dismissed L-1B Case: Plastics

US. Department of Homeland Security 
U. S. Citizenshiv and lmmimation Services 
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 Office ofAdmznlstratlve Appeals, MS 2090 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
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 U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
File: SRC 04 022 50533 Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: KT 2 6 2009 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 4 1 101 (a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
hief, Administrative Appeals Office 
SRC 04 022 50533 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The matter 
is now before the Administrative Appeals Office ("AAO") on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant visa petition seeking to employ the beneficiary as an L-1B intracompany 
transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 10 1 (a)( 15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
("the Act"), 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner, a Georgia corporation, states that it intends to engage in 
the import and export of plastics. It claims to be a subsidiary of Veer Exports, located in India. The petitioner 
seeks to temporarily employ the beneficiary as a product specialist in its new office in the United States. 
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge or that he has been or will be employed in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director's 
decision was "arbitrary and capricious." Counsel indicated on the Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal, that he 
would submit a brief and/or evidence to the AAO within 30 days. As of this date, no additional evidence has 
been incorporated into the record of proceeding. Accordingly, the record will be considered complete. 
To establish L-1 eligibility under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the petitioner must demonstrate that the 
beneficiary, within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, has 
been employed abroad in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a capacity involving specialized 
knowledge, for one continuous year by a qualifying organization. The petitioner must also demonstrate that the 
beneficiary seeks to enter the United States temporarily in order to continue to render services to the same 
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized 
knowledge. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (I)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himlher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
SRC 04 022 50533 
Page 3 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(vi) also provides that if the petition indicates that the beneficiary is 
coming to the United States in a specialized knowledge capacity to open or to be employed in a new office, 
the petitioner shall submit evidence that: 
(A) 
 Sufficient physical premises to house the new office have been secured; 
(B) 
 The business entity in the United States is or will be a qualifying organization as 
defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section; and 
(C) 
 The petitioner has the financial ability to remunerate the beneficiary and to 
commence doing business in the United States. 
The sole issue address by the director is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary has been or 
will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity and whether the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge. 8 C.F.R. 5 5 2 14.2(1)(3)(ii) and (iv). 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 11 84(c)(2)(B), provides: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
The petitioner filed the nonimmigrant petition on October 29, 2003. In a letter dated October 25, 2003, the 
petitioner stated that the beneficiary has been employed by the foreign entity since January 200 1 as a manager of 
purchase, sales and inventory management. The petitioner described his current job duties with the foreign entity 
as follows: 
[The beneficiary] has in depth knowledge of scrap products and selection methods, and 
advanced knowledge of our product categorization, inventory and pricing mechanism as well as 
marketing practices, and internal corporate methodologies. 
As a product specialist, he is responsible for assorting and buying various steel scraps and 
plastics as well as inventory control. He also handles steel scraps and plastics procurement, 
storage and shipping. He is our top most specialized knowledge manager and is solely 
responsible for assortment, inventory and security. He has gained valuable specialized 
experience in scrap material product line and is an asset to the company. [The beneficiary's] 
complex and specialized duties include but not [sic] limited to supervising and participating in 
SRC 04 022 50533 
Page 4 
steel scrap and plastic assortment, establishing rules and policies for in-house product assortment 
consistent with industry standards, and reviewing and certifying classification made. In addition, 
[the beneficiary] determines all corporate policies regarding security and inventory management 
and is solely responsible for safeguarding the merchandise which the company has on hand. 
