dismissed L-1B Case: Semiconductor Manufacturing

identifving data de!eted to 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
Office ofAdministrative Appeals, MS 2090 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
- - 
prevent clearly unwarrailted 
invasion of ~crsoczl privacy 
 U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
PUBLIC 
Services 
JUN 1 1 2089 
File: WAC 08 207 50885 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: . 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1 101(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. $ 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. $ 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
Appeals Office 
WAC 08 207 50885 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office ("AAO") on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the 
appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimrnigrant visa petition to employ the beneficiary an L-1B intracompany transferee 
with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("the Act"), 
8 U.S.C. $ 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner, a semiconductor manufacturer, is the parent company of the 
beneficiary's foreign employer located in Bangalore, India. The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary as a 
physical design engineer at its Chandler, Arizona facility for a period of approximately eight (8) months. 
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge or that he has been or will be employed in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. 
In denying the petition, the director observed that the record consisted primarily of the unsupported assertions 
of the petitioner, and that such assertions were insufficient to establish the beneficiary's eligibility. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director disregarded the petitioner's probative evidence of 
the beneficiary's eligibility for L-1B classification. Counsel asserts that the petitioner clearly differentiated 
the beneficiary's knowledge from that of the remaining U.S. and Indian workforce employed by the 
petitioning organization. Counsel further asserts that the director requested evidence that "simply remains 
unavailable," and inappropriately denied the petition based on a lack of evidence. Counsel asserts that "the 
petitioner's statements/documentation regarding employment, the critical need for the beneficiary's services, 
and the beneficiary's training and education are the applicable and appropriate 'hard evidence' of specialized 
knowledge." Counsel submits a detailed brief in support of the appeal. 
To establish L-1 eligibility under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the petitioner must demonstrate that the 
beneficiary, within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, has 
been employed abroad in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a capacity involving specialized 
knowledge, for one continuous year by a qualifying organization. The petitioner must also demonstrate that the 
beneficiary seeks to enter the United States temporarily in order to continue to render services to the same 
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized 
knowledge. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
WAC 08 207 50885 
Page 3 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himker to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The primary issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary has been or 
will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity and whether the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge. 8 C.F.R. $8 214.2(1)(3)(ii) and (iv). 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1184(c)(2)(B), provides: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. $ 2 14,2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
The petitioner filed the Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker, on July 22, 2008. In a letter dated July 
21,2008, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary has been employed by its Indian subsidiary since July 18,2005, 
where he currently serves in the position of Physical Design Engineer. The petitioner described the beneficiary's 
current duties as follows: 
[The beneficiary's] job duties and position at [the foreign entity] are similar to those that will be 
performed in the upcoming temporary U.S. assignment. At [the foreign entity], [the beneficiary] 
is responsible for providing physical design for block-level (cell level) to interface or FUB 
(Functional unit Block) level of the CHIP I0 ring. He also provides floor planning for multiple 
functional blocks, ESD planning, latch-up prevention, mixed-signal routing, and the physical 
design for the I0 interfaces. 
The position requires familiarity of proprietary, advanced semiconductor equipment technology, 
including but not limited to [the petitioner's] proprietary manufacturing processes, as well as [the 
petitioner's] operational and product procedural guidelines. As a result of [the beneficiary's] 
specialized knowledge in these areas, he is at a more advanced level than other employees at the 
[petitioner's] India site who have the same job title. [The beneficiq] was selected for this 
temporary assignment specifically because of his specialized knowledge of these . . .proprietary 
processes and systems. 
