dismissed L-1B Case: Restaurants

U.S. Department of Homeland Sfcurity 
20 Massachusetts Ave.. N.W.. Rm. A3042 
Washington, DC 20529 
File: SRC-03-22 1-50643 Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: 
IN RE: Petitioner: 
Beneficiary. 
Petition: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101 (a)(t 5)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
-=, c- 
Roberi P. Wiemann, 
4 Administrative Appeals office 
SRC-03-22 1-50643 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The matter 
is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to extend the status of the beneficiary as an L-I R 
nonimmigrant intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 101 (a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. $ 1101(a)(IS)(L). The petitioner is a corporation 
organized in the State of South Carolina that operates a chain of Japanese restaurants. The petitioner claims , I ,' 
that it is the subsidiary o- located in Tokyo. Japan. The petitioner now seeks to 
employ the beneficiary for an additional two year period as a Head Chef. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish that the beneficiary's position 
in the United States requires specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the petitioner 
has submitted "vast evidence and supporting documents . . . that overwhelmingly establish the beneficiary's 
employment as [an] intracompany transferee involving specialized knowledge." Counsel further asserts that 
the director erroneously relied on the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
in 17-56, Inc. v. Attorney General. 745 F. Supp. 9, IS (D.D.C. 1990). In support of these assertions, counsel 
submits a brief. 
'To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification. the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of ,the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101(a)(15)fL). Specifically, a qualifying 
organization must have employed the beneficiary in a qualifjting managerial or executive capacity, or in a 
specialized knowledge capacity, for one continuous year within the three years preceding the beneficiary's 
application for admission into the United States. In addition the beneficiary must seek to enter the United 
States temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate 
thereof in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3) states that an ind~vidual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (L)(I)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iir) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organizatiorr within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
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(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The issue in the present matter is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary's position in the 
United States will involve specialized knowledge as required by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(3)(ii). 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 3 11 84(c)(2)(B), provides the following: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines specialized knowledge as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes or procedures. 
With the initial petition Eled on August 8, 2003, in an attached letter the petitioner described the beneficiary's 
job duties as follows: 
[Thc beneficiary] has been working in our Spartanburg,.SC restaurant since December 2000 
as Head Chef. He is responsible for the entire kitchen management including preparation of 
menus and mixing and preparing the exclusive, secret and proprietary recipes. We use 
similar recipes in all of our restaurants in Florida, Tennessee, and South Carolina. [The 
beneficiary], who is one of the handful of our employees experienced in our cooking 
techniques and advanced level of expertise, brings his unique and specialized knowledge to 
our restaurant. This not only enhances our competitiveness in the Japanese restaurant 
business, but also in the dining marketplace due to the unique taste of our cuisine. 
and [the beneficiary's] knowledge surpasses the ordinary or usual knowledge of Japanese 
chefs. His expertise and specialized knowledge enables us to provide to the American public 
'> the exclusive and unique taste and cooking techniques of Japan's cuisine . . . . 
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We believe that [the beneficiary] is uniquely qualified and ideally suited for the responsibility 
of Head Chef in our Orlando, FL restaurant and to train key persons in the secret, exclusive 
and proprietary recipes and cooking techniques of our operation. 
On September 29, 2003, the director requested additional evidence, Specifically, the director requested the 
following: 
Provide the following evidence and any other documentation that you feel will present an 
accurate description of the product(s) your company uses. 
Explain, in more detail, exactly what is the equipment, system, product, technique, or 
service of which the beneficiary of this petition has specialized knowledge, and 
indicate if it is used or produced by other employers in the United States and abroad. 
train in^ Record: 
Provide the following evidence and any other documentation that you feel will present an 
accurate description of the training required for the position. 
Tndicate the minimum amount of time required to train an employee to fill the 
proffered position. Specify how many workers are similarly employed by your 
organization. Of these employees, please indicate 'now marry have received training 
comparable to the training administered to the beneficiary. 
Submit the beneficiary's resume. 
Organizational charts/ua~roll records: 
Provide the following evidence and any other documentation that you feel will present an 
accurate description of your organizational structure. 
Submit a copy of the U.S. company's organizational structui-e, and show the location 
af the beneficiary's current position in the organization's staffing pattern. 
