taken to fill the proposed 
responsibilities. 
In a response dated July 26, 2004, the petitioner stated that it employs 248 employees in the United States, 
including 21 at the restaurant that employs the beneficiary. The petitioner noted that it had filed a total of 
eight L-IB petitions for operations managers and that none would work at the same location as the 
beneficiary. The petitioner noted that, due to the nature of the duties, "it has always been necessary to transfer 
employees from the parent company" in order to fill its operations manager positions." In response to the 
director's request for a description of any special or advanced duties to be performed by the beneficiary, the 
petitioner provided essentially the same job description that was submitted with the initial petition. 
The petitioner noted that its fast food restaurants sell products that are not sold anywhere in the United States 
and other products that are not unique in the industry, but still have a taste unique to the petitioner's 
organization. The petitioner stated that the manner and technique in which these products are prepared and 
served is also unique, and that the beneficiary's services are needed because of his specialized knowledge in 
the company's operational procedures. The petitioner further explained: 
This knowledge of what is termed as the 
 culture and its superior unique quality 
products and services cannot be duplicated 
 labor market and are proprietary to 
[the petitioner's organization]. 
 It is knowledge that is unique to [the foreign entity's] 
employees who have been involved in key positions in the management, development, 
production, promotion, of the product and operation of the food chain that makes this 
knowledge specialized. The duties described above are different or unique from those 
performed by other workers currently employed or to be employed by the petitioner. The 
operational procedures, product, equipment and services of which the beneficiary of this 
petition has specialized knowledge may not be obtained from other U.S. employees as the 
operational procedures, service techniques and specifications of most of its equipment are 
patterned from the parent company. 
Since a substantial part of the beneficiary's work would involve the training and imparting of 
the . . . operational procedures and service techniques to newly hired US workers, it is 
essential that the person who will occuvv the vosition of Overations Manager. possess the 
- - - 
unique knowledge of th-~ culture, and which specialized knowledge can only be 
obtained through several years of work experience in the [foreign entity's] fast food chain 
WAC 04 058 52479 
Page 7 
operations. The operational procedures would include how the mother company will prepare, 
process, and serve its products to its customers. Other operational procedures would include 
ing of supplies which have been imported from abroad and the maintenance of the 
orld class standard of service and efficiency. 
The beneficiary's training is exclusive and significantly unique in comparison to any other 
person in the field as operations manager. The beneficiary has been trained with the [foreign 
entity] and has obtained the manner and trademark for selling the type of products and 
services that are exclusively [sic] only to [the petitioner's group]. The beneficiary has worked 
with the petitioner's mother company in various capacities and more importantly he has been 
actually responsible in giving training, setting up systems for the [foreign entity] in the 
Philippines. The duties of the beneficiary could therefore not be handled by any U.S. worker 
who do [sic] not possess the specialized knowledge of the ' 
 culture." 
The petitioner further noted that it intended to open a total of 28 stores between 2004 and 2006, and stated 
that the beneficiary's services are needed to ensure that the company's "unique food standards and quality, 
and services, and operational procedures are followed in the latest stores to be opened by the petitioner." The 
petitioner submitted a letter from the foreign entity confirming that the beneficiary had completed a total of 
five training courses with the foreign entity between 1990 and 2001. The petitioner also provided excerpts 
from several operations training manuals. The petitioner stated that the seminars and training undertaken by 
the beneficiary with the parent company are unique to the parent company and cannot be duplicated 
elsewhere. The petitioner indicated that in addition to the seminars attended by the beneficiary, he would also 
"regularly undergo specialized training regarding the operations and procedures of the mother company." 
The petitioner also submitted a July 23, 2004 letter from its research and development manager, who 
described the ethnic food items sold by the petitioner's restaurants in more detail. Regarding the beneficiary, 
the research and development manager stated: 
Before being transferred to the US Company, [the beneficiary] has undergone extensive 
training and seminars with our Training Development in conjunction with Research and 
Development regarding the food products we sell in our stores. Specifically [the beneficiary] 
was instructed regarding the components of these specialty food products, how they are 
prepared, the temperature settings required for the preparation and storage of each of these 
food products, and the recipes for some of these products that comprise part of the trade 
secrets of the company. 
Not all of our employees in the parent company have undergone such training. Only 
specialized personnel with the same level as [the beneficiary] are selected to participate in 
such trainings and have the privilege of gaining proprietary knowledge regarding some of the 
food recipes and preparation techniques. Such knowledge is essential in training future 
employees of the company. 
