dismissed L-1B Case: Hospitality

data deleted tu 
PUBLlC COPY 
U.S. Dcpenmenc of ~omciand Security 
20 Mass. Ave, N.W.. Rm. A3042 
Washlng~on. DC 20529 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
File: SRC 04 064 5061 2 Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: JUN 2 9 2005 
Petition: Pet~tion for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(l5)(L) of the Imm~gration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This IS the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your cke. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
--.- - -- -7-, 
7> 1,-- 
C- 
Robert P. Wiemann, Dlrector 
Admlnlstrat~ve Appeals Oftice 
SRC 04 064 50612 
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i 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant vlsa. The matter 
is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner is engaged in the hospitality and restaurant business and operates a restaurant: It seeks to 
temporarily employ the beneficiary as a chef' in the United states and. filed a petition to classify the 
beneficiary as a nonirnmigrant intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 
101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 4 1 101(a)(15)(L). The United States entity is 
a corporation organized in the State of Texas and .claims to.be the subsidiary of located 
in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia with headquarters in Karachi, Pakistan. The director determined that the petitioner 
had istablished neither' that the beneficiary possesses specialized. knowledge nor that the intended 
employment required specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The d~rector declined to treat the appeal as a motion, and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for revlew. On appeal, counsel submits a brief and asserts that the 
petitloner fully explained why the benefic~ary possesses specialized knowledge, and that the denla1 
rn~sconstmed the requirements for specialized knowledge as outlined in a 1998 and a 2002 Imm~gratlon and 
Naturalization Serv~ce (INS - now Citizenship and Immigration Sewices (CIS)) memorandum. 
To establish L-1 eligibility, the petitioner must meet the criteria outlined in section 101(a)(lS)(L) of the 
Imniigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. tj 1101(a)(15)(L). Specifically, within three years 
preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, a qualifying organization must 
have employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive 'capacity, or in a specialized 
. knowledge ~.~acity, for one continuous year:'. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States 
temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof 
in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization wh~ch employed or will employ the 
a1 ien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (I)( 1 )(ii )(G) of thls section. 
(11) Evldence that the allen wlll be employed In an executlve, managerial, or spec~allzed 
knowledge capacity, including a detalled description of the servlces to be performed. 
(iii) Evldence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full tlme employment abroad 
with a qualifying organizat~on within the three years preced~ng the fil~ng of the petition. 
(IV) Evldence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a pos~tion that was 
managerial, executlve or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prlor 
educat~on, trainlng, and employment qual~fies hlmther to perform the intended servlces 
In the United States; however, the work In the United States need not be the same work 
wh~ch the alien performed abroad. 
SRC 04 064 5061 2 
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The primary issue in tliis matter is whether the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1184(c)(2)(B), provides the following: 
For purposes of section IOl(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving speclallzed knowledge with respect to a company if the allen has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in lntemational markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 2 14.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpeclal knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product. 
servlce, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
In support of the petition, counsel for the petitioner submitted a letter from the petitioner dated December 18, 
2003, stating.that the beneficiary had been employed by the foreign entity as a chef since September 2002. 
The betitioner claimed that the beneficiary had several years of work experience in both Pakistan and Saudi 
Arabia, and that he possessed excellent culinary and restaurant management skills. The petitioner stated that 
the beneficiary began his career as a Ilcook helper," and later became acook. Between 1985 and 200 1, the 
petltloner clalms that the beneficiary was employed as a "cook supervisor" and chef for various restaurants In 
Saudi Arabla, which helped him to perfect his skills. The petitioner provided the followrng statement wlth 
regard to the beneficlary's proposed duties: 
Direct the preparation and presentatton of ethnlc South Asian dlshes. Coordinate food 
service activities of the restaurant on a daily basis and durlng soclal functions. Estlmate food 
and beverage costs and requisitions on purchase of supplies. Confer with food preparation 
and other personnel to plan menus and related activltles, such as dining room, bar, and 
banquet operations. Direct the hiring and assignment of personnel In the food preparation 
area Investigate and resolve food quality and servlce complaints. Review financial 
transact~ons and monitor budgets to ensure efficient operatron, and to ensure food 
expendrtures stay within budget I~m~tations. 
The petitloner farled to specifically address the beneficlary's qualifications as a nonimmigrant lntracompany 
transferee with specialized knowledge. 
