dismissed L-1B Case: Logistics

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
identifying data QLeted to 
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PUBLlc COPY 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. A3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
File: EAC-04-17 1-52862 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date: J"~ 
2006 
IN RE: Petitioner: 
Beneficiary: 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101 (ax 15XL) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S .C. $ 1 1 01 (a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
SELF-REPRESENTED 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
Administrative Appeals Office 
EAC-04-171-52862 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to employ the beneficiary as a logistics manager under 
the L-1B nonimmigrant, intracompany transferee program for specialized knowledge pursuant to section 
1 Ol(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 5 1 I Ol(a)(15)(L). The petitioner 
rents cell phones and cell plans for international tra 
 under the laws of the state of New 
York. The petitioner claims to be a subsidiary of 
 located in North Yorkshire, United 
Kingdom. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner had not established that the beneficiary has 
been or would be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. 
 On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the decision 
was based on improperly explained facts. In support of this assertion, the petitioner submits a brief. 
To establish eligibility for the L-l nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section IOl(a)(15)(L) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 4 1101(a)(15)(L). Specifically, a qualifying 
organization must have employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a 
specialized knowledge capacity, for one continuous year within the three years preceding the beneficiary's 
application for admission into the United States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United 
States temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or afiliate 
thereof in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (1)(1 )(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himlher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
EAC-04-171-52862 
Page 3 
The primary issue to be discussed in the present matter is whether the petitioner has established that the 
beneficiary's position in the United States will involve specialized knowledge as required by the regulation at 
8 C.F.R. tj 214.2(1)(3)(ii), and whether the beneficiary was employed abroad in a capacity that utilized such 
specialized knowledge as required by 8 C.F.R. tj 214.2(1)(3Xiv). 
Section 214(c)(2XB) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1 184(cX2XB), provides the following: 
For purposes of section IOl(a)(lSXL) of this title, an alien is considered to be serving in a 
capacity involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. tj 21 4.2(1)( 1 )(iiXD) defines specialized knowledge as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
In the initial petition, the petitioner it its letter dated May 6, 2004, described the beneficiary's job duties and 
specialized knowledge as follows: 
Manage, develop and motivate [petitioner's] [l]ogistics team to ensure the smooth 
and efficient running of the department. 
Provide the [l]ogistics team with training and guidance as required to ensure 
optimum team performance. 
Review work practices within the team and make recommendations for change to 
policy andfor procedure where necessary to improve performance 
Ensure stock is managed efficiently, and undertake regular stock audits in order to 
maintain the [clompany's electronic stock control system accurately 
Negotiate best pricdquality contracts with suppliers, and implement adequate 
performancelreview measures to ensure all supplier services (e.g. couriers) meet 
agreed service levels 
Provide management information as required. 
[The beneficiary] worked for [the foreign organization] as our [tlechnical [l]ogistics 
[mlanager from May 2000 to March 2003. In this position he managed the logistics 
team in our UK office. This included managing, leading, motivating, and organizing the 
team, performing staff appraisals, carrying out company disciplinary procedures when 
necessary, and manage the functional operation of the logistics office. 
EAC-04-171-52862 
Page 4 
On August 3, 2004, the director denied the petition. The director determined that the beneficiary did not 
possess specialized knowledge and that the position did not require a person with specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner subsequently appealed. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director was 
erroneous in her determination. 
In examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's 
description of the job duties and the weight of the evidence supporting any asserted specialized knowledge. 
See 8 C.F.R. 4 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed description of the services to be 
performed sufficient to establish specialized knowledge. Id. It is also appropriate for the AAO to then look 
beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the beneficiary's knowledge of the business's 
product or service, management operations, or decision-making process. A specific occupation will not 
inherently qualifL a beneficiary as possessing specialized knowledge. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. 1 17, 120 
(Comm. 198 l)(citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 61 8 (R.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. 
816 (R.C. 1971)).' 
In making a determination as to whether or not knowledge possessed by a beneficiary is special or advanced 
the AAO relies on the statute and regulations, prior precedent decisions, and legislative history. This yields a 
multiple pronged analysis to determine whether the petition has employed and will employ the beneficiary in 
a specialized knowledge capacity. In examining whether an alien has "special knowledge" of the petitioner's 
product and its application in international markets or an "advanced level" of knowledge of its processes and 
procedures, the AAO will consider whether the beneficiary: 1) is part of the petitioner's "key personnel" (See 
generally, H.R. Rep. No. 91-85 1, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750); 2) is more than a specialist or a skilled employee 
(Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 50); 3) has knowledge that qualifies as "special" or "advanced under the 
plain meaning of the term; 4) performs a key process or function for. the petitioner (See Matter of Penner, id.); 
and 5) possesses certain characteristics that have been deemed to be illustrative of specialized knowledge (see 
Puelo Memo (1 994)). 
