dismissed L-1B Case: Restaurant

identify@ &B B.kted 
prevent cksty unanrated 
tnvasian dpmmd @VCY 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rrn. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
File: EAC 06 247 51455 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date: APR 0 3 2008 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. fj 1 101(a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
Robert 
Administrative Appeals Office 
EAC 06 247 5 1455 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant visa petition seeking to extend the employment of the beneficiary as a 
meat cutter, known also as a churrasqueiro, as an L-1B nonimmigrant intracompany transferee having 
specialized lcnowledge pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 
U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a limited liability company organized under the laws of the State 
of Florida and allegedly operates Brazilian style steakhouses. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish (1) that the beneficiary will be 
employed in the United States in a position involving specialized knowledge; or (2) that the beneficiary has 
been employed abroad in a position involving specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel asserts that the beneficiary has specialized 
knowledge of Brazilian meat selection, preparation, cutting, and serving. 
To establish eligibility under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the petitioner must meet certain criteria. 
Specifically, within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, a 
firm, corporation, or other legal entity, or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof, must have employed the 
beneficiary for one continuous year. Furthermore, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States 
temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof 
in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, inchding a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies hirnlher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
EAC 06 247 5 1455 
Page 3 
The primary issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary has been or 
will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity and whether the beneficiary has specialized knowledge 
as defined in the Act and the regulations. 8 C.F.R. $8 214.2(1)(3)(ii) and (iv). 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1184(c)(2)(B), provides: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
The petitioner described the beneficiary's duties abroad, and proposed duties in the United States, in the Form 
1-129 as "[clut and trim portions of meat according to the type of meat, prepare the meat and serve to patrons 
applying knowledge in Brazilian 'Rodizio' and company's standards and its specifics [sic] meat cutting, 
preparing and serving techniques." 
On October 1 1,2006, the director requested additional evidence. The director requested, inter alia, evidence 
that the beneficiary has advanced knowledge, which is uncommon, noteworthy, or distinguished by some 
unusual quality, and not generally known by others in the beneficiary's field of endeavor, or that his 
knowledge distinguishes him from those with only elementary or basic knowledge; a statement discussing the 
type of training (both formal education and in-house training) required to adequately perform the duties of the 
proffered position; and evidence addressing the manner in which the beneficiary gained his claimed 
specialized knowledge. 
In response, counsel submitted a letter on December 28, 2006 in which he describes the beneficiary's claimed 
specialized knowledge. Counsel asserts the following: 
With regards to your inquiry about the specialized knowledge, please note that the petitioner 
is a Brazilian style steakhouse. The type of meat, the way the meat is cut and served, the 
preparation, seasoning, are all very unique and related to a culture that is over a century old in 
Southern Brazil. 
What is special and unique about the petitioner is that their employees must have special 
knowledge and training in different brands and cuts of meat, cutting the meat in a way that is 
unique to Brazilian style steakhouse culture which is more than 100 years old. To prepare the 
meat in accordance with strict cultural standards, seasoning the product, are all special 
EAC 06 247 5 1455 
Page 4 
knowledge only found in Brazil. 
The meat cutters, or gauchos are a mix of cooks and waiters due to the fact that they have to 
have knowledge in how to properly select the type of meat to be used. Then they must know 
how to properly cut the meat in a certain angle and manner that preserves the desired 
tenderness of the meat during the grilling process. 
The gauchos will have to watch the meat from time to time while serving the pieces that are 
ready to be served in special tools. The meat cutters then must know how to properly cut 
those pieces in slices applying a special and traditional technique to avoid waste of meat and 
the loss of the flavor and tenderness. 
The whole process of selecting the meat, preparing and seasoning and the grilling and serving 
techniques must be adequate to assure the success of the restaurant. A Brazilian style 
steakhouse must serve Brazilian churrasco the same way they do in Brazil, otherwise they 
would just be another generic steakhouse. 
A generic American steakhouse serves grilled meat in the American way which is completely 
different from the Brazilian churrasco. Therefore, local workers without the specialized 
knowledge would not be able to work for a Brazilian style steakhouse since they would 
compromise parts or the whole process of selecting, preparing and serving the meat according 
to the Brazilian style rodizio. And by not preserving the regional tradition and techniques, 
the petitioner would fatally lose customers to the other competing Brazilian style steakhouses 
in the area. 
Counsel also submitted a letter dated July 22, 2003 from another attorney, . Mr. 
describes the beneficiary's training and acquisition of the claimed specialized knowledge as follows: 
There are no classes to teach how to prepare and service "rotisserie gnll" in Brazil. 
