dismissed L-1B Case: Household Goods Transportation

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave.. N.W., Rm. A3042 
Washington, DC 20529 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
*L .* 34 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
File: WAC-04-0 12-530 10 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: 
Jut b)? 2005 
JN RE: Petitioner: 
Beneficiary: 
Petition: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. fj 1 101(a)(15)(L) 
JN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
obert P. Wiemann, Director 
dministrative Appeals Office 
WAC-04-0 12-5301 0 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The &A0 will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to employ the beneficiary as an L-1B nonimmigrant 
intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 10l(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. $ 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a corporation organized in the State of 
I 
California that is engaged in production, import, export, distribution, and transportation of households goods 
and furniture. The petitione; claims that it-is the subsidiary of located in Israel. The 
petitioner now seeks to employ the beneficiary for three years as an Account Specialist. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge or that the prospective position requires an individual with specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the position of 
Account Specialist with the petitioner requires specialized knowledge and that the beneficiary's experience 
with the foreign entity is necessary to perform his prospective duties. In support of these assertions, counsel 
submits a brief. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 10 l(a)(15)(L). Specifically, a qualifying 
organization must have employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a 
specialized knowledge capacity, for one continuous year within the three years preceding the beneficiary's 
application for admission into the United States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United 
States temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate 
thereof in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time emplayment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himlher to perform the intended 
WAC-04-012-53010 
Page 3 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The first issue in the present matter is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary's position in 
the United States will involve specialized knowledge as required by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 
5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1184(c)(2)(B), provides the following: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines specialized knowledge as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes or procedures. 
In a letter submitted with the initial petition on October 17, 2003, the petitioner described the beneficiary's 
prospective job duties as follows: 
[The beneficiary] will fill the position of Account Specialist of [the petitioner]. As such he 
will be responsible in the over-all direction of [the petitioner's] customer accounts, sales 
operations, and in the implementation of [the petitioner's] sales policies pursuant to the 
objectives set by [the] parent company in Israel. Time to be spent: 25% 
Moreover, as an Account Specialist, it is [the beneficiary's] duty to determine the manpower 
requirements for the sales operation. He plays a significant role in recruitment, hiring and 
training of sales representatives. He will also plan, coordinate, and direct [the] advertising 
campaign. He will also confer with clients to determine their requirements and budgetary 
limitations, utilizing knowledge of [the] service to be offered. Time to be spent: 25% 
Likewise, [the beneficiary] will research market conditions in [the] local and regional area to 
determine potential sales of [the petitioner's] services. He will also establish [a] research 
methodology and will design [the] format for data gathering, such as surveys, opinion polls, 
or questionnaires. He will also examine and analyze statistical data to forecast future 
marketing trends. He will gather data on competitors and analyzes [sic] prices, sales, and 
methods of marketing and distribution. He will collect data on customer preferences and 
buying habits. Time to be spent: 20% 
WAC-04-012-5301 0 
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[The beneficiary] will review sales account activity reports and financial statements to 
determine progress and status in attaining sales goals. He will also direct and coordinate 
formulations of sales programs to provide funding for new and continuing clients to 
maximize returns and generate more income. Time to be spent: 15% 
As the Account Specialist of the U.S. operations, [the beneficiary] will be responsible for 
expanding, organizing, directing and developing the company's sales capabilities. [The 
beneficiary] is also expected to set up a solid framework for the growth of the sales operation 
and to acquire intensive contracts in the United States in order to identify strategic partners 
and new clients. Time to be spent: 10% 
Moreover, it is [the beneficiary's] responsibility to train other account executives to [sic] so 
that [the beneficiary] can resume his employment at [the] Israeli parent company. Time to be 
spent: 5% 
[The beneficiary] will be able to execute his assignments in conformity with [the foreign 
entity's] standards. Bringing his experience and ideas to the [petitioner] where he will 
exchange ideas with U.S. based personnel is certain to create advances that are crucial to [the 
petitioner's] competitiveness. 
