dismissed L-1B Case: Process Automation Systems

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. A3042 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
FILE: SRC 03 170 5 16 13 Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: 
PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 10 1(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
. Wiemann, Director 
ddministrative Appeals Office 
I 
SRC 03 170 51613 
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DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The matter 
is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonirnmigrant petition seeking to employ the beneficiary as an L-1B nonirnrnigrant 
intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is engaged in the design, manufacture, 
sales and marketing of process automation systems for the pulp and paper mill industry. The petitionG claims 
that it is the affiliate of the beneficiary's foreign employer, located in Toronto, Canada. The beneficiary was 
previously granted L-1B classification for a three-year period and has entered the United States intermittently 
to serve as a project engineer. The petitioner now seeks authorization to employ the beneficiary in this 
position for an additional two-year period. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge or that he will be employed by the United States entity in a specialized knowledge 
capacity. The director noted that the petitioner had not established that the beneficiary's knowledge of the 
petitioner's products and systems is different or more advanced than that of any other project engineer 
employed within the United States entity or its Canadian affiliate. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director applied an inappropriate standard in determining 
whether the beneficiary is qualified for the benefit. Counsel states that the evidence on record is sufficient to 
establish that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge due to his training and experience, and that he 
will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity with the petitioner. Counsel requests that the evidence 
be reconsidered in light of a 1994 Immigration and Naturalization Service (now Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (CIS)) memorandum. Counsel submits a brief, copies of previously submitted evidence, and copies 
of two CIS memoranda in support of the appeal. 
To establish eligibility for the nonimmigrant L-1 visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, within three years preceding the beneficiary's 
application for admission into the United States, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue 
rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, 
executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the alien 
are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
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(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment abroad 
with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of the petition. 
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended services in 
the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the same work which 
the alien performed abroad. 
The issue in the present matter is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary will be employed 
by the United States entity in a specialized knowledge capacity as required by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 
5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1184(c)(2)(B), provides the following: 
For purposes of section lOl(a)(lS)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
The petitioner submitted the nonirnmigrant petition on June 2, 2003. In a May 19, 2003 letter submitted with 
the petition, the petitioner described the proposed United States position: 
[The petitioner] desires to employ [the beneficiary] on an as-needed basis as Project Engineer 
to perform specialized engineering and development services in connection with the design, 
development, configuration, installation, testing and debugging of the Paper Automation 
process control technology designed by [the petitioner's group]. [The beneficiary] will use his 
knowledge of the . . .proprietary process control technology as applied in the pulp and paper 
environment to determine the type and scope of process control achievable within a mill and 
will modify, implement and evaluate the control strategy. Specific job duties include 
configuration, commissioning, start-up, maintenance, servicing, and testing our patented 
proprietary systems. [The beneficiary] will play a pivotal role in system start-up and 
installation at the customer site, including configuration and testing of our sophisticated 
systems, and he will also provide high-level engineering assistance in connection with plant 
shut-down activities that may occur within our U.S. customer base. 
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With respect to the beneficiary's qualifications, the petitioner provided the following explanation: 
[The beneficiary] is well-qualified to assume the specialized knowledge job position Project 
Engineer by virtue of his education and by virtue of his prior employment in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with our affiliate . . . in Canada. 
[The beneficiary] has been employed by [the foreign entity] since June 1999. [The 
beneficiary] currently serves as Project Engineer for our Canadian affiliate where his duties 
include installation and start-up of the DAMATIC product line, including commissioning, 
servicing, and testing. 
The petitioner's letter also included a description of its corporate group's technology and specific systems 
developed by its Paper Automation Group, including the DAMATIC System, Sentry System and Sensodec 
System. The petitioner explains that these systems comprise computer software, hardware and electronic 
instrumentation that interface manufacturing systems with process control systems to increase quality control 
and production efficiency. 
