dismissed L-1B Case: Hospitality

U.S. Department of ~omciand Sccurity 
20 Mass. Ave, N.W., Rm. A3042 
iderrww data deleted to 
P& dearly onwamurted 
inprsba dl#rsoaal ~rlVa~ 
Washington, DC 20529 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
PuB]LIC copy 
File: SRC 04 064 50612 Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: JUN 2 9 2005 
Petition: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section I0 1 (a)(l S)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 4 1101(a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. A11 documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
Robert P. Wiemann, Director 
Administrative Appeals Office 
SRC 04 064 50612 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the petition for a nonirnmigrant visa. The matter 
is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner is engaged in the hospitality and restaurant business and operates a restaurant. It seeks to 
temporarily employ the beneficiary as a chef in the United States and filed a petition to classify the 
beneficiary as a nonimmigrant intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 
101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1 lOl(aj(lS)(L). The United States entity is 
a corporation organized in the State of Texas and claims to be the subsidiary of Poshak International, located 
in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia with headquarters in Karachi, Pakistan. The director determined that the petitioner 
had established neither that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge nor that the intended 
employment required specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion, and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel submits a brief and asserts that the 
petitioner fully explained why the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge, and that the denial 
misconstrued the requirements for specialized knowledge as outlined in a 1998 and a 2002 Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS - now Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS)) memorandum. 
To establish L-l eligibility, the petitioner must meet the criteria outlined in sectlon 101(a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. $ 1 10 l(a)(15)(L). Specifically, within three years 
preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, a qualifying organization must 
have employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized 
knowledge capacity, for one continuous year. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States 
temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof 
in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(0 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment abroad 
with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of the petition. 
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies hidher to perform the intended services 
in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the same work 
which the alien performed abroad. 
SRC 04 064 50612 
Page 3 
The primary issue in this matter is whether the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1184(c)(2)(B), provides the following: 
For purposes of section IOl(a)(lS)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
In support of the petition, counsel for the petitioner submitted a letter fiom the petitioner dated December 18, 
2003, stating that the beneficiary had been employed by the foreign entity as a chef since September 2002. 
The petitioner claimed that the beneficiary had several years of work experience in both Pakistan and Saudi 
Arabia, and that he possessed excellent culinary and restaurant management skills. The petitioner stated that 
the beneficiary began his career as a "cook helper," and later became a cook. Between 1985 and 2001, the 
petitioner claims that the beneficiary was employed as a "cook supervisor" and chef for various restaurants in 
Saudi Arabia, which helped him to perfect his skills. The petitioner provided the following statement with 
regard to the beneficiary's proposed duties: 
Direct the preparation and presentation of ethnic South Asian dishes. Coordinate food 
service activities of the restaurant on a daily basis and during social functions. Estimate food 
and beverage costs and requisitions on purchase of supplies. Confer with food preparation 
and other personnel to plan menus and related activities, such as dining room, bar, and 
banquet operations. Direct the hiring and assignment of personnel in the food preparation 
area. Investigate and resolve food quality and service complaints. Review financial 
transactions and monitor budgets to ensure efficient operation, and to ensure food 
expenditures stay within budget limitations. 
The petitioner failed to specifically address the beneficiary's qualifications as a nonimmigrant intracompany 
transferee with specialized knowledge. 
A request for additional evidence was issued on January 8, 2004. Specifically, the director requested precise 
details with regard to the training the beneficiary would provide to the petitioner's employees. In addition, the 
director requested information with regard to other L-I B specialized knowledge employees transferred to the 
United States in the last twelve months, and requested their names, titles, and position descriptions. The 
petitioner was given ninety days to respond to the request. 
SRC 04 064 5061 2 
Page 4 
On March 31, 2004, one week before the response to the director's request was due, counsel for the petition 
submitted a request for additional time to submit the requested evidence. Specifically, counsel stated that the 
petitioner's director was frequently traveling, and as a result was still in the process of gathering the requested 
information. Counsel requested an additional thirty days to submit the response. 
On April 12, 2004, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner's description of 
the beneficiary's alleged knowledge was not so specialized that it satisfied the regulatory requirements for the 
L-1B classification. In addition, the director stated that since the petition was not devoid of initial evidence 
when filed, the petitioner was not entitled to the requested extension to file the response to the request for 
evidence. 
Counsel submits a brief on appeal in support of the petitioner's assertions that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge. Counsel restates the description of the beneficiary's duties and the director's 
conclusions, submits some of the evidence requested in the request for evidence, and argues that the director 
erred by denying the request for additional time to file the response. In addition, counsel asserts that the 
director's failure to find that the beneficiary in fact possessed specialized knowledge was contrary to an INS 
policy memorandum dated March 9, 1994. This memorandum, counsel alleges, makes readily apparent the 
distinction between "duties" and "specialized knowledge." 
