dismissed L-1B Case: Medical Diagnostics

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Rm. 3042 
Washington, DC 20529 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Petition: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101 (a)(15)(L) of the Imniigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. # 1 101(a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any fi~rther inquiry must be made to that office. 
P. Wiemann, ~irector 
Administrative Appeals Office 
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DISCUSSION: The Director, Nebraska Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to employ the beneficiary as an L-IB nonimmigrant 
intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. $ 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is engaged in the development, manufacture 
and marketing of medical diagnostic systems. It claims to be an affiliate of Roche Diagnostics GmbH, located in 
Penzburg, Germany. The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary as a chemical technician for a period of three 
years. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge or that the prospective position requires an individual with specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion, and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director 
misinterpreted the requirements for the L-IB nonimmigrant classification as defined in the statute and as 
outlined in two Immigration and Naturalization Service (now Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS)) 
policy memoranda issued in 1994 and 2002, respectively. Counsel further asserts that the director failed to 
consider the information submitted in response to the request for evidence. Finally, counsel states that the 
director erroneously relied on Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comm. 1982) and Matter of 1756, Inc. v. 
Attorney General, F. Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990), rather than applying the proper statutory and regulatory 
criteria. Counsel submits copies of the above-referenced 1994 and 2002 memoranda in support of the appeal. 
To establish L-1 eligibility, the petitioner must meet the criteria outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. $ 1101(a)(15)(L). Specifically, within three years 
preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, a qualifying organization must 
have employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized 
knowledge capacity, for one continuous year. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States 
temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof 
in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. # 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
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(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himfher to perform the intended services in 
the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the same work 
which the alien performed abroad. 
This matter presents two related, but distinct, issues: (1) whether the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge; and, (2) whether the proposed employment is in a capacity that requires specialized knowledge. 
Section 2 14(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 184(c)(2)(B), provides the following: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 2 14.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
In a July 29, 2005 letter submitted with the 1-129 Petition, the petitioner explained that the beneficiary had 
completed four years of vocational training as a chemical technician with the petitioner's German affiliate, 
during which time she completed courses in protein-biochemistry methods, oncology, immunology, and 
pharmacology. The petitioner indicated that the beneficiary assumed her present role as a chemical technician 
with the foreign entity in February 2002 and currently performs the following duties: 
She works with Proteomics technologies, using two-dimensional gel electrophoresis, 
software-based image analysis and sample preparation. She utilizes immunological methods 
in examining crude tissue extracts. [The beneficiary] also utilizes western blotting and 
technical documentation of tissue samples and antibodies. She utilizes Lectin affinity 
chromatography and protein G affinity chromatography, develops ELISA prototype assays, 
and conducts Elecsys tests in order to develop new products and improve existing products 
for our customers. 
The petitioner further described the beneficiary's proposed position in the United States as follows: 
If approved, [the beneficiary] will serve as Chemical Technician for Assay Development for 
Therapeutic Drug Monitoring. She will work to develop IVD products, according to DCC 
guidelines for the Global Lab Systems organization which meet or exceed technical 
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specifications and customer requirements. She will participate [in] product evaluation, 
application and manufacturing transfer activities and provides technical expertise to the 
company's product and customer support groups. This position participates in new product 
ideas, feasibility, project design, and project planning. She will work to develop or modify 
existing IVD products according to project plans, DCC guidelines and [mlarketing 
specifications which meet or exceed customer requirements. She will perform evaluation and 
application studies as needed to ensure that product performance meets design specifications. 
She will document studies, make pertinent observations, draw conclusions and make 
recommendations for future work. 
[The beneficiary] will develop and validate test procedures for raw materials, intermediate 
components and finished products. She will assist product and customer support groups by 
providing technical expertise and training necessary for development of a strong product 
performance and troubleshooting knowledge base. She will participate as a member of 
appropriate project teams representing R&D as needed, prepare abstracts, conference posters 
and publications, and will assist team leaders in the preparation of Design History files. 
The petitioner stated that the beneficiary's current and proposed positions are similar and both involve 
product and precision instrument/sample testing, technical product development and complaint resolution 
aspects of the business. Finally, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary qualifies as a specialized knowledge 
intracompany transferee "by virtue of her nearly 7 years of experience with our German affiliate, all of which 
has been spent working with testing and research of chemical reagents, precision instruments and other 
processes similar to those which will be utilized in the US position." The petitioner noted that the 
beneficiary's knowledge of the organization's products, methods, resources and relevant U.S. and foreign 
customer product needs would be "invaluable to the function that will take place here in the [U.S.]," and 
stated: "The fact that she has completed training in Protein-Biochemistry Methods, Oncology, Immunology, 
and Pharmacology also demonstrates her specialized knowledge in this subject area." 
