dismissed L-1B Case: Food Service

~dentifying data dererea tt~ 
preveut clearly unwarranted 
~nvasim of ~ersonal privack 
PUBLIC COPY 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. A3042 
Washington, DC 20529 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
File: WAC 03 235 50654 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: JUL 0 6 2006 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. rj 1 101(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
SELF-REPRESENTED 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
Administrative Appeals Office 
WAC 03 235 50654 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: 
 The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to extend the employment of the beneficiary as an L- 
1B nonimmigrant intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 1 O 1 (a)(15)(L) of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 8 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a Philippines 
corporation qualified to do business in California. It operates a chain of fast food restaurants. The petitioner 
claims that it is the subsidiary of-, located in the Philippines. The beneficiary has 
been employed by the petitioner in L-1B status since December 2000, and the petitioner now seeks to extend 
her status so that she may continue to serve as an "Operations Manager 11" until December 2005. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish that the position offered to the 
beneficiary requires the services of an individual possessing specialized knowledge, or that the beneficiary 
possesses specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded it to the AAO for review. On appeal, former counsel for the petitioner asserts that Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (CIS) approved two previous petitions filed on behalf of the beneficiary for the same 
position and contends that the director was required to give deference to the prior approved petitions.' 
Former counsel asserts that the director failed to consider the evidence submitted, and claims that such 
evidence was sufficient to establish that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge of the petitioner's products 
and an advanced level of knowledge of the processes and procedures of the petitioner's company. Former 
counsel submits a brief in support of the appeal. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101(a)(15)(L). Specifically, a qualifying 
organization must have employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a 
specialized knowledge capacity, for one continuous year within the three years preceding the beneficiary's 
application for admission into the United States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United 
States temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate 
thereof in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
1 
 On April 11, 2006, counsel advised the AAO that she is no longer the counsel of record for the petitioner. 
Although she indicated that another attorney is now handling this matter, the record does not contain a Form 
G-28, Notice of Entry of Appearance as Attorney or Representative, or any correspondence from the new 
attorney. 
WAC 03 235 50654 
Page 3 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
This matter presents two related, but distinct issues: (1) whether the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge; and (2) whether the proposed employment is in a capacity that requires specialized knowledge. 
Section 2 14(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1 184(c)(2)(B), provides the following: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines specialized knowledge as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes or procedures. 
In an August 8, 2003 letter submitted in support of the petition, the petitioner indicated that the beneficiary 
would continue to serve as "Operations Manager 11," a position requiring "specialized knowledge of the 
products, presentation and service techniques that constitutes [sic] the trade secrets of the parent corporation." 
Specifically, the petitioner indicated that the beneficiary would perform the following duties: 
(1) Direct, coordinate the manner food service is presented in accordance with the processes, 
procedures established worldwide by [the foreign entity] to enable the [the petitioner's] food 
chain to compete in the market. 
(2) Educate the store crew team regarding the characteristic[s] of the company's unique product 
lines and processes; 
(3) Coordinate, train and manage the activities of the store crew as well as prospective managers 
in [the petitioner's] products, service techniques; 
(4) Direct, train U.S. employees of the corporation with established company policies, 
procedures and standards; 
WAC 03 235 50654 
Page 4 
(5) Impart [the foreign entity's] operational procedures to the new store crew and prospective 
managers in the various food chain activities unique to the company's standards and 
policies. 
The purpose of her important mission is to develop consistent service and product standards 
worldwide and to increase awareness of unique services and food products that have been 
uniquely developed by the mother company . . .. 
With the ongoing expansion projects of the company in the U.S., the services of [the 
beneficiary] will be required by the company to oversee the operations of other new outlets 
and impart to its new employees the standards and service techniques which have been 
uniquely developed by the mother company, especially at this crucial stage of expansion. 
[The beneficiary] has had a key role in the setting up of the company's latest outlets. Her 
continuing presence is essential to bring the company's development effort to a success[.] 
