dismissed L-1B Case: Recycling Services

~dentifyhq $nil deld to 
prevent dearly unwamt9d 
invasion of pe-1 privacy 
PUBLIC COPY 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm. A3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
File: WAC-04-1 77-52994 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: JUL 1 1 2006 
IN RE: Petitioner: 
Beneficiary: 
Petition: Petition p for a Nonimrnigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1 101 (a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
Administrative Appeals Office 
WAC-04-1 77-52994 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonirnrnigrant petition seeking to qualify the employment of its retail recycling 
specialist as an L-1B nonimmigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 101 (a)(] 5)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a corporation 
organized under the laws oft 
 and is engaged in retail recycling services. The petitioner 
claims that it is the affiliate of 
 de Mexico, located in Tijuana, Mexico. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish that the beneficiary will be 
employed in the United States in a specialized knowledge capacity. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the precedents 
cited by Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) were misapplied and that the position in the United 
States qualifies as a specialized knowledge position. In support of this assertion, the petitioner submits 
additional evidence. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101 (a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of ths section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
WAC-04-1 77-52994 
Page 3 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The issue to be discussed in the present matter is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary's 
position in the United States will involve specialized knowledge as required by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 3 
214.2(1)(3)(ii), and whether the beneficiary was employed abroad in a capacity that utilized such specialized 
knowledge as required by 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3)(ii). 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 11 84(c)(2)(B), provides the following: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines specialized knowledge as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes or procedures. 
In the initial petition, the petitioner described the beneficiary's job duties as follows: 
The [rletail [rlecycling [slpecialist is responsible for inspecting and training the employees of 
retail stores and recycling centers regarding [petitioner's] specific mechanical systems and 
processes, as well as ensuring compliance with recycling law and regulations. He must also 
register and train beverage manufacturers and distributors on program aspects and monitor 
their program-related transactions. 
He will conduct regular audits of client recycling activities, map the locations of convenience 
zones and recyclers, and conduct research studies, analyzing data and developing reports to 
determine various recycling rates, aid enforcement efforts, and improving [the petitioner's] 
program refinement. The [rletail [rlecycling [slpecialist is also responsible for utilizing his 
specialized expertise to expand [the petitioner's] market for recycled content products. 
On June 10, 2004, the director requested additional evidence. Specifically the director requested copies of 
organizational charts, lists of foreign national employees and their immigration status, as well as a more 
detailed articulation of how the beneficiary's duties abroad are different from other employees within the 
petitioner and within this particular industry. 
In response, counsel submitted a letter and additional documents. The petitioner resubmitted the initial 
description and added the following description to the beneficiary's duties: 
WAC-04-1 77-52994 
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The duties performed abroad and in the U.S. by [beneficiary] have been and will be unique 
and more advanced due to the complex combination of knowledge required to implement [the 
petitioner's] policies and procedures concerning implementation/integration of its recycling 
systerns/processes into large client locations (e.g. Home Depot). 
On July 7, 2004, the director denied the petition. The director determined that the position did not require a 
person with specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner subsequently appealed. 
 On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director 
misapplied precedent and that the beneficiary's position requires specialized knowledge. 
In examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's 
description of the job duties and the weight of the evidence supporting any asserted specialized knowledge. 
See 8 C.F.R. 4 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed description of the services to be 
performed sufficient to establish specialized knowledge. Id. It is also appropriate for the AAO to then look 
beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the beneficiary's knowledge of the business's 
product or service, management operations, or decision-making process. A specific occupation will not 
inherently qualify a beneficiary as possessing specialized knowledge. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. 1 17, 120 
(Comrn. 198 l)(citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 61 8 (R.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. 
816 (R.C. 1971)).' 