On August 22, 2005, the director advised the petitioner that the evidence of record was insufficient to 
establish that the knowledge possesses by the beneficiary is specialized, noting that the plain meaning of the 
term "specialized knowledge," is knowledge or expertise beyond the beyond the ordinary in a particular field, 
process, or function. The director further observed that it appeared the duties to be performed would not be 
significantly different from those performed by other chemical technicians employed by other companies in 
the petitioner's field. Accordingly, the director instructed the petitioner to provide evidence that the 
beneficiary's knowledge is uncommon. noteworthy or distinguished by some unusual quality and not 
generally known by practitioners in the field. The director noted that the evidence submitted must establish 
that the beneficiary's knowledge of the processes and procedures of the company is "apart from the 
elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others." Finally. the director requested that the petitioner submit 
evidence of any training the beneficiary has received with the foreign entity, including the dates, duration and 
objectives of such training, as well as evidence of how the beneficiary's training and knowledge is unique 
from that of other chemical technicians employed within the petitioner's group and others in the industry. 
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In a response dated August 24, 2005, counsel submitted a letter and copies of two policy memoranda 
addressing the interpretation of specialized knowledge: James A. Puleo, Acting Exec. Assoc. Comm., Office 
of Operations, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Irzterpretafion of Special Krlowledge (Mar. 9. 1994) 
("Puleo memo"); Fujie 0. Ohata, Assoc. Co~nn~., Service Center Operations, Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge (Dec. 20, 2002) ("Ohata memo"). Counsel reiterated the 
previously provided job descriptions for the beneficiary's current and proposed positions. Citing a definition 
of specialized knowledge from the Puleo memo, counsel stated that the beneficiary "clearly possesses 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets," based on her more than three 
years of experience as a chemical technician with the foreign entity. Counsel emphasized that "only one year 
of experience is required to qualify under the specialized knowledge regulations," and further explained how 
the beneficiary qualifies for classification as an employee with specialized knowledge: 
Because health care diagnostic systems are designed for not only a specific manufacturer, but 
also for specific clients and end uses, diagnostic system designs are normally specific and 
special to each individual model or type of product. Some systems and developments can be 
used across products for certain applications due to universal design for a specific subgroup. 
However, many are model or line specific. Health care products are one of the most heavily 
regulated and technical products made. . . . [The beneficiary's] work is performed "in order 
to develop new products and improve existing products for our customers." This clearly 
constitutes special knowledge, and also demonstrates the "application in international 
markets" as [the beneficiary] designs and improves these items for usage in markets for [the 
petitioner's corporate group] in multiple countries. 
Counsel noted that the Puleo memorandum requires the beneficiary's knowledge to be different from that 
generally held within the industry and "uncommon," but not proprietary or unique. Counsel stated: "Because 
healthcare diagnostic systems are designed for particular end use, clients or lines and types of products, 
usually from a single supplierldesign source, the design of [the petitioner's] diagnostic components and/or 
products are necessarily unique, as are the models and lines of products we supply and design components 
for, and it is also necessarily 'different or unconlmon."' Counsel emphasized that the Puleo memo states that 
there is no requirement that the alien's knowledge be unique, proprietary or not commonly found in the 
United States labor market. Counsel stated that the Puleo memo outlines possible characteristics of employees 
possessing specialized knowledge, and specifically asserted that the beneficiary: (1) possesses knowledge that 
is valuable to the employer's competitiveness in the marketplace; (2) is qualified to contribute to the U.S 
employer's knowledge of foreign operating conditions as a result of special knowledge not generally found in 
the industry: (3) has been utilized abroad in a capacity involving significant assignments which have 
enhanced the employer's productivity, competitiveness, image, or financial position; (4) possesses knowledge 
which, normally, can be gained only through prior experience with the foreign employer; and (5) possesses 
knowledge of a product or process which cannot be easily transferred or taught to another individual. 
Additionally, counsel emphasized that the beneficiary: had been working on the designs and types of research 
and products on which she will work in the United States; had worked with the petitioner's products and 
customer base and the unique requirements of our various product models for seven years; will "com~nunicate 
best practices" between the petitioner's international operations based on her knowledge of international 
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diagnostic market conditions; had "contributed significantly" to the foreign entity's designs; will provide 
technical expertise and training critical to the petitioner's product improvement and development; and, that 
the beneficiary possesses knowledge of "unique lines, models and makes of diagnostic systems" that could 
only be gained through previous experience with the company. 
Counsel further explained: 
[The beneficiary] and her foreign and proposed US Positions clearly meet either of the 
alternate definitions for a specialized knowledge worker. The knowledge she possesses and 
that required to perform her duties goes well beyond "mere knowledge of nomenclature or 
procedures." Healthcare diagnostic systems are complex scientific designs which are highly- 
regulated and must appropriately interact with unique designs and components in each new 
use and model of diagnostic tool. Knowledge of our products as well as the design 
requirements of our varied and unique customers as well as testing materials and other 
supplies is required in order to design safe, effective and affordable diagnostic systems. 