The petitioner indicated on Form 1-129 that she had served as a line trainer for the foreign entity from January 
1999 until December 2000, where she conducted floor control orientation seminars, orientation on the foreign 
entity's culture and values, the impact of operations managers in maintaining high quality, quality customer 
service, and interaction skills. The petitioner stated that the beneficiary served as an assistant store manager 
from July 1996 through December 1998 with responsibility for: putting in place quality management systems 
for food, cleanliness and facilities maintenance; inventory and cost management for food, paper, operating 
supplies, utilities, repairs and maintenance; implementation of store building maintenance and equipment and 
facilities maintenance plans; motivating the store's production crew; implementing the store safety program, 
and submitting administrative reports for her key results areas. The petitioner noted that the beneficiary had 
been employed by the foreign entity since 1991, previously holding the positions of store marketing assistant, 
store marketing coordinator, operations management trainee and shift manager. 
The director found the information submitted insufficient to establish that the beneficiary has specialized 
knowledge or that she has been and will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity. Accordingly, on 
November 6, 2003, the director requested, in part, the following additional documentation and information: 
(1) the number of persons holding the same or similar positions as the beneficiary at the U.S. location where 
she will be employed; (2) an explanation regarding any special or advanced duties that are different or unique 
from those of other workers employed by the petitioner or other U.S. employers; (3) an explanation regarding 
how the beneficiary's training is exclusive and significantly unique in comparison to that of others employed 
by the petitioner or another person in the same field; and (4) the petitioner's organizational chart showing the 
location of the offered position in the company's hierarchy and the number and types of positions the 
beneficiary will supervise. 
In a response dated January 26, 2004, the petitioner stated that it does not currently employ other workers in 
the same or similar positions at the location where the beneficiary will work, although the petitioner noted 
that it employs operations managers at other locations. The petitioner noted that, due to the nature of the 
WAC 03 235 50654 
Page 5 
duties, "it has always been necessary to transfer employees from the parent company" in order to fill its 
operations manager positions. In response to the director's request for a description of any special or 
advanced duties to be performed by the beneficiary, the petitioner provided essentially the same job 
description that was submitted with the initial petition. 
In reference to the specialized knowledge required for the offered position, the petitioner explained as 
follows: 
In order to perform the above-enumerated duties, he or she must possess knowledge of the 
products' presentation, service techniques and operational knowledge of the products' 
presentation, service techniques and operational procedures that constitutes [sic] trade secrets 
of [the petitioner's group]. The production methods, the quality services, the superior tasting 
food presentation and taste which result in superior quality products and high level of 
customer satisfaction are all aspects of the company that are unique to the [petitioner's] food 
chain and which constitutes [sic] the 
 culture." 
The products of [the petitioner] such as the peach mango pie, banana langka pie are not sold 
anywhere in the U.S. Even its other products such as aloha burgers, pansit palabok, fried 
chicken spaghetti, tapa, tosilogs have a taste which is only unique to [the petitioner]. The 
manner and technique how these products are prepared and served are only unique to the 
Jollibee culture. As earlier stated, the services of the beneficiary is [sic] needed badly by the 
petitioner because of her specialized knowledge in the operational procedures. 
It is therefore necessary to the success of the expansion efforts 
the United States a person with the unique knowledge of th 
knowledge can be gained only from years of prior experience 
 food chain. 
This knowledge of what is termed as the 
 culture and its superior unique quality 
and services cannot be duplicated 
 labor market and are proprietary to 
It is knowledge that is unique to [the foreign entity's] employees who have been 
in key positions in the management, development, production, promotion, of the 
product and operation of the food chain that makes this knowledge specialized. The duties 
described above are different or unique from those performed by other workers currently 
employed or to be employed by the petitioner. The operational procedures, product, 
equipment and services of which the beneficiary of this petition has specialized knowledge 
may not be obtained from other U.S. employees as the operational procedures, service 
techniques and specifications of most of its equipment are patterned from the parent 
company. 
Since a substantial part of the beneficiary's work would involve the training and imparting of 
the . . . operational procedures and service techniques to newly hired US workers, it is 
essential that the person who will occupy the position of Operations Manager, possess the 
unique knowledge of thculture, and which specialized knowledge can only be 
obtained through several years of work experience in the fast food chain operations. 