Counsel asserts on appeal that the director's denial of the petitioner's request for additional time to submit its 
response to the request for evidence is a "harsh reinterpretationlmodification" of 8 C.F.R. 103.2(b)(8). The 
cited regulation requires the director to request additional evidence in instances "where there is no evidence of 
ineligibility, and initial evidence or eligibility information is missing." Id. The director is not required to 
issue a request for further information in every potentially deniable case. If the director determines that the 
initial evidence supports a decision of denial, the cited regulation does not require solicitation of further 
documentation. In this case, the director did not deny the petition based on initial insufficient evidence of 
eligibility. Instead, the director as a courtesy offered the petitioner an opportunity to supplement the initial 
evidence submitted and afforded the petitioner a reasonable amount of time to submit this evidence. 
However, despite the clearly stated deadline, the petitioner failed to submit a timely response. 
The regulation states that the petitioner shall submit additional evidence as the director, in his or her 
discretion, may deem necessary. The purpose of the request for evidence is to elicit further information that 
clarifies whether eligibility for the benefit sought has been established as of the time the petition is filed. See 
8 C.F.R. $3 103.2(b)(8) and (12). The failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of 
inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. tj 103.2(b)(14). 
Where, as here, a petitioner has been put on notice of a deficiency in the evidence and has been given an 
opportunity to respond to that deficiency, the AAO will not accept evidence offered for the first time on 
appeal. See Mutter ofSoriano, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988); see ulso Matter of Ohaigbena, 19 T&N Dec. 533 
(BIA 1988). If the petitioner had wanted the submitted evidence to be considered, it should have submitted 
the documents in response to the director's request for evidence. Id. Under the circumstances, the AAO need 
not and does not consider the sufficiency of the evidence submitted on appeal. The AAO, therefore, will only 
evaluate the petition and the evidence contained therein prior to adjudication. 
SRC 04 064 506 t 2 
Page 5 
When examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. tj 214.2(1)(3)(ii). As required in the regulations, the 
petitioner must submit a detailed description of the services to be performed sufficient to establish specialized 
knowledge. Id, 
In the present matter, the petitioner provided a thorough description of the beneficiary's intended employment 
with the U.S. entity and of his responsibilities as a chef at the petitioner's restaurant. However, the petitioner has 
not sufficiently documented how the beneficiary's performance of the proposed job duties distinguishes his 
knowledge as specialized. The petitioner states throughout the record that the beneficiary is uniquely qualified for 
the position due to his familiarity with South Asian cuisine. The petitioner, however, offers no explanation as to 
the work qualifications necessary for a chef at the petitioner's restaurant or the responsibilities of each 
position. The record does not contain sufficient evidence that demonstrates that another employee of the 
company is incapable of performing the same or similar duties. Nor does the petitioner provide 
documentation that the beneficiary received training or work assignments focused specifically on the 
petitioner's processes or products. While counsel asserts that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge, 
the lack of specificity pertaining to the beneficiary's work experience and training, particularly in comparison to 
others employed by the petitioner and in this industry, fails to distinguish the beneficiary's howledge as 
specialized. As noted by the director, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the beneficiary's knowledge is 
more specialized and unique than that of his co-workers both in the United States and abroad. Without 
documentary evidence to support the claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of 
proof. Mutter of Obaighenu, 19 I&N Dec. at 534; Mutter ofRamirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 
1980). 
It is also appropriate for the AAO to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the 
beneficiary's knowledge of the business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making 
process. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. 1 17, 120 (Comm. 198 1) (citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 61 8 
(R.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. 816 (R.C. 1971)).] As stated by the Commissioner in 
Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 52 (Comm. 1982), when considering whether the beneficiaries possessed 
specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Ruulin decisions did not find that the occupations inherently 
qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have 
I Although the cited precedents pre-date the current statutory definition of "specialized knowledge," the AAO 
finds them instructive. Other than deleting the former requirement that specialized knowledge had to be 
"proprietary," the 1990 Act did not significantly alter the definition of "specialized knowledge" from the prior 
INS interpretation of the term. The 1990 Committee Report does not reject, criticize, or even refer to any 
specific INS regulation or precedent decision interpreting the term. The Committee Report simply states that 
the Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of "[vlarying [i.e., not specifically incorrect] 
interpretations by INS," H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I), at 69, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. Beyond that, the 
Committee Report simply restates the tautology that became section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Id. The AAO 
concludes, therefore, the cited cases, as well as Matter of Penner, remain useful guidance concerning the 
intended scope of the "specialized knowIedgeW L-1 B classification. 
SRC 04 064 50612 
Page 6 
unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. Id. The Commissioner also provided the 
following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or her to 
produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed primarily 
for his ability to carry out a key process or function which is important or essential to the 
businessf operation. 