Submit payroll records substantiating the information cbntained in these charts. 
In a response dated December 23, 2003, the petitioner submitted: (1) a letter from counsel addressing the 
director's requests; (2) the beneficiary's resume; (3) an organizational chart for the petitioner; (4) a copy of the 
petitioner's 2002 IRS Form 1120, U.S. Corporate Income Tax Return: (5) copies of the petitioner's state and 
federal quarterly tax filings; and (6) examples of payroll records. In his letter, counsel states the following: 
[The] Petitioner contends that the beneficiary's knowledge is uniquely different, is 
uncommon, surpasses the usual knowledge, is critical to the competitiveness of the business, 
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and to the very survival and profitability of its operation. This knowledge of the petitioner's 
exclusive proprietary recipes and techniques is not merely tended [sic] to enhance the quality 
of the business operation, but its absence will be a deterrent to function in this job and to 
compete in the marketplace. There is no gainsaying the fact that the chef is the heart and soul 
and the key person in a successful restaurant. 
These recipes and techniques are not used by any other employer or chefs except in the 
petitioner's restaurants in the United States and Japan. 
These recipes do not merely consist of ingredients, which are common to perhaps all 
Japanese cooking, but the techniques involved in preparing the entire meal. These techniques 
have been perfected over 25 years and are constantly.updated and improved in ,order to meet 
the changing food habits of Americans. 
Our recipes, several of which are unwritten and are disclosed to a handful of select chefs 
only, who sign a loyalty and secrecy oath, consist of techniques of mixing spices in a certain 
proportion, heating certain spices to a certain temperature, heating different ingredients for 
sauces at various temperatures before mixing, observing the color of seafood, determining its 
tenderness and optimum thickness. chilling different seafood sushimi [sic] items at certain 
temperatures before serving, akin to fine wines, to cite just a few examples. 
[The] Beneficiary continues to quaiify for the classification of an L-1B . . . because he has 
previously been found to so qualify for it . . . . 
[The] Petitioner believes that it takes a minimi~m of five years to learn the Japanese style of 
cooking including at least a year with ihe employer to learn the various techniques. The 
petitioner has been hampered in its availability to train chefs not only because of the problem 
of lack of availability of basic Japanese chefs here for training, or of retention but also 
because of the fear of disclosure of its recipes and techniques. 
There are 8 chefs similarly employed by the petitioner in its 5 locations; two each at 3 
locations, and one each in Spartartburg and Orlando locations; there are vacancies at each 
latter location for 1 more chef since each location requires 2 chefs and it is open for business 
for more than 70 hours per week. 
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Please note that all [head] chefs . . . have obtained training and experience in and have been 
transferred from the parent company's restaurant in Japan and have received a minimum of 
one year training in the techniques and recipes used by the organization, after they have had 
four or five years of experience as chef of Japanese cuisine. 
On January 9, 2004, the director denied the petition. The director determined that the petitioner did not 
establish that the beneficiary's position in the United States requires specialized knowledge. Specifically, the 
director stated the following: 
The petitioner has not furnished evidence sufficient to demonstrate that the beneficiary's 
duties involve knowledge or expertise beyond what is commonly held in his field. 
[Tlhe beneficiary has gone from a trainer here to build up a skilled labor force for the 
company to one of eight chefs managing the restaurants' kitchens. There is no evidence that 
the knowledge necessary to take over that position is different from the knowledge and skills 
commonly held by others in the culinary filed 
It is clear that any business coming to the U.S. would like to bring along some experienced 
personnel; however, because of the definition af specialized knowledge, and the restrictive 
nature of the L program as reaffirmed in [1?56], Inc. v. Attorney General, it is obvious that 
the intention of the L-1 B program sets a higher bar thail simply the desire for experienced 
personnel and puts the burden on the petitioner to prove that the employee being petitioned 
for meets the requirement of having knowledge that is different from that generally found in 
the industry. 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner has submitted "vast evidence and supporting documents . . . that 
overwhelmingly establish the beneficiary's employment as [an] intracompany transferee involving specialized 
knowledge." Counsel submits a lengthy brief discussing the beneficiary's position and the petitioner's need 
for an employee with specialized knowledge. As this document is part of the record, it will not be repeated in 
its entirety herein. In the brief, counsel cites numerous makers and correspondence to articulate the current 
definition of specialized knowledge, including: Matfer cfPenner, 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comm. 1982); Matter of 
Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 61 8 (R.C. 1970); Matter of LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. 816 (R.C. 1971); a CIS field 
memorandum from Fujie Ohata, Associate INS Commissioner, dated December 20, 2002; a CIS field 
memorandum from James A. Puleo, dated March 9, 1994; and an unpublished AAO decision. 
