dismissed L-1B Case: It And Finance

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
Office of Administrative Appeals 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
File: EAC 08 144 52157 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date: A~R 0 3 2009 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonirnmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101(a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office 
EAC 08 144 52157 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office ("AAO") on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the 
appeal. 
The petitioner, a New Jersey corporation, filed this nonirnmigrant visa petition to employ the beneficiary in the 
position of "IT and finance auditor" as an L-1B intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to 
section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("the Act"), 8 U.S.C. $ 1101(a)(15)(L). The 
petitioner claims to have a qualifylng relationship with the beneficiary's foreign employer in India. 
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary has at least 
one continuous year of full-time employment abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years 
preceding the filing of the petition. 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(3)(iii). 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner need only establish that the beneficiary was employed abroad for 
six months, even though the Act was amended in 2004 to require one year of foreign employment for all 
beneficiaries under the L classification after June 6, 2005. See L-1 Visa Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 
108-447, Div. J, Title IV, 1 18 Stat. 2809 (Dec. 8,2004). Counsel argues that, because the petitioner received 
approval of a blanket L petition on April 17, 2003 (EAC 03 138 54641), the beneficiary is "grandfathered" 
and, accordingly, only needs to establish that its beneficiaries have six months of foreign employment. 
To establish L-1 eligibility under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the petitioner must demonstrate that the 
beneficiary, within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, has 
been employed abroad in a qualifylng managerial or executive capacity, or in a capacity involving specialized 
knowledge, for one continuous year by a qualifjmg organization. The petitioner must also demonstrate that the 
beneficiary seeks to enter the United States temporarily in order to continue to render services to the same 
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized 
knowledge. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(3) fiu-ther states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifLing organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himlher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
EAC 08 144 52157 
Page 3 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The primary issue in the present matter is whether the petitioner must establish that the beneficiary has at least 
one continuous year of full-time employment abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years 
preceding the filing of the petition. 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(iii). 
The instant petition was filed on April 23, 2008. The petitioner indicates in a letter dated April 21, 2008 that 
the beneficiary began working for the foreign employer in India in August 2007, less than one year prior to 
the filing of the petition. Accordingly, the director concluded that the beneficiary is not eligible for the 
benefit sought because the beneficiary was not employed for one continuous year abroad. 8 C.F.R. 
5 214.2(1)(3)(iii). 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner need only establish that the beneficiary was employed abroad for 
six months. Counsel claims that, because the petitioner received approval of a blanket L petition on April 17, 
2003 (EAC 03 138 54641), which was during a window in time during which beneficiaries of petitions filed 
by importing employers with approved blanket petitions were only required to have six months of qualifying 
foreign employment, the beneficiary of the instant petition is "grandfathered." As a grandfathered petition, 
counsel argues that the beneficiary only needs to have six months of qualifylng employment abroad, even 
though the petition was filed almost three years afier the June 6, 2005 effective date of the L-1 Visa Reform 
Act, which restored the requirement that beneficiaries have one year of foreign employment. See L-1 Visa 
Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-447, Div. I, Title IV, 118 Stat. 2809 (Dec. 8,2004). Counsel concedes 
that policy guidance from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) indicates that all beneficiaries 
of initial petitions under the L classification filed after June 6, 2005 must have one year of qualifying foreign 
employment, including new beneficiaries of previously approved blanket petitions, like the instant 
beneficiary. Memo., . Dir. Of Operations, USCIS, Changes to the L Nonimmigrant 
ClassiJication made by the L-1 Reform Act of 2004 (July 28, 2005) (hereinafter "the Yates Memo"). 
However, counsel also asserts that, subsequent to the Yates Memo, "USCIS communicated to [the American 
Immigration Lawyers Association] that Blanket Ls approved prior to December 8, 2004 could continue to 
benefit from the six month exception." Counsel does not provide a copy of this "communication" or provide 
any additional details. 
Upon review, counsel's assertions are not persuasive, and the appeal will be dismissed. 
Prior to 2002, all beneficiaries under the L classification were required to have one year of qualifylng 
employment abroad. However, in 2002, section 2(a) of the Act of January 16, 2002, Pub L. 107-125, 115 
Stat. 2403 (Jan. 16, 2002) reduced this requirement to six months for beneficiaries of petitions filed by 
importing employers having approved blanket petitions. The Act of January 16, 2002 amended section 
214(c)(2)(A) of the Act to state as follows: 
In the case of an alien seeking admission under section 10 1 (a)(15)(L), the 1 -year period of 
continuous employment required under such section is deemed to be reduced to a 6-month 
period if the importing employer has filed a blanket petition under this paragraph and met the 
requirements for expedited processing of aliens covered under such petition. 
