dismissed L-1B Case: Restaurant

PUBLIC COPY 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Mass. Ave. N.W. Rm. A3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
FILE: LIN 05 026 51008 Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER Date: SEP 0 8 2006 
PETITION: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 
 1101(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
------- - - - - 
./* 
hbert P. Wiemann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
LIN 05 026 5 1008 
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DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner is engaged in the operation of Brazilian churrasco-style restaurants. It seeks to temporarily 
employ the beneficiary as a Churrasqueiro, or gaucho chef, and filed a petition to classify the beneficiary as a 
nonimmigrant intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge. The director determined that the 
petitioner had established neither that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge nor that the intended 
employment required specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion, and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel submits a brief and asserts that the 
petitioner has met its burden of proof by establishing that the proposed position requires specialized 
knowledge. Counsel further asserts that the director misconstrued relevant evidence of the beneficiary's 
specialized knowledge of the petitioner's processes and procedures. 
To establish L-1 eligibility, the petitioner must meet the criteria outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 9 1101(a)(15)(L). Specifically, within three years 
preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, a qualifying organization must 
have employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized 
knowledge capacity, for one continuous year. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United 
States temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate 
thereof in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himlher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
This matter presents two related, but distinct, issues: (1) whether the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge; and, (2) whether the proposed employment is in a capacity that requires specialized knowledge. 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. fj 1184(c)(2)(B), provides the following: 
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For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application 
in international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
As stated above, the petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary temporarily in the United States as a gaucho 
chef, which is generally translated into English as a barbeque chef. The petitioner's restaurant endeavors to 
provide its customers with an authentic taste of Southern Brazil and its cultures, requiring its gaucho chefs to 
not only cook meats to order but also be well versed in cultural facts and storytelling. 
In support of the petitioner's contention that the proposed position in the United States involves specialized 
knowledge, counsel submitted a number of documents with the initial petition in support of the beneficiary's 
qualifications, including a letter from the petitioner dated November 3, 2004. The letter explained that 
gaucho-chefs go through a rigorous two-year training process regarding the preparation of meat and the 
serving of churrasco style cooking. The petitioner claimed that as a result, the knowledge and training of a 
gaucho chef is completely different than that of similarly qualified employees of a typical American 
steakhouse, and specifically noted that the beneficiary had learned the petitioner's confidential recipes as a 
result thereof. With regard to the beneficiary's proposed position in the United States, the petitioner stated: 
As Gaucho-Chef, [the beneficiary] will be central to the functionality of [the petitioner]. He 
will prepare and cook the meat, operate the churrasqueira (grill), in addition to appearing to 
the customer and serving the meat. Specifically, [the beneficiary] will: 
Follow [the petitioner's] secret recipes based on the type of food to be 
prepared and apply personal knowledge and experience in food preparation 
Supervise personnel engaged in assisting in the preparation and cooking of 
meats 
Cook or otherwise prepare food according to recipe 
Cut, trim and bone meats and poultry for cooking 
Portion cooked foods 
Carve meats 
Appear to the Customer in traditional Gaucho costume and serve meat 
according to established company methods 
Estimate food consumption 
Requisition or purchase foodstuffs 
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Receive and examine foodstuffs and supplies to ensure quality and quantity 
meet established standards and specifications 
The petitioner concluded by stating that the beneficiary received extensive knowledge and training of the 
company's processes and procedures as a result of his five and one-half years working as a gaucho-chef for 
the foreign entity in Brazil. 
With regard to its training program for gaucho chefs, the petitioner indicated that four months, or 480 hours, 
of training was mandatory. The petitioner contended that during this time, the beneficiary was trained in 
three principle areas, namely, the preparation of meats and marinades, the operation of the chunasqueira 
(pll), and production and proper handling. After this initial training, the beneficiary entered a six-month 
period of practical training, which was followed by a one-year apprentice period. The petitioner concluded 
that overall, the training totaled close to two years from start to finish. 
In a letter dated November 10, 2004, the director requested additional evidence. Specifically, the director 
cited a September 9, 2004 memorandum by Fujie Ohata, Director of Service Center Operations, which 
clarified that chefs or specialty cooks were generally not considered to have specialized knowledge for L-1B 
purposes, although they may in fact have knowledge of a restaurant's special recipes or food preparation 
techniques. The director requested evidence to refute the premise that another chef in the industry could not 
master the petitioner's techniques within a reasonable period of time. 
In a response dated January 31, 2005, the petitioner provided an abundance of documentary evidence in 
support of the contention that the beneficiary, as a gaucho chef, was distinguishable from general chefs who 
were the subject of the cited service memorandum. The petitioner contended that the beneficiary underwent a 
"lengthy and structured training program," and contended that the petitioner's "particular style of cooking is 
ancient and has subtle nuances to it that must be learned." 