Id. at 53. In the present matter, the evidence of record demonstrates that the beneficiary is more akin to an 
employee whose skills and experience enable him to produce or create a specialized product or service, 
namely South Asian cuisine, rather than an employee who has unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond 
that of a skilled worker. There is no indication that the beneficiary's background is specialized, in that it 
would enable him to perform a key process or function of the company. His background in the restaurant 
industry indicates that he obtained his experience over thirty years of working for different restaurants. There 
is no evidence that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge of the petitioner's inner processes or 
procedures. 
It should be noted that the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the AAO to make 
comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The term "specialized 
knowledge" is not an absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed in 1756, Inc. v. Attorney 
General, "[slimply put, specialized knowledge is a relative . . . idea which cannot have a plain meaning." 745 
F. Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990). The Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended 
for "key personnel." See generally, H.R. EP. No. 91-85 1, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key 
personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." Wehster's IINew 
College Dictionary 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). In general, all employees can reasonably be 
considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic 
success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. An employee of 
"crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average employee. 
Accordingly, based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record related to that 
term, the AAO must make comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge employee and 
the general Iabor market, but also between that employee and the remainder of the petitioner's workforce. 
Here, the petitioner makes no claim that the beneficiary's knowledge is more advanced than other employees, 
nor did the petitioner distinbwish the beneficiary's knowledge, work experience, or training from the other 
employees. The lack of evidence in the record makes it impossible to classify the beneficiary's knowledge of 
the petitioner's products or procedures as advanced, and precludes a finding that the beneficiary's role is "of 
crucial importance" to the organization. Simply going on record without supporting documentary evidence is 
not sufficient for the purpose of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treaslrre Craji 
of Culifi,rnia, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972). While it may be correct to say that the beneficiary is a 
highly skilled and productive employee, this fact alone is not enough to bring the beneficiary to the level of 
"key personnel." 
SRC 04 064 506 12 
Page 7 
Moreover, in Matter of Penner, the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of the 
specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comm. 1982). The decision noted that the 1970 House 
Report, H.R. No. 9 1-85 1, stated that the number of admissions under the L-1 classification "will not be large" 
and that "[tlhe class of persons eligible for such nonimmigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be carefully 
regulated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id. at 5 1. The decision further noted that the House 
Report was silent on the subject of specialized knowledge, but that during the course of the sub-committee 
hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify 
under the proposed "L" category. In response to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that 
they understood the legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, 
and that it would not include "lower categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." Matter of Penner, id at 
50 (citing H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445, 91st 
Cong. 210,218,223,240,248 (November 12, 1969)). 
Reviewing the Congressional record, the Commissioner concluded in Matter of Penner that an expansive 
reading of the specialized knowledge provision, such that it would include skilled workers and techn~cians, is 
not warranted. The Commissioner emphasized that that the specialized knowledge worker classification was 
not intended for "all employees with any level of specialized knowledge." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 
53. Or, as noted in Matter of Collq, "[mlost employees today are specialists and have been trained and given 
specialized knowledge. However, in view of the House Report, it can not be concluded that all employees 
with specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
inh-acompany transferees." 18 I&N Dec. at 119. According to Matter of Penner, "[sjuch a conclusion would 
permit extremely large numbers of persons to qualify for the 'L-1' visa" rather than the "key personnel" that 
Congress specifically intended. 18 I&N Dec. at 53; see also 1756, inc., 745 F. Supp. at 15 (concluding that 
Congress did not intend for the specialized knowledge capacity to extend all employees with specialized 
knowledge, but rather to "key personnel" and "executives.") 
Counsel also alleges that CIS is not following its own policy guidelines as to the nature of specialized 
knowledge. Specifically, counsel asserts that the director erred in finding that the beneficiary does not have 
knowledge of the "companies information." In support of this assertion, counsel refers to two CIS policy 
memoranda, dated December 2002 and March 1994, which reflect CIS'S current interpretation of specialized 
knowledge. Counsel is correct that "[tlhere is no requirement in current legislation that the alien's knowledge 
be unique, proprietary, or not commonly found in the United States labor market." See Memo, from James A. 
Puleo, Acting Exec. Assoc. Commr., Office of Operations, Immigration and Naturalization Serv., to A11 Dist. 