The alien should possess a type of special or advanced knowledge that is different from that generally found 
in the particular industry. Where the alien has specialized knowledge of the company product, the knowledge 
must be noteworthy or uncommon. Where the alien has specialized knowledge of company processes and 
procedures, the knowledge must be advanced. The petitioner must also establish that it would be burdensome, 
' Although the cited precedents pre-date the current statutory definition of "specialized knowledge," the AAO 
finds them instructive. Other than deleting the former requirement that specialized knowledge had to be 
"proprietary," the 1990 Act did not significantly alter the definition of "specialized knowledge" from the prior 
INS regulation or precedent decisions interpreting the term. The Committee Report simply states that the 
Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of "[vlarying [i.e., not specifically incorrect] 
interpretations by INS," H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I), at 69, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. Beyond that, the 
Committee Report simply restates the tautology that became section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Id. The AAO 
concludes, therefore, that the cited cases, as well as Matter of Penner, remain useful guidance concerning the 
intended scope of the "specialized knowledge" L-1 B classification. 
EAC-04-171-52862 
Page 5 
or counterproductive to the petitioner's business plan to hire someone other than the alien to fill this position 
in the United States. See generally, Memorandum of Fujie Ohata, "Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge 
for Chefs and Specialty Cooks seeking L-1 B Status" (September 9,2004). 
One key characteristic of a beneficiary with specialized knowledge is that they constitute the petitioner's key 
personnel. The Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended for "key 
personnel." See generally, H.R. Rep. No. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key personnel" 
denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." Webster's II New College 
Dictionary 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). In general, all employees can reasonably be considered 
"important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic success of 
an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. An employee of "crucial 
importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of an average employee. Accordingly, based on the 
definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record related to that term, the AAO must make 
comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge employee and the general labor market, but 
also between that employee and the remainder of the petitioner's workforce such that the beneficiary's 
knowledge is relative to the petition at bar. See 1756, Inc. v, Attorney General, 745 F. Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 
1990)(concluding that specialized knowledge is a relative determination). 
The record does not demonstrate that the beneficiary is a key or crucial employee of the organization. There 
are no indications that the beneficiary occupied a senior position within the organization or performed a key 
process or function of the organization. If the beneficiary is not regarded as a key or crucial employee of the 
foreign organization then the beneficiary lacks a key characteristic of an employee possessing specialized 
knowledge. 
A second characteristic of a beneficiary with specialized knowledge is that they are more than skilled 
- employees. In Matter of Penner, the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of the 
specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. at 49. The decision noted that the 1970 House Report, H.R. 
No. 91-851, stated that the number of admissions under the L-1 classification "will not be large" and that 
"[tlhe class of persons eligible for such nonimmigrant visas is narrowly drawn." Id. at 51. During the course 
of the sub-committee hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically questioned witnesses on the level of skill 
necessary to qualify under the proposed "L" category. In response to the Chairman's questions various 
witnesses responded that they understood the legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts," 
individuals with "unique" skills, and that it would not include "lower categories" of workers or "skilled craft 
workers." Matter of Penner, id. at 50 (citing H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration Act of 
1970: Hearings on H.R. 445,913 Cong. 21 0,218,223,240,248 (November 12,1969)). 
The petitioner has not clearly articulated a basis of distinction for the beneficiary's training and education 
other than to assert that the beneficiary was employed by the foreign organization for three years. The 
petitioner failed to articulate and demonstrate that the beneficiary's training and experience distinguish him 
from other similar employees in the particular industry or within the foreign organization itself. Without a 
basis for distinction the AAO cannot determine that the beneficiary is more than a trained or experienced 
employee. The record does not support that the beneficiary is more than a skilled employee. Lacking the 
EAC-04-171-52862 
Page 6 
characteristic of being more than a skilled employee reduces the likelihood that the beneficiary actually 
possesses specialized knowledge. 
Although the petitioner regards the beneficiary as an "expert" by virtue of the beneficiary's experience with 
the petitioner's business procedures and products, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary is 
more than a skilled or experienced employee. The petitioner has submitted a resume of the beneficiary, but 
the beneficiary's listed experience is varied and does not indicate that the beneficiary had any related training 
other than with the foreign organization. In order to receive this classification, the claimed specialized 
knowledge has to be examined in the context of those in the particular industry and within the petitioning 
entity itself to such a degree that the employee would qualify as key or crucial personnel with an uncommon 
or noteworthy knowledge. In this case the record does not support that the beneficiary is more than a skilled 
employee producing a product through more than merely skilled labor. Further, the burden of demonstrating 
eligibility rests with the petitioner; this burden includes clearly articulating and supporting assertions of 
eligibility. The AAO will not presume or construct assertions on behalf of a petitioner, nor will it extrapolate 
facts fiom evidentiary submissions where the relevance of those submissions has not been made clear. 