Brazilians know how to prepare and serve "rotisserie grill" because they are raised by doing 
that. This expertise is passed along from generation to generation. 
And yet, it takes no formal training to learn how to prepare and serve "rotisserie grill" in the 
Brazilian style. Nevertheless, the "churrasqueiros " and gauchos (GAUCHOS) must be raised 
in a Brazilian family, having "rotisserie grill" while watching soccer games every weekend to 
know exactly what to do. The "rotisserie grill" is a strong feature of the Brazilian culture. 
On March 26, 2007, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that "[tlhe record does not 
establish that the beneficiary has been or will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity." 
On appeal, counsel to the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge of Brazilian meat 
EAC 06 247 5 1455 
Page 5 
selection, preparation, cutting, and serving. 
 Specifically, counsel argues that gauchos are "exhaustively 
trained" and "have acquired many years of practical experience in a unique type of work." 
Upon review, the petitioner's assertions are not persuasive in demonstrating that the beneficiary has been or 
will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity as defined at 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). 
As a threshold matter, it is noted that the record is devoid of evidence addressing the beneficiary's claimed 
specialized knowledge. The only documents in the record addressing the beneficiary's claimed specialized 
knowledge are letters from two attorneys and an appellate brief, neither of which is supported by any 
evidence. Without documentary evidence to support the claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the 
petitioner's burden of proof. The unsupported assertions of counsel, either in support of the petition or on 
appeal, do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter of 
Laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Matter ofRamirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503,506 (BIA 1980); INSv. 
Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 188-89 n.6 (1984). Accordingly, as the record is devoid of evidence addressing 
the beneficiary's claimed specialized knowledge, the petition will be denied for this reason. Failure to submit 
requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 
$ 103.2@)(14). Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of 
meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) 
(citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
Regardless, even considering counsels' unsubstantiated descriptions of the beneficiary's claimed specialized 
knowledge, the record fails to establish that the beneficiary has been or will be employed in a specialized 
knowledge capacity. In examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look 
to the petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8.C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(3). The petitioner must submit a 
detailed job description of the services that were and will be performed sufficient to establish that he has 
specialized knowledge. 
Although the petitioner repeatedly asserts that the beneficiary's position abroad and in the United States 
requires "specialized knowledge" and that the beneficiary had been and will be employed abroad in a 
"specialized knowledge" capacity, the petitioner has not adequately articulated any basis to support this claim. 
The petitioner has failed to identify any special or advanced body of knowledge which would distinguish the 
beneficiary's role from that of other similarly experienced gauchos employed by the petitioning organization 
or in the industry at large. Once again, going on record without documentary evidence is not sufficient for 
purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165 (citing 
Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190). Specifics are clearly an important indication of 
whether a beneficiary's duties involve specialized knowledge; otherwise, meeting the definitions would 
simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. See Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724, F. Supp. 1103 
(E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905, F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
The petitioner describes the beneficiary as having specialized knowledge of Brazilian meat selection, 
preparation, cutting, and serving. However, the petitioner never explains what, exactly, distinguishes the 
meat selection, preparation, cutting, and serving duties to be performed by the beneficiary in the petitioner's 
steakhouses from those techniques employed by workers in other restaurants serving meat or, crucially, why 
EAC 06 247 51455 
Page 6 
the knowledge of Brazilian style meat selection, preparation, cutting, and serving is noteworthy, uncommon, 
or distinguished by some unusual quality that is not generally known by other experienced meat preparers in 
general. It appears that all meat preparers must select, prepare, cut, season, and serve meat, and it is unclear 
why the Brazilian style would be of such complexity that this knowledge could not be imparted to a similarly 
experienced steakhouse worker. While counsel asserts that gauchos such as the beneficiary are "exhaustively 
trained" and "have acquired many years of practical experience in a unique type of work," the record fails to 
establish what kind of "exhaustive" training a gaucho receives or how long this training and practical 
experience must last in order to impart the claimed specialized knowledge to a "generic" steakhouse 
employee. In fact, prior counsel admits that there are no classes on how to prepare and serve "rotisserie grill" 
and states, without submitting any supporting evidence, that only a person who has been "raised in a Brazilian 
family, having 'rotisserie grill' while watching soccer games every weekend [will] know exactly what to do." 
Counsels' assertions are simply not persuasive. 
Finally, even if the petitioner could establish that the beneficiary's knowledge of Brazilian meat selection, 
cutting, preparation, and serving constitutes "specialized knowledge" in the United States, the petitioner has 
failed to establish that the beneficiary was employed in a specialized knowledge capacity in Brazil. 