The petitioner further stated the following: 
We find it crucial to transfer key personnel with unique knowledge of the formulatibn and 
implementation of company policies, business strategies and internal procedures when we 
enter a new foreign market. In order to assure correct positioning within the market, proper 
handling and promotion of the characteristics of our services, and upholding of uniformity 
throughout out international organization in policies formulation and management, we will 
temporarily transfer [the beneficiary] from our Israeli headquarters to the [petitioner]. 
On October 30, 2003, the director requested additional evidence. In part, the director requested evidence to 
show that the duties the beneficiary will perform in the United States "are different or unique from those of 
other workers employed by the petitioner or other U.S. employers in this type of position." The director 
further instructed the petitioner to "[elxplain, in more detail, exactly what is the equipment, system, product, 
technique, or service of which the beneficiary . . . has specialized knowledge, and indicate if it is used or 
produced by other employers in the United States and abroad." 
In a response dated December 17, 2003, in part the petitioner submitted a letter that repeated the beneficiary's 
job description as quoted above. The petitioner reiterated that it "offers its clients local, long-distance and 
International moving, residential, office and commercial moving," as well as "household and office storage, 
pick-up and delivery services." The petitioner stated that "[i]t is crucial . . . for [it] to retain [the beneficiary's] 
expertise and specialized knowledge in Account management. His familiarity with internal procedures of [the 
WAC-04-0 12-530 10 
Page 5 
foreign entity] will be especially beneficial to the [petitioner.]" The petitioner submitted copies of job 
announcements that it posted on the Internet for the position of Account Specialist, and stated that it was 
unable to locate any qualified candidates. 
On January 15, 2004, the director denied the petition. In part, the director determined that the petitioner failed 
to establish that the prospective position requires an individual with specialized knowledge. The director 
stated the following: 
The description of the position, while purporting the need for specialized knowledge, does 
not portray a position that could not be filled by a qualified individual with experience in the 
field at large, and be trained in any specifics of the duties required by this particular 
company. The evidence in the petition as submitted does not adequately display that the 
position to be filled necessarily requires a specified level of specialized knowledge regarding 
the petitioner's product and/or services. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the position of Account Specialist with the petitioner requires 
specialized knowledge. Counsel states that "[tlhe Nature and Complexity of the processes and procedures of 
operations of [the petitioner] necessitate the requirement for a specialized Accounts Specialist." Counsel 
provides a list of processes and procedures involved with the petitioner's operations, including tasks in 
furniture design and manufacture, market research and sales activities, labor, import and export planning, and 
accounting. Counsel further describes the beneficiary's prospective duties in the United States. Counsel 
states that "due to the parallel approach of both companies and similar company structure, the knowledge 
learned by [the beneficiary] can be gained only through his experience with [the foreign entity]." Counsel 
asserts that the director's decision is not in accord with an internal memorandum from former Immigration 
and Naturalization Service Commissioner James Puleo entitled "Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge," 
dated March 19, 1994. Counsel notes that the Puleo memorandum provides that whether there are qualified 
workers in the United States that could perform the prospective position is not a consideration in these 
proceedings. 
On review, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary's prospective position requires 
"specialized knowledge" as defined in section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. # 1184(c)(2)(B), and the 
regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). 
In the director's request for evidence, he specifically instructed the petitioner to provide more detail regarding 
the beneficiary's prospective duties, and to explain how those duties will be "different or unique from those of 
other workers employed by the petitioner or other U.S. employers in this type of position." In response, 
counsel merely repeated the job description provided with the initial petition. The regulation states that the 
petitioner shall submit additional evidence as the director, in his or her discretion, may deem necessary. The 
purpose of the request for evidence is to elicit further information that clarifies whether eligibility for the 
benefit sought has been established, as of the time the petition is filed. See 8 C.F.R. $5 103.2(b)(8) and (12). 
The failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying 
the petition. 8 C.F.R. # 103.2(b)(14). 