In addition, the petitioner submits an expert opinion b 
 Chef Instructor at the Illinois 
Institute of Art-Chicago, dated January 11,2005. Upon r 
 aining manual, he stated: 
It is of my professional opinion that the highly specialized duties of Gaucho-Chefs are not 
something that could be easily duplicated in the United States using local personnel. . . . Just 
trying to train a local chef engaged in meat preparation on the handling and cooking of the 
meat, as well as monitoring the open-flame charcoal pits, would be an immensely 
overwhelming task to take on, requiring many months of specialized training. 
An additional opinion b: 
Hospitality Programs at 
petitioner's contentions. In! 
[The petitioner's] Gaucho-Chefs are extensively trained in the restaurant's operations. The 
business will not succeed without a sufficient supply of trained Gaucho-Chefs. Why are these 
positions critical? Fundamental to the restaurant industry is the fact that the value added by 
personnel is the critical indicator of restaurant success. Untrained or improperly trained 
personnel will lead to wastage, lost inventory, and loss of guests. The Gaucho-Chefs are 
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trained in food production and cooking similar to American Steak houses, but much more 
than food production. 
 Butchery is also extensively taught and applied. 
 Cooking using 
extremely large coal fired grills is taught. Table service of a unique nature is taught and 
applied. The resulting skill set is unique to [the petitioner's] steak houses. The nearly 2-year 
training program for Gaucho-Chefs at [the petitioner's] Steakhouses is highly customized. 
The director determined that the record did not establish employment of the beneficiary in a position that 
requires specialized knowledge, nor did it establish that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. 
Specifically, the director noted that the petitioner failed to address the question posed in the request for 
evidence, which specifically asked why another chef in the industry with similar meat preparation and 
butchery skills would not be able to learn the essentials of gaucho training in a similar period. The director 
further noted that the petitioner's expert opinions did not clarify why it would take a long period of time for 
another chef to become similarly trained in this industry. Furthermore, the director noted that upon review of 
the expert reports, the petitioner's goal of providing an authentic experience to customers in the field of 
Southern Brazilian cuisine and heritage did not render its chefs, who are required to cook in the churrasca 
style, employees with specialized knowledge of the petitioner's processes. 
Counsel submits a lengthy brief on appeal in support of the petitioner's assertions that the beneficiary 
possesses specialized knowledge, and that the intended employment requires specialized knowledge. 
Counsel addresses each of the director's points individually, and seeks to overcome the basis of the director's 
denial by arguing that the director's reliance on the Ohata memorandum and the examples contained therein 
resulted in a misconstruing of the evidence and statements mentioned by all experts in determining the 
beneficiary's qualifications. Counsel argues that the director should have focused on the evidence which 
contends that the gaucho chefs are the key employees of the petitioner, and their existence and continued 
presence is critical to the petitioner's success. 
Counsel further refers to the 1994 Associate Commissioner's memorandum and the 2002 and 2005 
memoranda of the Director of Service Center Operations, and asserts that the beneficiary possesses 
knowledge of a product or process which cannot be easily transferred or taught to another individual, which is 
a characteristic of specialized knowledge according to the memorandum. See Memo. from James A. Puleo, 
Acting Exec. Assoc. Commr., Office of Operations, Immigration and Naturalization Serv., to All Dist. Dir. et 
al., Interpretation of Special Knowledge, 1-2 (March 9, 1994) (copy on file with Am. Immig. Law Assn.); 
Memo. from Fujie Ohata, Director of Service Center Operations, Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge 
(Dec. 20, 2002), Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge for Chefs and Specialty Cooks Seeking L-1B Status 
(Sept. 9,2004). 
On review, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge or that the intended position in the United States requires specialized knowledge. 
When examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. fj 214.2(1)(3)(ii). As required in the regulations, the 
petitioner must submit a detailed description of the services to be performed sufficient to establish specialized 
knowledge. Id. 
In the present matter, the petitioner has provided ample description of the beneficiary's intended employment in 
U.S. entity, and his responsibilities as a gaucho chef. Specifically, the petitioner, through statements from 
experts in the hospitality industry, has stated that the main functions of the beneficiary's proposed position are 
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three-fold: 
 (1) culinary duties, including butchering, preparing, and coolung meats; (2) service functions, 
including serving tables and engaging customers; and (3) dramaturgy, involving the serving of food to customers 
in a dramatic and theatrical manner, resulting in a memorable experience for the customer. The petitioner, 
however, has not sufficiently documented how the beneficiary's performance of the proposed job duties 
distinguishes his knowledge as specialized. The petitioner repeatedly states throughout the record that the 
beneficiary has noteworthy and in-depth knowledge of the foreign entity's and the petitioner's operational 
process, and in particular its confidential and secret recipes, and that his role in the petitioner's restaurant is 
consequently a key role that no similarly qualified chef in the United States could perform. The petitioner 
further asserts that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge as a result of his five and one-half years 
of work experience in the foreign company and his successful completion of the required two years of 
training to become a gaucho chef. While training has been discussed in detail in the record, it is noted that no 
documentation confirming the beneficiary's completion of such training is contained in the record. 