A request for additional evidence was Issued on January 8, 2004. SpecificalIy, the director requested precise 
details wlth regard to the training the beneficiary would provlde to the petitloner's employees. In add~tton, the 
dlrector requested ~nformatlon w~th regard to other L-IB specialized knowledge employees transferred to the 
Un~ted States in the last twelve months, and requested the~r names, titles, and posltion descriptions. 'I'he 
petltloner was given ninety days to respond to the request. 
SRC 04 064 50612 . . 
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On March 31, 2004, one week before the response to the director's request was due, counsel for the petrt~on 
submitted a request for additional tlme to submit the requested ev~dence. Spec~fically, counsel stated that the 
pet~tioner's director was frequently traveling, and as a result was st111 in the process of gathering the requested 
informat~on. Counsel requested an add~t~onal thlrty days to submit the response. 
On April 12,2004, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitloner's descrlptlon of 
the benefic~ary's alleged knowledge was not so spec~alized that ~t satisfied the regulatory requirements for the 
L-1B class~ficat~on. In addition, the director stated that since the petltion was not devoid of initial evidence 
when filed, the petitioner was not entltled to the requested extension to file the response to the request for 
evidence. 
Counsel submits a bnef on appeal m support of the pemroner's assertions that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge. Counsel restates the descript~on of the beneficiary's dut~es and the d~rector's 
conclus~ons, submlts some of the ev~dence requested In the request for ev~dence, and argues that the dlrector 
erred by denylng the request for add~tional time to file the response. In addillon, counsel asserts that the 
director's fa~lure to find that the benefic~ary in fact possessed spec~ahzed knowledge was contrary to an INS 
pollcy memorandum dated March 9, 1994. This memorandum, counsel alleges, makes readily apparent the 
distinct~on between "dut~es" and "spec~al~zed knowledge." 
Counsel asserts on appeal that the director's denial of the petitioner's request for additional time to submit its 
.response,to the request for evidence is a "harsh reinterpretation/modificationW of 8 C.F.R. 3 103.2(b)(8). The 
cited regulat~on requires.the director to request additional evidence in instances "where there is no evidence of 
ineligibility, and initial evidence or,eligibility information is missing." Id.. The director is not required to 
issue a request for furthdr information in every deniable case. If the director determines that the 
initial evidence supports a decision of denial, the cited regulation does not require solicitation of further 
documentation. In this case, the director did not deny the petition based on initial'.insufficient evidence of 
eligibility. ~nstead: the director as a courtesy offered the petitioner an opportunity to supplement the initial 
evidence submitted and afforded the petitioner a reasonable amount of time to submit this evidence. 
However, despite the clearly stated deadline, the petitioner faiIed to submit a timely .response. 
The regulation states that the petitloner shall subm~t additional evidence as the director. in h~s or her 
discretion, may deem necessary. The purpose of the request for evldence 1s to ehc~t further information that 
clar~fies whether eligibility for the benefit sought has been established as of the tlme the petition is filed. See 
8 C.F.R $3 103.2(b)(8) and (12). The failure to subm~t requested evidence that precludes a material llne of 
Inquiry shall be ~ounds for deny~ng the petltlon. 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(14). 
Where, as here, a petlttoner has been put on not~ce of a deficiency In the evidence and has been glven an 
opportunity to respond to that deficiency, the AAO will not accept ev~dence offered for the first tlme on 
appeal. See Mutter ofsoriano, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988); see ulso Matter of Ohaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533 
(BIA 1988). If the petitioner had wanted the submitted evidence to be cons~dered, ~t should have subm~tted 
the documents in response to the director's request for evidence. Id. Under the circumstances, the AAO need 
not and does not cons~der the sufficiency of the evidence subm~tted on appeal. The AAO, therefore, will only 
evaluate the petit~on and the evidence contained there~n prlor to adjudication. 
SRC 04 064 50612 
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When examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will.look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. tj 214.2(1)(3)(ii). As required in the regulations, the 
petitioner must submit a detailed description of the services to be performed sufficient to establish specialized 
knowledge. Id. 