Based on the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's duties, and the failure to distinguish those duties 
among other employees in the petitioner and within the particular industry, the AAO must conclude that the 
beneficiary has been performing functions that are common and routine in the software industry and which 
are not specialized. Without a description of the beneficiary's skill relative to the petitioners' other 
employees or to the market as a whole, the AAO can not determine whether the beneficiary possesses "special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an advanced level of 
knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. " See section 2 14(c)(2)(B) of the Act. 
A third characteristic of a beneficiary with specialized knowledge is that they possess knowledge that meets 
the plain meaning of special. Special is defined as "surpassing the usual; distinct among others of a kind; 
peculiar to a specific person or thing." Webster's I1 New College Dictionary, 2001, Houghton Mifflin. See 
also Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 2001 (defining special as "distinguished by some unusual 
quality; uncommon; noteworthy"). 
In the instant case, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the knowledge possessed by the beneficiary is 
special among a kind, as any employee chosen by petitioner could be trained to fill the position. It is not 
sufficient to assert that a beneficiary's experience prior to employment with the foreign organization is a basis 
for specialized knowledge because this fails to distinguish the beneficiary from other employees that the 
petitioner has hired based on the subjective qualifications determined by the foreign organization. The record 
does not distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge from what other cell-plan sales employee in other 
companies would have to learn about their companies' product or service in order to be effectively employed. 
This type of knowledge would be expected of any employee that interfaces with customers, that is to know 
their company's product or service. The petitioner has indicated that the beneficiary is to be employed as a 
logistics manager, but the beneficiary's knowledge has not been demonstrated to be uncommon or noteworthy 
in nature. 
EAC-04-17 1-52862 
Page 7 
For instance, the petitioner has not articulated or supported any assertion that its business procedure or 
manner of operations vary from the norm such that this particular beneficiary's knowledge of that operational 
procedure distinguishes the beneficiary among the petitioner's other employees, or among other employees 
within this particular industry, as having a special knowledge or an advanced level of knowledge of 
petitioner's processes and procedures. Without an articulation of how the beneficiary's knowledge is 
distinguished among petitioner's employees or within this particular industry, the AAO cannot make a 
determination that this knowledge surpasses the usual or is particular to this beneficiary. For these reasons, 
the petitioner has not established that the knowledge possessed by beneficiary is "special" or "advanced," in 
accordance with the plain meaning of the terms as used by the statute. 
The description of the beneficiary's duties is over broad and fails to provide enough detail to make a 
favorable decision. Reciting the beneficiary's vague job responsibilities or broadly-cast business objectives is 
not sufficient; the regulations require a detailed description of the beneficiary's daily job duties. 8 C.F.R. 4 
214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner has failed to answer a critical question in this case: What does the beneficiary 
primarily do on a daily basis? The actual duties themselves will reveal the true nature of the employment. 
Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1 103, 1 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)' afd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
The basic description of the beneficiary's duties does not articulate exactly what is specialized about the 
position, and instead represents the beneficiary as managing a non-existent "logistics team", providing 
training and guidance, reviewing employee performance and 'providing management information'. This 
language is typical of a petition for an L-IA managerial or executive position, but the duties have not been 
demonstrated to constitute specialized knowledge duties or to require specialized knowledge for their 
performance. As stated above, this classification is not based on characterizations or legal fiction; the 
petitioner must demonstrate that the beneficiary actually possesses specialized knowledge and will be 
employed in a capacity that involves specialized knowledge. The mere assertion that a beneficiary might 
possess knowledge that is different, without further distinction of the beneficiary's experience and duties from 
those typically found within the industry and within the company itself, is not suficient to carry the burden in 
this petition. 
A fourth characteristic of a beneficiary with specialized knowledge is that he or she typically carries out key 
processes or functions. As stated by the Commissioner in Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 52, the 
beneficiaries were considered to have specialized knowledge if they had unusual duties, skills, or knowledge 
beyond that of a skilled worker. Id. The Commissioner also provided the following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or her to 
produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is to be employed 
primarily for his ability to carry out a key process or function which is important or essential 
to the business firm's operation. 
Id. at 53. 