Counsel contends that the beneficiary is a "key person" as he is one of eight head chefs working for the 
petitioner in the United States. Counsel highlights that the beneficiary is the sole head chef working at the 
petitioner's Orlando location. Counsel states that "[tlhe beneficiary is essential to the business operation as he 
is the only one with knowledge of [the] petitioner's recipes and techniques developed by the parent company 
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in Japan." Counsel provides that "[tlhe entire operation ~f the petitioner rests upon the proprietary knowledge 
of its parent's recipes and techniques which were transferred to its restaurants in the United States, and which 
distinguish it from other so called Japanese cuisineirestaurants." Counsel asserts that: 
The knowledge [held by the beneficiary] of these recipes and techniques is known only to a 
handful of select chef;, and not all chefs are privy to all recipes and techniques. For example, 
the sushi chef may not know the recipes of soups, sauces and desserts and the other chef may 
not know the recipes of sushi and sashimi items. The authentic Japanese style cooking is 
quite complex, because not only does the chef have to know the recipes quantitatively, but he 
has to have the knowledge and skill to evaluate the cooking qualitatively by his experienced, 
discerning eye as to the color, doneness and temperature. 
Counsel further asserts that the director erroneously relied on the decision of the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia in 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F. Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990), as the cited 
mader involves a specialty chef and not a head chef with specialized knowledge. 
Counsel submitted an additional letter, dated September 20, 2004, in which he cites a CIS interoffice 
memorandum fr~m yirector of Operations, of April 23, 2004. Counsel asserts 
the following: 
, . I he Service (BCIS) violated its own Policy in matters of extensions, in that ". . . . a prior 
determination by an adjudicator that the alien is eligible far the particular nonimmigrant 
classification should be given deference." There was absolutely no change in circumstances 
[since the] prior approved petition. Theref~re, the petition should have been approved. 
On review, counsel has not demonstrated that the beneficiary possesses "specialized knowledge" as defined in 
section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.,§ 1184(c)(2)(B), and the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(D). 
In examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAG will look to the petitioner's 
description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed description 
of the services to be performed sufficient to establish specialized knowledge. Id. It is also appropriate for the 
AAO to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the beneficiary's knowledge of the 
business's product or service, management operations, or decision-maki~g process. Matter of Colley. 18 I&N 
Dec. 1 1'7, 120 (Comm. 198 l)(citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 6 18 (K.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 
13 I&N Dec. 816 (R.C. 1971)).' As stated by the Commissioner in Matter ofPenner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 52 
' Although the cited precedents pre-date the current statutory definition of "specialized knowledge," the AAO 
finds them instructive. Other than deleting the former requirement that specialized knowledge had to be 
"proprietary," the 1990 Act did not significantly alter the definition of "specialized knowledge" from the prior 
INS regulation or precedent decision interpreting the term. The Committee Report simply states that the 
Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of "[vlarying [i.e., not specifically incorrcct] 
interpretations by INS," H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(1), at 69, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. Beyond that, the 
Committee Report simply restates the tautology that became section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Id. The AAO 
SRC-03-22 1-50643 
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(Comm. 1982), when considering whether the beneficiariis possessed specialized knowledge, "the LeBIanc 
and Raulin decisions did not find that the occupations inherently qualified the beneficiaries for the 
classifications sought." Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have unusual duties, skills, or knowledge 
beyond that of a skilled worker. Id. The Commissioner also provided the following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or her to 
produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed primarily 
for his ability to cany out a key process or function which is important or essential to the 
business' operation. 
Id. at 53. 