In the present matt&, the petitioner provided a thorough description of the beneficiary's intended employment 
w~ih the U.S. entity and of his responsibilities as a chef at the petitioner's restaurant. However, the petitioner has 
not sufficiently documented how the beneficiary's performance of the proposed job duties distinguishes his 
. knowledge as specialized. The petitioner states throughout the record that the beneficiary is uniquely qualified for 
the position due to his familiarity with South Asian cuisine. The petitioner, however, offers no explanation as to 
, the work qualifications nticessary'for a chef at the petitioner's restaurant or the responsibilities of each 
position. The record does not contain sufficient evidence that demonstrates that another employee of the 
company is incapable of performing the same or similar duties. .Nor does the petitioner provide 
documentation ,that the. beneficiary received training or work assignments focused specifically on the 
petitioner's processes or products. While counsel asserts that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge, 
-the lack of specificity pertaining to the beneficiary's work experience and training, particulprly in comparison to 
others. employed by the petitioner and in this industry, fails to distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge as 
.' specialized. As noted by the director, there is nothing in the record to.suggest that the beneficiary's knowledge is 
more specialized and unique than that of his co-workers both in the United States and abroad. Without 
documentary evidence to support the claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of 
prool.. Mutter of Obaighena, 19 I&N Dec. at 534; Matter oJ'Ramirez-Sunchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (RIA 
1980). 
It IS also appropriate for the AAO to look beyond the stated job dut~es and cons~der the importance of the 
beneficiary's knowledge of the business's product or servlce, management operations, or decis~on-mak~ng 
process. Mutter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. 1 17, 120 (Comm. 1981) (c~tmg Matter of Ruulin, 13 I&N Dec. 618 
(R.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. 816 (R.C. 1971)).' As stated by the Commissioner m 
Matter of Pennrr, 18 I&N Dec. 49,52 (Comm. 1982). when cons~denng whether the beneficiaries possessed 
spec~al~zed knowledge, "the LeBlatrc and Ruulrn decis~ons did not find that the occupations tnherently 
qual~fied the beneficlar~es for the class~ficat~ons sought." Rather, the beneficlanes were constdered to have 
' Although the cited precedents pre-date the current statutory definition of "specialized knowledge," the AAO 
finds ' them instructive. Other than deleting the former requirement that specialized knowledge had to be 
"proprietary," the 1990 Act did not significantly alter the definition of "specialized knowledge" from the prior 
INS interpretation of the term. The 1990 Committee Report does not reject, criticize, or even refer to any 
specific INS regulation or precedent decision interpreting the term. The Committee Report simply states that 
the Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of "[vlarying [i.e.. not specifically incorrect] 
interpretations by INS," H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I), at 69, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. Beyond that, the 
Committee Rcport simply restates the tautology that became section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Id. The AAO 
concludes, therefore, the cited cases, as well as Matter cf Penner, remain useful guidance concerning the 
intended scope of the "specialized knowledge" L-1 B classification. 
SRC 04 064 50612 
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unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. Id. The Commiss~oner also provided the 
following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose skllls and knowledge enable hlm or her to 
produce a product through physlcal or skilled labor and the person who 1s employed pnmarlly 
for h~s abrl~ty to cany out a key process or funct~on whlch is Important or essential to the 
business' operation. 
Id. at 53. In the present matter, the evidence of record demonstrates that the beneficlary 1s more akin to an 
employee whose skills and expenence enable h~m to produce or create a specialized product or service, 
namely South Asran culslne, rather than an employee who has unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond 
that of a skllled worker. There 1s no mdicat~on that the beneficlary's background IS spec~allzed, In that it 
would enable hlm to perform a key process or functlon of the company. His background in the restaurant 
Industry indicates that he obtalned h~s expenence over thlrty years of worklng for different restaurants. There 
1s no evldence that the beneficiary possesses spec~allzed knowledge of the petitioner's inner processes or 
procedures. 
It should be noted that the statutory defimtion of speclallzed knowledge requires the AAO to make 
comparisons in order to determine what constitutes speclallzed knowledge. The term "speclallzed 
knowledge" IS not an absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed m 1756, Inc. v Attorney 
General, "[s]imply put, speclallzed knowledge 1s a relative . . . Idea whlch cannot have a plain meaning." 745 
F. Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990). The Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was Intended 
for "key personnel." See generally, H.R. REP. No. 91-851. 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key 
personnel" denotes a poslt~on wlthln the petitlonlng company that 1s "of crucial Importance." Wehsfer's NNew 
College Dictionary 605 (Houghton M~mln Co. 2001). In general, all employees can reasonably be 
considered "important" to a petitloner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economlc 
success of an enterprise, there would be no ratlonal economlc reason to employ that person. An employee of 
"cruc~al ~mportance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average employee. 
Accordmgly, based on the definit~on of "specialized knowledge" and the congesnonal record related to that 
term, the AAO must make comparisons not only between the clalmed speclallzed knowledge employee and 
the general labor market, but also between that employee and the remainder of the petitloner's workforce. 