In making a determination as to whether or not knowledge possessed by a beneficiary is special or advanced 
the AAO relies on the statute and regulations, prior precedent decisions, and legislative history. This yields a 
multiple pronged analysis to determine whether the petitioner has employed and will employ the beneficiary 
in a specialized knowledge capacity. In examining whether an alien has "special knowledge" of the 
petitioner's product and its application in international markets or an "advanced level" of knowledge of its 
processes and procedures, the AAO will consider whether the beneficiary: 1) is part of the petitioner's "key 
personnel" (See generally, H.R. Rep. No. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750); 2) is more than a specialist or a 
skilled employee (Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 50 (Comm. 1982)); 3) has knowledge that qualifies as 
"special" under the plain meaning of the term; 4) performs a key process or finction for the petitioner (See 
Matter of Penner, id.); and 5) possesses certain characteristics that have been deemed to be illustrative of 
1 
Although the cited precedents pre-date the current statutory definition of "specialized knowledge," the AAO 
finds them instructive. Other than deleting the former requirement that specialized knowledge had to be 
"proprietary," the 1990 Act did not significantly alter the definition of "specialized knowledge" from the prior 
INS regulation or precedent decisions interpreting the term. The Committee Report simply states that the 
Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of "[vlarying [i.e., not specifically incorrect] 
interpretations by INS," H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(1), at 69, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. Beyond that, the 
Committee Report simply restates the tautology that became section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Id. The AAO 
concludes, therefore, that the cited cases, as well as Matter of Penner, remain useful guidance concerning the 
intended scope of the "specialized knowledge" L-1B classification. 
WAC-04-1 77-52994 
Page 5 
specialized knowledge (see Memo, James A. Puleo, Acting Executive Associate Commissioner, 
Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge, March 9, 1994). 
The alien should possess a type of special or advanced knowledge that is different from that generally found 
in the particular industry. Where the alien has special knowledge of the company product, the knowledge 
must be noteworthy or uncommon. Where the alien has knowledge of company processes and procedures, 
the knowledge must be advanced. The petitioner must also establish that the alien has such specific 
knowledge of the employer's product or processes that it would be burdensome, or counterproductive to the 
petitioner's business plan to hire someone other than the alien to fill this position in the United States. See 
generally, Memorandum of Fujie Ohata, "Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge for Chefs and Specialty 
Cooks seeking L-1B Status" (September 9,2004). 
An important characteristic of a beneficiary with specialized knowledge is that they are more than skilled 
employees. In Matter of Penner, the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of the 
specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. at 49. The decision noted that the 1970 House Report, H.R. 
No. 91-851, stated that the number of admissions under the L-1 classification "will not be large" and that 
"[tlhe class of persons eligible for such nonimmigrant visas is narrowly drawn." Id. at 5 1. During the course 
of the sub-committee hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically questioned witnesses on the level of skill 
necessary to qualify under the proposed "L" category. In response to the Chairman's questions various 
witnesses responded that they understood the legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts," 
individuals with "unique" skills, and that it would not include "lower categories" of workers or "skilled craft 
workers." Matter of Penner, id. at 50 (citing H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Cornrn., Immigration Act of 
1970: Hearings on H.R. 445,9lSt Cong. 210,218,223,240,248 (November 12, 1969)). 
Although counsel refers to the beneficiary as an expert by virtue of the beneficiary's experience with the 
petitioner's business procedures and products, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary is more 
than a skilled or experienced employee. In order to receive this classification, the claimed specialized 
knowledge has to be examined in the context of those in the particular industry and within the petitioning 
entity itself to such a degree that the employee would qualify as key or crucial with an uncommon or 
noteworthy knowledge.2 The petitioner has asserted that the beneficiary has worked for an affiliate of the 
2 
 The Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended for "key personnel." See 
generally, H.R. Rep. No. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key personnel" denotes a position 
within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." Webster's I1 New College Dictionary 605 
(Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). In general, all employees can reasonably be considered "important" to a 
petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic success of an enterprise, 
there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. An employee of "crucial importance" or 
"key personnel" must rise above the level of an average employee. Accordingly, based on the definition of 
"specialized knowledge" and the congressional record related to that term, the AAO must make comparisons 
not only between the claimed specialized knowledge employee and the general labor market, but also between 
that employee and the remainder of the petitioner's workforce such that the beneficiary's knowledge is relative 
to the petition at bar. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F. Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990)(concluding that 
specialized knowledge is a relative determination). 