The operational procedures would include how the mother company will prepare, process, 
WAC 03 235 50654 
Page 6 
and serve its products to its customers. Other operational procedures would include the 
supplies which have been imported from abroad and the maintenance of the 
orld class standard of service and efficiency. 
The beneficiary's training is exclusive and significantly unique in comparison to any other 
person in the field as operations manager. The beneficiary has been trained with the [foreign 
entity] and has obtained the manner and trademark for selling the type of products and 
services that are exclusively [sic] only to [the petitioner's group]. The beneficiary has worked 
with the petitioner's mother company in various capacities and more importantly she has 
been actually responsible in giving training, setting up systems for the [foreign entity]. The 
duties of the beneficiary could therefore not be handled by any U.S. worker who do [sic] not 
possess the specialized knowledge of the culture." 
The petitioner further noted that it intended to open a total of 28 stores between 2004 and 2006, and stated 
that the beneficiary's services are needed to ensure that the company's "unique food standards and quality, 
and services, and operational procedures are followed in the latest stores to be opened by the petitioner." The 
petitioner submitted a letter from the foreign entity confirming that the beneficiary had completed a total of 
sixteen training seminars since joining the foreign entity in 1991. The petitioner included copies of 
completion certificates for two courses and provided excerpts from several operations training manuals. The 
petitioner stated that the seminars and training undertaken by the beneficiary with the parent company are 
unique to the parent company and cannot be duplicated elsewhere. The petitioner provided a list of employees 
who work at the location to which the beneficiary is assigned, but did not provide their job titles or indicate 
which employees would be supervised by the beneficiary. 
On July 7, 2004, the director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner had not established that the 
beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge, or that the position offered requires the services of an individual 
possessing specialized knowledge. Specifically, the director found that the beneficiary's job description 
paraphrased the regulatory requirements for specialized knowledge classification, and noted that the petitioner 
did not explain or document how the beneficiary's role as an operations manager is different from a first-line 
supervisor at any other international chain of fast food restaurants. The director further observed that the 
beneficiary's knowledge is merely general knowledge that allows her to provide a service. Accordingly, the 
director concluded that the beneficiary has not been shown to be serving in a specialized knowledge capacity 
with respect to the petitioner's product, nor has she been shown to possess an advanced level of knowledge of 
the processes and procedures of the petitioner's company. 
On appeal, former counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director erred in denying the petition in light of 
the two previous L-1B approvals granted to the beneficiary for the same U.S. position. Referring to an April 
23, 2004 CIS interoffice memorandum from William R. Yates, Associate Director for Operations, former 
counsel claims that the director was obligated to give deference to the prior decisions in which it was 
concluded that the beneficiary qualified for the benefit sought. Former counsel further asserts that the director 
ignored evidence submitted to establish that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge and will be 
employed in a capacity requiring specialized knowledge. Specifically, former counsel contends that the 
petitioner "was able to present evidence to show that the beneficiary possessed specialized knowledge in 
WAC 03 235 50654 
Page 7 
terms of operational procedures and food preparation procedures which are proprietary only to the petitioner's 
parent company." 
On review, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary possesses "specialized knowledge" as 
defined in section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 3 1184(c)(2)(B), and the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 
3 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D), or that the intended position requires the services of an employee with specialized 
knowledge. 
In examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's 
description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed description 
of the services to be performed sufficient to establish specialized knowledge. Id. 
In the instant matter, the petitioner submitted only a limited description of the beneficiary's duties and failed 
to document that the job duties to be performed require specialized knowledge as defined in 8 C.F.R. 