EAC 08 144 52157 
Page 4 
This reduced requirement lasted until June 6, 2005, the effective date of the L-1 Visa Reform Act, which 
restored the requirement that beneficiaries have at least one year of foreign employment. L-1 Visa Reform 
Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-447, Div. J, Title IV, 118 Stat. 2809 (Dec. 8, 2004). Section 413(b) of the L-1 
Visa Reform Act states that the restoration of this requirement "shall apply only to petitions for initial 
classification filed on or after [June 6, 20051." As the referenced 2002 amendment only applied to blanket- 
based petitions, it is clear that the L-1 Visa Reform Act's restoration of this requirement was also directed 
solely at blanket-based petitions, and no intent to grandfather an initial blanket-based petition could logically 
be derived from the plain language of the statute. Accordingly, all L-1 petitions filed after June 6, 2005 for 
new beneficiaries, including those filed by an employer with a previously approved blanket petition, must 
establish that the beneficiaries were employed abroad for at least one year.1 
Consistent with this clear interpretation, USCIS issued the Yates Memo on July 28, 2005, which also 
announced revisions to pertinent sections of the Adjudicator's Field Manual. The policy guidance in the 
Yates Memo explains the application of the statutory changes on pages 11 and 12 as follows: 
All L-1 beneficiaries are now required to have been employed abroad for a 12-month period 
regardless of whether the beneficiary is obtaining L classification based on a blanket petition 
or as an individual. This provision applies only to initial L-1 petitions filed after June 6, 
2005. Thus, adjudicators should not issue RFEs on that issue for L-1 petitions that were 
pending on that date. The 6-month rule should also continue to be applied to cases involving 
extensions or changes of job duties within the L classification filed after the effective date, 
but in which the original status was obtained through a blanket process prior to the effective 
date based upon the then-existing eligibility requirements. 
Finally, although counsel failed to specifically identify the claimed "communication" between USCIS and the 
American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) which is purportedly inconsistent with the Yates Memo, 
it appears that AILA has posted on its website a "communication" from June 8, 2006 which clarifies the 
position of both the Department of State and USCIS on this issue. See AILA InfoNet Doc. No. 06060863 
(June 8,2006). This "communication" is entirely consistent with the Yates Memo, stating in pertinent part: 
In conclusion, it is the shared viewed of USCIS and [the Department of State] that the 
reinstated twelve month requirement applies to an alien who is seeking initial classification as 
an L-1 nonimmigrant on the basis of a blanket petition filed with USCIS irrespective of when 
' It is noted that blanket petitions do not seek a "classification" as that term is used in the Act and the 
regulations. Instead, a blanket petition is only filed by a petitioner that "seek[s] continuing approval of itself 
and some or all of its parent, branches, subsidiaries, and affiliates as qualifying organizations. . . ." 8 C.F.R. 5 
2 14.2(1)(4)(i). Based on an approved blanket petition, managers, executives, and specialized knowledge 
professionals may then seek to be "classified as intracompany transferees." 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(4)(ii). Thus, 
based on this reasoning, it is even more apparent that Congress meant for the amendment in the L-1 Visa 
Reform Act to apply to any and all aliens covered under a blanket petition, who are seeking "initial 
classification" on or after June 6, 2005 as a manager, executive, or specialized knowledge professional. In 
other words, the determining factor in the amendment's applicability would be the date the 1-129s or 1-129 is 
filed seeking L-1 classification for the individual and not when the blanket petition seeking continuing 
approval of the qualifying relationship was initially filed and approved with USCIS. 
EAC 08 144 52157 
Page 5 
the blanket petition was filed. Of course, an alien who was classified as an L-1 nonimmigrant 
prior to June 6, 2005 on the basis of the blanket petition would continue to be subject to [the] 
six-month employment requirement. 
Id. 
Therefore, although counsel claims that USCIS "only recently has been adhering to the Yates memo," this 
claim, to the extent it is even relevant, appears to be incorrect. USCIS's position was made clear in the Yates 
Memo in 2005, and this position, which is consistent with the unambiguous language of the statute, was 
communicated to AILA in 2006, almost two years prior to the filing of the instant petition on April 23,2008. 