The director denied the petition on August 18, 2004, determining that the petitioner had not established that 
the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge, or that the beneficiary has been and would be employed in a 
capacity that requires specialized knowledge. The director cited the beneficiary's duties while employed by 
the foreign entity and concluded that he acted as a supervisor of non-professional employees performing tasks 
WAC 04 058 52479 
Page 8 
necessary to produce a common product, namely fast food. The director determined that the beneficiary was 
not employed in a qualifying capacity with the foreign entity. The director also cited the beneficiary's 
proposed duties and found that the submitted evidence did not explain or document how the beneficiary's job 
as an operations manager with the petitioner is different from any first-line supervisor job at any other 
international chain of fast food restaurants. 
The director referenced the regulatory and statutory definitions of "specialized knowledge" and also discussed 
Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comm. 1982), Matter of Colley 18 I&N Dec. 117 (Comm. 1981)' and 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, F. Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990) in his decision to emphasize the need for CIS to 
make comparisons between the beneficiary's claimed specialized knowledge and the knowledge of other 
similarly employed workers within the petitioner's group and within the industry. 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the director erred in denying the petition in light of the three previous L-1B 
approvals granted to the beneficiary for the same U.S. position. Referring to an April 23,2004 CIS interoffice 
memorandum from William R. Yates, Associate Director for Operations, counsel claims that the director was 
obligated to give deference to the prior decisions in which it was concluded that the beneficiary qualified for 
the benefit sought. Counsel further argues that, since the director departed from the previous decisions, the 
director was required to identify a material error with regard to the previous approvals, a substantial change in 
circumstances, or new material information that adversely impacts the petitioner's or beneficiary's eligibility. 
Counsel notes that the director's decision mentioned none of these factors, and further argues that a "material 
error" only applies to the misapplication of objective statutory or regulatory requirements. Counsel contends 
that the director was prohibited from questioning a previous subjective finding that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge. 
Counsel further argues that the director erred in determining that the beneficiary's duties abroad and in the 
United States did not involve specialized knowledge. Specifically, counsel asserts that the director 
"considered outdated and impermissible factors in defining specialized knowledge," and erred by comparing 
the beneficiary's knowledge to that of both the general labor market and the remainder of the petitioner's 
work force. Counsel asserts that the director was required to rely on current statutory and regulatory 
definitions, as well as two legacy INS policy memoranda "clarifying the current position on the meaning of 
'specialized knowledge."' See Memorandum from James A. Puleo, Acting Associate Commissioner, 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge, CO 214L-P (March 9, 
1994)("Puleo memo"); Memorandum from Fujie 0. Ohata, Associate Commissioner, Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge, (Dec. 20,2002)("0hata memo"). 
Counsel contends that the cases cited by the director, including Matter of Penner, Matter of Colley and 1756, 
Inc. v. Attorney General, and indirectly, the legislative history for the L-1 visa classification, do not provide a 
valid legal basis for the adverse decision. Specifically, counsel emphasizes that there is no current 
requirement that the beneficiary's knowledge be unique, proprietary or not commonly found in the U.S. labor 
market. Rather, counsel argues that the Puleo and Ohata memoranda only require an examination of the 
knowledge possessed by the beneficiary and a finding that the beneficiary possesses special knowledge of the 
company product and its application in international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge of the 
processes and procedures of the company. 
WAC 04 058 52479 
Page 9 
Counsel contends that following current definitions and interpretations of what constitutes specialized 
knowledge, the petitioner has submitted sufficient evidence to establish that the beneficiary possesses the 
required "special and advanced level of knowledge" of the processes and procedures of the company. 
Counsel incorporates excerpts of previously submitted letters from the petitioner and foreign entity into her 
brief, and asserts that the beneficiary possesses knowledge of the company's products "that is significantly 
different from other stores in the industry." 
On review, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary possesses "specialized knowledge" as 
defined in section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1184(c)(2)(B), and the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 
$ 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D), or that the intended position requires the services of an employee with specialized 
knowledge. 