3 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). As noted by the director, the duties cannot be distinguished from the duties performed by 
any supervisory employees working in any fast food restaurant. The described duties primarily involve 
training, overseeing and supervising kitchen, dining room, counter and utility "crew" and "prospective 
managers" and ensuring that they follow established procedures, policies and standards for cooking fast food, 
handling sales transactions and customer service duties, cleaning the kitchen, dining area and restrooms, and 
other routine functions involved in operating a restaurant. In response to the director's request for a 
description of any special or advanced duties to be performed by the beneficiary, the petitioner did not 
elaborate, but merely repeated the initial job description. Failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a 
material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(14). Further, although 
the petitioner claimed that the beneficiary will provide training to managers and oversee training at new 
restaurants, this claim is not substantiated by evidence in the record and appears to be speculative in nature. 
At the time the petition was filed, the beneficiary was assigned to a specific restaurant with responsibility for 
overseeing the employees providing the day-to-day services at this location. The petitioner must establish 
eligibility at the time of filing the nonimmigrant visa petition. A visa petition may not be approved at a future 
date after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. Matter of Michelin Tire 
Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Comm. 1978). 
Accordingly, the claimed specialized knowledge is based solely on the beneficiary's knowledge of "unique" 
procedures utilized by the petitioner's group and the "Jollibee culture." The petitioner has not established that 
such knowledge is noteworthy or uncommon, such that it can be considered "specialized." Although 
requested by the director, the petitioner failed to explain how the training is different compared to that 
provided by similar companies operating fast food restaurants around the world. Compared to other 
operations managers employed in the fast food industry, the beneficiary possesses an unspecified amount of 
training that is not offered within any other restaurant chain. However, the petitioner has submitted no 
evidence to suggest that its procedures and methods, although proprietary, are significantly different from 
those used by other large fast food chain restaurants. Furthermore, many of the training courses completed by 
the beneficiary do not appear to be specific to the petitioner's organization, but rather provided general 
instruction in supervision, management and sales techniques. An operations manager who had worked for an 
unrelated restaurant chain could reasonably be expected to perform the beneficiary's duties with minimal 
additional training. 
WAC 03 235 50654 
Page 8 
The petitioner claims that only an employee with several years of management experience with the foreign 
entity would be qualified to train U.S. staff in restaurant procedures and standards. The evidence in the record 
does not substantiate this claim. The submitted training manuals indicate that an employee with no previous 
experience with the organization can complete the training to become a "shift manager," in approximately 
three months. The foreign entity's web site indicates that its fianchisees and their management teams 
complete a three-month training program that equips them with all the knowledge needed to independently 
manage their own restaurants. The record indicates that the petitioner intends to operate franchised 
restaurants in the United States. It is reasonable to conclude that the petitioner will not require U.S. 
franchisees to hire management personnel who possess years of experience with the petitioner's overseas 
operations. The submitted evidence does not illustrate that the proprietary operating methods or procedures 
of the petitioner are different or special in the petitioner's industry, or that the length and type of training 
required for a management position in a Jollibee fast food restaurant exceeds standard requirements for this 
type of position. 
The petitioner asserts that its products are not sold by any other food chain, but has not substantiated its claim 
that an employee with specialized knowledge is needed to train U.S. employees in the operational procedures 
needed to prepare and serve these products. While the petitioner's specific menu, which includes some 
traditional Filipino items in addition to hamburgers, chicken, and spaghetti, may be relatively new to the 
United States market, its operating procedures have not been shown to be any different from those used by the 
dozens of fast food chains which are prevalent in the United States. The petitioner has not established that the 
knowledge needed to train employees to prepare and sell a Filipino dish is significantly different from that 
required to train employees to prepare and sell other "fast food" fare. Accordingly, the petitioner has not 
established that the beneficiary's knowledge is uncommon or noteworthy, such that it could be considered 
"specialized knowledge" as contemplated by the regulations. While the AAO can appreciate the petitioner's 
preference for experienced personnel to oversee its entry into the United States market, there is no evidence 
that special knowledge or experience of the foreign entity's products and services or advanced knowledge of 
the foreign entity's processes is actually required in order to perform the day-to-day oversight of restaurant 
operations for the petitioner's U.S. fast food stores. 
