dismissed L-1B Case: Jewelry

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Rm. A3042 
Washington, DC 20529 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
FILE: WAC 03 117 52441 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: JUN 0 7 
PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
P. ~iernand~irector 
Appeals Office 
WAC 03 1 17 5244 1 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonirnmigrant petition seeking to extend the employment of its director as an L-1B 
nonimmigrant intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to 5 101(a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a corporation 
organized in the State of Illinois engaged in the 'm retail sale and wholesale of fine jewelry. The 
petitioner claims that it is the subsidiary of located in Koyang City. Korea. The beneficiary 
was initially granted a one-year period of stay to be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity in a new 
office, and the petitioner now seeks to extend his stay for a two-year period. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be 
employed in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. 
On appeal, former counsel for the petitioner states that the director's decision was based upon an incorrect 
application of the law and contends that the petitioner clearly established that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge as defined by the regulations and Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) policy 
guidance. The petitioner's former counsel and current counsel have both submitted additional evidence in 
support of the appeal. 
To establish L-1 eligibility, the petitioner must meet the criteria outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L). Specifically, within three years 
preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, a qualifying organization must 
have employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized 
knowledge capacity, for one continuous year. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States 
temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof 
in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
WAC 03 1 17 5244 1 
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services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(14)(ii) also provides that a visa petition, which involved the opening of a 
new office, may be extended by filing a new Form 1-129, accompanied by the following: 
(A) Evidence that the United States and foreign entities are still qualifying organizations 
as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G),of this section; 
(B) Evidence that the United States entity has been doing business as defined in 
paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(H) of this section for the previous year; 
(C) A statement of the duties performed by the beneficiary for the previous year and the 
duties the beneficiary will perform under the extended petition; 
(D) A statement describing the staffing of the new operation, including the number of 
employees and types of positions held accompanied by evidence of wages paid to 
employees when the beneficiary will be employed in a management or executive 
capacity; and 
(E) Evidence of the financial status of the United States operation. 
The issue in the present proceeding is whether the beneficiary will be employed by the United States entity in 
a specialized knowledge capacity. 
Section 2 14(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 3 1 184(c)(2)(3), provides the following: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
The petitioner stated on the Form 1-129 Petition that the beneficiary would continue to serve as the 
petitioner's director under the extended petition, performing the following responsibilities: 
Beneficiary will continue to manage and direct [the petitioner.] He will research potential 
markets, franchises, and other customers, and estimate future revenues. He will solicit new 
WAC03 117 52441 
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customers, suggest new jewelry designs based upon market research, and report progress lo 
[the foreign entity.] He will establish new franchises or retail stores, oversee dl [the 
petitioner's] franchising, product development, personnel management. 
In a February 27, 2003 letter appended to the petition, the petitioner stated that the United States company's 
success would be "wholly dependent upon [the beneficiary's] efforts and guidance." With respect to the 
beneficiary's specialized knowledge qualifications, the petitioner stated: 
[The beneficiary] has been employed by [the foreign entity] and its affiliated companies for 
nearly a decade. He has held numerous positions with [the foreign entity], including Assistant 
Manager, Sales Manager, Domestic Marketing Manager, and Overseas Sales Manager. 
Because he has held so many varied positions during the course of his career with [the 
foreign entity], [the beneficiary] has gained intimate knowledge of [the petitioning 
organization's] manufacturing operations, design and development procedures, marketing 
strategies, management, pricing, and product lines. Thus, [the beneficiary] possesses 
"specialized knowledge" as defined by 8 CFR $2 14.2(1)(1)(ii)(D). 
The petitioner did not submit any supporting documents to substantiate its claims that specialized knowledge 
is required to fulfill the duties of the proffered position, nor evidence to establish that the beneficiary 
possesses specialized knowledge. 