The petitioner indicated that the beneficiary's proposed duties for the new U.S. company would including 
"organizing the U.S. operation," and acting as a product specialist "responsible for assorting, buying and 
exporting of plastic/steel scrap." The petitioner further stated that the beneficiary would be responsible for 
determining security and inventory policies utilizing "specialized knowledge of [the foreign entity's] 
organizational and operational knowledge." The petitioner explained that the company has regular suppliers of 
scrap materials in European countries and in the United States, as well as regular contract manufacturers who 
produce scrap materials. The petitioner indicated its intention to "import directly from the United States," rather 
than "dealing with the middlemen." The petitioner further described the beneficiary's qualifications as follows: 
[The beneficiary] qualifies as a Product Specialist based on his work experience and his 
expertise in and proprietary knowledge of our products, services protocol, as well as [the foreign 
entity's] traders and customers needs and our customer support methods. He is particularly 
valuable to us since he knows what we now have in inventory, what we need and what our 
sources need in India, and what we can obtain. No one outside our company knows this. He 
knows our sources and costs in India and so he can help us estimate availability, costs, and 
timing of delivery. All of this is crucial to our profitability. Based on his knowledge of our 
selecting systems and methods, he also consults with management to arrange direct shipments to 
India from customers outside the United States. We need a person with a through [sic] 
knowledge of our inventories and sources of hrther stock, in order to do this. There is no one 
outside our company who would have this specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner stated that it would need to send a U.S. worker to India for at least one year of training with its 
parent company before he or she could undertake the beneficiary's proposed duties. The petitioner concluded by 
stating that the beneficiary has "proprietary knowledge of [the foreign entity's] scrap products and selection 
methods, and advanced knowledge of our product categorization, inventory and pricing mechanism as well as 
marketing practices, and internal corporate methodologies." 
On November 7, 2003, the director requested additional evidence. Specifically, the director requested that the 
petitioner document, and explain in detail, exactly what is the equipment, system, product, technique or service of 
which the beneficiary has specialized knowledge, and indicate whether it is used or produced by other employers 
in the United States and abroad. The director also requested additional evidence regarding the beneficiary's 
training, and additional explanation as to how he gained the requisite specialized knowledge. 
In a response dated January 15, 2004, the foreign entity's representative, 
 essentially reiterated the 
statements made in the petitioner's initial letter. 
 noted that the beneficiary received six months of full- 
time on-the-job training in order to perform his duties with the foreign entity, but emphasized that someone with 
no prior experience in the field would require at least one year of training to perform the proposed duties as a 
product specialist. 
In addition, counsel for the petitioner submitted a letter dated February 4,2004, in which he stated: 
SRC 04 022 50533 
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[The beneficiary] possesses specialized knowledge because he has an advanced level of 
expertise and proprietary knowledge of the employer organization's techniques, which is not 
readily available in the U.S. labor market. Specifically, [the beneficiary]: 
a) Possesses knowledge of [the foreign entity's] proprietary assortment of scrap material, 
inventorying, and pricing system that is valuable to the employer's competitiveness in the 
market place; 
b) Is uniquely qualified to contribute to the U.S. employer's knowledge of foreign operating 
conditions; 
c) Has been utilized as a key employee abroad and has enhanced the employer's productivity 
and competitiveness; and 
d) Possesses knowledge that can be gained only through extensive prior experience with that 
employer. 
Counsel cited to a 1988 legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) memorandum in support of these 
claims. See Memorandum from Richard E. Norton, Associate Commissioner for Examinations, Immigration 
and Naturalization Service, Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge Under the L ClasszJication, (October 27, 
1 988)(Norton memorandum). 
The director denied the petition on February 19, 2004, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the 
beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that he has been or would be employed in a position requiring 
specialized knowledge. In denying the petition, the director noted that mere familiarity with a company's product 
or services, such as its nomenclature and procedures, does not constitute specialized knowledge. The director 
found that the petitioner did not establish that the knowledge held by the beneficiary is proprietary, or that it 
would be difficult to convey or learn. Rather the director determined that the knowledge "appears to be confined 
to various company policies and procedures, and does not appear to be far removed from industry standards." 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director's decision was "arbitrary and capricious," and 
contends that the petitioner established that the knowledge possessed by the beneficiary is specialized. 