WAC 08 207 50885 
Page 4 
The petitioner indicated that the beneficiary, as a Physical Design Engineer in the United States, will be 
"responsible for driving and integrating the double dynamic ram (DDR) input and output (10) interface full chip 
requirements, and enabling next general digital home product (low cost integrated memory controller) tape out on 
schedule." The petitioner described his specific proposed duties as: 
Working on DDR interface custom layouts in order to meet full chip requirements; 
VerifLing layouts to meet process design rules with the Chandler project environment; 
Attending regular meetings with the Sodaville team full chip owner and inputs to meet the 
integration requirements; 
Attending regular meetings with the DDR team at Bangalore and share inputs gathered 
from the full chip owner; and 
Working continuously with the Design Automation Engineer to enable smooth integration 
process. 
This position requires an employee who possesses specialized and advanced integrated 
knowledge of [the petitioner's] architecture-based platform for home entertainment, [the 
petitioner's] specific design techniques and processes, and [the petitioner's] P1266.8 process 
design rules and design methodology. These processes and methodologies are proprietary to [the 
petitioner] as they were developed by [company] engineers. This knowledge is specialized since 
it is all [company]-specific. It can only be acquired through on-the-job training at [the petitioner] 
or a [company] subsidiary and cannot be acquired through education or work experience with 
another company. 
The petitioner referred to a 1994 legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) memorandum that 
addresses the interpretation of specialized knowledge and stated that the beneficiary meets the criteria set forth in 
1 
the memorandum and the applicable regulations. 
 Specifically, the petitioner stated: 
[The beneficiary] possesses an advanced and specialized knowledge of [the petitioner's] 
architecture-based platform for home entertainment, [the petitioner's] specific design techniques 
and processes, and [the petitioner's] P1266.8 process design rules and design methodology. He 
has expertise in [the petitioner's] manufacturing processes and products which he acquired at [the 
foreign entity] through on the job training and site training classes. Specifically, he has spent the 
last three years in on-the-job training using [the petitioner's] proprietary manufacturing 
processes. 
In support of the petition, the petitioner submitted evidence that the beneficiary was awarded a diploma in 
electronics in June 2005 after completion of six semesters of study at a technical training school in Bangalore, 
India. 
The director issued a request for additional evidence on July 3 1, 2008, in which the director requested additional 
evidence to establish that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge. Specifically, the director instructed the 
I Memorandum of James A. Puleo, Acting Exec. Assoc. Comm., INS, Interpretation of Special Knowledge 
(March 9, 1994)(hereinafter "Puleo memorandum"). 
WAC 08 207 50885 
Page 5 
petitioner to submit: (1) the total number of employees at the foreign location where the beneficiary is employed; 
(2) the number of foreign nationals employed at the U.S. location where the beneficiary will work, including job 
titles and visa status; (3) the number of L-1B visa holders transferred to the U.S. location over the last five years; 
(4) the number of persons at the U.S. location holding the same or similar position as the beneficiary; (5) evidence 
regarding any special or advanced duties performed by the beneficiary, including an explanation as to how the 
beneficiary's duties abroad and in the United States are different from those performed by others; (6) evidence 
that the beneficiary's training or experience is uncommon, noteworthy or distinguished by some unusual quality 
and not generally known by others employed by the petitioner in the same field; and (7) an explanation regarding 
the training the beneficiary will provide to other workers in the United States. 
In response to the RFE, the petitioner submitted a letter dated September 10, 2008. The petitioner explained its 
use of the L-1B classification, noting that its design, fabrication and manufacturing sites are located around the 
world. The petitioner noted that each product is assigned to a particular business group, which often includes both 
U.S. and foreign employees, resulting in a need for U.S. and foreign sites to partner resources from conception to 
the final production phases of an assigned product. The petitioner emphasized that in cases where a business 
group has both U.S. and foreign employees working on a product, "the employees are not duplicating work or 
development. Rather each site contributes to a portion of the production, with an eye toward merging activities to 
generate a single, quality product." 
The petitioner stated that it utilizes the L-IB classification to temporarily bring the team lead of each business 
group to the U.S. for critical steps in the production cycle, and to "temporarily bring team leads and/or team 
members with specific advanced knowledge of [the petitioner's] proprietary processes and products to assist the 
U.S. team and/or site with new processes and/or tools" as required by production cycle deadlines. The petitioner 
stated that, in the instant matter, the beneficiary's direct input in the DDR input and output interface integration 
process at the Chandler, Arizona site will ensure that the petitioner's digital home product is completed on 
schedule. 