According to counsel, Brazil is the source of the claimed specialized knowledge in meat selection, cutting, 
preparation, and serving. While counsel argues on appeal that "merely being Brazilian does not qualify 
someone to perform the duties of the gauchos without the proper experience and training," counsel again fails 
to specifically describe the nature and length of training and practical experience necessary to impart the 
claimed specialized knowledge to gauchos working in Brazil. Once again, going on record without 
documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. 
Matter of Sofici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165 (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190). 
The AAO does not dispute the possibility that the beneficiary is a skilled and experienced employee who has 
been, and would be, a valuable asset to the petitioning organization. However, it is appropriate for the AAO 
to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the beneficiary's knowledge of the 
business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making process. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N 
Dec. 1 17, 120 (Cornrn. 198 1) (citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 61 8(R.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 
13 I&N Dec. 816 (R.C. 1971)). As stated by the Commissioner in Matter of Penner, when considering 
whether the beneficiaries possessed specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find 
that the occupations inherently qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." 18 I&N Dec. at 52. 
Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled 
worker. Id. The Commissioner also provided the following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or her to 
produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed primarily 
for his ability to cany out a key process or function which is important or essential to the 
business firm's operation. 
Id. at 53. 
It should be noted that the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the AAO to make 
EAC 06 247 5 145 5 
Page 7 
comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The term "specialized knowledge" 
is not an absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed in 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 
"[slimply put, specialized knowledge is a relative . . . idea which cannot have a plain meaning." 745 F. Supp. 
9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990). The Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended for "key 
personnel." See generally, H.R. REP. NO. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key personnel" 
denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." Webster's I1 New College 
Dictionary 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). In general, all employees can reasonably be considered 
"important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic success of 
an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. An employee of "crucial 
importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average employee. Accordingly, 
based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record related to that term, the AAO 
must make comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge employee and the general labor 
market, but also between the employee and the remainder of the petitioner's workforce. While it may be 
correct to say that the beneficiary in the instant case is a highly skilled and productive employee, this fact 
alone is not enough to bring the beneficiary to the level of "key personnel." 
Moreover, in Matter of Penner, the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of the 
specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comm. 1982). The decision noted that the 1970 House 
Report, H.R. REP. NO. 91-851, stated that the number of admissions under the L-1 classification "will not be 
large" and that "[tlhe class of persons eligible for such nonimmigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be 
carefully regulated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id. at 5 1. The decision further noted that 
the House Report was silent on the subject of specialized knowledge, but that during the course of the sub- 
committee hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary 
to qualify under the proposed "L" category. In response to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses 
responded that they understood the legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts," individuals with 
"unique" skills, and that it would not include "lower categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." Matter 
of Penner, 18 I&N at 50 (citing H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration Act of 1970: Hearings 
on H.R. 445,91" Cong. 210,218,223,240,248 (November 12, 1969)). 
Reviewing the Congressional record, the Commissioner concluded in Matter of Penner that an expansive 
reading of the specialized knowledge provision, such that it would include skilled workers and technicians, is 
not warranted. The Commissioner emphasized that the specialized knowledge worker classification was not 
intended for "all employees with any level of specialized knowledge." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 53. 
Or, as noted in Matter of Colley, "[m]ost employees today are specialists and have been trained and given 
specialized knowledge. However, in view of the House Report, it can not be concluded that all employees 
with specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
intracompany transferees." 18 I&N Dec. at 119. According to Matter of Penner, "[s]uch a conclusion would 
permit extremely large numbers of persons to qualify for the 'L-1 ' visa" rather than the "key personnel" that 
Congress specifically intended. 18 I&N Dec. at 53; see also 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F. Supp. at 
15 (concluding that Congress did not intend for the specialized knowledge capacity to extend to all employees 
with specialized knowledge, but rather to "key personnel" and "executives.") 
A 1994 Immigration and Naturalization Service (now Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS)) 
EAC 06 247 51455 
Page 8 
memorandum written by the then Acting Executive Associate Commissioner also directs CIS to compare the 
beneficiary's knowledge to the general United States labor market and the petitioner's workforce in order to 
distinguish between specialized and general knowledge. The Executive Associate Commissioner notes in the 
memorandum that "officers adjudicating petitions involving specialized knowledge must ensure that the 
knowledge possessed by the beneficiary is not general knowledge held commonly throughout the industry but 
that it is truly specialized." Memorandum from James A. Puleo, Acting Executive Associate Commissioner, 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge, CO 214L-P (March 9, 
1994). A comparison of the beneficiary's knowledge to the knowledge possessed by others in the field is 
therefore necessary in order to determine the level of the beneficiary's skills and knowledge and to ascertain 
whether the beneficiary's knowledge is advanced. In other words, absent an outside group to which to 
compare the beneficiary's knowledge, CIS would not be able to "ensure that the knowledge possessed by the 
beneficiary is truly specialized." Id. The analysis for specialized knowledge therefore requires a test of the 
knowledge possessed by the United States labor market, but does not consider whether workers are available 
in the United States to perform the beneficiary's job duties. 