WAC-04-1 77-52994 
Page 6 
petitioner since 1999, and has an advanced knowledge of their processes and procedures. In attempting to 
ascertain any distinction among this petitioner's processes and procedures with others within the industry the 
only relevant articulation in the record is an assertion by the petitioner in response to the director's RFE 
which states: 
[The petitioner] is an international industrial recycling company, specializing in turn key 
programs for all solid non hazardous by-products . . . The company's primary market is in 
large industrial operations. . . . This involves a different approach for the services provided. 
Thus, it cannot be determined what the petitioner does which is different from routine industry procedure, and 
why the beneficiary's knowledge of this procedure could be considered specialized. Without such a 
distinction it cannot be determined that the beneficiary's position here in the United States requires more than 
a skilled employee. The position itself has not been distinguished such that it would require more than just a 
similarly situated employee within the industry. The AAO can take judicial notice of the fact that the 
petitioner is not the only company processing or recycling industrial waste, but without a distinction as to why 
this particularly beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner's processes or procedures rises above the basic 
knowledge that any similarly situated employee would have, it cannot be determined that his knowledge is 
advanced. 
Based on the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's duties, and the failure to distinguish those duties 
among other employees in the petitioner and with the particular industry, the AAO must conclude that the 
beneficiary has been performing functions that are common and routine in the retail recycling industry and 
thus not advanced. The sales materials submitted by the petitioner are not probative as to the why this 
beneficiary's knowledge rises above the skill typically found in the industry at this level. Nor is such sales 
material or the beneficiary's resume demonstrative of the beneficiary's status as a "high-level" worker or 
"expert," as claimed by counsel. While the petitioner has submitted sales documentation which explains the 
type of service offered, retail recycling, it does not articulate how or why this petitioner's method of operation 
is significantly different from procedures used by other businesses within the retail recycling industry. 
Without an articulation of the beneficiary's particular skill, or this petitioner's particular method of operation, 
relative to the petitioners' other employees or to the market as a whole, the AAO can not determine whether 
the beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner's processes is "an advanced level of knowledge of processes and 
procedures of the company." See section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. 
At the heart of this petitioner's failure to demonstrate eligibility is the failure to adequately articulate and 
support a distinction between the duties that will be performed by the beneficiary with those which would be 
performed by similarly situated employees throughout the industry. On appeal counsel for petitioner has cited 
an internal CIS memo and asserts that it supercedes established precedent. Counsel asserts that the director's 
referral to established precedent as a misapplication of law because the in the cases cited the petitions were 
approved. Each individual petition is a separate record of proceeding which is required to meet its own 
burden of proof. Thus, the holding in particular precedent decision may not be as relevant to a petition at bar 
as its reasoning which was used in reaching that decision. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F. Supp. at 
15 (concluding that specialized knowledge is relative determination). Barring a similarity of fact patterns the 
reasoning of a precedent decision serves to inform current CIS policy with regard to this classification more 
WAC-04-177-52994 
Page 7 
than whether that particular decision was approved or denied. In addition, internal memos are for guidance 
only. These memos have not been through the notice and comment procedure required for establishing 
regulations, and thus do not supercede statute, regulation or established precedent decisions. They are not 
intended to create any right, substantive or procedural, in any form or manner. 
Counsel's assertions that the director misapplied precedent is not probative of whether the position in the 
United States involves the application of specialized knowledge. The petitioner asserts that the beneficiary's 
experience abroad has given the beneficiary a specialized knowledge which will be applied in the U.S. 
position. This is not the same, however, as saying that the position itself requires specialized knowledge, and 
without an articulation of why the foreign organization's processes and procedures are significantly different 
this assertion relies on a presumption which is not supported by the record. Moreover, while counsel asserts 
that the cited precedent decisions in fact support the instant petition, counsel's conclusion appears to be based 
solely on the final determination in each case, i.e., approval of the classification sought. Regardless, for 
counsel to make such a claim, the burden remains on counsel to furnish evidence that the facts of the instant 
petition are analogous to those in the precedent decisions. Here, counsel has not met that burden. 