Accordingly, the petitioner in this matter is obligated to establish that the beneficiary has at least one 
continuous year of full-time employment abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years 
preceding the filing of the petition. As the petitioner concedes that the beneficiary has not been employed for 
at least one year abroad, the beneficiary is not eligible for the benefit sought and the appeal will be 
di~missed.~ 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary has been or will 
be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity or that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. 8 
C.F.R. $9 214.2(1)(3)(ii) and (iv). 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1184(c)(2)(B), provides: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
2 
 Counsel &her argues that, since the beneficiary will not apply for "admission" to the United States until 
afier he completes his one-year period of foreign employment in August 2008, the petition should 
nevertheless be approved. However, this argument is not persuasive. A visa petition may not be approved 
based on speculation of future eligibility or afier the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new 
set of facts. See Matter ofMichelin Tire Colp., 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Comm. 1978); Matter of Katigbak, 14 
I&N Dec. 45,49 (Comm. 1971). Therefore, the petitioner's speculation that, in the future, the beneficiary will 
be eligible for the benefit sought, because of his anticipated fulfillment of the one-year foreign employment 
requirement, may not be used to establish eligibility. The petitioner must wait until the beneficiary has 
completed his one-year period of foreign employment before filing an initial petition seeking L-1 
classification. 
EAC 08 144 52157 
Page 6 
The petitioner describes the beneficiary's duties and claimed specialized knowledge in a letter dated April 21, 
2008. The petitioner claims that the beneficiary has worked for the petitioning organization for the past eight 
months "in reviewing, audit[ing] and documenting business processes and Internal Controls of [enterprise 
resource planning]-IT systems," and, thus, has "the required and necessary specialized and advanced knowledge 
of the project." The petitioner mher claims that the beneficiary has special and advanced knowledge "of the 
domain and of [the petitioning organization's] financial and accounting systems, business processes and internal 
controls." Finally, the petitioner claims that, in the United States, the beneficiary will work as an "internal 
auditor, auditing IT & financial systems to ascertain weakness if any and compliance with current laws 
(particularly Sox-Sarbanes-Oxley Act) and financial reporting requirements." 
Upon review, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary has been or will be employed in a 
specialized knowledge capacity or that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(D). 
The L-1B specialized knowledge classification requires USCIS to distinguish between those employees who 
possess specialized knowledge fkom those who do not possess such knowledge. Exactly where USCIS should 
draw that line is the question before the AAO. On one end of the spectrum, one may find an employee with the 
minimum one-year of experience but only the basic job-related skill or knowledge that was acquired through that 
employment. Such a person would not be deemed to possess specialized knowledge under section 101(a)(15)(L) 
of the Act. On the other end of the spectrum, one may find an employee with ten years of experience and 
advanced training who developed a product or process that is narrowly understood by a few people within the 
company. That individual would clearly meet the statutory standard for specialized knowledge. In between these 
two extremes would fall, however, the whole range of experience and knowledge that may be found within a 
workplace. 
Looking to the language of the statutory definition, Congress has provided USCIS with an ambiguous definition 
of specialized knowledge. In this regard, one Federal district court explained the infeasibility of applying a 
bright-line test to define what constitutes specialized knowledge: 
This ambiguity is not merely the result of an unfortunate choice of dictionaries. It reflects the 
relativistic nature of the concept special. An item is special only in the sense that it is not 
ordinary; to define special one must first defme what is ordinary. . . . There is no logical or 
principled way to determine which baseline of ordinary knowledge is a more appropriate reading 
of the statute, and there are countless other baselines which are equally plausible. Simply put, 
specialized knowledge is a relative and empty idea which cannot have a plain meaning. CJ 
Westen, The Empty Idea ofEquality, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 537 (1982). 
1 756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. 9,14-15 (D.D.C., 1990).~ 
Although 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General was decided prior to enactment of the statutory definition of 
specialized knowledge by the Immigration Act of 1990, the court's discussion of the ambiguity in the legacy 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) definition is equally illuminating when applied to the definition 
created by Congress. 
EAC 08 144 52157 
Page 7 
While Congress did not provide explicit guidance for what should be considered ordinary knowledge, the 
principles of statutory interpretation provide some clue as to the intended scope of the L-1B specialized 
knowledge category. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987) 
(citing INSv. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207,94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)). 
First, the AAO must look to the language of section 214(c)(2)(B) itself, that is, the terms "special" and 
"advanced." Like the courts, the AAO customarily turns to dictionaries for help in determining whether a word in 
a statute has a plain or common meaning. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 109 F.3d 965, 967-68 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(using Webster's Dictionary for "therefore"). According to Webster's New College Dictionary, the word "special" 
is commonly found to mean "surpassing the usual" or "exceptional." Webster's New College Dictionary, 1084 
(3rd Ed. 2008). The dictionary defines the word "advanced" as "highly developed or complex" or "at a higher 
level than others." Id. at 17. 