The director issued a request for evidence dated September 25, 2003, noting that the record did not 
demonstrate that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. The director referenced a 1994 INS (now 
CIS) memorandum as providing guidance in establishing that an alien possessed specialized knowledge, and 
noted that the beneficiary's knowledge must be shown to be different and advanced from the knowledge 
generally held within the industry. Memorandum from James A. Puleo, Acting Associate Commissioner, 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge, CO 214L-P (March 9, 
1994). The director requested that the petitioner submit "evidence that the beneficiary's knowledge is 
uncommon, noteworthy or distinguished by some unusual quality and not generally known by practitioners in 
the field." The director also noted that the beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner's processes and 
procedures must be more than the basic or elementary knowledge possessed by others in the field. The 
director also noted that the petitioner must show that employment of the beneficiary or someone with 
equivalent knowledge is critical to the petitioner's proprietary interests, noting that L-1B classification does 
not extend to persons whose general knowledge and expertise enable them to merely produce a product or 
provide a service. 
In response the petitioner submitted an affidavit from the U.S. entity's engineering manager which addresses 
the director's concerns. The petitioner stated that the affidavit will describe how the beneficiary's duties with 
regard to start-up and installation of the company's proprietary systems "are qualitatively different from the 
duties that could be performed by any other engineer." The petitioner included short descriptions of its 
DAMATIC, Sentry and Sensodec systems which were provided in its previous letter, and emphasized the 
proprietary nature of the systems. With respect to the beneficiary's qualifications the petitioner provides, in 
part: 
10. [The beneficiary] has trained on. . .specialized process control systems and possesses 
specialized knowledge of [the petitioner's group's] proprietary property, in particular its 
patented DAMATICDNAPaperIQ product lines, which knowledge is not available to 
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[the petitioner] through conventional sources in the United States. [The beneficiary] is 
also an expert in quality control matters. 
11. [The petitioner] and its affiliate in Canada currently employ a total of 19 full-time 
engineers, 8 of them at its U.S. facility in Atlanta, Georgia and 11 at the Canadian 
affiliate location in Toronto. Of these full-time hires, 6 of them (4 in Canada and 2 in the 
US) had [experience with the petitioner's group] prior to starting as a full-time employee 
with either [the petitioner] or [the foreign entity], either through co-op work terms or at 
another . . . office. The remaining 13 were hired from the local labor market. 
12. Those engineers hired from the local labor market serve as 'regular engineers' with 
responsibility to specify, configure, test and install our. . . control systems. 
13. [The beneficiary's] job duties differ in that he is highly specialized in process control and 
[the group's] quality controls, and he possesses significant paper mill experience and 
knowledge that is essential for him to lead [the petitioner's] more complex projects and 
perform highly specialized tasks that the general engineers would not be able to do (e.g. 
develop a customized control from scratch, or tune a highly complex control). 
14. In order to obtain this specialized knowledge, in addition to [the beneficiary's] work 
experience with [the Canadian entity], it was necessary for him to also complete 
additional training courses on [the petitioner's group's] patented paper automation 
systems in order to be qualified for this particular position. 
15. Customers who purchase [the petitioner's] proprietary products must complete training 
courses in order to learn how to run the equipment, including courses on engineering and 
operator training, but in general [the petitioner's] customers never attain the level of 
expertise that [the beneficiary] and our other project engineers have, and [the petitioner] 
often gets demand service calls for engineering support and for system expansion. 
16. [The beneficiary] serves as both a trainer for [the petitioner's] client customers and also 
as an engineer who provides critical field service in emergency situations. [The 
beneficiary's] specialized services are critical to [the petitioner] and its customers as a 
problem involving [the petitioner's] proprietary products can result in a customer 
needing to shut down the plant for a period of time, resulting in losses from $100,000 to 
$500,000 per hour, depending on the client's production rate. [The petitioner] sells and 
services high speed paper machines where efficiency and uptime are crucial, and it is 
essential that Project Engineers have years of specialized process and system knowledge 
to be able to respond immediately to a customer problem. 
17. Because of his more than four years of experience with the installation, technical support, 
diagnosis, and troubleshooting of the complex problems and issues that arise in 
connection with [the petitioner's] sophisticated proprietary automation systems, in 
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particular its patented DAMATIC and Sensodec systems, [the beneficiary] does in fact 
possess the required specialized knowledge and performs specialized engineering and 
development services in connection with [the petitioner's] paper automation process 
control technology that are crucial to [the petitioner] and it [sic] clients. 