In a request for evidence, dated April 8, 2003, the director requested additional evidence to establish that the 
beneficiary has specialized knowledge. Specifically, the director requested that the petitioner submit: (1) an 
organizational chart for the foreign company and the number of employees at the foreign location; (2) the 
U.S. company's organizational chart showing the beneficiary's position, the number of employees supervised, 
and the total number of employees at the location where the beneficiary is employed; (3) information 
regarding the number of foreign nationals employed at the location where the beneficiary is employed, 
including their job titles and visa status; (4) information regarding the number of persons holding the same or 
similar position as the beneficiary in the U.S., including an explanation as to how many other employees 
perform the same duties and how the beneficiary's duties were performed prior to the beneficiary's transfer to 
the United States; (5) an explanation as to how the duties performed by the beneficiary overseas and in the 
United States are different or unique from those of the workers employed by the petitioner in the same type of 
position; (6) an explanation as to the equipment, system, product, technique or service of which the 
beneficiary has specialized knowledge, and whether it is used or produced by other employers in the United 
States and abroad; (7) an explanation as to how the beneficiary's training is exclusive and significantly unique 
in comparison to that of others employed by the petitioner or another person in the field; and (8) a description 
as to the impact on the petitioner's business if the petitioner is unable to obtain the beneficiary's services, and 
what alternative action would be taken to fill the responsibilities. 
In response to the director's request for evidence, former counsel for the petitioner asserted that the director's 
requests were overly burdensome and irrelevant to a determination as to whether the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge. Although counsel stated that the director's requests were contrary to Citizenship and 
Immigration Services [CIS] policy, the petitioner did respond to each request contained in the request for 
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evidence. In a letter dated April 18, 2003, counsel described the beneficiary's "special or advanced duties" as 
follows: 
The beneficiary, as Director of the U.S. company clearly has "unique duties" as compared to 
the other employees of the U.S. petitioner company. As indicated in the support letter, the 
beneficiary will continue to manage and develop [the petitioner.] He wiII research potential 
markets, franchises, and other customers, and estimate future revenues. He will solicit new 
customers, suggest new jewelry designs based upon market research, and report progress to 
[the foreign entity.] Specifically, the beneficiary targets small and large businesses to provide 
award cards, gold picture frames, and other "awards." He will supervise the creation of 
sample displays, establish points of contact with new stores and companies, develop a 
website, oversee the continued production of a catalogue, and design and develop smaller 
"kiosks" for placement in malls. In the future, he will establish new franchises or retail stores, 
oversee all [the petitioner's] employees, and oversee the finance and accounting functions. 
For existing customers, he will assist with the design of custom orders, forward orders to the 
parent company, and will facilitate the overseas manufacturing of the orders. 
Counsel further stated that the petitioner's other employees are primarily responsible for management or sales 
from the company's retail store and do not have the beneficiary's "marketing budgeting or client development 
responsibilities." Counsel further stated that the parent company manufactures a "proprietary line" of jewelry 
and that the beneficiary has "special and advanced" knowledge of the following: 
The International, Korean and U.S. jewelry market; 
Gold, silver, gems, stones, etc., used in the manufacture of fine jewelry; 
International jewelry exhibitions and conventions; 
The petitioner company's manufacturing techniques and manufacturing systems; 
The petitioner company's accounting and materials handling systems; 
The petitioner company's product lines and inventories; 
The petitioner company's shipping procedures and timelines; 
The petitioner company's sales prices and manufacturing costs; 
The petitioner company's employee management strategies; and 
The petitioner company's safes and marketing techniques. 
In response to the director's request for a description of the beneficiary's training, the petitioner indicated that 
the beneficiary had been employed with the Korean parent company for nearly a decade and listed his various 
job titles as a "Quality Assistance Manager," "President," "Manager of Domestic Marketing," "Manager of 
Overseas Sales," and "Director of Overseas Marketing and Planning." The petitioner further stated that, in 
contrast, the U.S. company's other employees have been employed with the company for no more than two 
years and have not been exposed to the international marketing and sales practices of the parent company in 
Korea. The petitioner concluded that it had established that the beneficiary has knowledge which is 
specialized and advanced, and further noted that the director's requirement that his training be "exclusive and 
unique" was overly burdensome. 
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On May 21, 2003, the director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner had not established that the 
beneficiary would be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity. The director noted that the beneficiary 
has not been shown to possess specialized knowledge of the petitioner's product, nor an advanced level of 
knowledge of the petitioner's processes and procedures. Finally, the director stated that the petitioner had not 
established that the beneficiary possesses knowledge beyond general knowledge or expertise which enables 
him to provide a service. 