Another characteristic of a beneficiary with specialized knowledge is that they possess knowledge that meets 
the plain meaning of special. Special is defined as "surpassing the usual; distinct among others of a kind; 
peculiar to a specific person or thing." Webster's I1 New College Dictionary, 2001, Houghton Mifflin. See 
also Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 2001 (defining special as "distinguished by some unusual 
quality; uncommon; noteworthy"). In this case the petitioner is asserting that the beneficiary has an advanced 
knowledge of the company's process or procedure such that the knowledge is specialized and required for the 
U.S. position. 
An additional characteristic of a beneficiary with specialized knowledge is that he or she typically carries out 
key processes or functions. As stated by the Commissioner in Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 52, the 
beneficiaries were considered to have specialized knowledge if they had unusual duties, skills, or knowledge 
beyond that of a skilled worker. Id. The Commissioner also provided the following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or her to 
produce a product through physical or slulled labor and the person who is employed primarily 
for his ability to carry out a key process or function which is important or essential to the 
business' operation. 
Id. at 53. 
On appeal counsel for petitioner has asserted that the beneficiary will be performing a key process or 
function, but the record does not support this assertion. In a letter dated June 25, 2004, counsel for petitioner 
asserts that the beneficiary will have "full responsibility for the company's retail recycling program," a 
position heretofore unfilled by one person, and claims that because these duties are necessary for the 
petitioner's operation they are a key process or function. This confuses the basic economic rationale for 
hiring an employee - the need to fill a position - with the ability of an intracompany transferee to perform a 
key process or function. Counsel stated that until now other employees of the petitioner have been 
WAC-04-1 77-52994 
Page 8 
performing this function in an ad hoc manner, but this nonetheless indicates that the ability to perform the 
duties of the position are not peculiar to this beneficiary. In addition, a distinction can be made between a 
person who can perform duties through physical or skilled labor, and a person who is employed in a position 
because of uncommon or noteworthy skills peculiar to them. 
The record falls short of supporting eligibility on this issue because the petitioner has failed to indicate why 
the processes or procedures employed by the petitioner are significantly distinguishable such that the 
beneficiary's knowledge of them are uncommon or noteworthy and peculiar to him. The failure of the 
petitioner to articulate and support any distinction in its procedures, and the failure of the petitioner to 
persuasively assert that this beneficiary is being hired to specifically to perform a key process or function, as 
opposed to filling a new position generated by the expansion of business, tips the weight of the evidence in 
the record so that it appears more likely than not the position which the beneficiary is to fill does not require 
specialized knowledge. The petitioner has not persuasively asserted that this beneficiary's knowledge is 
advanced in relation to other employees working for the petitioner. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F. 
Supp. at 15 (concluding that specialized knowledge is relative determination). 
Moreover, in what appears to be part of a claim that the beneficiary applies specialized knowledge in 
international markets, the petitioner states that "the beneficiary ensures "compliance with recycling laws and 
regulations." Counsel on appeal further claims that the beneficiary is "thoroughly familiar with Mexican and 
U.S. recycling laws and regulations" and indicates that this knowledge was gained through "managing a 
number of high profile international accounts in Mexico, including Samsung and Coca-Cola." Counsel and 
the petitioner fail to explain with any specificity, however , whether the beneficiary was dealing solely with 
the operations of these components in Mexico or whether he was responsible for recycling operations of these 
companies in the United States as well. Regardless, these claims have not been supported in any way through 
corroborating evidence. Therefore, it appears more likely that the beneficiary only handled recycling 
operations for these companies in Mexico and, as such, the claim that the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge of U.S. recycling laws and regulations is not credible. If CIS fails to believe that a fact stated in 
the petition is true, CIS may reject that fact. Section 204(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1154(b); see also 
Anetekhai v. I.N.S., 876 F.2d 1218, 1220 (5th Cir.1989); Lu-Ann Bakery Shop, Inc. v. Nelson, 705 F. Supp. 7, 
10 (D.D.C. 1988); Systronics Corp. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001). Furthermore, even assuming 
arguendo that the U.S. position was considered a specialized knowledge position, lacking knowledge of U.S. 
recycling laws and regulations, which appears to be central to the proffered position, the beneficiary does not 
possess the necessary knowledge to fill the position. For this additional reason, the petition may not be 
approved. 