The petitioner also submitted evidence to establish that the petitioner and its parent and affiliated companies 
hold over 1,000 patents for products and systems used in the pulp and paper industries, including four patents 
specific to its DAMATIC product line. In addition, the petitioner submitted sample training manuals and 
course descriptions, explaining that the petitioner's project engineers are required to successfully complete 
numerous specialized courses to work on the company's DAMATIC, Sensodec and metsoDNA products and 
systems. 
Counsel claimed that the evidence submitted established that: (1) the petitioner and its affiliated companies 
hold patents for their proprietary systems; (2) the petitioner and its affiliates have developed practices to 
ensure that they can expertly install, test and maintain their system at client sites and provide expert repair 
services; (3) that the petitioner's and affiliates' employees must complete additional training courses specific 
to each of their proprietary systems; and, (4) the beneficiary has completed these courses and thus "has 
acquired knowledge that is uncommon, noteworthy and distinguished from other members of the engineering 
field as well as from other engineering employees of Petitioner who are not trained on these particular 
systems and equipment for which the Petitioner and its affiliates hold patents." 
In a decision dated March 29, 2004, the director determined that the petitioner did not establish that the 
proposed "duties warrant the expertise of someone possessing truly specialized knowledge" or that 
knowledge of the company's methods "is indicative of advanced knowledge." The director specifically 
observed that most of the petitioner's engineers were hired without prior experience with the company. The 
director noted that the duties performed by the beneficiary are not different from any other project engineer 
within the company's paper automation group and the evidence submitted does not establish that he has a 
level of knowledge that constitutes "specialized knowledge." Consequently, the director denied the petition. 
Counsel filed an appeal on May 3, 2004 stating that the director applied an incorrect standard that is contrary 
to the regulations and guidance subsequently provided by CIS policy memoranda regarding the interpretation 
of specialized knowledge. Counsel specifically noted that no test of the United States labor market is required 
in the analysis of a beneficiary's specialized knowledge qualifications, and that the director erred in denying 
the petition based, in part, on the fact that the petitioner and the foreign entity had hired project engineers 
from the local labor market. Counsel asserts that the director failed to consider evidence submitted which 
differentiates the beneficiary's duties from those of the company's "regular engineers." Counsel reviews the 
evidence previously submitted and states that the petitioner has established all specialized knowledge 
qualifications as outlined in a 2002 CIS memorandum. See Memorandum of Fujie S. Ohata, Associate 
Commissioner, Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge, HQSCOPS 7016.1 (December 22, 2002). 
Specifically, counsel concludes (i) the beneficiary's knowledge is uncommon, noteworthy or distinguished by 
some unusual quality and generally unknown; (ii) the beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner's products is 
apart from the elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others; and, (iii) the beneficiary's job duties 
involve knowledge or expertise beyond what is commonly held or is beyond the ordinary in the field. 
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Upon review, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary would be employed by the United 
States entity in a specialized knowledge capacity. 
In examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's 
description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed description 
of the services to be performed sufficient to establish specialized knowledge. Id. 
Here, although the petitioner has provided a list of job duties to be performed by the beneficiary in the 
position of project engineer, the petitioner has not documented the beneficiary's claimed specialized 
knowledge. The petitioner repeatedly refers to specialized training completed by the beneficiary, particularly 
in DAMADIC and Sensodec systems, and suggests that such training is narrowly available within the 
company. The petitioner states that, by completing such training, the beneficiary is an "expert" in such 
systems, and asserts that such knowledge is required to perform the duties of the position offered in the 
United States. In support of this statement, the petitioner submits course descriptions and training manuals for 
courses encompassing various products and systems developed and deployed by the petitioner and its 
Canadian affiliate. However, the petitioner has neither provided documentary evidence, such as course 
completion certificates, to establish that the beneficiary actually completed any training courses within the 
petitioner's organization, nor has it identified the specific courses required to perform the proposed duties in 
the United States. Nor has the petitioner provided a list of specific projects to which the beneficiary has been 
assigned or any other documentation to evidence his hands-on experience with these systems. The only 
documentation of the beneficiary's qualifications contained in the record is a photocopy of the beneficiary's 
university diploma. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes 
of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Sofici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) 
(citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Cornm. 1972)). 