In an appeal submitted on June 20, 2003, the petitioner's former counsel asserts that the director's decision 
was based upon an incorrect application of the law. Counsel also refers to a 1994 INS (now Citizenship and - - 
Immigration Services interpreting the statutory definition of specialized 
knowledge. Memorandum fro cting Associate Commissioner, Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, CO 214L-P (March 9, 1994). Counsel states 
that the memorandum substantiates his claim that the beneficiary (1) has knowledge which is different from 
that found in the industry; (2) has advanced knowledge that is narrowly held within the company; (3) has 
knowledge that is valuable to the petitioner's competitiveness in the marketplace; (4) has been utilized abroad 
in a capacity involving significant assignments which have enhanced the petitioner's business; (5) has 
knowledge which can only be gained through prior experience with the company abroad; and (6) has 
knowledge that cannot be easily transferred to another employee. In support of these assertions, the petitioner 
submits a document drafted by the beneficiary entitled "Understanding Jewelry and the U.S. Market," another 
copy of the beneficiary's resume, a company catalogue, and sample invoices, customs forms and shipping 
documents for the petitioner, as further evidence of the beneficiary's specialized knowIedge. The petitioner's 
former counsel asserts: 
These documents confirm that the Beneficiary has been employed by the foreign parent 
company for more than a decade, in various capacities. He is intimately familiar with the 
company's product lines, quality control procedures, raw material types, sources and prices, 
labor costs for his company's manufacturing, employee management, inventory, payroll, 
accounting, the company's customers in Asia and the U.S., the shippingheceiving procedures 
for the U.S. company from the company overseas, jewelry designers, and the company's 
marketing strategies both in the U.S. and internationally. He regularly attends international 
jewelry trade shows and travels worldwide to promote the company's business. He is 
responsible for receipt of overseas shipments to the U.S. and is the designated agent for [the 
petitioner] for customs purposes. 
In addition, the Beneficiary has helped develop the company's e-business practice. They plan 
to expand their services to provide all aspects for a web-based jewelry business, including 
website design, catalogue creation and maintenance, software management for inventory and 
client service, digital imaging for web sites and catalogues. [The petitioner] has started 
development of a proprietary system for its web-based business, with the Beneficiary an 
essential part of the development team. The Beneficiary's education in electrical engineering 
and training in the jewelry market makes him uniquely qualified to advance this business plan 
into the future. 
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The petitioner's current counsel submitted additional evidence on March 16, 2004, the majority of which has 
no bearing on the issue of whether the beneficiary has specialized knowledge and/or was previously 
submitted. 
It is noted that the document entitled "Understanding Jewelry & U.S. Market," written by the beneficiary and 
submitted on appeal, provides a summary of the beneficiary's specialized knowledge qualifications. 
Specifically, the beneficiary states: 
I have special knowledge: 
= [Gleneral concept of jewelry 
Experience [sic] jeweler for a long time 
How to manufacture jewelry 
= Pricing in domestic and international trading 
Majored in university with electronics 
Understand U.S. jewelry market and Korean market 
= Can make complete e-solution with the understanding of computer algorism [sic] and 
jewelry. 
Have special knowledge in taking digital images with digital camera. 
Have many years of experience in international trading 
Have an understanding in the trend of jewelry 
I have these special knowledge, which is a combination of jewelry and computer, that nobody 
has. 
On review, the record as presently constituted is not persuasive in demonstrating that the beneficiary wouId be 
employed by the U.S. entity in a position requiring specialized knowledge. When examining the specialized 
knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the petitioner's description of the job duties. 
See 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed description of the services to be 
performed sufficient to establish specialized knowledge. Id. It is also appropriate for the AAO to look 
beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the beneficiary's knowledge of the business's 
product or service, management operations, or decision-making process. See Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. 
1 17, 120 (Cornrn. 1981) (citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 618 (R.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 13 
I&N Dec. 816 (R.C. 1971))' As stated by the Commissioner in Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 52 
I Although the cited precedents pre-date the current statutory definition of "specialized knowledge," the AAO 
finds them instructive. Other than deleting the former requirement that specialized knowledge hid to be 
"proprietary," the 1990 Act did not significantly alter the definition of "specialized knowledge" from the prior 
INS interpretation of the term. The 1990 Committee Report does not reject, criticize, or even refer to any 
specific INS regulation or precedent decision interpreting the term. The Committee Report simply states that 
the Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of "[vjarying [i.e., not specifically incorrect] 
interpretations by INS," H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I), at 69, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. Beyond that, the 
Committee Report simply restates the tautology that became section 214(c)(Z)(B) of the Act. Id. The AAO 
concludes, therefore. that the cited cases, as well as Matter of Penner, remain useful guidance concerning the 
intended scope of the "specialized knowledge" L-1B classification. 
