dismissed L-1B Case: Horse Training

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PUBLIC: copy 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. A3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
File: EAC 06 229 52286 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date: Am (P 3 2006 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 4 1 101 (a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
/ 
Administrative Appeals Office 
EAC 06 229 52286 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition for a nonirnrnigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant visa petition seeking to employ the beneficiary as a stables 
managerltrainer as an L-1B nonimrnigrant intracompany transferee having specialized knowledge pursuant to 
section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L). The 
petitioner is a limited liability company organized under the laws of the State of Oregon and is allegedly in 
the business of boarding, training, and selling horses. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish (1) that the beneficiary will be 
employed in the United States in a position involving specialized knowledge; or (2) that the beneficiary has 
been employed abroad in a position involving specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel asserts that the beneficiary has specialized 
knowledge of (1) the training, development, and care of the Marwari breed of horse; and (2) the training of 
horses to perform in Hindu and Sikh wedding ceremonies and other traditional festivals and events. 
To establish eligibility under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the petitioner must meet certain criteria. 
Specifically, within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, a 
firm, corporation, or other legal entity, or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof, must have employed the 
beneficiary for one continuous year. Furthermore, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States 
temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof 
in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
EAC 06 229 52286 
Page 3 
The primary issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary has been or 
will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity and whether the beneficiary has specialized knowledge 
as defined in the Act and the regulations. 8 C.F.R. $4 214.2(1)(3)(ii) and (iv). 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 4 11 84(c)(2)(B), provides: 
For purposes of section 10 1 (a)(15)(L), an alien is considered- to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 2 14.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
The petitioner described the beneficiary's duties abroad, and proposed duties in the United States, in a letter 
dated August 3,2006 as follows: 
[The beneficiary] currently oversees operations of [the foreign employer] in India. He is 
responsible for the care, training and development of our horses, including foals, yearlings 
and pregnant mares. There responsibilities include setting and monitoring feeding schedules 
and maintaining the proper nutritional mix to maximize each horse's overall development. 
[The beneficiary] closely supervises and trains our new employees to ensure proper handling 
and the safety of our horses. [The beneficiary] is also responsible for procuring and 
maintaining feed stocks, hay and other supplies. 
While [the beneficiary] naturally answers to myself and my partner in India, [the beneficiary] 
is the key to our success. This is because [the beneficiary] has been around horses all of his 
life and he has a natural ability to work and relate to them. [The beneficiary] knows horses. 
He knows how to care for them, to train them and to prepare them to reach their maximum 
potential, whether it is for racing, riding, show or re-sale. 
[The beneficiary] will be responsible for the feeding, care, development and training of all of 
our horses. He will also be responsible for the proper care and safety of our boarders' horses. 
[The beneficiary] will develop the necessary schedules to exercise and rotate our horses from 
pasturing to boarding, and he will develop the appropriate nutntional mix and feeding 
schedule for each horse. Strong, healthy horses attract a top premium price and they 
encourage other boarders to use our facilities and thus increase our business. [The 
EAC 06 229 52286 
Page 4 
beneficiary] will personally oversee the care of all pregnant mares and foals. 
[The beneficiary] will also be responsible for supervising and training all employees who are 
in regular contact with the horses. [The beneficiary] will assist in the selection of new horses 
to purchase and in the showing of horses for sale. As we begin our plan to introduce new 
breeds from India into the local market, [the beneficiary] will be responsible for helping the 
horses get used to their new environment and de-stressing from their long journey. 
The petitioner also noted that the beneficiary has been working for the foreign employer since March 2004 
and that, before worlung for the foreign employer, the beneficiary worked for a different stable in India. The 
owner of that stable provided a letter dated March 3, 2006 in which the beneficiary is described as being 
"fully trained in Care of Bred or Pregnant Marest' and in "trail ridding [sic] and break horses." 
Finally, the petitioner submitted documents outlining its business plan. These documents indicate that the 
petitioner plans to purchase Marwari foals in India, pasture them in India, and import them into the United 
States for sale at age three for racing purposes. The petitioner plans to market these horses for sale before 
importation and predicts that most of these horses will be sold "before they reach American soil." The 
petitioner describes its business generally as a "horse boarding, riding, and training facility." 