Nevertheless, a review of the petitioner's statements and the statements of the experts raises the question of 
whether the beneficiary's qualifications are so unique and specialized that similar knowledge could not be 
imparted to an American worker without undue economic hardship to the petitioner. As discussed by the 
director in the denial, there is no documentary evidence that definitively indicates that an American worker, 
meeting all of the petitioner's requirements as an ideal candidate for gaucho chef, would be refused employment 
with the petitioner's U.S. entity. In fact, the petitioner appears to have disregarded the director's request for 
clarification on this issue entirely. 
With this established, the AAO can next look to the training requirements of the beneficiary's proposed position. 
It appears from the evidence submitted that the two-year training period for a gaucho chef with the petitioner 
starts with the implementation of basic skills, and once initial training is completed, the hands-on training is the 
result of a one year apprenticeship. The AAO finds this policy confusing, particularly in light of the claims of 
counsel and the petitioner that no other chefs similarly trained in the industry could perform the duties of the 
beneficiary or of gaucho chefs in general. Counsel further claims that to forego the transfer of employees from 
the foreign parent and instead train American chefs or similarly slulled workers to fill the gaucho chef positions 
at the petitioner's restaurants would result in undue economic hardshp to the petitioner, thus obviating the 
guidance set forth in the 2004 Ohata memorandum. The AAO disagrees. The petitioner indicates that even if a 
new employee has worked in the industry previously, he must still undergo the petitioner's exclusive training. 
What then, if anything, prohibits an American employee from undergoing the same procedures? The petitioner 
has failed to discuss why the cost of on-the-job training for an American worker in one of its U.S. restaurants 
would result in financial hardship, since it is evident from the evidence provided that the petitioner employs 
many gaucho chefs throughout its various U.S. locations. Going on record without supporting documentary 
evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 
22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. 
Comm. 1972)). The petitioner has failed to adequately show that it would be financially burdened by training 
American employees in any of its U.S. locations in lieu of transferring employees from its parent in Brazil, 
particularly since much of the training is on the job. Alternatively, the petitioner has also failed to establish that it 
would be more of a financial hardship to train and transfer workers from its parent in Brazil than to send U.S. 
workers to Brazil for training. 
It is also appropriate for the AAO to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the 
beneficiary's knowledge of the business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making 
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process. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. 1 17, 120 (Comm. 1981) (citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 61 8 
(R.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. 816 (R.C. 1971)).' As stated by the Commissioner in 
Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 52 (Comm. 1982), when considering whether the beneficiaries possessed 
specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find that the occupations inherently 
qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have 
unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. Id. The Commissioner also provided 
the following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or her to 
produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed primarily 
for his ability to cany out a key process or function which is important or essential to the 
business' operation. 
Id. at 53. In the present matter, the evidence of record demonstrates that the beneficiary is more akin to an 
employee whose skills and experience enable him to perform procurement duties, rather than an employee 
who has unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a slulled worker. 
It should be noted that the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the AAO to make 
comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The term "specialized 
knowledge" is not an absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed in 1756, Inc., "[slimply 
put, specialized knowledge is a relative . . . idea which cannot have a plain meaning." 745 F. Supp. at 15. 
The Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended for "key personnel." See 
generally, H.R. REP. No. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key personnel" denotes a position 
within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." Webster's 11 New College Dictionary 605 
(Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). In general, all employees can reasonably be considered "important" to a 
petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic success of an enterprise, 
there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. An employee of "crucial importance" or 
"key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average employee. Accordingly, based on the 
definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record related to that term, the AAO must make 
comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge employee and the general labor market, 
but also between that employee and the remainder of the petitioner's workforce. 
Here, the petitioner continually claims that the beneficiary is a key employee and is of crucial importance to 
the petitioner's industry. However, the petitioner has not provided any information pertaining to other 
gaucho chefs employed by the petitioner. Nor did the petitioner distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge, 
work experience, or training from the other employees. In fact, the record shows that the petitioner employs 
1 
 Although the cited precedents pre-date the current statutory definition of "specialized knowledge," the AAO 
finds them instructive. Other than deleting the former requirement that specialized knowledge had to be 
"proprietary," the 1990 Act did not significantly alter the definition of "specialized knowledge" from the 
prior INS interpretation of the term. The 1990 Committee Report does not reject, criticize, or even refer to 
any specific INS regulation or precedent decision interpreting the term. The Committee Report simply states 
that the Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of "[vlarying [i.e., not specifically 
incorrect] interpretations by INS," H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I), at 69, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. Beyond 
that, the Committee Report simply restates the tautology that became section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Id. 