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(Cornm. 1982), when considering whether the beneficiaries possessed specialized knowledge, "the LeBEanc 
and RauEin decisions did not find that the occupations inherently qualified the beneficiaries for the 
classifications sought." Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have unusual duties, skills, or knowledge 
beyond that of a skilled worker. Id. The Commissioner also provided the following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or her to 
produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed primarily 
for his ability to carry out a key process or function which is important or essential to the 
business' operation. 
Id. at 53. 
Here, the beneficiary's proposed job duties do not identify services to be performed by the beneficiary in a 
specialized knowledge capacity. For example, the beneficiary's responsibilities of managing the company, 
researching potential markets, estimating revenues, soliciting customers, receiving deliveries, developing a 
web site, attending trade shows, reporting progress of the United States entity, establishing new retail 
locations and managing personnel are all tasks typically performed by any individual tasked with overseeing a 
start-up operation in a new market. If CIS were to follow the petitioner's reasoning, any foreign worker 
transferred to the United States to open a new office would qualify for L-1B status as a specialized knowledge 
worker. The record is devoid of any documentary evidence that the beneficiary's position involves special 
knowledge of the petitioning organization's product, service, research, equipment, techniques, management, 
or other interests as required in the regulations. While the petitioner claims that the beneficiary utilizes 
specialized knowledge of the petitioner's manufacturing techniques, management systems, materials handling 
systems, accounting systems, shipping procedures, product lines, and shipping procedures, the petitioner has 
not described how he utilizes this knowledge, provided evidence or otherwise described the systems and 
procedures used by the petitioner's group, or adequately explained how the beneficiary gained his claimed 
specialized knowledge, other than listing his various job titles with the foreign company. Going on record 
without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in 
these proceedings. Matter of Sofici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Crafr of 
California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
Additionally, the petitioner has not submitted any evidence of the knowledge and expertise required for the 
proffered position that would differentiate the beneficiary from other managers employed within the 
petitioner's group or working for other employers within the jewelry industry. It is noted that the statutory 
definition requires the AAO to make comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized 
knowledge. As observed in 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, "[slimply put, specialized knowledge is a relative 
. . . idea which cannot have a plain meaning." 745 F. Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990). The term "specialized 
knowledge" is relative and cannot be plainly defined. The Congressional record specifically states that the L- 
1 category was intended for "key personnel." See generally, H.R. REP. No. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. 
The term "key personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." 
Websterrs 11 New College Dictionary 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). In general, a11 employees can 
reasonably be considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the 
overall economic success of an enterprise, there would be no rational reason to employ that person. An 
employee of "crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average 
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employee. Accordingly, based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record 
related to that term, the AAO must make comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge 
employee and the general labor market, but also between that employee and the remainder of the petitioner's 
workforce. 
Here, the petitioner has indicated that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge as a result of his 
employment with the foreign entity, which gave him "intimate knowledge" of the foreign company's 
procedures and practice" that is "significantly more detailed than the knowledge that is generally found in the 
jewelry industry." The petitioner further states that his knowledge is advanced and "narrowly held within the 
company, noting that no other employees were transferred to the United States. However, the fact that the 
beneficiary was chosen for transfer to the United States does not establish that his knowledge of the 
company's products or processes is advanced compared to the knowledge possessed by others within the 
company. Counsel further states that the beneficiary has been utilized abroad in a capacity involving 
significant assignments which have enhanced the employer's business, and again lists the various job titles 
held by the beneficiary with the foreign company. Again, other than asserting that the beneficiary has 
attended "numerous" international jewelry conventions, the petitioner does not attempt to substantiate its 
claim that the beneficiary has been utilized in significant assignments. The record contains no detailed 
employment history for the beneficiary, and the petitioner does not claim that he received any special training, 
such that the AAO could determine exactly what "special" or "advanced" knowledge the beneficiary 
possesses or how he acquired it. Finally, the petitioner states that the beneficiary's knowledge could only be 
gained by prior experience with the company abroad and that his "corporate knowledge" could not easily be 
transferred to another employee. Again, no evidence is submitted to substantiate counsel's claims on appeal. 
Without documentary evidence to support the claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's 
burden of proof. The assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 
533, 534 (BLA 1988); Matter of hureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N 
Dec. 503,506 (BIA 1980). 
The petitioner indicates that merely working for the foreign entity for a significant length of time in "various 
positions" is sufficient to bestow "special knowledge" or an "advanced level of knowledge." While it may be 
correct to say that the beneficiary is a productive and valuable employee, this fact alone is not enough to bring 
the beneficiary to the level of "key personnel." 