It is important to note that the petitioner does not indicate that it will train Marwari horses in the United States 
for any purpose, including for use in Indian weddings or festivals. Furthermore, the petitioner does not 
indicate that the beneficiary will train Marwari horses in the United States for any purpose, or that he trained 
Marwari horses abroad, or that he trained any horses for participation in weddings or festivals. To the 
contrary, the petitioner states that it plans to import three-year old Marwari horses into the United States for 
immediate resale, that the beneficiary's only involvement with these horses will be "helping the horses get 
used to their new environment and de-stressing from their long journey," and that the beneficiary prepared 
horses abroad for "racing, riding, show or re-sale." 
On August 18, 2006, the director requested additional evidence. 
 The director requested, inter alia, a 
description of the manner in which the beneficiary acquired his purported specialized knowledge; evidence 
that the beneficiary has advanced knowledge, which is uncommon, noteworthy, or distinguished by some 
unusual quality, and not generally known by others in the beneficiary's field of endeavor, or that his 
knowledge distinguishes him from those with only elementary or basic knowledge; evidence that the 
beneficiary's job duties in the United States will require his claimed specialized knowledge; and evidence that 
the processes and procedures of which the beneficiary has knowledge is different from those used by other 
comparable entities within the petitioner's industry. 
In response, the petitioner submitted a letter dated September 7,2006 in which the petitioner further describes 
the beneficiary's claimed specialized knowledge and proposed duties as follows: 
[The beneficiary] possesses a very special talent. His unique ability to communicate with 
horses far exceeds anyone else's talents that I have witnessed. [The beneficiary] has spent 
almost his entire life around horses, and relating to them comes naturally for him. In 
EAC 06 229 52286 
Page 5 
addition, [the beneficiary's] knowledge and experience with certain exotic breeds that are 
well known and respected in India, but that are very rare here in the United States, is a 
tremendous strategic advantage for [the petitioning organization]. Part of the plan for [the 
petitioner] is to start importing, showing and selling certain exotic breeds, such as the 
Marwari, and it would be nearly impossible here in the United States to find a sufficiently 
qualified individual to work with this breed of horse. Similarly, as a Sikh, I am contacted by 
many Indians living in the United States and even Canada who are interested in hiring horses 
for our traditional festivals and wedding ceremonies. I am not aware of any stables in North 
America that currently provides this service and I would like to be the first. However, I 
would need [the beneficiary] to train the horses for these special performances. 
Apart from the care, development and training of all of our and our boarders' horses, I have 
already identified two new market opportunities that [the beneficiary's] knowledge will 
enable me to capitalize on. The first is the importing of the Marwari breed to the United 
States. The Marwari is a famous, native Indian breed that will bring top prices here in the 
United States. I have already submitted my business plan for this breed to your office and I 
am including with this letter some additional information about these horses. I do not think 
that I could find anyone capable of training these horses in the United States, and I need [the 
beneficiary's] assistance to enable me to undertake this venture. 
The second business opportunity that I have identified is the growing and currently untapped 
market in the United States for specially trained horses for Hindu and Sikh weddings ("Ghodi 
Sajana"), and other traditional festivals and events. [The beneficiary] was the innovator in 
this specialized field when he worked for Behbal Stud Farms, where he trained some of the 
first horses specifically for such occasions [sic]. At [the petitioner's business] in Portland, I 
have a 3200 square foot indoor arena suitable for use as a wedding hall, with a capacity for 
approximately 250 people. I also have outdoor facilities that will accommodate 300 guests. 
Because I am a Sikh, many of my customers are also from India and I have already been 
contacted by other members of the Indian community interested in renting our facilities for 
special occiasions [sic], and they would like to hire trained horses for Indian weddings. 
However, these horses must be specially trained to perform with loud noise and small 
children all around them and to dance to traditional Hindu and Punjabi music. It would be 
dangerous to the horse and the guests if the horse were not properly trained. I do not know 
anyone here in the United States that has knowledge to train these horses. I need [the 
beneficiary's] special knowledge and expertise to allow me to serve this unique market. 
Without [the beneficiary], this part of my business will fail. 
On September 22, 2006, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that "[tlhe record does not 
establish that the beneficiary has been and will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity." 
On appeal, counsel to the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge of (1) the training, 
EAC 06 229 52286 
Page 6 
development, and care of the Manvari breed of horse; and (2) the training of horses to perform in Hindu and 
Sikh wedding ceremonies and other traditional festivals and events. 
Upon review, the petitioner's assertions are not persuasive in demonstrating that the beneficiary has been or 
will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity as defined at 8 C.F.R. 4 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). 