Second, looking at the term's placement within the text of section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the AAO notes that 
specialized knowledge is used to describe the nature of a person's employment and that the term is listed among 
the higher levels of the employment hierarchy together with "managerial" and "executive" employees. Based on 
the context of the term within the statute, the AAO therefore would expect a specialized knowledge employee to 
occupy an elevated position within a company that rises above that of an ordinary or average employee. See 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 14. 
Third, a review of the legislative history for both the original 1970 statute and the subsequent 1990 statute 
indicates that Congress intended for USCIS to closely administer the L-1B category. Specifically, the original 
drafters of section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act intended that the class of persons eligible for the L-1 classification 
would be "narrowly drawn" and "carefully regulated and monitored" by USCIS. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91- 
851 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750,2754, 1970 WL 5815. The legislative history of the 1970 Act 
plainly states that "the number of temporary admissions under the proposed 'L' category will not be large." Id. In 
addition, the Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended for "key personnel." 
See generally, id. The term "key personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "[olf 
crucial importance." Webster S New College Dictionary 620 (31d ed., Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing 
Co. 2008). Moreover, during the course of the sub-committee hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically 
questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify under the proposed "L" category. In response 
to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that they understood the legislation would allow 
"high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, and that it would not include "lower 
categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." See H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Cornm., Immigration 
Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445,9lS Cong. 210,218,223,240,248 (Nov. 12,1969). 
Neither in 1970 nor in 1990 did Congress provide a controlling, unambiguous definition of "specialized 
knowledge," and a narrow interpretation is consistent with so much of the legislative intent as it is possible to 
determine. H. Rep. No. 91-851 at 6, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2754. This interpretation is consistent with legislative 
history, which has been largely supportive of a narrow reading of the definition of specialized knowledge and the 
L-1 visa classification in general. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 15-16; Boi Na Braza 
Atlanta, LLC v. Upchurch, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 2372846 at *4 (N.D.Tex., 2005), aj'd 194 
Fed.Appx. 248 (5th Cir. 2006); Fibermuster, Ltd. v. I.N.S., Not Reported in F.Supp., 1990 WL 99327 (D.D.C., 
1990); Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Dept. of Justice, Civ. Action 00-2977-LFO (D.D.C. April 6, 2001)(on file with 
AAO). 
EAC 08 144 52157 
Page 8 
Further, although the Immigration Act of 1990 provided a statutory definition of the term "specialized 
knowledge" in section 214(c)(2) of the Act, the defintion did not generally expand the class of persons eligible 
for L-1 B specialized knowledge visas. Pub.L. No. 1 01 -649, 5 206(b)(2), 104 Stat. 4978, 5023 (1 990). Instead, 
the legislative history indicates that Congress created the statutory definition of specialized knowledge for the 
express purpose of clarifying a previously undefined term from the Immigration Act of 1970. H.R. Rep. 101 - 
723(I) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6749, 1990 WL 200418 ("One area within the L visa that 
requires more specificity relates to the term 'specialized knowledge.' Varying interpretations by INS have 
exacerbated the problem."). While the 1990 Act declined to codify the "proprietary knowledge" and "United 
States labor market" references that had existed in the previous agency defintion found at 8 C.F.R. 
6 214.2(1)(l)(ii)@) (1988), there is no indication that Congress intended to liberalize its own 1970 definition of 
the L-1 visa classification. 
If any conclusion can be drawn fiom the enactment of the statutory definition of specialized knowledge in section 
214(c)(2)(B), it would be based on the nature of the Congressional clarification itself. By not including any strict 
criterion in the ultimate statutory definition and further emphasizing the relativistic aspect of "special knowledge," 
Congress created a standard that requires USCIS to make a factual determination that can only be determined on 
a case-by-case basis, based on the agency's expertise and discretion. Rather than a bright-line standard that would 
support a more rigid application of the law, Congress gave the INS a more flexible standard that requires an 
adjudication based on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. C$ Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 33 1 F.3d 
369,377 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89,91 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
To determine what is special or advanced, USCIS must first determine the baseline of ordinary. As a 
baseline, the terms "special" or "advanced" must mean more than simply "skilled" or "experienced." By 
itself, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically complex products will not equal "special 
knowledge." See Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 53 (Cornrn. 1982). In general, all employees can 
reasonably be considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the 
overall economic success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. 