Finally, the agency has interpreted "specialized knowledge" to find that a qualified beneficiary should possess 
certain characteristics. In a 1994 memo written by James A. Puleo, Acting Executive Associate 
Commissioner, on the subject of "Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge," the legacy INS offered the 
following possible characteristics of an alien who possesses specialized knowledge: 
Possesses knowledge that is valuable to the employer's competitiveness in the market place; 
WAC-04-177-52994 
Page 9 
Is qualified to contribute to the United States employer's knowledge of foreign operating 
conditions as a result of special knowledge not generally found in the industry; 
Has been utilized abroad in a capacity involving significant assignments which have 
enhanced the employer's productivity, competitiveness, image, or financial position; 
Possesses knowledge which, normally, can be gained only through prior experience with that 
employer; 
Possesses knowledge of a product or process, which cannot be easily transferred or taught to 
another individual. 
The Associate Commissioner also stated: 
From a practical point of view, the mere fact that a petitioner alleges that an alien's 
knowledge is somehow different does not, in and of itself, establish that the alien possesses 
specialized knowledge. The petitioner bears the burden of establishing through the 
submission of probative evidence that the alien's knowledge is uncommon, noteworthy, or 
distinguished by some unusual quality and not generally known by practitioners in the alien's 
field of endeavor. 
Id. 
 In a subsequent memorandum, the Associate Commissioner later added that "[all1 companies are 
different, and it can generally be expected that no two companies will employ the same procedures. Standing 
alone, however, an alien's knowledge of minor variations in style or manner of operations cannot be 
considered specialized." Legacy INS memo, HQSCOPS, 7016.1, "Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge" 
(December 20,2002). 
In this case the petitioner has asserted that the beneficiary meets several of these criteria. However, the AAO 
is not persuaded by the petitioner's assertions because the petitioner has not articulated any significant 
distinction in the foreign organization's procedures, nor has it articulated why the particular processes and 
procedures utilized abroad are even relevant to this particular industry within the United States. In the context 
of the commissioner's interpretation of specialized knowledge the beneficiary's experience or familiarity with 
the foreign organization's manner of operations does not, standing alone, establish his knowledge is 
specialized or an advance knowledge of the petitioner's product or service. Further, without an articulated 
and supported distinction of significant differences in the petitioner's service from others within this 
particular industry, the record is not clear as to why this beneficiary's knowledge of foreign operating 
conditions is relevant here in the United States. 
Overall, the mere fact that counsel for the petitioner states again and again that the beneficiary possesses 
special and advanced knowledge does not make it so. Without documentary evidence to support the claim, 
the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The unsupported assertions of 
counsel do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter of 
Laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). 
WAC-04- 177-52994 
Page 10 
Here, the petitioner and counsel fail to explain with specificity and corroborating evidence how the 
knowledge of the beneficiary is special or advanced and how the proffered position requires such specialized 
knowledge. 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, supra at 16. Based on the evidence presented, it is concluded 
that the beneficiary was not employed abroad, and will not be employed in the future, in a specialized 
knowledge capacity. Nor has it been established that the beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner's business 
procedures is advanced, despite the fact that only two other employees have received the training that serves 
as the basis of a distinction from other employees of the petitioner. 
On review, counsel has not demonstrated that the beneficiary possesses "specialized knowledge" as defined in 
section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 184(c)(2)(B), and the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D), 
nor has counsel demonstrated that beneficiary would be employed in a capacity utilizing any such specialized 
knowledge as required by 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). 
In visa proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
director's decision will be affirmed and the petition will be denied. 
ORDER: The appeal is denied.