As a preliminary matter, it must be noted that in making a determination as to whether knowledge possessed 
by a beneficiary is special or advanced, the AAO relies on the statute and regulations, legislative history and 
prior precedent. Although counsel suggests that CIS is bound to base its decision entirely on the statutory and 
regulatory definitions and the above-referenced Puleo and Ohata memoranda, the memoranda were issued as 
guidance to assist CIS employees in interpreting a term that is not clearly defined in the statute, not as a 
replacement for the original intentions of Congress in creating the specialized knowledge classification or to 
overturn prior precedent decisions that continue to prove instructive in adjudicating L-1B visa petitions. The 
AAO will weigh guidance outlined in the policy memoranda accordingly, but not to the exclusion of the 
statutory and regulatory definitions, legislative history or prior precedents. Counsel's specific objections to 
the director's reliance on Matter of Penner, Matter of Colley, and 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General will be 
discussed in more detail below. 
In examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's 
description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed description 
of the services to be performed sufficient to establish specialized knowledge. Id. 
In the instant matter, the petitioner submitted only a limited description of the beneficiary's duties and failed 
to document that the job duties to be performed require specialized knowledge as defined in 8 C.F.R. 
$ 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). As noted by the director, the duties cannot be distinguished from the duties performed by 
any supervisory employee working in any fast food restaurant. The described duties primarily involve 
training, overseeing and supervising kitchen, dining room, counter and utility "crew" and "prospective 
managers" and ensuring that they follow established procedures, policies, and standards for cooking fast food, 
handling sales transactions and customer service duties, cleaning the lutchen, dining area and restrooms, and 
other routine functions involved in operating a restaurant. In response to the director's request for a 
description of any special or advanced duties to be performed by the beneficiary, the petitioner did not 
elaborate, but merely repeated the initial job description. Failure to submit requested evidence that precludes 
a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. $ 103.2(b)(14). 
Further, although the petitioner claimed that the beneficiary would provide training to managers and oversee 
training at new restaurants, this claim is not substantiated by evidence in the record and appears to be 
speculative in nature. At the time the petition was filed, the beneficiary was assigned to a specific restaurant 
with responsibility for overseeing the employees providing the day-to-day services at this location. The 
petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing the nonirnrnigrant visa petition. A visa petition may 
WAC 04 058 52479 
Page 10 
not be approved at a future date after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. 
Matter of Michelin Tire Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Comm. 1978). 
Accordingly, the claimed specialized knowledge is 
 ly on the beneficiary's knowledge of "unique" 
procedures utilized by the petitioner's group and the 
 culture." The petitioner has not established that 
such knowledge is noteworthy or uncommon, such that it can be considered "specialized." Although 
requested by the director, the petitioner failed to explain how the training is different compared to that 
provided by similar companies operating fast food restaurants around the world. Compared to other 
operations managers employed in the fast food industry, the beneficiary is said to possess an unspecified 
amount of training that is not offered within any other restaurant chain. However, the petitioner has submitted 
no evidence to suggest that its procedures and methods, although "proprietary," are significantly different 
from those used by other large fast food chain restaurants. Based on the evidence of record, it is evident that a 
fast food manager who had worked for an unrelated restaurant chain could reasonably be expected to perform 
the beneficiary's duties with minimal additional training. Going on record without supporting documentary 
evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Sof$ci, 
22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. 
Comm. 1972)). 
The petitioner claims that only an employee with several years of management experience with the foreign 
entity would be qualified to train U.S. staff in restaurant procedures and standards. The evidence in the record 
does not substantiate this claim. The submitted training manuals indicate that an employee with no previous 
experience with the organization can complete the training to become a "shift manager" in approximately 
three months. The foreign entity's web site indicates that its franchisees and their management teams 
complete a three-month training program that equips them with all the knowledge needed to independently 
manage their own restaurants. The record indicates that the petitioner intends to operate franchised 
restaurants in the United States. It is reasonable to conclude, and the petitioner has not shown otherwise, that 
the petitioner will not require U.S. franchisees to hire management personnel who possess years of experience 
with the petitioner's overseas operations. The submitted evidence does not illustrate that the proprietary 
operating methods or procedures of the petitioner are different or special compared to others in the 
petitioner's industry, or that the length and type of training required for a management position in a Jollibee 
fast food restaurant exceeds normal requirements for this type of position. 