As explained above, the record does not distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge as more advanced than the 
knowledge possessed by other people employed by the petitioning organization or by meat cutters employed 
elsewhere. As the petitioner has failed to document any materially unique qualities to the beneficiary's 
knowledge, the petitioner's claims are not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary, while perhaps highly 
skilled, would be a "key" employee. There is no indication that the beneficiary has any knowledge that 
exceeds that of any other similarly experienced meat cutters or that he has received special training in the 
company's methodologies or processes which would separate him from other workers employed with the 
foreign entity or elsewhere. It is simply not reasonable to classify this employee as a key employee of crucial 
importance to the organization. 
Finally, as correctly noted by the director, a 2004 CIS memorandum written by the then Director of Service 
Center Operations indicates that "chefs and specialty cooks" are generally not considered to have specialized 
knowledge for L-1B purposes even if they have knowledge of a restaurant's "food preparation techniques." 
Memorandum from Fujie 0. Ohata, Director Service Center Operations, Citizenship and Immigration 
Services, Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge for Specialty Chefs and Specialty Cooks Seeking L-1B 
Status, (September 9, 2004). Despite counsel's claim on appeal that this memorandum does not apply to 
gauchos, it is clear that gauchos, as cutters and preparers of meat, fall squarely within the purview of the 
memorandum. The memorandum concludes that a petitioner seeking to classify a chef or specialty cook as an 
intracompany transferee having specialized knowledge must establish that the worker's knowledge is 
uncommon and cannot be "easily or rapidly acquired, but is gained from significant experience or in-house 
training." Id. at 4. This conclusion is not dissimilar from earlier guidance addressing "specialized 
knowledge" more generally. See supra. As noted above, the record fails to establish both that the claimed 
meat cutting and serving knowledge is uncommon and that this knowledge is gained from significant 
experience or training. Accordingly, the 2004 memorandum cited above is both instructive and relevant to 
this matter, and the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary has been or will be employed in a 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The legislative history of the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
EAC 06 247 5 1455 
Page 9 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, supra at 16. Based on the evidence presented, it is concluded 
that the beneficiary was not employed abroad, and will not be employed in the Untied States, in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge. For this reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner failed to establish that it has a qualifying relationship with 
the foreign entity. 
To establish a "qualifying relationship" under the Act and the regulations, the petitioner must show that the 
beneficiary's foreign employer and the proposed United States employer are the same employer (i.e., one 
entity with "branch" offices), or related as a "parent and subsidiary" or as "affiliates." See generally section 
lOl(a)(lS)(L) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1). If one individual owns a majority interest in the petitioner and 
the foreign employer, and controls those entities, then the entities will be deemed to be "affiliates" under the 
definition. 8 C.F.R. 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(L). The petitioner must also establish that both it and the foreign 
employer are "doing business." "Doing business" is defined as the "regular, systematic, and continuous 
provision of goods andlor services." 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(H). 
In this matter, the petitioner asserts in the L Classification Supplement to Form 1-129 that "M & R Com de 
Alimentos controls [the petitioner]." However, the record is devoid of evidence supporting this assertion. 
On October 24, 2007, the AAO issued a Notice of Consideration of Derogatory Information pursuant to 8 
C.F.R. 9 103.2(a)(16)(i). The AAO noted the following: 
[Tlhe petitioner's corporate records on file with the Florida Department of State appear to 
contradict [the petitioner's assertion that it is owned and controlled by the foreign employer]. 
First, the corporate records for the petitioner beginning in 2003 indicate that the members of 
the etitioner a limited liability company, are and with 
being designated as the managing member. Second, on April 23, 2007, the 
petitioner filed Articles of Amendment to its Articles of Organization indicating that = 
- was removed as a member and that the managing member of the limited liability 
company was changed and is now which is similar to what the petitioner 
asserted in its Florida annual report filed on March 15,2007. 
Given these corporate filings, it appears (1) that M & R Comercio de Alimentos, Ltda. has 
never owned and controlled the petitioner; and (2) that, even if the petitioner could establish 
that it had a qualifying relationship with M & R Comercio de Alimentos, Ltda. at the time the 
instant petition was filed on August 31, 2006, this qualifying relationship was terminated 
once the petitioner's membership, and thus its ownership and control, changed on or about 
April 23,2007. 