Here, the petltloner makes no claim that the beneficiary's knowledge 1s more advanced than other employees, 
nor d~d the petlt~oner dlstln~w~sh the beneficlary's knowledge, work expenence, or tralning from the other 
employees. The lack of ev~dence m the record makes ~t lmposslble to classlfy the beneficlary's knowledge of 
the petitioner's products or procedures as advanced, and precludes a finding that the benefic~ary's role is "of 
crucial ~mportance" to the organizat~on. Slmply golng on record wlthout supporting documentary evidence is 
not sufticlent for the purpose of meet~ng the burden of proof In these proceed~ngs. Matter of Treasure Crafr 
of Cul$)rniu, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972). Whlle ~t may be correct to say that the beneficlary is a 
highly skilled and productwe employee, thls fact alone IS not enough to brlng the beneficlary to the level of 
"key personnel ." 
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Moreover, in Matter of Penner, the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of the 
specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comm. 1982). The decision noted that the 1970 House 
Report, H.R. No. 91-851, stated that the number of admissions under the L-1 classification "will not be large" 
and that "[tlhe class of persons eligible for such noi- immigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be carefully 
regulated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id. at 51. The decision further noted that the House 
Report was silent on the subject of specialized knowledge,. but that during the course of the sub-committee 
hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify 
under the proposed "L" category. In response to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that 
they understood the legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, 
and that,it would not include "lower categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." Matter ofPmner, id. at 
50 (citing H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445, 91st 
Cong. 210,218,223,240,248 (November 12, 1969)). 
Reviewing the Congressional record, the commissioner concluded in Matter of Penrter that an expansive' 
reading of the specialized knowledge provision, such that it would include skilled workers and technicians, is 
not warianted. The Commissioner emphasized that that the specialized knowledge worker classification was 
not intended for "allemployees with any level of specialized knowledge." Matter ofPenner, 18 I&N Dec. at 
53. Or, as noted in'hfatter of Colley. '"m]ost employees today are specialists and have been trained and given 
specialized knowledge. However, in view of the House Report, it can not be concluded that all employees 
with specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
intracompany transferees." 18 I&N Dec. at 119. According to Matter of Penner, "[sluch a conclusion would 
permit extremely large numbers of persons to qualify for the 'L-1' visa" rather than the "key personnel" that 
Congress specifically intended. 18 I&N Dec. at 53; see also 1756, Inc., 745 F. Supp. at 15 (concluding that 
Congress did not intend for the specialized knowledge capacity to extend all employees with specialized 
knowledge, but rather to "key personnel" and "executives.") 
Counsel also alleges that CIS is not following its own policy guidelines as to the nature of specialized 
knowledge. Specifically, counsel asserts that the director erred in finding that the beneficiary does not have 
knowledge ofthe "companies information." In support of this assertion. counsel refers to two CIS policy 
memoranda, dated December 2002 and March 1994, which reflect CIS'S current interpretation of specialized 
knowledge. Counsel is correct that "[tlhere is no requirement in current legislation that the alien's knowledge 
be unique, proprietary, or not commonly found in the United States labor market." See Memo. from James A. 
Puleo. Acting Exec. Assoc. Commr., Office of Operations, Immigration and Naturalization Serv., to All Dist. 
Dir. et al., Inferpretafion of Special Knowledge, 1-2 (March 9, 1994) (copy on tile with Atn. Itnmig. Luw 
Assn.). However, while the petitioner need not establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is proprietary or 
unique, the knowledge must be different or uncommon. Id. As discussed above, the petitioner has not 
established that the beneficiary's knowledge meets this lesser, but still stnct, standard. On appeal, counsel 
simply restates the previously submitted description of the beneficiary's duties and the knowledge they require 
and asserts that, since the beneficiary is the only employee who possesses South Asian food preparation and 
presentation knowledge, he has consequently satisfied the'detinition of specialized knowledge. Additionally, 
prjor to adjudication and again on appeal, the petitioner alleges that the beneficiary's knowledge is'valuable to the 
petitionerls,productivity, competitiveness, and financial position. While the beneficiary's skills and knowledge 
may contribute to'the success of the petitioning organization, this factor, by itself, does not constitute the 
. . SRC 04 064 506 12 
Page 8 
possession of specialized knowledge. While the beneficiary's contribution to the economic success of the 
restaurant may be considered, the regulations specifically require that the beneficiary possess an "advanced level 
of knowledge" of the organization's process and procedures, or a "special knowledge" of the petitioner's product, 
service, research. equipment, techniques, or management. 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(1Xii)(D). As determined above, 
the beneficiary does not satisfy the requirements for possessing specialized knowledge. 