As a threshold matter, the petitioner's attempt in its response to the director's Request for Evidence to expand 
and redefine both the beneficiary's purported specialized knowledge, and his foreign and proposed job duties, 
in an attempt to establish that he has been, and will be, employed in a specialized knowledge capacity was 
inappropriate. The purpose of the Request for Evidence is to elicit further information that clarifies whether 
eligibility for the benefit sought has been established. 8 C.F.R. fj 103.2(b)(8). When responding to a Request 
for Evidence, a petitioner cannot offer a new position to the beneficiary, or materially change a position's title, 
its level of authority within the organizational hierarchy, or its associated job responsibilities. The petitioner 
must establish that the position offered to the beneficiary when the petition was filed merits classification as a 
managerial or executive position. Matter of Michelin Tire Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248, 249 (Reg. Comm. 1978). 
If significant changes are made to the initial request for approval, the petitioner must file a new petition rather 
thanseek approval of a petition that is not supported by the facts in the record. 
In this matter, the petitioner generally described the beneficiary's duties in the initial petition as training and 
caring for horses. The petitioner did not indicate that the beneficiary trained Marwari horses abroad or that he 
trained horses for Indian weddings or festivals. The petitioner also did not indicate in the initial petition that 
the beneficiary would perform such duties in the United States. To the contrary, the petitioner originally 
described a business strategy that would not utilize part of the beneficiary's purported specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner states that it plans to import three-year old Manvari horses into the United States for immediate 
resale and that the beneficiary will be "helping the horses get used to their new environment and de-stressing 
from their long journey." Not until its response to the Request for Evidence does the petitioner claim that the 
beneficiary will train these Manvari horses in the United States. Furthermore, not until its response to the 
Request for Evidence did the petitioner indicate that the beneficiary will prepare horses for participation in' 
Indian weddings and festivals or that the petitioner plans to offer such services. 
Accordingly, Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) will not consider the expanded description of the 
beneficiary's claimed specialized knowledge or job duties, both abroad and in the United States. In view of 
the above, the petitioner has failed to identify any specialized or advanced body of knowledge which would 
distinguish the beneficiary's role from that of other similarly experienced horse trainer employed by the 
foreign entity, the petitioner, or in the industry at large. The AAO does not dispute the possibility that the 
beneficiary is a skilled and experienced horse trainer who has been, and would be, a valuable asset to the 
petitioning organization. However, this is not sufficient to establish that the beneficiary has been or will be 
employed in a specialized knowledge capacity. It has not been established that the beneficiary has advanced 
knowledge which is uncommon, noteworthy, or distinguished by some unusual quality, and not generally 
known by others in the beneficiary's field of endeavor, or that his knowledge distinguishes him from those 
with only elementary or basic knowledge. Going on record without documentary evidence is not sufficient 
for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 
(Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
EAC 06 229 52286 
Page 7 
Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties involve specialized knowledge; 
otherwise, meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. See Fedin Bros. 
Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724, F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905, F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
Moreover, the petitioner offers no explanation for the numerous inconsistencies in the record resulting from 
its response to the Request for Evidence. For example, the petitioner submitted with the initial petition a 
substantial business plan which fails to address the training and provision of horses for Indian weddings and 
festivals. However, in response to the Request for Evidence, the petitioner identifies this service for the first 
time. Also, the petitioner's business plan indicates that it will import three-year old Marwari horses into the 
United States for resale and that the beneficiary will be "helping the horses get used to their new environment 
and de-stressing from their long journey." However, in response to the Request for Evidence, the beneficiary 
is described as training these horses. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the 
record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not 
suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of 
Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, 
lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa 
petition. Id. at 591. 
Regardless, even if CIS considered the petitioner's expanded description of the beneficiary's claimed 
specialized knowledge, foreign job duties, and proposed job duties in the United States, the petitioner 
nevertheless failed to establish that the beneficiary has been or will be employed in a specialized knowledge 
capacity. In examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8.C.F.R. tj 214.2(1)(3). The petitioner must submit a detailed 
job description of the services that were and will be performed sufficient to establish that he has specialized 
knowledge. 
Although the petitioner repeatedly asserts that the beneficiary's position abroad and in the United States 
requires "specialized knowledge" and that the beneficiary had been and will be employed abroad in a 
"specialized knowledge" capacity, the petitioner has not adequately articulated any basis to support this claim. 
The petitioner has failed to identify any specialized or advanced body of knowledge which would distinguish 
the beneficiary's role from that of other similarly experienced horse trainers employed by the foreign entity or 
in the industry at large. Once again, going on record without documentary evidence is not sufficient for 
purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165 (citing 
Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190). Specifics are clearly an important indication of 
whether a beneficiary's duties involve specialized knowledge; otherwise, meeting the definitions would 
simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. See Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724, F. Supp. 1 103, aff'd' 
905, F.2d 41. 