In response, counsel submitted a letter dated November 19, 2007 in which he asserts that both the petitioner 
and the foreign employer were purchased by . In support, the petitioner submitted a 
EAC 06 247 5 1455 
Page 10 
translation of 
 ating that 
 now owns a 90% interest in the foreign 
and 
 now owns a 10% interest. The contract also indicates that Ms. 
is responsible for the administration of the business and "that in the event of sale or alienation of the 
immobilized active of the firm, the signatures of all partners will be utilized." 
Upon review, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the petitioner and the foreign employer are 
qualifying organizations for several reasons. 
First, as noted above, the petitioner clearly claims in the Form 1-129 to be owned and controlled by the 
foreign employer. However, the record also contains evidence, such as the petitioner's corporate filings, 
indicating that the petitioner has claimed to be owned and controlled by. The petitioner does 
not attempt to clarjfy this fundamental inconsistency in the record, which undermines its claim to be a 
qualifying organization, even though the AAO noted the discrepancy in its Notice of Consideration of 
Derogatory Information. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by 
independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice 
unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 
I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). Therefore, the AAO is unable to discern the petitioner's ownership and 
control at the time the petition was filed, and the petition may not be approved for that reason. 
Second, the petitioner has also failed to establish that either it or the foreign employer is currently doing 
business. The record is devoid of evidence of current business activity by either entity. Once again, going on 
record without documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these 
proceedings. Matter of Sofici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165 (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N 
Dec. 190). 
Third, even if the foreign entity's purported 2007 change in ownership were relevant to a petition filed in 
2006, the evidence submitted by counsel in response to the AAO's Notice of Consideration of Derogatory 
Information is not ersuasive in establishing that both the petitioner and the foreign employer are now owned 
and controlled by w. As noted above, while the Brazilian contract submitted by counsel 
owns a 90% interest in the foreign employer, the contract also indicates 
that 
 , the owner of a 10% interest, is responsible for the administration of the 
business and "that in the event of sale or alienation of the immobilized active of the firm, the signatures of all 
partners will be utilized." Therefore, it appears that control over the foreign employer has been ceded to Ms. 
and that the legal right and authority to direct the establishment, management, and operations of the 
oreign employer is disproportionally shared with the minority stockholder. The record does not establish that 
f 
the petitioner and the foreign employer share common control. 
 See Matter of Church Scientology 
International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 595 (BIA 1988). Furthermore, the Brazilian contract described above is not 
alone persuasive in establishing that a 90% interest in the foreign employer has been sold to - 
The record is devoid of evidence establishing that paid for this interest. The record also does not 
contain copies of any stock certificates, ledgers, or other objective evidence establishing that ownership has 
truly been transferred to 
m- 
Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to establish that it has a qualifying relationship with the foreign entity, 
EAC 06 247 51455 
Page 11 
and the petition may not be approved for this additional reason. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), affd, 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can 
succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's 
enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
appeal will be dismissed. 
Finally, CIS records indicate that the instant petitioner has also filed petitions for numerous other 
intracompany transferees. In view of the above, the director is directed to review the previously approved or 
pending petitions listed below filed pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1101(a)(15)(L), 
or section 203(b)(l)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1153(b)(l)(C), for possible revocation under 8 C.F.R. $ 
214.2(1)(9) or 8 C.F.R. $ 205.2, as appropriate. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
FURTHER ORDERED: 
 The director shall review the following L-1 nonimmigrant petitions, and 
immigrant petitions for multinational executives or managers, approved on 
behalf of the petitioner for possible revocation pursuant to 8 C.F.R. $ 
214.2(1)(9) or 8 C.F.R. 5 205.2: 
EAC 07 236 51913 
EAC 07 236 5 1848 
EAC 07 236 5 175 1 
EAC 07 233 51834 
EAC 07 233 5 1783 
EAC 07 233 5 1726 
SRC 07 222 50659 
EAC 07 180 52284 
LIN 06 167 5 1 724 (I- 140) 
EAC 06 239 50233 
EAC 06 239 50250 
EAC 06 160 50919 
EAC 06 219 52313 
LIN 06 151 53185 (1-140) 
EAC 06 239 50191 
EAC 06 199 53764 
EAC 06 163 52541 
SRC 05 163 51178 
EAC 06 199 53750 
LIN 06 151 52145 (1-140) 
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SRC 06 162 5 1977 
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EAC 06 199 53725 
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