The AAO concludes, therefore, the cited cases, as well as Matter of Penner, remain useful guidance 
concerning the intended scope of the "specialized knowledge" L-1B classification. 
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eighteen gaucho chefs in its multiple U.S. locations, all of whom work together as a team. Although the 
petitioner acknowledges that it does have competitors, it fails to reasonably distinguish the beneficiary from 
other "Americanized" gaucho chefs or steak house chefs working in the United States. The lack of evidence 
in the record makes it impossible to classify the beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner's operation and 
cooking process as specialized, particularly since there are so many competitors in the industry serving 
churrasca. The AAO, therefore, is precluded from finding that the beneficiary's role is "of crucial 
importance" to the organization. Neither the petitioner nor counsel provided any documentation or 
discussion of an organizational structure and process unique only to the petitioner and of which the 
beneficiary possessed expertise. Simply going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not 
sufficient for the purpose of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of 
California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972). While it may be correct to say that the beneficiary is a 
highly skilled and productive employee, this fact alone is not enough to bring the beneficiary to the level of 
"key personnel." 
It appears that the petitioner's business thrives on providing a feeling of authenticity to its customers. The 
AAO cannot ignore the fact that native Portuguese gauchos from Southern Brazil undoubtedly contribute to 
this authenticity. However, without clearly showing that the actual job of a gaucho chef could not be 
performed by a similarly qualified chef in the United States (for example, there are many Brazilian 
restaurants operating in the United States and therefore there are undoubtedly similarly qualified chefs 
employed therein), the fact that the petitioner desires to employ native "gauchos" from Southern Brazil is 
insufficient to qualify the beneficiary for an L-1B visa. While the beneficiary's ethnic background, slulls and 
knowledge may contribute to the successfulness of the petitioning organization, this factor, by itself, does not 
constitute the possession of specialized knowledge. 
The AAO notes that, with regard to counsel's reliance on the 1994 Associate Commissioner's memorandum, the 
memorandum was intended solely as a guide for employees and will not supersede the plain language of the 
statute or regulations. Although the memorandum may be useful as a statement of policy and as an aid in 
interpreting the law, it was intended to serve as guidance and merely reflects the writer's analysis of the issue. 
Therefore, while the beneficiary's contribution to the economic success of the corporation may be considered, 
the regulations specifically require that the beneficiary possess an "advanced level of knowledge" of the 
organization's process and procedures, or a "special knowledge" of the petitioner's product, service, research, 
equipment, techniques, or management. 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). As determined above, the beneficiary 
does not satisfy the requirements for possessing specialized knowledge. 
In the present matter, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary's training, work experience, or 
knowledge in the churrasca coolang style is more advanced than the knowledge possessed by others employed 
by the petitioner, or in the industry. It is clear that the petitioner considers the beneficiary to be an important 
employee of the organization. The AAO, likewise, does not dispute the fact that the beneficiary's knowledge has 
allowed him to competently perform his job in the foreign entity. However, the successful completion of one's 
job duties does not distinguish the beneficiary as "key personnel;" nor does it establish employment in a 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
Nor does the record establish that the proposed U.S. position requires specialized knowledge. While the 
position of gaucho chef may require a comprehensive knowledge of the manner in which to prepare and cook 
meats in the traditional barbeque style native to Southern Brazil, there is no documentation, other than 
counsel's assertions, that a gaucho chef must possess advanced, "specialized knowledge" as defined in the 
regulations and the Act. As previously stated, without documentary evidence to support the claim, the 
assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The unsupported assertions of counsel 
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do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. at 534; Matter of Laureano, 19 1&N Dec. 1; 
Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. at 506. 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. 
 See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, supra at 16. 
 Based on the evidence presented, it is 
concluded that the beneficiary does not possess specialized knowledge, nor would the beneficiary be 
employed in a capacity requiring specialized knowledge. For this reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the record contains insufficient evidence to establish that the overseas 
company employed the beneficiary in a specialized knowledge capacity. See 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3)(iv). For 
the reasons discussed above, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary's training, work experience, 
or knowledge in the field of churrasca is more advanced than the knowledge possessed by others employed by 
the petitioner, or in the industry itself in Brazil. While the position of gaucho chef may require a 
comprehensive knowledge of the manner in which to prepare and cook meats in the traditional barbeque style 
native to Southern Brazil, there is no documentation, other than counsel's assertions, that a gaucho chef must 
possess advanced, "specialized knowledge" as defined in the regulations and the Act. For this additional 
reason, the petition may not be approved. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), affd, 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a challenge only 
if she shows that the AAO abused it discretion with respect to all of the AAO's enumerated grounds. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043, afld, 345 F.3d 683. 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit 
sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1361. Here, that burden has 
not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.