When analyzing whether a beneficiary's knowledge rises to the level of specialized, it is also appropriate for 
the AAO to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the beneficiary's knowledge of 
the business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making process. Matter of Colley, 18 
I&N Dec. 117, 120 (Cornrn. 1981) (citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 618 (R.C. 1970) and Matter of 
LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. 816 (R.C. 1971)).' As stated by the Commissioner in Matter of Penner, when 
considering whether the beneficiaries possessed specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions 
did not find that the occupations inherently qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." 18 I&N 
1 Although the cited precedents pre-date the current statutory definition of "specialized knowledge," the AAO 
finds them instructive. As will be discussed, other than deleting the former requirement that specialized 
knowledge had to be "proprietary," IMMACT 1990 did not significantly alter the definition of "specialized 
knowledge" from the prior INS interpretation of the term. The Committee Report simply states that the 
Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of "[vlarying [i.e., not specifically incorrect] 
interpretations by INS," H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I) at 69, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. Beyond that, the 
Committee Report simply restates the tautology that became section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Id. The AAO 
concludes, therefore, that the cited cases, as well as Matter of Penner, remain useful guidance concerning the 
intended scope of the "specialized knowledge" L-1B classification. 
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Dec. at 52. Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that 
of a slulled worker. Id. The Commissioner also provided the following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or her to 
produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed primarily 
for his ability to carry out a key process or function which is important or essential to the 
business' operation. 
Id. at 53. In the present matter, the evidence of record demonstrates that the beneficiary is more akin to an 
employee whose skills and experience enable him to provide a specialized service, rather than an employee 
who has unusual duties, skills or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. 
It should also be noted that the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the AAO to make 
comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The term "specialized knowledge" 
is not an absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed in 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 
"[slimply put, specialized knowledge is a relative . . . idea which cannot have a plain meaning." 745 F. Supp. 
9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990). The Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended for "key 
personnel." See generally, H.R. Rep. No. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key personnel denotes 
a position within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." Webster's 11 New College 
Dictionavy 605 (Hougton Mifflin Co. 2001). In general, all employees can reasonably be considered 
"important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic success of 
an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. An employee of "crucial 
importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average employee. Accordingly, 
based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record related to that term, the AAO 
must make comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge employee and the general labor 
market, but also between that employee and the remainder of the petitioner's workforce. 
The 1994 Immigration and Naturalization Service memorandum referenced previously also allows CIS to 
compare the beneficiary's knowledge to the general United States labor market and the petitioner's workforce 
in order to distinguish between specialized and general knowledge. The Associate Commissioner notes in the 
memorandum that "officers adjudicating petitions involving specialized knowledge must ensure that the 
knowledge possessed by the beneficiary is not general knowledge held commonly throughout the industry but 
that it is truly specialized." Memorandum from James A. Puleo, Acting Associate Commissioner, 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge, CO 214L-P (March 9, 
1994). A comparison of the beneficiary's knowledge to the knowledge possessed by others in the field is 
therefore necessary in order to determine the level of the beneficiary's skills and knowledge and to ascertain 
whether the beneficiary's knowledge is advanced. In other words, absent an outside group to which to 
compare the beneficiary's knowledge, CIS would not be able to "ensure that the knowledge possessed by the 
beneficiary is not general knowledge held commonly throughout the industry but that it is truly specialized." 
Id. The analysis for specialized knowledge therefore requires an examination of the knowledge in context of 
the foreign and United States labor market, but does not consider whether workers are available in the United 
States to perform the beneficiary's job duties. 
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In this case, the petitioner has established that its products are proprietary and thus distinguishes the 
beneficiary's knowledge from that generally known in the industry. The petitioner also attempts to distinguish 
the beneficiary's knowledge of the company's products as specialized, i.e., noteworthy or uncommon, or 
advanced within the petitioner's organization. The petitioner has failed to do so. Based on the record of 
proceeding, it appears that the petitioner and its Canadian affiliate are both engaged in the design, 
development, implementation and support of the same proprietary paper automation control systems. The 
petitioner has not successfully differentiated the beneficiary's knowledge from that of other engineers 
employed within the petitioner's or its affiliate's paper automation group. The petitioner asserted that it 
employs nineteen engineers in the paper automation groups in the United States and Canada, including 13 
who were hired from the local labor market. The petitioner states that the other six engineers had experience 
with the petitioner's group prior to starting as full-time employees, through "co-ops" or through another office 
within the group. The petitioner further explained that the engineers hired from local labor markets are 
"regular engineers" who are responsible for specifying, configuring, testing and installing the petitioner's 
systems. The petitioner has provided no additional evidence, such as company job descriptions outlining the 
duties and requirements for these purportedly differently classes of engineering positions, or described the 
qualifications of other engineers within its paper automation groups in the United States and Canada. Going 
on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of 
proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. 