The petitioner asserts that its products are not sold by any other food chain, but has not substantiated its claim 
that an employee with specialized knowledge is needed to train U.S. employees in the operational procedures 
needed to prepare and serve these products. While the petitioner's specific menu, which includes some 
traditional Filipino items in addition to hamburgers, chicken, and spaghetti, may be relatively new to the 
United States market, its operating procedures have not been shown to be any different from those used by the 
dozens of fast food chains which are prevalent in the United States. The petitioner has not established that the 
knowledge needed to train employees to prepare and sell a Filipino dish is significantly different frm that 
required to train employees to prepare other "fast food" fare. Accordingly, the petitioner has not established 
that the beneficiary's knowledge is uncommon or noteworthy, such that it could be considered "special 
knowledge" as contemplated by the regulations. While the AAO can appreciate the petitioner's preference for 
experienced personnel to oversee its entry into the United States market, there is no evidence that special 
knowledge or experience of the foreign entity's products and services or advanced knowledge of the foreign 
WAC 04 058 52479 
Page 11 
entity's processes is actually required in order to perform the day-to-day oversight of restaurant operations for 
the petitioner's U.S. fast food stores. 
It is also appropriate for the AAO to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the 
beneficiary's knowledge of the business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making 
process. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. 117, 120 (Comm. 198l)(citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 618 
(R.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. 816 (R.C. 1971)).' As stated by the Commissioner in 
Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 52 (Comm. 1982), when considering whether the beneficiaries possessed 
specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find that the occupations inherently 
qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have 
unusual duties, slulls, or knowledge beyond that of a slulled worker. Id. The Commissioner also provided the 
following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or her to 
produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed primarily 
for his ability to carry out a key process or function which is important or essential to the 
business' operation. 
Id. at 53. As noted by the director, the evidence of record demonstrates that the beneficiary is more akin to 
an employee whose slulls, experience and general knowledge enable him to provide a service, rather than an 
employee who has unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a slulled worker. There is no indication 
that the beneficiary's background is specialized, in that it would enable him to perform a key process or 
function of the company. 
Although counsel objects to the director's comparison of the beneficiary's knowledge to that of other 
employees within the petitioner's group and to similarly employed workers in the petitioner's industry, the 
AAO notes that the Puleo memorandum referenced previously allows CIS to compare the beneficiary's 
knowledge to the general United States labor market and the petitioner's workforce in order to distinguish 
between specialized and general knowledge. The Associate Commissioner notes in the memorandum that 
"officers adjudicating petitions involving specialized knowledge must ensure that the knowledge possessed by 
the beneficiary is not general knowledge held commonly throughout the industry but that it is truly 
specialized." Puleo memo, supra. A comparison of the beneficiary's knowledge to the knowledge possessed 
by others in the field is therefore necessary in order to determine the level of the beneficiary's slulls and 
1 
 Counsel specifically asserted that the director erred by citing Matter of Penner, Matter of Colley and 1756, 
Inc. v. Attorney General in his decision. However, although the cited precedents pre-date the current statutory 
definition of "specialized knowledge," the MO finds them instructive. Other than deleting the former 
requirement that specialized knowledge had to be "proprietary," the 1990 Act did not significantly alter the 
definition of "specialized knowledge" from the prior INS regulation or precedent decision interpreting the 
term. The Committee Report simply states that the Committee was recommending a statutory definition 
because of "[vlarying [i.e., not specifically incorrect] interpretations by INS," H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I), at 
69, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. Beyond that, the Committee Report simply restates the tautology that 
became section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Id. The MO concludes, therefore, that the cited cases, as well as 
Matter of Penner, remain useful guidance concerning the intended scope of the "specialized knowledge" L- 
1B classification. 
WAC 04 058 52479 
Page 12 
knowledge and to ascertain whether the beneficiary's knowledge is advanced. In other words, absent an 
outside group to which to compare the beneficiary's knowledge, CIS would not be able to "ensure that the 
knowledge possessed by the beneficiary is not general knowledge held commonly throughout the industry but 
that it is truly specialized." Id. The analysis for specialized knowledge therefore requires an examination of 
the knowledge in context of the foreign and United States labor market, but does not consider whether 
workers are available in the United States to perform the beneficiary's job duties. 
In addition, contrary to counsel's assertions, the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the 
AAO to make comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The term 
"specialized knowledge" is not an absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed in 1756, Inc. 
v. Attorney General, specialized knowledge is a relative idea which cannot have a plain meaning. 745 F. 
Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990). The Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended 
for "key personnel." See generally, H.R. REP. NO. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key 
personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." Webster's 11 
New College Dictionary 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). In general, all employees can reasonably be 
considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic 
success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. An employee of 
"crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average employee. 