Upon review, the petitioner's assertions are not persuasive in demonstrating that the beneficiary has 
specialized knowledge or that he has been or will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity as defined 
at 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). 
Looking to the language of the statutory definition, Congress has provided USCIS with an ambiguous definition 
of specialized knowledge. In this regard, one Federal district court explained the infeasibility of applying a 
bright-line test to define what constitutes specialized knowledge: 
This ambiguity is not merely the result of an unfortunate choice of dictionaries. It reflects the 
relativistic nature of the concept special. An item is special only in the sense that it is not 
ordinary; to define special one must first define what is ordinary. . . . There is no logical or 
principled way to determine which baseline of ordinary knowledge is a more appropriate reading 
of the statute, and there are countless other baselines which are equally plausible. Simply put, 
SRC 04 022 50533 
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specialized knowledge is a relative and empty idea which cannot have a plain meaning. CJ: 
Westen, fie Empty Idea ofEquality, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 537 (1982). 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. 9, 14- 15 (D.D.C., 1990).' 
While Congress did not provide explicit guidance for what should be considered ordinary knowledge, the 
principles of statutory interpretation provide some clue as to the intended scope of the L-1B specialized 
knowledge category. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 1 12, 123 (1 987) 
(citing lrNSv. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207,94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)). 
First, the AAO must look to the language of section 214(c)(2)(B) itself, that is, the terms "special" and 
"advanced." Like the courts, the AAO customarily turns to dictionaries for help in determining whether a word in 
a statute has a plain or common meaning. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 109 F.3d 965,967-68 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(using Webster's Dictionary for "therefore"). According to Webster's New College Dictionary, the word "special" 
is commonly found to mean "surpassing the usual" or "exceptional." Webster's New College Dictionary, 1084 
(3rd Ed. 2008). The dictionary defines the word "advanced" as "highly developed or complex" or "at a higher 
level than others." Id. at 17. 
Second, looking at the term's placement within the text of section 1 0 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Act, the AAO notes that 
specialized knowledge is used to describe the nature of a person's employment and that the term is listed among 
the higher levels of the employment hierarchy together with "managerial" and "executive" employees. Based on 
the context of the term within the statute, the AAO therefore would expect a specialized knowledge employee to 
occupy an elevated position within a company that rises above that of an ordinary or average employee. See 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 14. 
Third, a review of the legislative history for both the original 1970 statute and the subsequent 1990 statute 
indicates that Congress intended for USCIS to closely administer the L-1B category. Specifically, the original 
drafters of section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act intended that the class of persons eligible for the L-1 classification 
would be "narrowly drawn" and "carefully regulated and monitored" by USCIS. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91- 
851 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750, 2754, 1970 WL 5815. The legislative history of the 1970 Act 
plainly states that "the number of temporary admissions under the proposed 'L' category will not be large." Id In 
addition, the Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended for "key personnel." 
See generally, id. The term "key personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "[olf 
crucial importance." Webster 's New College Dictionary 620 (3rd ed., Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing 
Co. 2008). Moreover, during the course of the sub-committee hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically 
questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify under the proposed "L" category. In response 
to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that they understood the legislation would allow 
"high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, and that it would not include "lower 
categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." See H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration 
Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445,9 1 Cong. 2 10,2 18,223,240,248 (Nov. 12, 1969). 
1 
 Although 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General was decided prior to enactment of the statutory definition of 
specialized knowledge by the Immigration Act of 1990, the court's discussion of the ambiguity in the legacy 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) definition is equally illuminating when applied to the definition 
created by Congress. 