The petitioner presumably does not include the beneficiary among its "regular engineers" and claims that he 
"is highly specialized in process control and [the petitioner's] quality controls," which enables him to "lead 
more complex projects" and perform "highly specialized tasks that the general engineers would not be able to 
do." However, the petitioner has submitted no evidence to establish that the beneficiary was not one of its 
"local labor market" hires. The petitioner indicated that he joined the Canadian company as a project 
engineer in June 1999, but has provided no information regarding his professional background prior to that 
date. The beneficiary's diploma indicates that he graduated from the University of Waterloo in June 1999. 
Based on the record, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary is among the group of six engineers 
tasked with more complex assignments that might involve specialized or advanced knowledge. 
The petitioner also asserts that its "general engineers" have not received the specialized training in the 
company's proprietary products that is possessed by the beneficiary. The petitioner states that this training is 
not available "from conventional sources" in the United States and that it is not available to "general 
engineering employees," explaining that "an engineer is required to have completed additional training 
courses on the patented paper automation systems in order to be qualified for this particular position." These 
assertions are not persuasive for several reasons. First, as discussed above, the petitioner has provided no 
documentary evidence that the beneficiary has actually completed any training courses with the petitioner. 
Second, the course descriptions provided clearly state that the training classes are offered in "both the Atlanta 
and Toronto Training Centers," which directly contradicts the petitioner's statement that the training 
completed by the beneficiary is not available in the United States. Finally, based on the petitioner's 
representations, the AAO is expected to accept that training in the petitioner's systems is somehow 
unavailable to the company's "general engineers." However, it is simply not plausible that these courses are 
only available to the small select group of employees who are differentiated as having more advanced 
knowledge of the petitioner's systems. Each course appears to be only three to eight days long, and the AAO 
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assumes, and it has not been proven otherwise, that any similarly employed engineer in the company could 
progress, and most likely would be expected to progress, through the company's training program. If CIS 
fails to believe that a fact stated in the petition is true, CIS may reject that fact. Section 204(b) of the Act, 8 
U.S.C. § 1154(b); see also Anetekhai v. I.N.S., 876 F.2d 121 8, 1220 (5th Cir. 1989); Lu-Ann Bakery Shop, Inc. 
v. Nelson, 705 F. Supp. 7, 10 (D.D.C. 1988); Systronics Corp. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001). 
As noted in the 1994 memorandum cited by the petitioner: 
[Tlhe mere fact that a petitioner alleges that an alien's knowledge is somehow different does 
not, in and of itself, establish that the alien possesses specialized knowledge. The petitioner 
bears the burden of establishing through the submission of probative evidence that the alien's 
knowledge is uncommon, noteworthy, or distinguished by some unusual quality and not 
generally known by practitioners in the alien's field of endeavor. Likewise, a petitioner's 
assertion that the alien possesses an advanced level of knowledge of the processes and 
procedures of the company must be supported by evidence describing and setting apart that 
knowledge from the elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others. It is the weight and 
type of evidence which establishes whether or not the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge. 
Memorandum from James A. Puleo, Acting Associate Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge, CO 214L-P (March 9, 1994). Based on the minimal 
evidence submitted to establish the beneficiary's claimed specialized knowledge, and the failure to 
differentiate through submission of evidence the beneficiary's knowledge from that of other similarly 
employed engineers within the company, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary's knowledge 
can be considered truly "specialized Nor has the petitioner established that the beneficiary's knowledge is 
"advanced" such that it can be distinguished from the elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others 
within the petitioner's organization. Accordingly, the beneficiary may not be considered "key personnel." 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756 Inc. v. Attorney General, 745, F. Supp. 9, 16 (D.D.C. 1990). Based on the evidence 
presented, it is concluded that the beneficiary will not be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity in the 
United States. For this reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 3 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
director's decision will be affirmed and the petition will be denied. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.