Moreover, in Matter of Penner, the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of the 
specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Cornm. 1982). Although the definition of "specialized 
knowledge" in effect at the time of Matter of Penner was superseded by the 1990 Act to the extent that the 
fonner definition required a showing of "proprietary" knowledge, the reasoning behind Matter of Penner 
remains applicable to the current matter. The decision noted that the 1970 House Report, H.R. No. 91-851, 
was silent on the subject of specialized knowledge, but that during the course of the sub-committee hearings 
on the bill, the Chairman specifically questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify under the 
proposed "L" category. In response to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that they 
understood the legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, and 
that it would not include "lower categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." Matter of Penner, supra at 
50 (citing H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Cornrn., Immigrarion Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445, 91st 
Gong. 210,218,223,240,248 (November 12, 1969)). Reviewing the congressional record, the Commissioner 
WAC 03 117 52441 
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concluded that an expansive reading of the specialized knowledge provision, such that it would include 
skilled workers and technicians, is not warranted. For the same reasoning, the AAO cannot accept the 
proposition that any skilled worker is necessarily a specialized knowledge worker, or the petitioner's 
reasoning that any employee chosen to open a new office in the United States shouId be deemed to possess 
specialized knowledge. 
The AAO notes that the only evidence submitted to substantiate the petitioner's claim that the beneficiary 
possesses specialized knowledge includes the beneficiary's brief resume, shipping documents and invoices 
showing the beneficiary as the petitioner's primary contact for billing and import matters, and a document 
written by the beneficiary, in which he provides an overview of the jewelry industry, the Korean and U.S. 
markets, a description of the foreign and U.S. entities, and a summary of his own "special knowledge." The 
AAO notes that, while the beneficiary claims to have a "unique" combination of knowledge related to 
computers and the jewelry industry in general, none of his claimed knowledge relates to the petitioner's 
products, processes or other interests. 
Finally, counsel's reliance on the 1994 memorandum is misplaced. It is noted that the memorandum was 
intended solely as a guide for employees and will not supercede the plain language of the statute or the 
regulations. Therefore, by itself, counsel's assertion that the beneficiary's qualifications are analogous to the 
examples outlined in the memorandum is insufficient to establish the beneficiary's qualification for 
classification as a specialized knowledge professional. Specifics are clearly an important indication of 
whether a beneficiary's duties encompass specialized knowledge; otherwise meeting the definition would 
simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. See Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1103 
(E.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). As discussed, the petitioner has not submitted probative 
evidence to establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is uncommon, noteworthy, or distinguished by some 
unusual quality and not generally known in the beneficiary's field of endeavor. 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F. Supp. at 16. Based on the foregoing, the record does 
not establish that the beneficiary would be employed by the U.S. entity in a specialized knowledge capacity. 
For this reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
An additional issue not addressed by the director is whether a quaIifying relationship exists between the 
foreign and U.S. entities as required in the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(14)(ii)(B). The regulations and 
case law further confm that the key factors for establishing a qualifying relationship between the U.S. and 
foreign entities are ownership and control. Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, lac. 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 
1986); Matter of Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 (Comm. 1982); see also Matter of Church Scientology 
International, 19 I&N Dec. 593 (BIA 1988) (in immigrant visa proceedings). In the context of this visa 
petition, ownership refers to the direct and indirect legal right of possession of the assets of an entity with full 
power and authority to control; control means the direct or indirect legal right and authority to direct the 
establishment. management, and operations of an entity. Matter of Church Scientology International, supra 
at 595. 
WAC 03 117 52441 
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In the present matter, the petitioner stated that the petitioner is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the foreign 
company. The petitioner's articles of incorporation indicate that the United States company is authorized to 
issue up to 100,000 shares at no par value, and that the company proposed to issue 1,000 shares for 
consideration of $1,000. The petitioner did not submit copies of its stock certificates, stock registry or any 
other documentation that would establish that the foreign company in fact owns the petitioning company. 
Again, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the 
burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Sofici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165 (citing Matter of Treasure Crafr 
of Califarnia, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). The petitioner has not demonstrated that a qualifying 
relationship exists between the beneficiary's foreign employer and the petitioning entity. For this additional 
reason, the petition may not be approved. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the 
AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afd. 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
director's decision will be affirmed and the petition will be denied. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.