Accordingly, based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record related to that 
term, the AAO must make comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge employee and 
the general labor market, but also between that employee and the remainder of the petitioner's workforce. 
Here, the petitioner has not submitted persuasive evidence that the beneficiary's knowledge is advanced 
compared to other similarly employed workers within the petitioner's group, nor did the petitioner distinguish 
the beneficiary's knowledge, work experience, or training from the other employees. Compared to other 
employees within the petitioner's corporate group, the beneficiary has likely received the same or similar 
training available to and completed by all supervisory and managerial employees working in the foreign 
organization's hundreds of restaurants. Although the petitioner provided a letter from its research and 
development manager stating that the beneficiary has undergone "extensive training and seminars. . . in 
conjunction with Research and Development" regarding the petitioner's and foreign entity's food products, 
including instruction regarding product components, preparation methods, storage methods, and recipes, the 
record is devoid of any evidence regarding the type and length of specialized training undergone by the 
beneficiary. As noted above, the training certificate provided by the foreign entity only references general 
management courses completed by the beneficiary. Further, the petitioner did not substantiate its statement 
that "only specialized personnel with the same level as [the beneficiary] are selected to participate in such 
trainings and have the privilege of gaining proprietary knowledge regarding some of the company's food 
recipes and preparation techniques." Even if the petitioner had established that the beneficiary actually 
completed this training, the petitioner provided no basis for determining how many "specialized personnel 
with the same level" completed the same training, such that it could be considered "advanced" within the 
petitioner's organization. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for 
purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Sof$ci, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. 
Regardless, as discussed above, there is no evidence that knowledge of "proprietary" recipes and food 
preparation techniques is actually required to perform the duties of the position offered in the United States. 
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Page 13 
Based on the petitioner's statements and the evidence presented, the AAO cannot conclude that the 
beneficiary qualifies as "key personnel" within the petitioner's family of companies based on his training and 
previous assignments. See Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 53. The evidence in the record makes it 
impossible to classify the beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner's products or procedures as advanced, and 
precludes a finding that the beneficiary's role is "of crucial importance" to the organization. While it may be 
correct to say that the beneficiary is a skilled employee, this fact alone is not enough to bring the beneficiary 
to the level of a specialized knowledge employee. 
Moreover, in Matter of Penner, the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of the 
specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comm. 1982). The decision noted that the 1970 House 
Report, H.R. No. 91-851, stated that the number of admissions under the L-1 classification "will not be large" 
and that "[tlhe class of persons eligible for such nonimmigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be carefully 
regulated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id. at 5 1. The decision further noted that the House 
Report was silent on the subject of specialized knowledge, but that during the course of the sub-committee 
hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify 
under the proposed "L" category. In response to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that 
they understood the legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, 
and that it would not include "lower categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." Matter of Penner, id. at 
50 (citing H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445, 91st 
Cong. 210,218,223,240,248 (November 12, 1969)). 
Reviewing the Congressional record, the Commissioner concluded in Matter of Penner that an expansive 
reading of the specialized knowledge provision, such that it would include skilled workers and technicians, is 
not warranted. The Commissioner emphasized that the specialized knowledge worker classification was not 
intended for "all employees with any level of specialized knowledge." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 53. 
Or, as noted in Matter of Colley, "[mlost employees today are specialists and have been trained and given 
specialized knowledge. However, in view of the House Report, it can not be concluded that all employees 
with specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligble for classification as 
intracompany transferees." 18 I&N Dec. 117, 119 (Comm. 1981). According to Matter of Penner, "[sluch a 
conclusion would permit extremely large numbers of persons to qualify for the 'L-1' visa" rather than the 
"key personnel" that Congress specifically intended. 18 I&N Dec. at 53; see also, 1756, Inc., 745 F. Supp. at 
15 (concluding that Congress did not intend for the specialized knowledge capacity to extend to all employees 
with specialized knowledge, but rather to "key personnel" and "executives.") 