Dir. et al., Interpretation of Special Knowledge, 1-2 (March 9, 1994) (copy on file with Am. Immig. Luw 
Assn.). However, while the petitioner need not establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is proprietary or 
unique, the knowledge must be different or uncommon. Id. As discussed above, the petitioner has not 
established that the beneficiary's knowledge meets this lesser, but still stnct, standard. On appeal, counsel 
simply restates the previously submitted description of the beneficiary's duties and the knowledge they require 
and asserts that, since the beneficiary is the only employee who possesses South Asian food preparation and 
presentation knowledge, he has consequently satisfied the definition of specialized knowledge. Additionally, 
prior to adjudication and again on appeal, the petitioner alleges that the beneficiary's knowledge is valuable to the 
petitioner's productivity, competitiveness, and financial position. While the beneficiary's skills and knowledge 
may contribute to the success of the petitioning organization, this factor, by itself, does not constitute the 
SRC 04 064 50612 
Page 8 
possession of specialized knowledge. While the beneficiary's contribution to the economic success of the 
restaurant may be considered, the regulations specifically require that the beneficiary possess an "advanced level 
of knowledge" of the organization's process and procedures, or a "special knowledge" of the petitioner's product, 
service, research. equipment, techniques, or management. 8 C.F.R. 214.2(1)(I)(ii)(D). As determined above, 
the beneficiary does not satisfy the requirements for possessing specialized knowledge. 
In the present matter, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the beneticiary's training, work experience, or 
knowledge of the company products and their application in international markets is more advanced than the 
knowledge possessed by others employed by the petitioner, or in the industry. It is clear that the petitioner 
considers the beneficiary to be an important employee and asset to the organization. The AAO, likewise, does 
not dispute the fact that the beneficiary's knowledge has allowed him to competently perform his job for the 
foreign entity. However, the successful completion of one's job duties does not distinguish the beneficiary as 
"key personnel," nor does it establish employment in a specialized knowledge capacity. 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc., 745 F. Supp. at 16. Based on the evidence presented, it is concluded that the 
beneficiary does not possess specialized knowledge; nor would the beneficiary be employed in a capacity 
requiring specialized knowledge. For this reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the record contains insufficient evidence to establish that the overseas 
company employed the beneficiary as required by the regulations. Although evidence establishing the 
payment of wages to the beneficiary was requested, the petitioner failed to submit such evidence. Going on 
record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof 
in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Crufi 
uf CuEifirnia, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
While not addressed in the decision, CIS should examine the home country as well when considering the general 
knowledge of a product within a specific industry, especially given that the same specialized knowledge was 
claimed for the beneficiary's required one year of employment abroad with the foreign entity. While the South 
Asian way of cooking food does not need to be proprietary, it should not be common and generally shared by 
other South Asian chefs. In this case, no evidence was presented indicating that a South Asian chef is uncommon 
in South Asia or that the beneficiary's is uncommon or somehow different from other chefs 
in that region of the world. As in her September 9,2004 memorandum, a chef will not 
be considered to possess specialized he or she has knowledge of a "particular type of 
ethnic cooking [that may] represent[] the culmination of centuries of cooking practices." Memo. from Fujie 0. 
Ohata, Dir., Serv. Ctr. Operations, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Serv., to Serv. Ctr. Dir., Interprerntion 
of Speciul~zed Knowledge for Chefs und Speciulty Cooks seeking LIB status, 2 (Sept. 9, 2004). 
Beyond the decision of the director, the remaining issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has 
established that a qualifying relationship exists between the petitioning entity and a foreign entity pursuant to 
8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(G). Specifically, the petitioner only submitted a copy of its corporate minutes as 
SRC 04 064 50612 
Page 9 
evidence that it is a subsidiary of the foreign entity. The regulation and case law confirm that ownership and 
control are the factors that must be examined in determining whether a qualifying relationship exists between 
United States and foreign entities for purposes of this visa classification. Matter of Church Scientology 
lnrernulional, 19 l&N Dec. 593 (BlA 1988); see also Mutter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 l&N Dec. 
362 (BIA 1986); Mutter of Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 (Comm. 1982). In the context of this visa petition, 
ownership refers to the direct or indirect legal right of possession of the assets of an entity with full power and 
authority to control; control means the direct or indirect legal right and authority to direct the establishment, 
management, and operations of an entity. Mutter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 595. 
As general evidence of a petitioner's claimed qualifying relationship, corporate minutes alone are not 
sufficient evidence to determine whether a stockholder maintains ownership and control of a corporate entity. 
In addition to the minutes of relevant annual shareholder meetings, the corporate stock certificates, stock 
certificate ledger, stock certificate registry, and corporate bylaws must also be examined to determine the total 
number of shares issued, the exact number issued to the shareholder, and the subsequent percentage 
ownership and its effect on corporate control. Additionally, a petitioning company must disclose all 
agreements relating to the voting of shares, the distribution of profit, the management and direction of the 
subsidiary, and any other factor affecting actual control of the entity. See Mutter of Siemens Medicul Syslems, 
Inc., szpra. Without full disclosure of all relevant documents, the AAO is unable to conclude that the 
petitioner is owned and controlled by the foreign entity. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1 025, I043 (E.D. Cal. 200 1 ), affd. 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 4 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
director's decision will be affirmed and the petition will be denied. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.