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Neither in 1970 nor in 1990 did Congress provide a controlling, unambiguous definition of "specialized 
knowledge," and a narrow interpretation is consistent with so much of the legislative intent as it is possible to 
determine. H. Rep. No. 91-851 at 6, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2754. This interpretation is consistent with legislative 
history, which has been largely supportive of a narrow reading of the definition of specialized knowledge and the 
L-1 visa classification in general. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 15-16; Boi Na Braza 
Atlanta, LLC v. Upchwch, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 2372846 at "4 (N.D.Tex., 2005), afSd 194 
Fed.Appx. 248 (5th Cir. 2006); Fibermaster, Ltd. v. INS., Not Reported in F.Supp., 1990 WL 99327 (D.D.C., 
1990); Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Dept. of Justice, Civ. Action 00-2977-LFO (D.D.C. April 6, 2001)(on file with 
AAO). 
Further, although the Immigration Act of 1990 provided a statutory definition of the term "specialized 
knowledge" in section 214(c)(2) of the Act, the definition did not generally expand the class of persons eligible 
for L-1B specialized knowledge visas. Pub.L. No. 101-649, 5 206(b)(2), 104 Stat. 4978, 5023 (1 990). Instead, 
the legislative history indicates that Congress created the statutory definition of specialized knowledge for the 
express purpose of clarifying a previously undefined term from the Immigration Act of 1970. H.R. Rep. 101- 
723(I) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6749, 1990 WL 20041 8 ("One area within the L visa that 
requires more specificity relates to the term 'specialized knowledge.' Varying interpretations by INS have 
exacerbated the problem."). While the 1990 Act declined to codify the "proprietary knowledge" and "United 
States labor market" references that had existed in the previous agency definition found at 8 C.F.R. 
5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) (1988), there is no indication that Congress intended to liberalize its own 1970 definition of 
the L- 1 visa classification. 
If any conclusion can be drawn from the enactment of the statutory definition of specialized knowledge in section 
214(c)(2)(B), it would be based on the nature of the Congressional clarification itself. By not including any strict 
criterion in the ultimate statutory definition and further emphasizing the relativistic aspect of "special knowledge," 
Congress created a standard that requires USCIS to make a factual determination that can only be determined on a 
case-by-case basis, based on the agency's expertise and discretion. Rather than a bright-line standard that would 
support a more rigid application of the law, Congress gave the INS a more flexible standard that requires an 
adjudication based on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. CJ: Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 33 1 F.3d 
369,377 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89,91 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
To determine what is special or advanced, USCIS must first determine the baseline of ordinary. As a 
baseline, the terms "special" or "advanced" must mean more than simply "skilled" or "experienced." By 
itself, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically complex products will not equal "special 
knowledge." See Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 53 (Comm. 1982). In general, all employees can 
reasonably be considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the 
overall economic success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. 
An employee of "crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average 
employee. In other words, specialized knowledge generally requires more than a short period of experience; 
otherwise special or advanced knowledge would include every employee in an organization with the 
exception of trainees and entry-level staff. If everyone in an organization is specialized, then no one can be 
considered truly specialized. Such an interpretation strips the statutory language of any efficacy and cannot 
have been what Congress intended. 
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Considering the definition of specialized knowledge, it is the petitioner's, not USCIS's, burden to articulate 
and prove that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" knowledge. Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 
8 U.S.C. $ 11 84(c)(2)(B). USCIS cannot make a factual determination regarding the beneficiary's specialized 
knowledge if the petitioner does not, at a minimum, articulate with specificity the nature of the claimed 
specialized knowledge, describe how such knowledge is typically gained within the organization, and explain 
how and when the beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
Once the petitioner articulates the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and type of 
evidence which establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized knowledge. A 
petitioner's assertion that the beneficiary possesses advanced knowledge of the processes and procedures of 
the company must be supported by evidence describing and distinguishing that knowledge from the 
elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others. Because "special" and "advanced" are comparative 
terms, the petitioner should provide evidence that allows USCIS to assess the beneficiary's knowledge 
relative to others in the petitioner's workforce or relative to similarly employed workers in the petitioner's 
specific industry. 
In examining the specialized knowledge of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's description of 
the job duties and the weight of the evidence supporting any asserted specialized knowledge. See 8 C.F.R. 