The petitioner describes the beneficiary as having specialized knowledge of (1) the training, development, and 
care of the Manvari breed of horse; and (2) the training of horses to perform in Hindu and Sikh wedding 
ceremonies and other traditional festivals and events. However, the petitioner never explains what, exactly, 
distinguishes the training of Marwari horses from other horse breeds or why the knowledge of Manvari horses 
is noteworthy, uncommon, or distinguished by some unusual quality that is not generally known by other 
EAC 06 229 52286 
Page 8 
experienced horse trainers in general. Furthermore, the petitioner never explains what, exactly, distinguishes 
the training of horses to perform in Hindu and Sikh weddings, festivals, and events from the training of horses 
generally to participate in events. The only qualities attributed to these specially trained horses -- skills which 
allegedly can only be imparted by the beneficiary and similarly "specialized" trainers -- involve tolerance to 
loud music, small children, and crowds; dancing; sitting on command; and eating Bengal gram. However, the 
petitioner never explains what, exactly, distinguishes the training methods or processes for these qualities 
fi-om training horses in general or why the ability to train horses to do these things is noteworthy, uncommon, 
or distinguished by some unusual quality that is not generally known by other experienced horse trainers. 
Finally, even if the petitioner could establish that the beneficiary's knowledge or Marwari horses and the 
training of horses to perform in Indian weddings and festivals constitute "specialized knowledge" in the 
United States, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary was employed in a specialized 
knowledge capacity in India. According to the petitioner, India is the origin of both the Marwari horse and 
the cultural traditions for which horses need to be trained as participants. The record is devoid of evidence, 
and counsel does not even attempt to address, whether this purported specialized knowledge is noteworthy, 
uncommon, or distinguished by some unusual quality in India. To the contrary, given that the beneficiary 
apparently acquired these slulls during his employment by other stables in India, it appears from the record 
that his knowledge is not "specialized knowledge" as defined by the Acts and in the regulations. 
The AAO does not dispute the possibility that the beneficiary is a skilled and experienced employee who has 
been, and would be, a valuable asset to the petitioning organization. However, it is appropriate for the AAO 
to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the beneficiary's knowledge of the 
business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making process. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N 
Dec. 1 17, 120 (Comm. 198 l)(citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 61 8(R.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 
13 I&N Dec. 8 16 (R.C. 1971)). As stated by the Commissioner in Matter of Penner, when considering 
whether the beneficiaries possessed specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find 
that the occupations inherently qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." 18 I&N Dec. at 52. 
Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled 
worker. Id. The Commissioner also provided the following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or her to 
produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed primarily 
for his ability to carry out a key process or function which is important or essential to the 
business firm's operation. 
Id. at 53. 
It should be noted that the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the AAO to make 
comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The term "specialized knowledge" 
is not an absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed in 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 
"[slimply put, specialized knowledge is a relative . . . idea which cannot have a plain meaning." 745 F. Supp. 
9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990). The Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended for "key 
personnel." See generally, H.R. REP. NO. 9 1-85 1, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key personnel" 
EAC 06 229 52286 
Page 9 
denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." Webster's I1 New College 
Dictionary 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). In general, all employees can reasonably be considered 
"important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic success of 
an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. An employee of "crucial 
importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average employee. Accordingly, 
based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record related to that term, the AAO 
must make comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge employee and the general labor 
market, but also between the employee and the remainder of the petitioner's workforce. While it may be 
correct to say that the beneficiary in the instant case is a highly skilled and productive employee, this fact 
alone is not enough to bring the beneficiary to the level of "key personnel." 
Moreover, in Matter of Penner, the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of the 
specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comm. 1982). The decision noted that the 1970 House 
Report, H.R. REP. NO. 91-85 1, stated that the number of admissions under the L-1 classification "will not be 
large" and that "[tlhe class of persons eligible for such nonimmigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be 
carefully regulated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id. at 5 1. The decision further noted that 
the House Report was silent on the subject of specialized knowledge, but that during the course of the sub- 
committee hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary 
to qualify under the proposed "L" category. In response to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses 
responded that they understood the legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts," individuals with 
"unique" skills, and that it would not include "lower categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." Matter 
of Penner, 18 I&N at 50 (citing H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration Act of 1970: Hearings 
on H.R. 445,9lSt Cong. 210,218,223,240,248 (November 12, 1969)). 