WAC-04-0 12-530 10 
Page 6 
On appeal, counsel now provides greater explanation of the beneficiary's prospective tasks. Yet, where a 
petitioner has been put on notice of a deficiency in the evidence and has been given an opportunity to respond 
to that deficiency, the AAO will not accept evidence offered for the first time on appeal. See Matter of 
Soriano, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988); see also Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533 (BIA 1988). If the 
petitioner had wanted the additional explanation of the beneficiary's duties to be considered, it should have 
submitted it in response to the director's request for evidence. Id. Under the circumstances, the AAO need not 
and does not consider the sufficiency of the job description submitted on appeal in counsel's brief. 
Consequently, the appeal will be adjudicated based on the job description submitted to the director. 
In examining whether a position requires specialized knowledge, the AAO will look to the petitioner's 
description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed description 
of the services to be performed sufficient to establish that it involves specialized knowledge. Id. It is also 
appropriate for the AAO to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the beneficiary's 
knowledge of the business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making process. Matter 
of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. 117, 120 (Comm. 198l)(citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 61 8 (R.C. 1970) and 
Matter of LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. 8 16 (R.C. 197 I)).' As stated by the Commissioner in Matter of Penner, 18 
I&N Dec. 49, 52 (Comm. 1982), when considering whether the beneficiaries possessed specialized 
knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find that the occupations inherently qualified the 
beneficiaries for the classifications sought." Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have unusual duties, 
skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. Id. The Commissioner also provided the following 
clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or her to 
produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed primarily 
for his ability to carry out a key process or function which is important or essential to the 
business' operation. 
Id. at 53. 
It should be noted that the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the AAO to make 
comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The terrh "specialized 
knowledge" is not an absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed in 1756, Inc. v. Attorney 
General, "[slimply put, specialized knowledge is a relative . . . idea which cannot have a plain meaning." 745 
1 Although the cited precedents pre-date the current statutory definition of "specialized knowledge," the AAO 
finds them instructive. Other than deleting the former requirement that specialized knowledge had to be 
"proprietary," the 1990 Act did not significantly alter the definition of "specialized knowledge" from the prior 
INS regulation or precedent decision interpreting the term. The Committee Report simply states that the 
Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of "[vlarying [i.e., not specifically incorrect] 
interpretations by INS," H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I), at 69, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. Beyond that, the 
Committee Report simply restates the tautology that became section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Id. The AAO 
concludes, therefore, that the cited cases, as well as Matter of Penner, remain useful guidance concerning the 
intended scope of the "specialized knowledge" L- 1B classification. 
WAC-04-012-5301 0 
Page 7 
F. Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990). The Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended 
for "key personnel." See generally, H.R. Rep. No. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key 
personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." Webster's II New 
College Dictionary 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). In general, all employees can reasonably be 
considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic 
success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. An employee of 
ll~ru~ial importance1' or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average employee. 
Accordingly, based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record related to that 
term, the AAO must make comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledgk employee and 
the general labor market, but also between that employee and the remainder of the petitioner's yn~orkforce. 
Moreover, in Matter of Penner, the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of the 
specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comm. 1982). The decision noted that tbe 1970 House 
Report, H.R. No. 91-851, stated that the number of admissions under the L-1 classification "will not be large" 
and that "[tlhe class of persons eligible for such nonimmigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be carefully 
regulated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id. at 5 1. The decision further noted that the House 
Report was silent on the subject of specialized knowledge, but that during the course of the sub-committee 
hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify 
under the proposed "L" category. In response to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that 
they understood the legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, 
and that it would not include "lower categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." Matter of Penner, id. at 
50 (citing H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445, 91st 
Cong. 2 10,2 18,223,240,248 (November 12, 1969)). 
Reviewing the Congressional record, the Commissioner concluded in Matter of Penner that an expansive 
reading of the specialized knowledge provision, such that it would include skilled workers and technicians, is 
not warranted. The Commissioner emphasized that that the specialized knowledge worker classification was 
not intended for "all employees with any level of specialized knowledge." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 
53. Or, as noted in Matter of Colley, "[mlost employees today are specialists and have been trained and given 
specialized knowledge. However, in view of the House Report, it can not be concluded that all employees 
with specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
intracompany transferees." 18 I&N Dec. 117, 119 (Comm. 1981). According to Matter of Penner, "[s]uch a 
conclusion would permit extremely large numbers of persons to qualify for the 'L-1' visa" rather than the 
"key personnel" that Congress specifically intended. 18 I&N Dec. at 53; see also, 1756, Inc., 745 F. Supp. at 
15 (concluding that Congress did not intend for the specialized knowledge capacity to extend to all employees 
with specialized knowledge, but rather to "key personnel" and "executives.") 