The petitioner provided additional background information on the petitioner's "Sodaville project" which involves 
the development of "a next generation home entertainment product (a low cost integrated memory controller)." 
The petitioner stated that the beneficiary "will be performing the physical verifications on the DDR family 
interface, which entails density testing and performing a design rules check (DRC) and layout versus schematic 
(LVS) test." The beneficiary will then communicate any issues uncovered by his verification with the "full chip 
team" in Arizona and provide continuous feedback on full chipset issues to the DDR team in India to ensure that 
they meet the full chip requirements on schedule. 
The petitioner emphasized that the knowledge the beneficiary possesses can only be gained through employment 
with the petitioning group, and with specific training on DDR layout methodologies as applied within the 
petitioner's production cycle. The petitioner stated that the knowledge could not easily be transferred to a 
company employee working within a different business group or with different equipmentltools. 
In response to the director's specific inquiry, the petitioner indicated that there are no U.S. workers at the Arizona 
worksite performing the duties of the beneficiary's proposed position. The petitioner stated that there is currently 
one Physical Design Engineer among the site's 5,823 employees, but that he or she does not operate in the 
Sodaville Project group, and does not have the project design knowledge needed for the integration of the DDR. 
, WAC 08 207 50885 
Page 6 
The petitioner emphasized that the beneficiary will not add to or displace the U.S. workforce, but will only briefly 
travel to the United States to verify and integrate the DDR into the full chipset. 
In response to the director's request for an explanation regarding any special or advanced duties the beneficiary 
performs, the petitioner stated: 
The beneficiary's duties differ from other [company] employees because his duties are specific to 
the Sodaville project and the DDR design for that project. [The petitioner] employs other 
Physical Design Engineers, but each engineer works within a particular division, which is part of 
a larger business group. Furthermore, each division is assigned to a specific product .... 
Therefore a Physical Design Engineer from a different division would not have the Sodaville 
project-specific knowledge of the product's DDR design that the beneficiary possesses. Although 
other design engineers comprise the India-based DDR team, the beneficiary's in-depth 
knowledge and training in physical verifications and DDR design distinguish him from the rest 
of the team. This elevated level of knowledge concerning the product's design and the transfer 
of that knowledge to DDR integration activities separate and elevate the beneficiary above the 
rest of the team. 
The Sodaville project is being coordinated between teams in both India and the U.S. 
Development of the DDR layout has been confined to the Bangalore, India facility, while the full 
chip team is based in Chandler, Arizona. As these teams have yet to begin integrating their 
designs, the position involved in this petition does not currently exist in the U.S. Furthermore, 
due to its required specialized knowledge of the DRR layouts and design rules for the p1266.8 
. . . process, the position cannot be assigned to a U.S. employee. 
In addressing how the beneficiary's training or experience is uncommon, noteworthy or distinguished, the 
petitioner stated that the beneficiary "has spent the last five years working with physical verification techniques 
and DDR design," and emphasized that these "intense, specific duties coupled with his previous DDR layout 
experience provide the beneficiary with precise product knowledge that is required to validate the design and 
power-on of the product." The petitioner stated that the beneficiary is the only physical design engineer at the 
Bangalore site with the knowledge required to complete the Sodaville project, and that he will be the only such 
engineer at the Chandler site. 
The director denied the petition on September 22, 2008, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the 
beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that he has been and would be employed in a capacity that 
requires specialized knowledge. In denying the petition, the director observed that the petitioner provided no 
evidence in support of its assertions regarding the beneficiary's advanced and specialized knowledge, and no 
evidence of the claimed training he underwent while employed by the foreign entity. The director emphasized 
that the record consists primarily of the petitioner's unsupported assertions. 