Reviewing the Congressional record, the Commissioner concluded in Matter of Penner than an expansive 
reading of the specialized knowledge provision, such that it would include skilled workers and technicians, is 
not warranted. The Commissioner emphasized that the specialized knowledge worker classification was not 
intended for "all employees with any level of specialized knowledge." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 53. 
Or, as noted in Matter of Collq, "[mlost employees today are specialists and have been trained and given 
specialized knowledge. However, in view of the House Report, it can not be concluded that all employees 
with specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
intracompany transferees." 18 I&N Dec. at 119. According to Matter of Penner, "[s]uch a conclusion would 
permit extremely large numbers of persons to qualify for the 'L-1 ' visa" rather than the "key personnel" that 
Congress specifically intended. 18 I&N Dec. at 53; see also 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F. Supp. at 
15 (concluding that Congress did not intend for the specialized knowledge capacity to extend to all employees 
with specialized knowledge, but rather to "key personnel" and "executives.") 
A 1994 Immigration and Naturalization Service (now CIS) memorandum written by the then Acting 
Associate Commissioner also directs CIS to compare the beneficiary's knowledge to the general United States 
labor market and the petitioner's workforce in order to distinguish between specialized and general 
knowledge. The Associate Commissioner notes in the memorandum that "officers adjudicating petitions 
involving specialized knowledge must ensure that the knowledge possessed by the beneficiary is not general 
knowledge held commonly throughout the industry but that it is truly specialized." Memorandum from James 
EAC 06 229 52286 
Page 10 
A. Puleo, Acting Associate Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Interpretation of 
Specialized Knowledge, CO 2 14L-P (March 9, 1994). A comparison of the beneficiary's knowledge to the 
knowledge possessed by others in the field is therefore necessary in order to determine the level of the 
beneficiary's skills and knowledge and to ascertain whether the beneficiary's knowledge is advanced. In other 
words, absent an outside group to which to compare the beneficiary's knowledge, CIS would not be able to 
"ensure that the knowledge possessed by the beneficiary is truly specialized." Id. 
 The analysis for 
specialized knowledge therefore requires a test of the knowledge possessed by the United States labor market, 
but does not consider whether workers are available in the United States to perform the beneficiary's job 
duties. 
As explained above, the record does not distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge as more advanced than the 
knowledge possessed by other people employed by the foreign entity or by horse trainers employed 
elsewhere. As the petitioner has failed to document any materially unique qualities to the beneficiary's 
knowledge, the petitioner's claims are not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary, while perhaps highly 
slulled, would be a "key" employee. There is no indication that the beneficiary has any knowledge that 
exceeds that of any other similarly experienced horse trainer or that he has received special training in the 
company's methodologies or processes which would separate him from other workers employed with the 
foreign entity or elsewhere. It is simply not reasonable to classify this employee as a key employee of crucial 
importance to the organization. 
The legislative history of the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the bbnarrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, supra at 16. Based on the evidence presented, it is concluded 
that the beneficiary was not employed abroad in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. For this reason, 
the appeal will be dismissed. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner failed to establish that it has a qualifying relationship with 
the foreign entity. 
To establish a "qualifying relationship" under the Act and the regulations, the petitioner must show that the 
beneficiary's foreign employer and the proposed United States employer are the same employer (i.e., one 
entity with "branch" offices), or related as a "parent and subsidiary" or as "affiliates." See generally section 
10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. $ 2 14.2(1). If one individual owns a majority interest in the petitioner and 
the foreign employer, and controls those entities, then the entities will be deemed to be "affiliates" under the 
definition. 8 C.F.R. $ 2 14.2(1)(l)(ii)(L). 
In this matter, the petitioner asserts that it and the foreign employer are both owned and 
 ntrolled by 
. However, the record is devoid of evidence establishing that the 
 owns and 
controls the petitioner, an Oregon limited liability company. The petitioner failed to submit an operating 
agreement, membership certificate, or other evidence establishing whom, exactly, owns and controls the 
petitioner. See generally Or. Rev. Stat. Ch. 63 (2005). Once again, going on record without documentary 
EAC 06 229 52286 
Page 11 
evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Sofici, 
22 I&N Dec. at 165 (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190). 
Accordingly, the petitioner failed to establish that it has a qualifying relationship with the foreign entity, and 
the petition may not be approved for this additional reason. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afd, 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can 
succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's 
enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
appeal will be dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.