The need to adapt existing designs in order to move them from or into the US market also 
requires knowledge of the existing product and its requirements, as well as the requirements 
and regulations of the target market. As noted, these designs are very complex and designed 
to work with very precise and specific companion component parts that are normally patented 
and specific to individual lines, uses and models of diagnostic tools. 
Finally, with respect to the beneficiary's training, counsel reiterated that the beneficiary completed four years 
of "vocational training" prior to assuming her current role with the foreign organization. Counsel noted that as 
the regulations require only one year of experience in a position involving specialized knowledge and no 
formal educational training, the beneficiary's preparation "far exceeds these minimum requirements." 
On September 6, 2005, the director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the 
beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that the prospective position requires an individual with 
specialized knowledge. The director noted that the statutory definition of "specialized knowledge" requires 
Citizenship and Immigration Services to make a comparative assessment not only between the claimed 
specialized knowledge employee and general labor market, but also between that employee and the remainder 
of the petitioner's workforce. The director found that the beneficiary's duties appear to be those associated 
with any chemical technician or research assistant position at any company in the petitioner's industry, noting 
that such companies are required to adhere to certain guidelines in developing In Vitro Diagnostic, or IVD, 
medical devices. 
The director further concluded that the petitioner had not adequately explained exactly what the beneficiary's 
claimed specialized knowledge is, as the petitioner had not indicated that she would apply her existing 
knowledge of any particular device or product in the prospective position. but rather would be working on 
development and testing of new products. The director noted that the evidence also failed to establish that the 
beneficiary has developed an advanced knowledge of the petitioner's products, systems or processes from her 
coursework or work experience that would distinguish her from other chemical technicians or similar 
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employees engaged with the same technologies throughout the petitioner's international organization or by 
other companies similar to the petitioner. The director found that the limited evidence submitted with respect 
to the beneficiary's training and experience compared to that of other similarly employed workers within the 
petitioner's organization made it impossible to classify the beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner's 
technologies as advanced, and precluded any finding that she qualifies as "key personnel." The director 
discussed Mutter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comm. 1982) and 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, F. Supp. 9, 
15 (D.D.C. 1990) in his decision to emphasize the need for CIS to make comparisons between the 
beneficiary's claimed specialized knowledge and the knowledge of other similarly employed workers within 
the petitioner's group and within the industry. The director determined that the evidence of record did not 
sufficiently establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is uncommon, noteworthy, or distinguished by some 
unusual quality, or that the beneficiary's position abroad or proposed position in the United States require a 
person with "specialized knowledge" as defined in the regulations. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner contends that the director failed to acknowledge any of the arguments or 
evidence submitted in response to the request for evidence and failed to apply the above-referenced Puleo and 
Ohata memoranda to the facts of this case. Counsel argues that the director erroneously concluded that the 
beneficiary "received no specific training since the beginning of her employment with the foreign company," 
noting that the petitioner clearly indicated that the beneficiary received four years of vocational training prior 
to assuming her current position with the foreign entity. Counsel again emphasizes that the regulations only 
require one year of "specialized knowledge employment" and suggests that the director's request for 
documentary evidence related to the beneficiary's training was irrelevant. 
Counsel further contends that the cases cited by the director, 1756, Inc. v. Attorney Generul and Matter of 
Penner, and, indirectly, the legislative history for the L-1 visa classification, do not provide a valid legal basis 
for the adverse decision. Counsel suggests that Congress "was not clear" on the definition of specialized 
knowledge, prompting the subsequent issuance of the 1994 Puleo memo and 2002 Ohata memo. Counsel 
further asserts that the director disregarded these memoranda by requiring that the petitioner distinguish the 
beneficiary's knowledge from that held by other employees within the petitioner's group, noting that the 
petitioner must only establish that the knowledge is different from that found generally in the particular 
industry, "not different from internal employees." Counsel attempts to distinguish the instant matter from 
Matter of Penner, noting that the decision "merely prohibits use of the L classification for skilled workers or 
lower categories of workers." Counsel claims that the petitioner's response to the request for evidence 
outlined the various types of specialized knowledge that may qualify an employee for L-1B status under the 
Puleo and Ohata memoranda, and contends that the director failed "to provide any justification for 
disregarding its own procedural guidance set out in these two memos" or "any reasoning for rejecting the 
arguments set forth by the petitioner regarding qualification according to the memos." 
On review, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary's prospective position requires 
"specialized knowledge" as defined in section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1184(c)(2)(B), and the 
regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). Instead, the petitioner consistently describes the position as one 
requiring an experienced and skilled chemical technician, rather than someone who possesses specialized 
knowledge. 