$ 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed job description of the services to be performed sufficient to 
establish specialized knowledge. At a minimum, the petitioner must articulate with specificity the nature of the 
claimed specialized knowledge. Merely asserting that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" 
knowledge will not suffice to meet the petitioner's burden of proof. 
Upon review, the petitioner in this case has failed to establish either that the beneficiary's position in the 
United States requires an employee with specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has specialized 
knowledge. Although the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary has been and will be employed in a 
"specialized knowledge" capacity, the petitioner has not adequately articulated any basis to support this claim. 
The record is devoid of any documentary evidence that the beneficiary's position involves special knowledge 
of the petitioning organization's product, service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other 
interests as required in the regulations. While the petitioner claims that the beneficiary utilizes specialized 
knowledge of the petitioner's internal systems, "pricing mechanism," selection system, customer information 
network, technical standards, inventory, sources, marketing practices, corporate methodology, services 
protocol and customer needs and support methods, the petitioner has not described how he utilizes this 
knowledge, provided evidence or otherwise described the petitioner's systems, methods, practices, standards 
or services, or adequately explained how the beneficiary gained his claimed specialized knowledge, other than 
stating that he was employed by the petitioner's overseas parent company for over one year. Going on record 
without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in 
these proceedings. Matter of Sofici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of 
California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a 
beneficiary's duties involve specialized knowledge; otherwise, meeting the definitions would simply be a 
matter of reiterating the regulations. See Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724, F. Supp. 1 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), 
afd, 905, F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
The petitioner has indicated that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge as a result of his 
employment with the foreign entity, which gave him specialized knowledge of the company's methods, 
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standards, customers and services. However, the AAO notes that the beneficiary was hired by the foreign 
entity for the position of "manager of purchase, sales and inventory management," based on his experience 
working with other Indian firms in the same field. While the petitioner later stated that the beneficiary 
completed six months of full-time on-the-job training, it did not document this training or describe in any 
detail the nature, scope and content of such training, such that the AAO could determine exactly what 
"special" or "advanced" knowledge the beneficiary possesses or how he acquired it. Rather, considering that 
the beneficiary was hired and immediately assigned to manage the foreign entity's purchase, sales and 
inventory functions, it appears that the beneficiary already possessed the general knowledge and skills 
necessary for the position based on his prior experience in similar positions with unrelated companies. While 
it may be correct to say that the beneficiary is an experienced employee, this fact alone is not enough to bring 
the beneficiary to the level of specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner emphasizes that no one outside the foreign entity possesses knowledge of its inventories, 
sources, selection methods, inventories or its customers and their needs, and that such knowledge is critical to 
the company's profitability. However, the petitioner has not identified any aspects of its business model that 
would distinguish it from any other company operating in the scrap materials industry in India or elsewhere, 
nor explained how experience with its business model would automatically impart its employees with 
specialized knowledge. According to the reasoning of Matter of Penner, work experience and knowledge of a 
firm's technically complex products, by itself will not equal "special knowledge."* An expansive interpretation of 
specialized knowledge in which any experienced employee would qualify as having special or advanced 
knowledge would be untenable, since it would allow a petitioner to transfer any experienced employee to the 
United States in L-1B classification. The term "special" or "advanced" must mean more than experienced or 
skilled. 
Importantly, the record is not persuasive in establishing why, exactly, any of the beneficiary's company- 
specific knowledge, such as its "methodology" cannot be imparted to a similarly experienced purchase 
specialist or manager in the scrap metal industry, in a relatively short period of time. The lack of detail with 
respect to explaining the company-specific knowledge required for the position precludes a finding that such 
knowledge is truly specialized or advanced. Accordingly, despite the petitioner's claim, the record does not 
establish how, exactly, this knowledge materially differs from knowledge possessed by other workers 
employed by the petitioning organization or in the scrap metal industry at large. The record does not establish 
what qualities of this knowledge of scrap metal sourcing, selection and sorting are of such complexity that the 
impartation of this knowledge amounts to the acquisition of special or advanced knowledge. The petitioner 
does not articulate with specificity the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, describe how such 
knowledge is typically gained within the organization, or explain how and when the beneficiary gained such 
2 
 As observed above, the AAO notes that the precedent decisions that predate the 1990 Act are not categorically 
superseded by the statutory definition of specialized knowledge, and the general issues and case facts themselves 
remain cogent as examples of how the INS applied the law to the real world facts of individual adjudications. 