It is also appropriate for the AAO to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the 
beneficiary's knowledge of the business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making 
process. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. 1 17, 120 (Comrn. 198 l)(citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 61 8 
(R.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. 816 (R.C. 1971)).~ As stated by the Commissioner in 
Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 52 (Cornrn. 1982), when considering whether the beneficiaries possessed 
2 
 Although the cited precedents pre-date the current statutory definition of "specialized knowledge," the AAO 
finds them instructive. Other than deleting the former requirement that specialized knowledge had to be 
"proprietary," the 1990 Act did not significantly alter the definition of "specialized knowledge" from the prior 
INS regulation or precedent decision interpreting the term. The Committee Report simply states that the 
Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of "[vlarying [i.e., not specifically incorrect] 
interpretations by INS," H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I), at 69, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. Beyond that, the 
Committee Report simply restates the tautology that became section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Id. The AAO 
concludes, therefore, that the cited cases, as well as Matter of Penner, remain useful guidance concerning the 
intended scope of the "specialized knowledge" L-1B classification. 
WAC 03 235 50654 
Page 9 
specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find that the occupations inherently 
qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have 
unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. Id. The Commissioner also provided the 
following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or her to 
produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed primarily 
for his ability to carry out a key process or function which is important or essential to the 
business' operation. 
Id. at 53. As noted by the director, the evidence of record demonstrates that the beneficiary is more alun to 
an employee whose skills, experience and general knowledge enable her to provide a service, rather than an 
employee who has unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. There is no indication 
that the beneficiary's background is specialized, in that it would enable her to perform a key process or 
function of the company. 
It should be noted that the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the AAO to make 
comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The term "specialized 
knowledge" is not an absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed in 1756, Inc. v. Attorney 
General, "[slimply put, specialized knowledge is a relative . . . idea which cannot have a plain meaning." 745 
F. Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990). The Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended 
for "key personnel." See generally, H.R. REP. NO. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key 
personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." Webster's 11 
New College Dictionary 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). In general, all employees can reasonably be 
considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic 
success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. An employee of 
"crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average employee. 
Accordingly, based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record related to that 
term, the AAO must make comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge employee and 
the general labor market, but also between that employee and the remainder of the petitioner's workforce. 
Here, the petitioner makes no claim that the beneficiary's knowledge is advanced compared to other similarly 
employed workers within the petitioner's group, nor did the petitioner distinguish the beneficiary's 
knowledge, work experience, or training from those of the other employees. Compared to other employees 
within the petitioner's corporate group, the beneficiary has likely received the same or similar training 
available to and completed by all supervisory and managerial employees working in the foreign 
organization's hundreds of restaurants. Based on the petitioner's statements and the evidence presented, the 
AAO cannot conclude that the beneficiary qualifies as "key personnel" within the petitioner's family of 
companies based on her training and previous assignments. See Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 53. The 
evidence in the record makes it impossible to classify the beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner's products 
or procedures as advanced, and precludes a finding that the beneficiary's role is "of crucial importance" to the 
organization. While it may be correct to say that the beneficiary is a skilled and productive employee, this fact 
alone is not enough to bring the beneficiary to the level of "key personnel." 
WAC 03 235 50654 
Page 10 
Moreover, in Matter of Penner, the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of the 
specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comm. 1982). The decision noted that the 1970 House 
Report, H.R. No. 91-85 1, stated that the number of admissions under the L-1 classification "will not be large" 
and that "[tlhe class of persons eligible for such nonimmigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be carefully 
regulated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id, at 5 1. The decision further noted that the House 
Report was silent on the subject of specialized knowledge, but that during the course of the sub-committee 
hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify 
under the proposed "L" category. In response to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that 
they understood the legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, 
and that it would not include "lower categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." Matter of Penner, id. at 
50 (citing H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comrn., Immigration Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445, 91st 
Cong. 210,218,223,240,248 (November 12, 1969)). 
Reviewing the Congressional record, the Commissioner concluded in Matter of Penner that an expansive 
reading of the specialized knowledge provision, such that it would include skilled workers and technicians, is 
not warranted. The Commissioner emphasized that the specialized knowledge worker classification was not 
intended for "all employees with any level of specialized knowledge." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 53. 