In the instant matter, the duties of the account specialist with the petitioner are common to most account 
executives or sales managers in the industry. The duties do not contain tasks that clearly involve prior 
knowledge of products and procedures that are specific to the petitioner or foreign entity. Further, the 
petitioner has not shown that its services, such as fabricating or moving furniture, are uniq~e in nature or 
otherwise distinguished from those of similar companies. For example, counsel states that the petitioner will 
design furniture, yet the petitioner has failed to submit examples of such designs or explanation of how they 
WAC-04-0 12-5301 0 
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differ from other companies' products, such that prior knowledge of the petitioner's designs is required in 
order to effectively serve as an account specialist. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence 
is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N 
Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 
1972)). 
While the petitioner provides that "[the beneficiary] will be able to execute his assignments in conformity 
with [the foreign entity's] standards," this general statement is not sufficient to show the involvement of 
specialized knowledge. It is understood that the petitioner will require all of its employees to follow certain 
business practices and established procedures. The fact that an employee is required to follow general 
company procedure does not render his or her position one involving specialized knowledge. The petitioner 
has not described any of the foreign entity's standards such to distinguish them from the standards of all 
companies. Again, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes 
of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. Greater 
explanation is required to show that the position requires knowledge and experience that is unusual, different 
or uncommon, such that it is distinguished from other account executive or sales manager positions in the 
field. 
The petitioner submitted copies of job announcements that it posted on the Internet in attempt to fill the 
prospective position. The petitioner noted that it was unable to locate any qualified candidates. Counsel 
correctly notes that the petitioner is not required to make an attempt to recruit a worker for the position from 
the general American workforce. Yet, the fact that the petitioner placed numerous public employment 
advertisements on the Internet for the position over a four-month period calls into question whether it requires 
an employee with specialized knowledge of its products or procedures. In fact, the advertisements each state 
that the minimum requirement for the position is four years of experience in sales. Nowhere do the 
advertisements reference prior experience with the petitioner or foreign entity. 
Based on the foregoing, the petitioner has failed to explain how previous experience with the foreign 
company is required in order to successfully perform the beneficiary's prospective duties. See 8 C.F.R. 
lj 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary's prospective pasition requires 
"specialized knowledge" as defined in section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 3 1184(c)(2)(B), and the 
regulation at 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). For this reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
The second issue in the present matter is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary's prior 
employment abroad was in a position that involved specialized knowledge, such that the beneficiary 
possesses specialized knowledge. See 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(3)(iv). 
In a letter submitted with the initial petition, the petitioner described the beneficiary's prior experience with 
the foreign entity as follows: 
As the Sales Manager of the Parent company in Israel, [the beneficiary] developed and 
established goals, strategic policies to achieve effective market developments and efficient 
operations. He was responsible for service strategy, service planning, quality monitoring and 
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quality feedback. Serving in this key position, he was also responsible for customer service 
operations, customer relations and marketing support, and system evaluation based on 
customer service. Besides, [the beneficiary] coordinated all essential functions between 
divisions; liaised with outside distributors and professionals, and reviewed and evaluated all 
proposals for improving business efficiency. 
In the director's request for evidence, in part he instructed the petitioner to "[elxplain how the beneficiary's 
training is exclusive and significantly unique in comparison to that of others employed by the petitioner or 
another person in this particular field." 
In response, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary owned and operated his own furniture retailing business 
from August 1987 to September 1999. The petitioner further provided the following: 
In September 1999, [the beneficiary] joined [the foreign entity] as a Sales Manager. As such, 
[the beneficiary] was in charge of all aspects of sales operations, marketing decisions, [and] 
sales promotions. 
[The beneficiary] has successfully completed the parent company's in-house training 
program for an Account Specialist. Through this program, [the beneficiary] obtained 
knowledge in all aspects of sales and account management. 