USCIS must distinguish between skilled workers and specialized knowledge workers when making a 
determination on an L-1B visa petition. The distinction between skilled and specialized workers has been a 
recurring issue in the L-1B program and is discussed at length in the INS precedent decisions, including Matter of 
Penner. See 18 I&N Dec. at 50-53. (discussing the legislative history and prior precedents as they relate to the 
distinction between skilled and specialized knowledge workers). 
SRC 04 022 50533 
Page 10 
knowledge. Again, going on record without documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting 
the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. 
Overall, the record does not establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is substantially different from the 
knowledge possessed by experienced managers or specialists in the petitioner's industry. The fact that 
workers outside the organization have not been exposed to the petitioner's specific sourcing arrangements, 
customers, and internal processes and strategies does not alone establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is 
indeed advanced or special. All employees can be said to possess unique skill sets to some degree; however, 
a skill set that can be easily imparted to another similarly educated and generally experienced employee is not 
"specialized knowledge." Moreover, the petitioner has not submitted evidence that any knowledge of its 
products, strategies or methodologies can be considered "special" or "advanced." Rather, the petitioner must 
establish that qualities of the petitioner's processes, procedures, or technologies require this employee to have 
knowledge beyond what is common in the industry. This has not been established in this matter. There is no 
indication that the beneficiary has any knowledge of the company's methodologies or processes which would 
truly separate him from any other similarly-employed worker within the petitioner's organization or in the 
industry at-large. 
The AAO does not discount the likelihood that the beneficiary is a skilled and experienced purchase 
specialist. There is no indication, however, that the beneficiary has any knowledge that exceeds that of any 
similarly-employed worker, or that he has received special training in the company's methodologies or 
processes which would separate him from any other worker employed within the petitioner's organization or 
in the industry at-large. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary's knowledge is any more 
advanced or special than the knowledge held by a skilled worker. See Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 52. 
Finally, counsel's reliance on the Norton memorandum is misplaced. It is noted that the memorandum was 
intended solely as a guide for employees and will not supercede the plain language of the statute or the 
regulations. Therefore, by itself, counsel's assertion that the beneficiary's qualifications are analogous to the 
examples outlined in the memorandum is insufficient to establish the beneficiary's qualification for 
classification as an intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge. Specifics are clearly an important 
indication of whether a beneficiary's duties encompass specialized knowledge; otherwise meeting the 
definition would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. See, e.g., Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 
F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). While the beneficiary may possess 
knowledge valuable to the petitioner's productivity and competitiveness, and has held a key assignment abroad, 
these factors, by themselves, do not constitute the possession of specialized knowledge. While the beneficiary's 
contribution to the economic success of the company may be considered, the regulations specifically require that 
the beneficiary possess an "advanced level of knowledge" of the organization's process and procedures, or a 
"special knowledge" of the petitioner's product, service, research, equipment, techniques, or management. 8 
C.F.R. § 2 14.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). As determined above, the beneficiary does not satisfy these requirements. 
Based on the evidence presented, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary has specialized 
knowledge or that he was or will be employed in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. For this reason, 
the appeal will be dismissed. 
Therefore, based on the evidence presented and applying the statute, regulations, and binding precedents, the 
petitioner has not established that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge or that he has been or would be 
SRC 04 022 50533 
Page 11 
employed in the United States in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. For this reason, the appeal will 
be dismissed. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
appeal will be dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.