dismissed L-1B Case: Manufacturing

identifying dnta deleted to 
prevent clax j unwamted 
invasion of personal priv8~y 
PUBLIC COPY 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. A3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
FILE: SRC 05 01 1 50739 Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: On 2 4 2@)6 
IN RE: Petitioner: 
Beneficiary: 
PETITION: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1 101(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
/?+ 
&- -- 
Robert P. Wiemann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
SRC 05 01 1 50739 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The matter 
is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. 
The petitioner is engaged in the manufacture of reinforcement fibers. It seeks to temporarily employ the 
beneficiary as a process development engineer in the United States and filed a petition to classify the 
beneficiary as a nonimmigrant intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge. The director determined 
that the petitioner had not established that the beneficiary possessed the requisite specialized knowledge nor 
that the intended employment required specialized knowledge, and consequently denied the petition. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. On appeal, counsel submits a brief and additional evidence, and 
asserts that the denial was erroneous because the director incorrectly determined that the beneficiary did not 
satisfy the definition of specialized knowledge. Specifically, counsel asserts that contrary to the director's 
findings, the beneficiary did in fact possess an unusual level of knowledge about the petitioner's products as 
well as an advanced level of knowledge with regard to the petitioner's processes and procedures. 
To establish L-1 eligibility, the petitioner must meet the criteria outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L). Specifically, within three years 
preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, a qualifying organization must 
have employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized 
knowledge capacity, for one continuous year. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States 
temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof 
in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (I)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
This matter presents two related, but distinct, issues: (1) whether the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge; and (2) whether the proposed employment is in a capacity that requires specialized knowledge. 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1184(c)(2)(B), provides the following: 
SRC 05 01 1 50739 
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For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 2 14.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
In a letter of support dated September 24, 2004, the petitioner stated that the parent company was one of the 
100 largest industrial companies in the world. Specifically, the petitioner explained that it was the leading 
producer of building materials, abrasives, containers, flat glass, high performance plastics products, industrial 
ceramics, insulation, reinforcement, and piping. With regard to the U.S. entity, the petitioner stated that it 
was one of the largest reinforcement fabric manufacturers in the world. 
With regard to the beneficiary, the petitioner stated that he obtained a degree in Mechanical Engineering from 
the University of Alberta, located in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. In addition, the petitioner claimed that the 
beneficiary was well qualified for the U.S. position as a result of his three years of experience with the foreign 
entity. Finally, the petitioner noted that his participation in a Textile Technology Program at Mohawk 
College in Hamilton, Ontario, Canada in 2001 further led to his expertise in the field. With regard to his 
proposed duties in the United States, the petitioner stated as follows: 
Specifically, the Process Development Engineer is responsible for: 
Developing products for coated fabrics market. 
Conducting scrim machine trials to quantify the effects of adjusting process levers. 
Providing engineering support to manufacturing and research and development 
divisions through analysis of product [defects] to determine the significance of 
possible causes for those defects through lab experimentation and trials and 
implementing proper corrective action. 
Serving as a specialist in fiberglass textile web processes, including fabric-forming 
machinery (weaving and laid scrim), web mechanics (electrical drive systems, 
controllers), coatings and curing equipment. 
Designing machine upgrades, new equipment selection, cost estimates, 
communicating with suppliers and commissioning equipment with time constraints. 
Designing measurement systems to monitor process conditions and test methods for 
level variation used in our coating process. 
Assuming responsibility for technology transfer, equipment and layout of coatings 
mix room for Spanish plant. 
Utilizing strong technical writing ability to communicate CAPEX materials to 
management and operations. 
The Process Development Engineer position requires an individual with relevant technical 
experience related to the development of related technical fabrics products. Specifically, the 
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previous experience must include relevant knowledge of our coated fabrics and related 
products, our research and development activities, and our production processes. Because we 
are the most technologically advanced manufacturer of technical fabrics in the world, 
comparable experience with a competitor is not sufficient for this position. This type of 
specialized knowledge is essential to our ability to maintain our competitive edge in the 
market, because this individual provides support to our research and development division 
and other employees and teams who are all involved in developing, improving and selling our 
products. Someone without specialized knowledge in these areas would require several years 
of on-the-job training to function effectively in this position. 
With regard to the beneficiary's qualifications for the proposed U.S. position, the petitioner stated: 
Specifically, [the beneficiary] possesses proprietary knowledge of our coated fabrics and 
related products, our research and development projects and activities, and our production 
methods. He is a specialist in fiberglass textile web processes and has extensive knowledge 
of [the petitioner's] technology sufficient to impart that knowledge in a technology transfer to 
an overseas plant. His recognizable achievement in developing products for the coated 
fabrics market is expected to result in $4 million sales and overall scrap reduction. In 
addition, he conducted scrim machine trials to quantifL the effects of adjusting process levers, 
the successful results of which resulted in the recapture of two major customers. 