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As a preliminary point, the petitioner's claim fails on an evidentiary matter. The petitioner contends that the 
beneficiary gained her specialized knowledge through a four-year vocational training program followed by 
more than three years of practical experience as a chemical technician with the foreign entity. The petitioner 
identified four specific areas of training undertaken by the beneficiary, and claimed that the completion of this 
training "demonstrates her specialized knowledge in this area." Yet, when the director requested evidence to 
establish the nature and existence of the beneficiary's training, counsel merely responded that that there is no 
formal training requirement for this visa category and provided no further information or documentation. It is 
reasonable for the director to request information that will establish the nature of the beneficiary's training and 
assist him in identifying the claimed specialized knowledge, whether the beneficiary possesses the claimed 
knowledge, the petitioner's requirements for the position, and any other information that will enable him to 
evaluate the claimed specialized knowledge. Although the training is critical to the petitioner's claim, the 
record is devoid of any evidence of this training. 
The regulation states that the petitioner shall submit additional evidence as the director, in his or her 
discretion, may deem necessary. 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(viii). The purpose of the request for evidence is to 
elicit further information that clarifies whether eligibility for the benefit sought has been established, as of the 
time the petition is filed. See 8 C.F.R. $5 103.2(b)(8) and (12). The failure to submit requested evidence that 
precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. $ 103.2(b)(14). By 
itself, the petitioner's failure to submit the requested evidence of the beneficiary's training is grounds for 
denial. For this reason, the appeal must be dismissed and the petition denied. 
Second, regarding the petitioner's claim of specialized knowledge, it must be noted that in making a 
determination as to whether the knowledge possessed by a beneficiary is special or advanced, the AAO relies 
on the statute and regulations, legislative history and prior precedent. Although counsel suggests that CIS is 
bound to base its decision on theabove-referenced Puleo and Ohata memoranda, the memoranda were issued 
as guidance to assist CIS employees in interpreting a term that is not clearly defined in the statute, not as a 
replacement for the statute or the original intentions of Congress in creating the specialized knowledge 
classification, or to overturn prior precedent decisions that continue to prove instructive in adjudicating L-I B 
visa petitions. The AAO will weigh guidance outlined in the policy memoranda accordingly, but not to the 
exclusion of the statutory and regulatory definitions, legislative history or prior precedents. Counsel's specific 
objections to the director's reliance on Matter of Penner and 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General will be discussed 
in more detail below. 
In examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's 
description of the job duties and the weight of the evidence supporting any asserted specialized knowledge. 
See 8 C.F.R. 5 2 14.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed description of the services to be performed 
sufficient to establish that it involves specialized knowledge. Id It is also appropriate for the AAO to then look 
beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the beneficiary's knowledge of the business's product 
or service, management operations, or decision-making process. M~ztter of Colle~i, 18 I&N Dec. 1 17, 120 
(Comm. 1981) (citing Matter of Ruulin, 13 I&N Dec. 61 8 (R.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBlunc, 13 I&N Dec. 
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8 16 (R.C. 197 I)).' As stated by the Commissioner in Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 52 (Comm. 1982), 
when considering whether the beneficiaries possessed specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Razrli~? 
decisions did not find that the occupations inherently qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications 
sought." Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of 
a skilled worker. Id. The Commissioner also provided the following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or her to 
produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed primarily 
for his ability to carry out a key process or function which is important or essential to the 
business' operation. 
Id. at 53. 
In Matter of Penner, the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of the specialized 
knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comm. 1982). Although the definition of "specialized knowledge" in 
effect at the time of Matter of Penner was superseded by the 1990 Act to the extent that the former definition 
required a showing of "proprietary" knowledge, the reasoning behind Matter of Penner remains applicable to 
the current matter. The decision noted that the 1970 House Report, H.R. No. 91-85 1, was silent on the 
subject of specialized knowledge, but that during the course of the sub-committee hearings on the bill, the 
Chair~nan specifically questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify under the proposed "L" 
category. In response to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that they understood the 
legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, and that it would not 
include "lower categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." Matter of Penner, supra at 50 (citing H.R. 
Subcomm. No. I of the Jud. Comm., Itnmigration Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 415, 91st Cong. 210, 218, 
223,240,248 (November 12, 1969)). 
Reviewing the congressional record, the Commissioner concluded that an expansive reading of the 
specialized knowledge provision, such that it would include skilled workers and technicians, is not warranted. 