Or, as noted in Matter of Colley, "[mlost employees today are specialists and have been trained and given 
specialized knowledge. However, in view of the House Report, it cannot be concluded that all employees 
with specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
intracompany transferees." 18 I&N Dec. 117, 119 (Comm. 1981). According to Matter of Penner, "[sluch a 
conclusion would permit extremely large numbers of persons to qualify for the 'L-1' visa" rather than the 
"key personnel" that Congress specifically intended. 18 I&N Dec. at 53; see also, 1756, Inc., 745 F. Supp. at 
15 (concluding that Congress did not intend for the specialized knowledge capacity to extend to all employees 
with specialized knowledge, but rather to "key personnel" and "executives.") 
The petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary's training, work experience, or knowledge of the 
company's processes and their application in international markets is more advanced than the knowledge 
possessed by others employed by the petitioner, or in the industry. The legislative history for the term 
"specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive interpretation of the term. In the present 
matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary should be considered a member of the 
"narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized knowledge. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 
supra at 16. The record does not establish that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge or that the position 
offered with the United States entity requires specialized knowledge. For this reason, the appeal will be 
dismissed. 
The AAO acknowledges that CIS previously approved two L-1B petitions filed on behalf of the beneficiary 
for the same U.S. position. Counsel asserts that the director is required by current CIS policy to give 
deference to the subjective determination of prior adjudicators who concluded that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge and will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity. See Memorandum of 
William R. Yates, Associate Director for Operations, USCIS, to Service Center Directors, et al, The 
Significance of a Prior CIS Approval on a Nonimmigrant Petition in the Context of a Subsequent 
Determination Regarding Eligibility for Extension of Petition Validity HQOPRD 7211 1.3 (April 23, 
2004)("Yates Memo"). 
WAC 03 235 50654 
Page 11 
Counsel's assertion is not persuasive. It must be emphasized that that each nonimrnigrant petition filing is a 
separate proceeding with a separate record and a separate burden of proof. See 8 C.F.R. tj 103.8(d). While 
CIS approved two other petitions that had been previously filed on behalf of the beneficiary, the prior 
approvals do not preclude CIS from denying an extension of the original visa based on reassessment of 
beneficiary's qualifications. Texas AM Univ. v. Upchurch, 99 Fed. Appx. 556, 2004 WL 1240482 (5th Cir. 
2004). Furthermore, if the previous nonimmigrant petitions filed by the petitioner were approved based on 
the same unsupported assertions that are contained in the current record, the approvals would constitute 
material and gross error on the part of the director. Due to the lack of evidence of eligibility in the present 
record, the AAO finds that the director was justified in departing from the previous approvals by denying the 
present request to extend the beneficiary's status. 
The AAO is not required to approve applications or petitions where eligibility has not been demonstrated, 
merely because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. See, e.g. Matter of Church Scientology 
International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Cornm. 1988). It would be absurd to suggest that CIS or any agency 
must treat acknowledged errors as binding precedent. Sussex Engg. Ltd. v. Montgomery, 825 F.2d 1084, 1090 
(6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988). CIS memoranda merely articulate internal guidelines for 
CIS personnel; they do not establish judicially enforceable rights. An agency's internal personnel guidelines 
"neither confer upon [plaintiffs] substantive rights nor provide procedures upon which [they] may rely." Lou- 
Herrera v. Trominski, 231 F.3d 984, 989 (5th Cir. 2000)(quoting Fano v. O'NeilE, 806 F.2d 1262, 1264 (5th 
Cir.1987)). 
Furthermore, the AAO's authority over the service centers is comparable to the relationship between a court 
of appeals and a district court. Even if a service center director had approved the nonimmigrant petitions on 
behalf of the beneficiary, the AAO would not be bound to follow the contradictory decision of a service 
center. Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS, 2000 WL 282785 (E.D. La.), affd, 248 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 
2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 51 (2001). 
The director is instructed to review the beneficiary's previous nonimmigrant approvals for possible 
revocation, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(9)(iii). 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.