Since September 2001, [the beneficiary] has worked in the position of Process Technology 
Engineer responsible for providing technical engineering support on product quality issues at 
our St. Catharine's facility. Beginning November 2003, he has traveled to our facility in 
Ridgeway, South Carolina on an intermittent basis, in TN status, to troubleshoot issues and to 
conduct trials with textile machinery. [The beneficiary] has performed all of the duties of the 
position as delineated above and established himself as a key resource within our 
organization for technical engineering support for industrial fabric quality control and related 
products. 
The director found the initial evidence submitted with the petition insufficient to warrant a finding that the 
beneficiary possessed the required specialized knowledge. Consequently, a request for evidence was issued 
on October 27, 2004, which requested more detailed evidence that the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge of the petitioner's product, service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests 
and its application in international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the 
organization's processes and procedures, and that such knowledge was not general knowledge held commonly 
through the industry. The petitioner responded on November 1 1, 2004. In response to the director's request, 
the petitioner provided an additional overview of its products and services, and explained that the beneficiary 
had a solid foundation for the position offered based on his prior work experience. Specifically, the petitioner 
stated that the beneficiary had at least five years experience in the engineering field, as he had began his 
career as a design engineer after obtaining his degree. Additionally, the petitioner provided the following 
clarification with regard to the manner in which the beneficiary's knowledge was specialized and advanced: 
Because [the petitioner] is the most technologically-advanced manufacturer of technical 
fabrics in the world, experience of our advanced manufacturing processes and procedures is 
vital to the performance of the duties and responsibilities of the position offered. This 
knowledge is different from that generally held within the industry. In addition, because of 
the technology transfer aspect of this position, an individual with a general background in the 
SRC 05 01 1 50739 
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technical fabrics industry would not be suitable for this position because he would not have 
specialized knowledge of our manufacturing processes or procedures and, therefore, would 
not be able to assist with the technology transfer from our Canadian facility. 
As state[d] above, in order to engage in process technology activities, design plans and 
transfer proprietary knowledge of the reinforcement process and products from our Canadian 
facility to the United States, [sic] the beneficiary must have specialized knowledge of the 
company's products and the products designs since these unique designs reflect the 
company's standards and requirements and those of our customers. While other companies 
may manufacture reinforcement fabrics, [the petitioner] is number one in the reinforcement 
market in Europe and number two worldwide. The company enjoys a reputation for 
exceptional products created through its proprietary processes. [The petitioner] has a unique 
customer base and provides unique products to those customers based on their specific needs 
and usage. This knowledge cannot be obtained from employment with other manufacturers 
because the customer base and specifications are unique to [the petitioner] and because the 
products are unique to [the petitioner] based on those requirements. 
In addition, the Process Development Engineer with [the petitioner] must have specialized 
knowledge of the company's reinforcement fabric process and products to transfer this 
knowledge, technology, equipment and layout specifications to US workers. A Process 
Development Engineer without specialized knowledge of [the petitioner's] processes and 
technology would not be able to transfer that knowledge to another facility and to other 
workers that lack that specific knowledge or provide technical support on specific issues that 
involve the proprietary knowledge of the company's reinforcement products and processes. 
This knowledge cannot be acquired without extensive experience with [the petitioner's] 
products and its processes. Troubleshooting, by its very nature, implies an above-average 
level of knowledge of specific tasks, materials, processes so as to enable the troubleshooter to 
assist those with general or basic knowledge of the process or product to move beyond that 
basic level or to resolve specific issues of concern. To develop products for the coated 
fabrics market and provide engineering support to manufacturing and research and 
development divisions through analysis of product defects to determine the significance of 
the possible causes for those defects, the Process Development Engineer must have 
specialized knowledge of these factors as defined by the company and by our customers. 
Since [the petitioner's] products are proprietary and mostly protected by patents and/or 
trademarks and this knowledge cannot be obtained outside of the company. This knowledge 
can only be obtained through employment with [the petitioner] or its affiliates. 