The record does not indicate that the beneficiary has been or would be performing a key process or function 
which is essential to the firm's operation. Without an articulation of what distinguishes the beneficiary's 
knowledge among other employees it cannot be determined that the beneficiary is performing anything other 
EAC-04- 17 1-52862 
Page 8 
than normal and routine duties. Even if an employee were trained or possesses knowledge that is different, 
this does not establish that the employee is performing a key process or function. In this case the record does 
not support that the beneficiary is performing a key process or function which rises above the basic economic 
rationale of hiring the employee in the first place. 
Finally, the agency has interpreted "specialized knowledge" to find that a qualified beneficiary should possess 
certain characteristics. In a 1994 memo written by James A. Puleo, Acting Executive Associate 
Commissioner, on the subject of "Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge," the legacy INS offered the 
following examples of the characteristics of an alien who possesses specialized knowledge: 
Possesses knowledge that is valuable to the employer's competitiveness in the market place 
Is qualified to contribute to the United States employer's knowledge of foreign operating 
conditions as a result of special knowledge not generally found in the industry; 
Has been utilized abroad in a capacity involving significant assignments which have 
enhanced the employer's productivity, competitiveness, image, or financial position; 
Possesses knowledge which, normally, can be gained only through prior experience with that 
employer; 
Possesses knowledge of a product or process, which cannot be easily transferred or taught to 
another individual. 
The Associate Commissioner also stated: 
From a practical point of view, the mere fact that a petitioner alleges that an alien's 
knowledge is somehow different does not, in and of itself, establish that the alien possesses 
specialized knowledge. The petitioner bears the burden of establishing through the 
submission of probative evidence that the alien's knowledge is uncommon, noteworthy, or 
distinguished by some unusual quality and not generally known by practitioners in the alien's 
field of endeavor. 
Id. 
 In a subsequent memorandum, the Associate Commissioner later added that "[all1 companies are 
different, and it can generally be expected that no two companies will employ the same procedures. Standing 
alone, however, an alien's knowledge of minor variations in style or manner of operations cannot be 
considered specialized." Legacy INS memo, HQSCOPS, 7016.1, "Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge" 
(December 20,2002). 
The petitioner has not articulated any distinguishing characteristic, knowledge or experience from other 
employees within the foreign organization or within this particular industry. This leads the AAO to conclude 
that the petitioner or the foreign entity would not sustain economic inconvenience to train andlor teach 
someone the special knowledge that it claims is possessed by the beneficiary. The petitioner has asserted that 
EAC-04-171-52862 
Page 9 
the beneficiary's knowledge of the European cell phone market would allow him to better serve the 
petitioner's clients. However, the record does not corroborate this assertion with such evidence as work 
product or other evidence that the beneficiary's knowledge is relevant to selling cell phone plans in the United 
States. Further, it remains unexplained how the specialized knowledge of European cell phone systems will 
even be needed in the United States, given the petitioner's explanation of their differences. Even if such 
knowledge were proven to be relevant, the fact that a beneficiary's knowledge is different, standing alone, is 
not sufficient to demonstrate that the knowledge is specialized or advanced in terms of process or procedure. 
In addition, the petitioner has asserted that the beneficiary's work abroad was important, but this has not been 
supported by documentation and is in fact doubthl given that the beneficiary does not currently appear to be 
working for the foreign organization. Finally, the record does not support that the knowledge possessed by 
the beneficiary can only be gained by employment with the foreign organization or is not easily transferable 
to another similarly situated employee within this company or within the particular industry. 
Moreover, the description of the beneficiary's experience with the foreign entity portrays the beneficiary as a 
supervisory employee as opposed to a specialized knowledge employee. The supervisor like duties listed do 
not involve any knowledge that could be considered specialized, or which have been distinguished from other 
similarly situated employees within the particular industry or within the company itself. This classification 
requires that the beneficiary have been employed one year within the last three in a specialized knowledge 
capacity. The petitioner has failed to distinguish what, if any, specialized knowledge duties the beneficiary 
performed for the duration of his employment abroad. 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, supra at 16. Based on the evidence presented, it is concluded 
that the beneficiary was not employed abroad, and will not be employed in the future, in a specialized 
 . 
knowledge capacity. Nor has it been established that the beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner's business 
procedures is advanced, despite the fact that only two other employees have received the training that serves 
as the basis of a distinction from other employees of the petitioner. 
On review, counsel has not demonstrated that the beneficiary possesses "specialized knowledge" as defined in 
section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1184(c)(2)(B), and the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 4 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D), 
nor has counsel demonstrated that the beneficiary has been or would be employed in a capacity utilizing any 
such specialized knowledge as required by 8 C.F.R. 4 214.2(1)(3)(ii) and (iv). 
In visa proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
director's decision will be affirmed and the petition will be denied. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.