An employee of "crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average 
employee. In other words, specialized knowledge generally requires more than a short period of experience; 
otherwise special or advanced knowledge would include every employee in an organization with the 
exception of trainees and entry-level staff. If everyone in an organization is specialized, then no one can be 
considered truly specialized. Such an interpretation strips the statutory language of any efficacy and cannot 
have been what Congress intended. 
Considering the definition of specialized knowledge, it is the petitioner's, not USCIS's, burden to articulate 
and prove that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" knowledge. Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 
8 U.S.C. 6 11 84(c)(2)(B). USCIS cannot make a factual determination regarding the beneficiary's specialized 
knowledge if the petitioner does not, at a minimum, articulate with specificity the nature of the claimed 
specialized knowledge, describe how such knowledge is typically gained within the organization, and explain 
how and when the beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
Once the petitioner articulates the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and type of 
evidence which establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized knowledge. A 
petitioner's assertion that the beneficiary possesses advanced knowledge of the processes and procedures of 
the company must be supported by evidence describing and distinguishing that knowledge from the 
EAC 08 144 52157 
Page 9 
elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others. Because "special" and "advanced" are comparative 
terms, the petitioner should provide evidence that allows USCIS to assess the beneficiary's knowledge 
relative to others in the petitioner's workforce or relative to similarly employed workers in the petitioner's 
specific industry. 
In examining the specialized knowledge of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's description of 
the job duties and the weight of the evidence supporting any asserted specialized knowledge. See 8 C.F.R. 
8 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed job description of the services to be performed sufficient to 
establish specialized knowledge. At a minimum, the petitioner must articulate with specificity the nature of the 
claimed specialized knowledge. Merely asserting that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" 
knowledge will not suffice to meet the petitioner's burden of proof. 
Upon review, the petitioner in this case has failed to establish either that the beneficiary's position in the 
United States or abroad requires an employee with specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has 
specialized knowledge. Although the petitioner repeatedly asserts that the beneficiary has been and will be 
employed in a "specialized knowledge" capacity, the petitioner has not adequately articulated any basis to 
support this claim. The petitioner has failed to identify any special or advanced body of knowledge which 
would distinguish the beneficiary's role from that of other similarly experienced workers employed by the 
petitioning organization or in the industry at-large. Going on record without documentary evidence is not 
sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. 
158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 
1972)). Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties involve specialized 
knowledge; otherwise, meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. See 
Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724, F. Supp. 1 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), afd, 905, F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
The petitioner asserts that the beneficiary has approximately eight months of experience abroad where he 
allegedly acquired "specialized knowledge" of the petitioning organization's financial and accounting systems, 
business processes, and internal controls. The petitioner also asserts that this knowledge was necessary to 
perform the beneficiary's duties abroad and will be necessary to perform the duties of the proffered position in the 
United States. However, despite the petitioner's claim, the record does not establish how, exactly, this 
knowledge materially differs from knowledge possessed by other workers employed by the petitioning 
organization or by similarly experienced and educated workers in the industry at-large. The record does not 
establish what qualities of the petitioning organization's financial and accounting systems, business processes, 
and internal controls are of such complexity that the impartation of this knowledge amounts to the acquisition 
of special or advanced knowledge. Importantly, the record is not persuasive in establishing why, exactly, any 
of the beneficiary's knowledge cannot be imparted to a similarly experienced and educated accountant in a 
relatively short period of time. Again, going on record without documentary evidence is not sufficient for 
purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165 (citing 
Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190)). Finally, the record is not persuasive in 
establishing that the beneficiary's claimed eight months of work experience truly imparted to him knowledge 
that could reasonably be considered "special" or "advanced." Not only is the record devoid of evidence 
establishing that he received any training, it does not appear that knowledge of a process or methodology that 
can be imparted to a worker after eight months of work experience, absent evidence to contrary, could be 
considered to be specialized knowledge. 
EAC 08 144 52157 
Page 10 
The AAO does not discount the likelihood that the beneficiary is a skilled and experienced worker. There is 
no indication, however, that the beneficiary has any knowledge that exceeds that of any similarly educated or 
experienced worker, or that he has received special training in the company's methodologies or processes 
which would separate him from other similarly experienced and educated workers employed within the 
petitioner's organization or in the industry at-large. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the 
beneficiary's knowledge is any more advanced or special than the knowledge held by a skilled worker. See 
Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 52. 
Based on the evidence presented, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary has specialized 
knowledge or that he was or will be employed in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. For this 
additional reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afd, 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can 
succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's 
enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
appeal will be dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.