In the present matter, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the beneticiary's training, work experience. or 
knowledge of the company products and their application in international markets is more advanced than the 
knowledge possessed by others employed by the petitioner, or in the industry. It is clear that the petitioner 
considers the beneficiary to be an important employee and asset to the organization. The AAO, likewise, does 
not dispute the fact that the beneficiary's knowledge has allowed him to competently perform his job for the 
foreign entity. However, the successful completion of one's job duties does not distinguish the beneficiarj as 
"key personnel," nor does it establish employment in a specialized knowledge capacity. 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter. the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. ,Tee 1756. lncb., 745 F. Supp. at 16. Based on the evidence presented, it is concluded that the 
beneficiary does not possess specialized knowledge; nor would the beneficiary be employed in a capacity 
requiring specialized knowledge. For this reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the record contains insufficient evidence to establish that the overseas 
company employed the beneficiary as required by the regulations. Although evidence establishing the 
payment of wages to the beneficiary was requested, the petitioner failed to submit such evidence. Going on 
record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof 
in these proceedings. Matter ojsoffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Mazter of Trtusure C'rufi 
of (Jcrliforniu, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comrn. 1972)). 
While not addressed in the decision, CIS should examine the home country as well when considering the general 
knowledge of a product within a specific industry, especially given that the same specialized knowledge was 
claimed for the beneficiary's required one year of employment abroad with the foreign entity. While the South 
Asian way of cooking food does not need to be proprietary, it should not be common and generally shared by 
other South Asian chefs. In this case. no evidence was presented indicating that a South Asian chef is uncommon 
in South Asia or that the beneficiary's is uncommon or somehow different from other chefs 
in that region of the world. As 9,2004 memorandum, a chef will not 
be considered to possess specialized he or she has knowledge of a "particular type of 
ethnic cooking [that may] represent[] the culmination of centuries of cooking practices." Memo. fiom Fu.jie 0. 
Ohata, Dir., Serv. Ctr. Operations, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Serv., to Serv. Ctr. Dir.. Interprefut~on 
of Specralrzed Knowledge for Chefi und Specrutty Cooks seeking L-IB status, 2 (Sept. 9,2004). 
~eyond the decision of the director, the remaining issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has 
established that a qualifying relationship exists between the petitioning entity and a foreign entity pursuant to 
8 C.F.R. 4 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(G). Specifically, the petitioner only-submitted a copy of its corporate minutes as 
SRC 04 064 506 1 2 
Page 9 
evidence that it is a subsidiary of the foreign entity. The regulation and case law confirm that ownership and 
control are the factors that must be examined in determining whether a qualifying relationship exists between 
United States and foreign entities for purposes of this visa classification. Matfer of Church Scienrolom 
Internurional, 19 I&N Dec. 593 (BIA 1988); see also MuNer of Siemens Medicul Systems. Inc.. 19 I&N Dec. 
362 (BIA 1986); Mhfer of Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 (Comm. 1982). In the context of this visa petition, 
ownership refers to the direct or indirect legal right of possession of the assets of an entity with full power and 
authority to control; control means the direct or indirect legal right and authority to direct the establishment, 
management, and operations of an entity. Mutfer of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 595. 
As general evidence of a petitioner's claimed qualifying relationship, corporate minutes alone are not 
sufficient evidence to determine whether a stockholder maintains ownership and control of a corporate entity. 
In addition to the minutes of reletant annual shareholder meetings, the corporate stock certificates, stock 
certificate ledger, stock certificate registry, and corporate bylaws must also be examined to determine the total 
number of shares issued, the exact number issued to the shareholder. and the subsequent percentage 
ownership and its effect on corporate control. Additionally. a petitioning company must disclose all 
agreements relating to the voting of shares, the distribution of profit, the management and direction of the 
subsidiary, and any other factor affecting actual control of the entity. See Malrer of Siemens Medicul Systems, 
Inc.. supra. Without full disclosure of all relevant documents, the AAO is unable to conclude that the 
petitioner is owned and controlled by the foreign entity. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United Stutes, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 200 1 ), affd. 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 4 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly. the 
director's decision will be affirmed and the petition will be denied. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.