The director determined that the record neither established that the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge nor that the intended position in the U.S. is one that requires specialized knowledge, and 
concluded that the beneficiary was not eligible for the classification sought. The director specifically noted 
that the petitioner had failed to show that the beneficiary's duties and training were significantly different 
from other similarly-qualified engineers. The director concluded that the evidence submitted did not establish 
that the beneficiary's knowledge was uncommon or distinct and distinguished from other practitioners in the 
field, and consequently denied the petition. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner submits a detailed brief in support of its assertions that the beneficiary 
possesses specialized knowledge. Counsel asserts that the petitioner pointed out numerous times the manner 
in which the position required specialized knowledge and the manner in which the beneficiary possessed such 
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knowledge, and asserts that he is highly trained and thus extremely valuable to the petitioner in the 
international market place. Counsel asserts that the denial should be reversed based on these contentions. 
On review, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge nor that the intended position requires an employee with specialized knowledge. 
When examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 
 214.2(1)(3)(ii). As required in the regulations, the 
petitioner must submit a detailed description of the services to be performed sufficient to establish specialized 
knowledge. Id. 
In the present matter, the petitioner provided a lengthy but vague description of the beneficiary's employment 
in the foreign entity, his intended employment in the U.S. entity, and his responsibilities as a process 
development engineer. Despite specific requests by the director, namely, what specifically set apart the 
beneficiary's knowledge from other similarly trained engineers in the field, the petitioner failed to provide 
such information. The petitioner has not sufficiently documented how the beneficiary's performance of the 
proposed job duties distinguishes his knowledge as specialized. The petitioner repeatedly relies on the same 
evidence prior to adjudication in support of the petition. Despite the director's finding that the initial evidence 
submitted was insufficient, the petitioner failed to supplement the record as requested and merely resubmitted 
similar statements regarding the petitioner's business and its rank in the market that had been deemed 
unacceptable by the director as evidence of the beneficiary's qualifications for the benefit sought. Although 
specifically requested by the director, the record contains no definitive evidence supporting the contention 
that the beneficiary's knowledge is uncommon and more advanced than similarly trained professionals in the 
field. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3)(viii) states that the director may request additional evidence in 
appropriate cases. Although specifically and clearly requested by the director, the petitioner failed to provide 
documentary evidence to support its claims that the beneficiary obtained a specialized level of knowledge 
through his work in the industry. The failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of 
inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. See 8 C.F.R. 
 103.2(b)(14). 
 In this case, the petitioner 
relies on the AAO to accept its uncorroborated assertions that the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge, both prior to adjudication and again on appeal, based merely on the contention that the petitioning 
entity holds a near monopoly on the industry. While the petitioner's high rankings in the marketplace are 
undoubtedly impressive, they alone do not establish that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge 
simply because the petitioner is a large company that dominates a particular segment of the industry. These 
assertions do not constitute evidence. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not 
sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 
158, 165 (Cornm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 
1972)). 
It is also appropriate for the AAO to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the 
beneficiary's knowledge of the business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making 
process. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. 1 17, 120 (Comm. 198 1) (citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 61 8 
(R.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. 816 (R.C. 1971))' As stated by the Commissioner in 
Although the cited precedents pre-date the current statutory definition of "specialized knowledge," and 
counsel raises that very argument with regard to the director's reliance on Matter of Penner in support of the 
denial, the AAO finds them instructive. Other than deleting the former requirement that specialized 
SRC 05 01 1 50739 
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Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 52 (Comrn. 1982), when considering whether the beneficiaries possessed 
specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find that the occupations inherently 
qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have 
unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. Id. The Commissioner also provided the 
following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or her to 
produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed primarily 
for his ability to cany out a key process or function which is important or essential to the 
business firm's operation. 
Id. at 53. In the present matter, the evidence of record demonstrates that the beneficiary is more akin to an 
employee whose skills and experience enable him to provide a specialized service, rather than an employee 
who has unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. Moreover, the petitioner's 
failure to submit a more detailed discussion of the beneficiary's day-to-day duties or the nature of the training 
he received creates a presumption of ineligibility. In this matter, the petitioner continually repeats the claim 
that the beneficiary, as a process development engineer, must have specialized knowledge of the company's 
reinforcement fabric process and products to transfer this knowledge, technology, equipment and layout 
specifications to U.S. workers. The petitioner continues by stating that a process development engineer 
without specialized knowledge of the petitioner's processes and technology would not be able to transfer that 
knowledge to another facility and to other workers that lack that specific knowledge or provide technical 
support on specific issues that involve the proprietary knowledge of the company's reinforcement products 
and processes. The petitioner claims that this knowledge cannot be acquired without extensive experience 
with its products and its processes, but fails to clarifL why the beneficiary's experience and training as a 
process development engineer differs from any of the other process development engineers employed by the 
petitioner. Again, the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge, yet omits any detail 
with regard to how this knowledge was obtained, and why his knowledge is different from other similarly 
trained engineers employed by the petitioner. As previously stated, going on record without supporting 
documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. 
Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. 
It should be noted that the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the AAO to make 
comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The term "specialized 
knowledge" is not an absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed in 1756, Inc. v. Attorney 
General, "[slimply put, specialized knowledge is a relative . . . idea which cannot have a plain meaning." 745 
F. Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990). The Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended 
for "key personnel." See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key 
personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." Webster's IINew 
knowledge had to be "proprietary," the 1990 Act did not significantly alter the definition of "specialized 
knowledge" from the prior INS interpretation of the term. The 1990 Committee Report does not reject, 
criticize, or even refer to any specific INS regulation or precedent decision interpreting the term. The 
Committee Report simply states that the Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of 
"[vlarying [i.e., not specifically incorrect] interpretations by INS," H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I), at 69, 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. Beyond that, the Committee Report simply restates the tautology that became section 
214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Id. The AAO concludes, therefore, the cited cases, as well as Matter of Penner, 
remain useful guidance concerning the intended scope of the "specialized knowledge1' L-1B classification. 
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College Dictionary 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). 
 In general, all employees can reasonably be 
considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic 
success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. An employee of 
"crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average employee. 
Accordingly, based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record related to that 
term, the AAO must make comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge employee and 
the general labor market, but also between that employee and the remainder of the petitioner's workforce. 
Here, the petitioner's only contention that the beneficiary's knowledge is more advanced than other engineers 
in the field is its assertion that because it claims to be the most technologically advanced manufacturer of 
technical fabrics in the world, comparable experience with a competitor is not sufficient for this position. The 
petitioner, however, fails to provide any discussion whatsoever of the nature of the training and experience 
that its employees receive that is so different and unique from the training its competitors provide to their 
process development engineers. Additionally, the petitioner has not provided any information pertaining to 
the exact day-to-day duties of the beneficiary as compared to the daily duties of other process development 
engineers. Nor did the petitioner distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge, work experience, or training from 
those of other employees. Other than the petitioner's continuous assertions that it is number one or number 
two in the marketplace and thus no one else has familiarity or expertise with its processes, products and 
procedures, there is no independent evidence corroborating these claims. The lack of tangible evidence in the 
record makes it impossible to classify the beneficiary's knowledge of technical fabrics as advanced and 
precludes a finding that the beneficiary's role is of crucial importance to the organization. As previously 
stated, simply going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for the purpose of 
meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Sofici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. 
The claim that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge, without submitting any documentation of the 
training he received or the manner in which the beneficiary gained such knowledge, is insufficient. Although 
the petitioner generally discusses the petitioner's products or services, the lack of specific information with 
regard to the beneficiary and his role in these products and services precludes the AAO from clearly 
understanding the actual role of the beneficiary in the petitioner's organization. While the beneficiary's skills 
and knowledge may contribute to the success of the petitioning organization, this factor, by itself, does not 
constitute the possession of specialized knowledge. Therefore, while the beneficiary's contribution to the 
economic success of the corporation may be considered, the regulations specifically require that the 
beneficiary possess an "advanced level of knowledge" of the organization's process and procedures or a 
"special knowledge" of the petitioner's product, service, research, equipment, techniques, or management. 8 
C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). As determined above, the beneficiary does not satisfy the requirements for 
possessing specialized knowledge. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner alleges that the denial was erroneous and submits a detailed brief in 
support of his contentions. Counsel restates the previously-provided synopsis of the beneficiary's duties, and 
addresses a service center memorandum outlining the requirements of specialized knowledge. See Memo. 
from James A. Puleo, Acting Exec. Assoc. Comrnr., Office of Operations, Immigration and Naturalization 
Serv., to All Dist. Dir. et al., Interpretation of Special Knowledge, 1-2 (March 9, 1994) (copy on file with Am. 
Immig. Law Assn.). Counsel focuses on the main points of the memorandum, outlining each particular basis 
for the possession of specialized knowledge, and thus concludes that the beneficiary satisfies each one. Once 
again, the simple rebuttal to these contentions rests upon the fact that the petitioner has failed to provided any 
independent or objective evidence which shows that the beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner's products 
or processes is so unique or advanced that it differs significantly from other similarly trained engineers in the 
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industry. On appeal, counsel contends that the letters from the petitioner, dated September 24, 2004 and 
November 11, 2004, clearly highlight these qualifications. The AAO disagrees, and agrees with the director's 
determination that the evidence in the record is simply insufficient to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge. Although counsel alleges on appeal, for example, that as a result of the beneficiary's 
special knowledge not generally found in the marketplace, he is qualified to contribute to the petitioner's 
knowledge of foreign operating conditions, and that he has been utilized in such a capacity that his 
assignments have enhanced the petitioner's competitiveness and financial position, no independent evidence 
to corroborate these claims has been submitted. Without documentary evidence to support the claim, the 
assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The unsupported assertions of counsel 
do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter of laureano, 19 
I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). 