The Commissioner emphasized that that the specialized knowledge worker classification was not intended for 
"all employees with any level of specialized knowledge." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 53. Or, as noted 
I Counsel specifically asserted that the director erred by citing Mutter of Penrler in his September 2, 2005 
decision. However, although the cited precedents pre-date the current statutory definition of "specialized 
knowledge," the AAO finds them instructive. Other than deleting the former requirement that specialized 
knowledge had to be "proprietary," the 1990 Act did not significantly alter the definition of "specialized 
knowledge" from the prior INS interpretation of the term. The 1990 Committee Report does not reject, 
criticize, or even refer to any specific INS regulation or precedent decision interpreting the term. The 
Committee Report simply states that the Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of 
"[vlarying [i.e., not specifically incorrect] interpretations by INS," H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I), at 69, 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. Beyond that, the Committee Report simply restates the tautology that became section 
214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Id. The AAO concludes, therefore, the cited cases, including Matter of Pem~er, 
remain useful guidance concerning the intended scope of the "specialized knowledge" L- 1 B classification. 
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in Matter of Colley, "[mlost employees today are specialists and have been trained and given specialized 
knowledge. However, in view of the House Report, it can not be concluded that all employees with 
specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as intracompany 
transferees." 18 I&N Dec. at 119. According to Mutter of Penner, "[sjuch a conclusion would permit 
extremely large numbers of persons to qualify for the 'L-1' visa" rather than the "key personnel" that 
Congress specifically intended. 18 I&N Dec. at 53; see also, 1756, Inc., 745 F. Supp. at 15 (concluding that 
Congress did not intend for the specialized knowledge capacity to extend all employees with specialized 
knowledge, but rather to "key personnel" and "executives.") 
Thus, based on the intent of Congress in its creation of the of the L-1B visa category, as discussed in Matter 
of Penner, even showing that a beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge does not necessarily establish 
eligibility for the L-IB intracompany transferee classification. The petitioner should also submit evidence to 
show that the beneficiary is being transferred to the United States as a crucial employee. As discussed below, 
the beneficiary's job description does not distinguish her knowledge as more advanced or distinct among 
chemical technicians employed by the foreign or U.S. entities or by other unrelated companies who design 
similar types of products based on common industry standards. The statutory definition of specialized 
knowledge requires the AAO to make comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized 
knowledge. The term "specialized knowledge" is not an absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As 
observed in 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, "[slimply put, specialized knowledge is a relative . . .idea which 
cannot have a plain meaning." 745 F.Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990). The Congressional record specifically states 
that the L-I category was intended for "key personnel." See generally, H.R. Rp. No. 91-851, 1970 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key personnelt' denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "of 
crucial importance." Webster's IINew College Dictionary 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). In general, all 
employees can reasonably be considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not 
contribute to the overall economic success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to 
employ that person. An employee of "crucial importance" or "key personnelt' must rise above the level of the 
petitioner's average employee. Accordingly, based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the 
congressional record related to that term, the AAO must make comparisons not only between the claimed 
specialized knowledge employee and the general labor market, but also between that employee and the 
remainder of the petitioner's workforce. 
Counsel relies heavily on the 1994 Puleo memo and 2002 Ohata memo and asserts that these memos 
represent current CIS policy of specialized knowledge criteria. The Puleo memo allows CIS to compare the 
beneficiary's knowledge to the general United States labor market in order to distinguish between specialized 
and general knowledge. The Acting Associate Commissioner notes in the memorandum that "officers 
adjudicating petitions involving specialized knowledge must ensure that the knowledge possessed by the 
beneficiary is not general knowledge held commonly throughout the industry but that it is truly specialized." 
Puleo memo, supra. A comparison of the beneficiary's knowledge to the knowledge possessed by others in 
the field is therefore necessary in order to determine the level of the beneficiary's skills and knowledge and to 
ascertain whether the beneficiary's knowledge is advanced. In other words, absent an outside group to which 
to compare the beneficiary's knowledge, CIS would not be able to ensure that the knowledge possessed by the 
beneficiary is not general knowledge held commonly throughout the industry but that it is truly specialized. 
Id. The analysis for specialized knowledge therefore requires a review of the knowledge possessed by the 
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United States labor market, but does not consider whether workers are available in the United States to 
perform the beneficiary's job duties. 
Counsel claims that the director erred by attempting to compare the beneficiary's knowledge with those of 
other workers employed within the petitioner's group of companies, and also disputes the director's reliance 
on 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1990). In 1756, Inc. the court upheld the denial of 
an L-l petition for a chef, where the petitioner claimed that the chef possessed specialized knowledge. The 
court noted that the legislative history demonstrated a concern that the L-l category would become too large: 
"The class of persons eligible for such nonimmigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be carefully regulated 
and monitored by the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id at 16. ( citing H.R. Rep. No. 91-85 1, 1970 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750,2754, 1970 WL 5815). The court stated, "[Iln light of Congress' intent that the L-1 
category should be limited, it was reasonable for the INS to conclude that specialized knowledge should not 
extend to all employees with specialized knowledge. On this score, the legislative history provides some 
guidance. Congress referred to 'key personnel' and executives." 1756, Inc., 745. F.Supp. at 16. 