WAC 08 207 50885 
Page 7 
The director acknowledged the petitioner's statements that no other worker could perform the proposed duties, but 
stated that "a scarce skill does not necessarily establish that the skill derives from specialized knowledge." The 
director determined that the beneficiary's knowledge had not been shown to be advanced relative to the rest of the 
petitioner's workforce. The director also questioned whether the petitioner would realistically "rely so heavily on 
the aptitude of one employee for the completion of a project." 
The director, while granting that the beneficiary's knowledge is company-specific, determined that the skills 
required to perform the duties had not been shown to require specialized knowledge of the petitioner's product, 
processes or procedures that "surpasses the ordinary or usual," such that the beneficiary would rise to the level of 
"key personnel." 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director failed to consider the evidence submitted in response 
to the WE, and instead relied on "boilerplate" language that did not include a meaningful analysis of the 
petitioner's evidence. Counsel asserts that the petitioner submitted significant probative evidence to establish that 
the beneficiary is a key employee possessing specialized knowledge, and to distinguish the beneficiary from the 
U.S . company's workforce. 
Counsel asserts that the director implemented a standard for L-1B classification that is "inapplicable and 
unrealistic," by requiring that the petitioner's distinguish the beneficiary from other workers in the semiconductor 
industry. Counsel emphasizes that it does not have access to and cannot provide information that pertains to the 
confidential and proprietary standards of its competitors. Counsel further asserts that the standard of comparing 
an L-1B beneficiary to employees outside the petitioner's operations is not mandated by statute or regulation. 
Counsel asserts: 
The L-1B classification is based on employment with a petitioner and a beneficiary's 
qualifications; thus, the petitioner's statements/documentation regarding employment, the critical 
need for the beneficiary's services, and the beneficiary's training and education are the applicable 
and appropriate "hard evidence" of specialized knowledge. 
Ultimately, the comparative evidence regarding an "outside group" requested by [the director] 
cannot be provided, and therefore, creates a standard that is impossible to meet. . . . [The 
petitioner] properly established specialized knowledge by detailing the importance of the process 
at hand and confirming [the beneficiary's] specialized and narrowly-tailored experience within 
that process. This viable, "hard" evidence properly distinguishes [the beneficiary] from [the 
petitioner's] remaining India and U.S. workforces. More importantly, the evidence [the 
petitioner] provided establishes [the beneficiary] as a key employee possessing specialized 
knowledge. 
Counsel disagrees with the director's determination that the petitioner did not distinguish the beneficiary from its 
remaining workforce, emphasizing that the petitioner explained in detail the "integral nature of the process on 
which [the beneficiary} would work and [the beneficiary's] expertise with the process." Counsel notes that "the 
product is one of [the petitioner's] new System-on-Chip products set for a 2009 release to the ever-evolving 
internet consumer electronics ("CE") market." Counsel hrther explains that the product is critical to the 
petitioner's expansion to the "internet TV" arena and essential to the company's competitiveness, and that it 
WAC 08 207 50885 
Page 8 
cannot be marketed until the physical verification process for VO components is completed at the Chandler, 
Arizona facility. Counsel asserts that the petitioner would not use a "mere 'competent' employee to secure the 
functionality of a critical product," and instead filed the L-1B petition based on the beneficiary's specialized, 
advanced and narrowly-tailored experience with DDR and physical verification. 
Counsel further states: 
[The beneficiary] is not merely a skilled worker; rather, he is a key employee whose expertise 
regarding an essential process in the production of [the petitioner's] products is required in the 
U.S. to complete a product vital to [the petitioner's] competitiveness in the industry. Some of the 
[company]-sponsored training [the beneficiary] has completed includes: [the petitioner's] 65 
nanometer (p1265) technology, [the petitioner's] 45 nanometer (p1266) technology, VLSI back 
end design flow, high speed CMOS design, and low power circuit design. [The petitioner] 
would not undergo the significant expense of temporarily transferring [the beneficiary] to the 
U.S. so that he can perform a routine task. . . . 