As discussed above, the beneficiary's job description does not distinguish his knowledge as more advanced or 
distinct among fast food restaurant supervisors or managers employed by the foreign or U.S. entities or by 
other unrelated companies who operate similar types of businesses. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate 
that the beneficiary's training, work experience, or knowledge of the company's processes and their 
application in international markets is more advanced than the knowledge possessed by others employed by 
the petitioner, or in the industry. The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample 
support for a restrictive interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated 
that the beneficiary should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing 
specialized knowledge. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, supra at 16. The record does not establish that 
the beneficiary has specialized knowledge or that the position offered with the United States entity requires 
specialized knowledge. For this reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
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Page 14 
Counsel asserts that it is an abuse of discretion for the director to deny the instant petition after approving 
three previous petitions filed on behalf of the beneficiary for the same position. Referring to an April 23,2004 
CIS interoffice memorandum from William R. Yates, Associate Director for Operations, counsel further notes 
that since there was no substantial change in circumstances, the director was required to make a determination 
of "material error7' with regard to the prior approved petition or acknowledge receipt of new material 
information that adversely impacts the petitioner's or beneficiary's eligibility. Counsel claims that the director 
was otherwise required by current CIS policy to give deference to the subjective determination of prior 
adjudicators who concluded that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge and will be employed in a 
specialized knowledge capacity. See Memorandum of William R. Yates, Associate Director for Operations, 
USCIS, to Service Center Directors, et al, The Significance of a Prior CIS Approval on a Nonimmigrant 
Petition in the Context of a Subsequent Determination Regarding Eligibility for Extension of Petition Validity 
HQOPRD 7211 1.3 (April 23,2004)("Yates Memo"). 
Counsel's assertion is not persuasive. It must be emphasized that each nonimrnigrant petition filing is a 
separate proceeding with a separate record and a separate burden of proof. See 8 C.F.R. 9 103.8(d). In 
making a determination of statutory eligibility, CIS is limited to the information contained in that individual 
record of proceeding. See 8 C.F.R. 9 103.2(b)(16)(ii). Despite any number of previously approved petitions, 
CIS does not have any authority to confer an immigration benefit when the petitioner fails to meet its burden 
of proof in a subsequent petition. See section 291 of the Act. 
While CIS approved three other petitions that had been previously filed on behalf of the beneficiary, the prior 
approvals do not preclude CIS from denying an extension of the original visa based on reassessment of 
beneficiary's qualifications. Texas AM Univ. v. Upchurch, 99 Fed. Appx. 556, 2004 WL 1240482 (5th Cir. 
2004). If the previous nonimmigrant petitions filed by the petitioner's predecessor company were approved 
based on the same unsupported assertions that are contained in the current record, the approvals would 
constitute material and gross error on the part of the director. Due to the lack of evidence of eligibility in the 
present record, the MO finds that the director was justified in departing from the previous approvals by 
denying the present request to amend and extend the beneficiary's status. Further, although counsel argues 
that the prior findings that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge were based on a subjective 
determination and are therefore excluded from being re-adjudicated based on a finding of material error, the 
MO notes that the term "specialized knowledge" is defined in the statute and the regulations, and that the 
determination is left to the director's discretion, based on the submission of objective evidence. See section 
214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1184(c)(2)(B); 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). As discussed above, the 
evidence submitted fails to establish that the beneficiary possesses knowledge or that the U.S. position 
requires knowledge that meets the plain meaning of "specialized knowledge." 
The MO is not required to approve applications or petitions where eligibility has not been demonstrated, 
merely because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. See, e.g. Matter of Church Scientology 
International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Cornrn. 1988). It would be absurd to suggest that CIS or any agency 
must treat acknowledged errors as binding precedent. Sussex Engg. Ltd. v. Montgomery, 825 F.2d 1084, 1090 
(6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988). CIS memoranda merely articulate intemal guidelines for 
CIS personnel; they do not establish judicially enforceable rights. An agency's intemal personnel guidelines 
"neither confer upon [plaintiffs] substantive rights nor provide procedures upon which [they] may rely." Loa- 
Herrera v. Trominski, 231 F.3d 984, 989 (5th Cir. 2000)(quoting Fano v. OtNeill, 806 F.2d 1262, 1264 (5th 
Cir. 1987)). 
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Page 15 
Furthermore, the AAO's authority over the service centers is comparable to the relationship between a court 
of appeals and a district court. Even if a service center director had approved the nonimmigrant petitions on 
behalf of the beneficiary, the AAO would not be bound to follow the contradictory decision of a service 
center. Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS, 2000 WL 282785 (E.D. La.), afd, 248 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 
2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 51 (2001). The director is instructed to review the beneficiary's previous 
nonimmigrant approvals for possible revocation, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(9)(iii). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit 
sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, that burden has 
not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.