While the AAO acknowledges counsel's statements that the 1756, Inc. decision cited by the director pre-dates 
the 1990 amendment to the definition of "specialized knowledge," it has been noted above that Congress' 
1990 amendments to the Act did not specifically overrule 1756, Inc., nor any administrative precedent 
decision, nor did the 1990 amendments otherwise mandate a less restrictive interpretation of the term 
"specialized knowledge." The House Report, which accompanied the 1990 amendments, stated: 
One area within the L visa that requires more specificity relates to the term "specialized 
knowledge." Varying interpretations by INS have exacerbated the problem. The bill therefore 
defines specialized knowledge as special knowledge of the company product and its 
application in international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge of processes and 
procedures of the company. 
H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(1), 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6749, 1990 WL 20041 8. As previously noted, the 
statutory definition states, "an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity involving specialized knowledge 
with respect to a company if the alien has a special knowledge of the company product and its application in 
international markets or has an advanced knowledge of processes and procedures of the company." 8 U.S.C. 
0 1 184(c)(2)(B). 
Prior to the Immigration Act of 1990, the statute did not provide a definition for the term specialized 
knowledge. Instead, the regulations defined the term as follows: 
"Specialized knowledge" means knowledge possessed by an individual whose advanced level 
of expertise and proprietary knowledge of the organizations' product, service, research, 
equipment, techniques, management or other interests of the employer are not readily 
available in the United States labor market. This definition does not apply to persons who 
have general knowledge or expertise which enables them merely to produce a product or 
provide a service. 
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8 C.F.R. § 2 14.2(1)(1)(ii)(D)(1990). 
Although the Immigration Act of 1990 provided a statutory definition of the term "specialized knowledge," 
Congress did not give any indication that it intended to expand the field of aliens that qualify as possessing 
specialized knowledge. Although the statute omitted the term "proprietary knowledge" that was contained in 
the regulations, the statutory definition still calls for "special knowledge' or an "advanced level of 
knowledge," similar to the original regulation. Neither the 1990 House Report nor the amendments to the 
statute indicate that Congress intended to expand the visa category beyond the "key personnel" that were 
originally mentioned in the 1970 House Report. Considered in light of the original 1970 statute and the 1990 
amendments, it is clear that Congress intended for the class of nonimmigrant L-1 aliens to be narrowly drawn 
and carefully regulated, and to this end provided a specific statutory definition of the term "specialized 
knowledge" through the Immigration Act of 1990. 
Contrary to counsel's assertions, the Puleo memorandum, although issued after the 1990 amendment, does 
not differ significantly from previous CIS guidance on this issue, other than removing the requirement that a 
beneficiary's specialized knowledge be proprietary or unique. For example, the memorandum indicates that 
one possible characteristic of an employee who possesses specialized knowledge is that the individual "has 
been utilized abroad in a capacity involving significant assignments which have enhanced the employer's 
productivity, competitiveness, image or financial position." Puleo memo, supra. While the language differs 
from previous interpretations. this criterion is another way of stating that the petitioner may establish a 
beneficiary's specialized knowledge credentials by submitting evidence that the beneficiary is a "key 
employee." Accordingly, counsel's argument that CIS is prohibited from comparing the beneficiary's 
knowledge to that of similarly employed workers within the petitioner's international group is not persuasive, 
and the AAO will consider whether the beneficiary qualifies as "key personnel" in its analysis. 
In this matter, the petitioner has provided only general descriptions of the beneficiary's current and proposed 
roles as a chemical technician that convey little understanding of the type or extent of specialized knowledge 
that would be required to successfully perform the purported job duties. When asked by the director to 
describe how the beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner' products or other interests is "uncommon, 
noteworthy, or distinguished by some unusual quality," the petitioner responded by emphasizing the 
beneficiary's experience with the overseas office. However, other than stating that the beneficiary's duties in 
the United States will be "similar" to those she performs for the foreign entity, it is unclear what specialized 
knowledge the beneficiary possesses or how this knowledge would be applied in the proffered position. 
The petitioner indicated that the beneficiary currently works as a chemical technician working with proteomic 
technologies in which her duties include two-dimensional gel electrophoresis, software-based image analysis, 
sample preparation, immunological methods in examining crude tissue extracts, western blotting and 
technical documentation of tissue samples and antibodies. The petitioner indicated that she utilizes 
chromatography methods and conducts tests in order to develop and improve new and existing products, but 
did not identify any specific products or the beneficiary's contribution to their development. Without further 
explanation, these appear to be duties that could be performed by any chemical technician trained in the same 
field as the beneficiary. 