It should be noted that the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the AAO to make 
comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The term "specialized 
knowledge" is not an absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed in 1756, Inc. v. Attorney 
General, "[slimply put, specialized knowledge is a relative . . . idea which cannot have a plain meaning." 745 
F. Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990). The Congressional record specifically states that the L-l category was intended 
for "key personnel." See generully, H R. Rep. No. 91-851, 197@ U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key 
personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." Webster's /I New 
College Dicrioanry 605 (Houghton MiMin Co. 2001). In general, all employees can reasonably be 
considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic 
success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. An employee of 
"crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the :eve1 of the petitionkr's average employee. 
Accordingly, based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record related to that 
term, the AAO must make comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge employee and 
the general labor market, but also between that employee and the remainder of the petitioner's workforce. 
Moreover, in Matler ofPenner, the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of the 
specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comm. 1982). The decision noted that the 1970 House 
Report, H.R. No. 9 1-85 1, stated that the number of admissions under the L-1 classification "will not be large" 
and that "[tlhe class of persons eligible for such nonimmigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be carefully 
regulated by the Immigrztion and Naturalization Service." Id. at 5 1. The decision further noted that the House 
Report was silent on the subject of specialized knowledge, but that during the course of the sub-committee 
hearings 011 the bill, the Chairman specifically questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify 
under the proposed "L" category. In response to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that 
they understood the legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts." individuals with "unique" skills, 
and that it would not include "lower categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." Mutter of Penner, id. at 
50 (citing H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445, 91st 
Cong. 2 10.2 18.223,240,248 (November 12, 1969)). 
concludes, therefore. that the cited cases, as well as Matter of Penner, remain gseful guidance concerning the 
intended scope of the "specialized knowledge" L-l B classification. 
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/ 
Reviewing the Congressional record, the Commjssioner concluded in Matter of Penner that an expansive 
reading of the specialized knowledge provision, such that it would include skilled workers and technicians, is 
not warranted. The Commissioner emphasized that that the specialized knowledge worker classification was 
not intended for "all employees with any level of specialized knowledge." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 
53. Or, as noted in Matter of Colley, "[mlost employees today are specialists and have been trained and given 
specialized knowledge. However, in view of the House ~e~ort, it can not be concluded that all employees 
with specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
intracompany transferees." 18 I&N Dec. 117, 119 (~omh. 1981). According to Matter of Penner, "[s]uch a 
conclusion would permit extremely large numbers of 'persons to qualify for the 'L-1' visa" rather than the 
"key personnel" that Congress specifically intended. 18 I&N Dec. at 53; see also, 1756, Inc., 745 F. Supp. at 
15 (concluding that Ccngress did not intend for the specialized knowledge capacity to extend to all employees 
with specialized knowledge, but rather to "key personnel" and "executives.") 
In the instant matter, the petitioner has not submitted sufficient documentation to show that the beneficiary's 
duties involve specialized knowledge as defined in 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). While the record suggests 
that the beneficiary is an experienced chef, evidence does not show that his responsibilities require a greater 
level of knowledge and ability than that possessed by a skilled chef in the culinary fieid. 
The petitioner references its "exclusive, secret and proprietary recipes." yet rhe petitioner has failed to name 
any of these recipes, 01. :o provide independent evidence of their existence. The petitioner's documentation in 
this regard is limited to general statements from the petitioner and counsel that the beneficiary has learned 
"techniques of mixing spices in a certain proportion, heating certain spices to a certain temperalure. heating 
different ingredients for sauces at various temperatures before mixing, observing the color of seafood, 
determining its tenderness arld optimum thickness, [and] chilling different seafood sushimi [sic] items at 
certain temperatures before serving. . . ." As stated, this list of skills could be attributed to any Javanese chef 
working in the restaurant business. The petitioner submitted a copy of a menu for its restauratit in Orlando 
where the beneficiary would work, yet this menu provides no indication that the restaurant offers food that is 
prepared using recipes and methods that are specific to the petitioner's family of restaurants. Counsel and the 
petitioner have failed to articulate and document how the beneficiary's particular knowledge is specific to the 
petitioner's ~nternal methods and operations. Going on record without supporting documentary evidelice is 
not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Mutter of Treusure Craf' of 
Cbllforniu, 14 Ic?N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972). Without documentary evidence to support thc claim, the 
assertions of counsel hill not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The assertions of (:ourlsel do not 
constitute evidence. hlatter cf Obuigbenu, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Murtur Of Laureuno, 19 I&N 
Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Adutter ofRamirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). Conclusory statements 
that the beneficiary possesses.specialized knowledge will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. 