Counsel and the petitioner overlook the fact that the beneficiary is undoubtedly one of many process 
development engineers in the workforce today. It is fair to conclude that most people employed in this line of 
work must also have an understanding of the specific industry in which the petitioner is engaged. The 
petitioner seems to focus on this aspect of the beneficiary's background as the key element of the beneficiary's 
qualifications. The petitioner does not, however, offer any evidence that the beneficiary has uncommon, 
advanced, or proprietary knowledge of the petitioner's unique processes or procedures.z Instead, the argument 
is that the beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner's products and processes through his employment with 
the foreign entity gives him specialized knowledge. 
Additionally, in Matter of Penner, the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of 
the specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. 49. The decision noted that the 1970 House Report, H.R. 
No. 91-851 stated that the number of admissions under the L-1 classification "will not be large" and that 
"[tlhe class of persons eligible for such nonimmigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be carefully regulated 
by the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id. at 5 1. The decision further noted that the House Report 
was silent on the subject of specialized knowledge but that, during the course of the sub-committee hearings 
on the bill, the Chairman specifically questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify under the 
proposed "L" category. In response to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that they 
understood the legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, and 
that it would not include "lower categories" of workers or "slulled craft workers." Id. at 50 (citing H.R. 
Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445, 91st Cong. 210, 218, 
223,240,248 (November 12, 1969)). 
Reviewing the Congressional record, the Commissioner concluded in Matter of Penner that an expansive 
reading of the specialized knowledge provision, such that it would include skilled workers and technicians, is 
not warranted. The Commissioner emphasized that that the specialized knowledge worker classification was 
not intended for "all employees with any level of specialized knowledge." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 
53. Or, as noted in Matter of Colley, "[mlost employees today are specialists and have been trained and given 
2 
 Although the fact that a beneficiary has experience with a proprietary product or procedure does not serve as 
prima facie evidence that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge, when such a claim is made, 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) must carefully evaluate the claimed knowledge and the depth of 
the beneficiary's experience in order to determine whether it rises to the level of specialized knowledge as 
contemplated by 8 C.F.R. 4 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). Thus, while a beneficiary is no longer required to have 
specialized knowledge, such knowledge can still be a basis for this determination. 
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specialized knowledge. However, in view of the House Report, it can not be concluded that all employees 
with specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
intracompany transferees." 18 I&N Dec. at 119. According to Matter of Penner, "[sluch a conclusion would 
permit extremely large numbers of persons to qualify for the 'L-1' visa" rather than the "key personnel" that 
Congress specifically intended. 18 I&N Dec. at 53; see also 1756, Inc., 745 F. Supp. at 15 (concluding that 
Congress did not intend for the specialized knowledge capacity to extend to all employees with specialized 
knowledge, but rather to "key personnel" and "executives."). 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc., 745 F. Supp. at 16. Based on the evidence presented, it is concluded that the 
beneficiary does not possess specialized knowledge; nor would the beneficiary be employed in a capacity 
requiring specialized knowledge. For this reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the record contains insufficient evidence to establish that the beneficiary 
has at least one continuous year of full time employment abroad with the foreign entity within the three years 
preceding the filing of the petition. See 8 C.F.R. tj 214.2(1)(3)(iii). The petition in this matter was filed on 
October 15, 2004. As a result, the pertinent period for purposes of this analysis is from October 15, 2001 to 
October 15,2004. 
On the L Supplement to Form 1-129, the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary has been employed with the 
Canadian entity as a process engineer since September 2001. The petitioner further claims that beginning in 
November of 2003, the beneficiary made intermittent trips to the United States to render his services to the 
petitioner's U.S. offices. Other than the beneficiary's resume, however, the petitioner has failed to provide 
any documentary evidence establishing that the beneficiary was in fact employed by the Canadian entity 
during the relevant time period. Merely claiming that the beneficiary was employed abroad since September 
2001, without documentary evidence such as paystubs or tax forms, is insufficient to satisfy this requirement. 
Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the 
burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Sofici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comrn. 1998) (citing Matter 
of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). In addition, the unsupported 
assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); 
Matter of Laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 
1980). For this additional reason, the petition will be denied. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afld. 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
director's decision will be affirmed and the petition will be denied. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.