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In the United States, the beneficiary would develop IVD products according to DCC guidelines, participate in 
product evaluation, application and manufacturing transfer activities, provide expertise to product and 
customer support groups, participate in project design and planning, develop and validate test procedures for 
raw material, intermediate components and final products, provide technical expertise and training, participate 
in project teams and assist team leaders. Again, this job description could describe any chemical technician 
position in the petitioner's or any other company, as the petitioner did not identify any aspect of the position 
that would require special knowledge of the petitioner's products or the specific experience possessed by the 
beneficiary. 
Based on these descriptions, it is not possible to determine if the beneficiary would even be working on the 
same types of products in the United States, much less applying specialized knowledge of a specific product 
that could only be gained with the foreign employer. The AAO notes that there is no mention that the 
beneficiary has previous experience specifically related to the development of IVD products with the foreign 
entity, and thus it is difficult to determine how her experience with the foreign entity prepared her to perform 
the duties of a chemical technician for IVD product development with the petitioner. 
Counsel attempts to differentiate the beneficiary's knowledge by noting that companies that develop products 
for the healthcare industry generally customize their product lines for particular uses or customers, therefore 
making prior experience with the company's products different from experience which would generally be 
held within the petitioner's industry. The petitioner emphasized that the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge of the petitioner's products, methods and resources and "customer product needs." However, as 
noted above, the petitioner does not indicate that the beneficiary is being transferred to the United States to 
apply her knowledge of a particular product line or to continue work with a specific customer or customers, 
nor has it described the beneficiary's claimed specialized knowledge in any detail, or her contribution to the 
design or development of a particular product or component. Similarly, counsel attempts to distinguish the 
beneficiary's knowledge by emphasizing her knowledge of the company's products and its application in 
international markets. Counsel asserted that the petitioner and the foreign entity need to adapt German 
products to meet the requirements of the United States market and vice versa, and stated that the beneficiary 
may provide training to United States employees, but again, failed to identify any specific products or 
technologies being transferred between the two countries, the beneficiary's relevant experience with any 
particular product or technology to be transferred, or the type or purpose of the training to be delivered by the 
beneficiary. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of 
meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) 
(citing Matter of Treasure Craft of CaZifor??iu, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
As discussed above, beneficiaries of L-IB petitions should be more than merely skilled, but rather must be 
shown to carry out key processes or functions. In addition, the petitioner should establish that the 
beneficiary's knowledge meets the plain meaning of "special." See 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(I)(I)(ii)(D) (defining 
"specialized knowledge" as "special knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's 
product, service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests"). "Special" is defined as 
"surpassing the usual; distinct among others of a kind; peculiar to a specific person or thing." WebsterJ.v II 
New College Dictionary 2001, Houghton Mifflin. See also Webster 's Third New Intertzutior~ul Dictionaty, 
2001 (defining special as "distinguished by some unusual quality; uncommon; noteworthy.") In this case, the 
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Page 14 
petitioner has only established that the beneficiary is a trained employee who fills a position the petitioner 
considers important. However, the beneficiary has been and will be working as a technician. While counsel 
correctly stated that it is the beneficiary's actual job duties and not her job title that determine whether she 
possesses specialized knowledge, it is evident that as a technician, she does not play a lead or senior role in 
the development or enhancement of the petitioner's products. Rather, it is likely that she works under the 
guidance and direction of scientists, researchers and engineers and follows standard procedures in performing 
her job duties, utilizing scientific analysis and testing techniques and methods common in the industry. The 
petitioner has not established that the beneficiary performs unusual duties or that she is employed primarily to 
carry out a key process or function. See Matter cgPentzer, 18 I&N Dec. at 52. 
The record does not distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge as different or more advanced than the 
knowledge possessed by other similarly employed chemical technicians supporting development of the same 
types of products for similar companies in the petitioner's industry. By itself, work experience and knowledge 
of a firm's technically complex products will not equal "special knowledge." See Matter of Penner, 18 I&N 
Dec. at 53. 
Likewise, the petitioner has submitted no evidence that would distinguish the beneficiary from any other 
chemical technician employed within its international organization. Counsel specifically objected to the 
director's request that the petitioner submit evidence that would set the beneficiary's knowledge apart from 
others within the petitioner's organization, yet continues to claim that the beneficiary's knowledge is 
"advanced." The petitioner does not, however, contend that the beneficiary's knowledge is more advanced 
than other chemical technicians employed within its organization, and it specifically rejects the suggestion 
that it is required to do so. As discussed above, counsel's position is incorrect; the petitioner is required to 
establish that the beneficiary is a key employee rather than merely a skilled worker with knowledge of the 
petitioner's products and processes. Based on counsel's arguments, anyone who has worked as a chemical 
technician with the foreign entity for more than one year would possess "special knowledge" or an "advanced 
level of knowledge." Counsel's expansive interpretation of the specialized knowledge provision is untenable, 
as it would allow virtually any skilled or experienced employee to enter the United States as a specialized 
knowledge worker. 