Further, his progressive work experience with the Israeli parent company made him the only 
ideal candidate for this position in the U.S. company. 
In denying the petition, the director found that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge. The director stated the following: 
[Tlhe beneficiary has not been shown to be serving in a specialized knowledge capacity with 
respect to the petitioner's product or service. Nor has the beneficiary been shown to possess 
an advanced, exclusionary level of knowledge of the processes and procedures of the 
petitioner's company . . . . The petitioner has not established that the beneficiary's knowledge 
is not merely general knowledge or expertise which enables them to provide a service. 
In his appellate brief, counsel repeats the description of the beneficiary's duties with the foreign entity as 
submitted with the initial petition. 
On review, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary possesses "specialized knowledge" as 
defined in section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 ll84(c)(2)(B), and the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 
5 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(D). 
The description of the beneficiary's duties abroad reflects that he was responsible for a range of duties 
commonly associated with sales management positions. Thus, prior experience working with the petitioner's 
products or providing the petitioner's services does not serve as prima facie evidence of specialized 
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knowledge. The petitioner stated that "[the beneficiary] was responsible for service strategy [and] service 
planning." Yet, it failed to provide examples of such strategies or plans that would indicate whether they are 
unique to the foreign entity's operations. Again, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is 
not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N 
Dec. at 165. The job description does not reflect that the beneficiary's activities resulted in specialized 
knowledge. 
The director requested that the petitioner "[elxplain how the beneficiary's training is exclusive and 
significantly unique in comparison to that of others employed by the petitioner or another person in this 
particular field." The petitioner provided that the beneficiary "successfully completed the parent company's 
in-house training program for an Account Specialist," which led to "knowledge in all aspects of sales and 
account management." Yet, the petitioner failed to provide sufficient detail regarding this training program, 
such as the particular subjects studied, the duration, or the number of employees included in comparison to 
the foreign entity's entire staff. Again, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not 
sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. at 
165. The petitioner failed to respond to the director's request to compare the beneficiary's training to that of 
other employees or workers. The failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of 
inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(14). 
The petitioner referenced the beneficiary's progressive work experience in response to the director's request 
for evidence. As discussed above, the petitioner has not established that its products dr services are 
proprietary or unique, such to show that merely working with the foreign entity for a lengthy period would 
provide uncommon skills or experience. 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge7' provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, supra at 16. Based on the evidence presented, it is concluded 
that the beneficiary was not employed abroad in a specialized knowledge capacity. For this additional reason, 
the appeal will be dismissed. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has not established that it has a qualifying relationship with 
the beneficiary's foreign employer as required by 8 C.F.R. tj 214.2(1)(3)(i). On the initial petition, the 
petitioner indicated that it is the subsidiary of the beneficiary's foreign employer, as the foreign entity owns 
5 1 percent of the petitioner's outstanding stock. The petitioner provided that 25 percent of its stock is owned 
by and 24 percent is owned by The petitioner provided copies of stock 
certificates that reflect that, on April 6, 2002, the foreign entity acquired 5 10 shares, acquired 
250 shares, and- acquired 240 shares. However, the petitioner's Minutes of Organizational 
Meeting, also dated April 6, 2002, states that-acquired 600 shares for $48,000 and- 
acquired 400 shares for $32,000. The petitioner's 2002 IRS Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax 
Return, Schedule K, reflects that - owns 50 percent of the petitioner. Wire transfers for 
establishment of the petitioner came from five separate individuals. Thus, the petitioner has provided 
inconsistent evidence of its ownership, and therefore has not established that it is a subsidiary of the foreign 
WAC-04-012-53010 
Page 11 
entity. See 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(K). Further, the petitioner indicated that the foreign entity is owned by a 
single individual,- As this individual does not own an interest in the petitioner, it has also not been 
shown that the two entities are affiliates due to common ownership and control. See 8 C.F.R. 
$ 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(L). For this additional reason, the petition may not be approved. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afd. 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
In visa proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 3 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
director's decision will be affirmed and the petition will be denied. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.