In response to the director's request for evidence, counsel stated that chefs, such as the beneficiary, who have 
received training in the petitioner's proprietary methods and recipes "sign a loyalty and secrecy oath." 
However, despite the director's request for evidence that reflects the proprietary nature of the beneficiary's 
knowledge, the petitioner has not provided a copy of this oath. Again. going on record without supporting 
documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in' these proceedings. 
Matter of Treasure Craft of Culifbrnia, 14 I&N Dec. at j90. 
/' 
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The petitioner state ipes and techniques of 
cooking used in our restaurant in Japan under Yet, the petitioner has 
provided no docume the manner of his study 
under the petitioner' fact that it took one year. The director further requested 
evidence of the beneficiary's training and the beneficiary's resume. The beneficiary's resume provides no 
information regarding any training he received from the petitioner or parent company abroad. Regarding the 
beneficia 's employment abroad, the resume states that he served as a second chef at- 
in Osaka, Japan from 1993 to 1999. The petitioner has provided no explanation or 
documentation to show thatrestaurant associated with it or the foreign entity, such 
that the beneficiary receivedXning from the petitioner's family of restaurants while he was in Japan. Thus, 
the petitioner has failed to submit any independent documentatidn to corroborate it statements regarding the 
beneficiary's one year of training. Again, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not 
sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Cruft c?f 
Californiu, 14 I&N Dec. at 190. 
Thus, contrary to counsel's assertion, the record aoes not contain "vast evidence and supporting documents" 
to establish the petitioner's eligibility, and the director's decision does not suggest that she failed to consider 
the materials submitted in support of the petition. 
Counsel further asserts that the director erroneously relied on the decision in 1756, Inc. v. Attorne-v General, 
745 F. Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990), as the cited matter involves a specialty chef an3 not a head chef with 
specialized knowledge. However, the director's decision reflects that the director correctly considered the 
cited matter for the general guidance it provides regarding eligibility for L-IB status. The director did not 
claim that the decision in 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General particularly excludes specialty or head chefs from L- 
1 B classification. 
In his appellate brief, counsel cites an unpublished AAO decision. The AAO notes that, while 8 C.F.R. 
fj 103.3(cj provides that AAO precedent decisions are binding on all CIS employees in the administration of 
the Act, unpublished decisions are nbt similarly binding. 
Counsel asserts that the director improper1 denied the etition, in that the decision was contrary to the April 
23, 2004 interoffice memorandum fron Yunsel claims that, as CIS previously approved a 
petition for L-IB status on behalf of the beneficia&baied,on the same facts, CIS is now precluded from 
denying the present petition for an extension. Yet, prior approvals do not preclude CIS from denying an 
extension of the original visa based on reassessment of petitioner's qualifications. Texus A&M Univ. v. 
Upchurch, 99 Fed. Appx. 556, 2004 WL 1240482 (5th Cir. 2004). The director's decision in the present 
matter does not indicate whether she reviewed the prior approval of the previous nonimmigrant petition. If 
the previous nonimmigrant petition was approved based on. the same documentation and alleged specialized 
knowledge provided in the current record, the approval would constitute material and gross error on the part 
of the director. The AAO is not required to approve applications or petitions where eligibility has not been 
demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. See, e.g. Murrer of Church 
Scientology Internutionul, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm. 1988). It would be absurd to suggest that CIS or 
any agency must treat acknowledged errors as binding precedent. Sussex Engg. Ltd. v. hJcntgornely. 825 F.2d 
1084, 1090 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988). It is further no'ted that the director's decision 
was issued on January 9, 2004, while the memorand& fro-was circulated over three 
months later on April 23,2004. Thus, the memorand& does not serve as evidence of binding CIS policy at 
the time the director issued her decision. 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, supra at 16. The petitioner has failed to submit sufficient 
documentation to show that the beneficiary will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity. For this 
reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
In visa proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
director's decision will be affirmed and the petition will be denied. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.