Considering that the beneficiary commenced a four-year vocational program with the foreign entity at the age 
of sixteen, it appears that the foreign entity offers a formal post-secondary school apprenticeship program in 
the beneficiary's specialty, and that the training she completed was no different from that completed by many 
other chemical technicians employed by the foreign entity. The petitioner offered no information regarding 
other employees working for the foreign company, such that the director or the AAO could make a 
meaningful comparison between the beneficiary's claimed "advanced knowledge" and the knowledge 
possessed by other workers within the petitioner's organization. Although knowledge need not be narrowly 
held within an organization in order to be specialized knowledge, the L-I B visa category was not created in 
order to allow the transfer of employees with any degree of knowledge of a company's products and 
processes. The lack of evidence in the record makes it impossible to classify the beneficiary's knowledge of 
the petitioner's products or procedures as advanced, and precludes a finding that the beneficiary's role is "of 
crucial importance" to the organization. While it may be correct to say that the beneficiary is a highly skilled 
and experienced employee, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary rises to the level of a 
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specialized knowledge or "key" employee, as contemplated by the statute. See Mutter of Penner, I8 I&N Dec. 
at 53. 
Finally, the AAO will address counsel's claim that the beneficiary qualifies for classification as a specialized 
knowledge employee pursuant to characteristics outlined in the 1994 Puleo memo, specifically, that she: 
possesses knowledge that is valuable to the employer's competitiveness in the marketplace; is qualified to 
contribute to the petitioner's knowledge of foreign operating conditions as a result of special knowledge not 
generally found in the industry; has been utilized abroad in a capacity involving significant assignments; 
possesses knowledge which normally can only be gained through prior experience with the foreign employer; 
and possesses knowledge of a product or process that cannot be easily transferred to another individual. While 
these factors may be considered, the regulations specifically require that the beneficiary possess an "advanced 
level of knowledge" of the organization's process and procedures, or a "special knowledge" of the petitioner's 
product, service, research, equipment, techniques, or management. 8 C.F.R. $214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). As discussed 
above, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary's knowledge rises to the level of specialized 
knowledge contemplated by the regulations. 
Regardless, counsel's claims regarding the beneficiary's qualifications under the Puleo memo were not 
supported by evidence. As stated in the 1994 Puleo memorandum: 
[Tlhe mere fact that a petitioner alleges that an alien's knowledge is somehow different does 
not, in and of itself, establish that the alien possesses specialized knowledge. The petitioner 
bears the burden of establishing through the submission ofprobative evidence that the alien 's 
knowledge is uncornn~on noteworthy, or distinguished by some unusual quality and not 
generally known by practitioners in the alien's field of endeavor. Likewise, a petitioner's 
assertion that the alien possesses an advanced level of knowledge of the processes and 
procedures of the company nmst be supported bj) evidence describing and setting apart that 
knowledgej?om the elementary of basic knowledge possessed by others. It is the weight and 
type of evidence which establishes whether or not the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge. 
(Emphasis added.) Puleo memo, supra. 
The AAO notes that the only supporting documentary evidence submitted in support of this petition was a 
2004 annual report for the petitioner's corporate group. Upon review, in every instance where the petitioner 
attempted to distinguish the beneficiary as having specialized knowledge, the petitioner failed to submit any 
evidence that would allow the AAO to evaluate the claim. In fact, the petitioner's response to the director's 
request for evidence consisted solely of a memorandum from counsel containing arguments supported with no 
evidence other than copies of the Puleo and Ohata memos. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not 
constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter of Laureano, 19 I&N 
Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Mutter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). Going on record without 
supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these 
proceedings. Matter of,Soflci, 22 I&N Dec. 158. 165 (Comm. 1998). 
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Page 16 
Based on the above discussion, the beneficiary's duties and technical skills, while impressive, demonstrate 
knowledge that is common among chemical technicians working in the petitioner's industry. The petitioner 
has failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary's training, work experience, or knowledge of the company's 
products or products is more advanced than the knowledge possessed by others employed by the petitioner. 
The AAO does not dispute the fact that the beneficiary's knowledge has allowed her to successfully perform 
her job duties for the foreign entity. However, the successful completion of one's job duties does not 
distinguish the beneficiary as "key personnel," nor does it establish employment in a specialized knowledge 
capacity. As discussed, the petitioner has not submitted probative evidence to establish that the beneficiary's 
knowledge is uncommon, noteworthy, or distinguished by some unusual quality and not generally known in 
the beneficiary's field of endeavor, or that her knowledge is advanced compared to the knowledge held by 
other similarly employed workers within the petitioner and the foreign entity. 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, supra at 16. The record does not establish that the 
beneficiary has specialized knowledge or that the position offered with the United States entity requires 
specialized knowledge. 
The petition will be denied and the appeal dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an 
independent and alternative basis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving 
eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. 
Here, that burden has not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.