Ultimately, the significance of the product at hand and the crucial aspect of the physical 
verification process establish the specialized knowledge at the basis of the L-1B petition. 
Counsel contends that the director's decision should be reversed because the director ignored the "probative 
evidence" it requested to establish specialized knowledge, which counsel asserts was included in the petitioner's 
response to the RFE. Counsel states that the director requested such evidence based on a need to make 
comparisons between the beneficiary's knowledge and the remainder of the petitioner's workforce and then 
ignored the evidence submitted in response. Specifically, counsel states: 
[Tlhe denial neither addresses the responsibilities of the assignment and the significance of the 
physical verification process, nor explains why the significant employee data that [the petitioner] 
provided does not differentiate the beneficiary from [the petitioner's] remaining workforce. 
In addition, counsel argues that the director "unreasonably implies a lack of candor on the part of [the petitioner] 
by citing [the petitioner's] statement that 'no other worker can step into the beneficiary's role"' and calling such 
statement disingenuous. Counsel asserts that the director's conclusion is unfair and evidences a misunderstanding 
of how businesses operate in the global economy. Counsel explains: 
[The petitioner] employs other Physical Design Engineers, even with [the beneficiary's] own 
group at the India site. However, as required by the L-1B regulations, [the beneficiary] operates 
at a level above his peers at the India site due to this specific knowledge of DDR design and the 
physical verification process as it relates to the project/product at hand. It remains possible for 
another of [the petitioner's] physical design engineers to complete the U.S. assignment, but not 
without significant training on the specific design and architecture of the product. Such training 
would result in considerable delay and cost to the project at hand and the project that the other 
physical design engineer would have to abandon to complete the U.S. assignment. . . . It remains 
unreasonable for [the director] to request [the petitioner] to distinguish [the beneficiary] in terms 
. WAC 08 207 50885 
Page 9 
of training and experience, to then disregard the distinction as improbable, and lastly, imply that 
the very distinction [the director] requested is disingenuous. 
Counsel requests that in light of the director's failure to consider the petitioner's response to the RFE, the director's 
decision should be overturned. 
Upon review, counsel's assertions are not persuasive. The petitioner has not established that the beneficiary 
has specialized knowledge or that he has been or will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity as 
defined at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). 
Looking to the language of the statutory definition, Congress has provided USCIS with an ambiguous definition 
of specialized knowledge. In this regard, one Federal district court explained the infeasibility of applying a 
bright-line test to define what constitutes specialized knowledge: 
This ambiguity is not merely the result of an unfortunate choice of dictionaries. It reflects the 
relativistic nature of the concept special. An item is special only in the sense that it is not 
ordinary; to define special one must first define what is ordinary. . . . There is no logical or 
principled way to determine which baseline of ordinary knowledge is a more appropriate reading 
of the statute, and there are countless other baselines which are equally plausible. Simply put, 
specialized knowledge is a relative and empty idea which cannot have a plain meaning. Cf: 
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 53 7 (1 982). 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. 9, 14-1 5 (D.D.C., 1990).~ 
While Congress did not provice explicit guidance for what should be considered ordinary knowledge, the 
principles of statutory interpretation provide some clue as to the intended scope of the L-1B specialized 
knowledge category. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 1 12, 123 (1 987) 
(citing INSv. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207,94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)). 
First, the AAO must look to the language of section 214(c)(2)(B) itself, that is, the terms "special" and 
"advanced." Like the courts, the AAO customarily turns to dictionaries for help in determining whether a word in 
a statute has a plain or common meaning. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 109 F.3d 965, 967-68 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(using Webster's Dictionary for "therefore"). According to Webster's New College Dictionary, the word "special" 
is commonly found to mean "surpassing the usual" or "exceptional." Webster's New College Dictionary, 1084 
(3rd Ed. 2008). The dictionary defines the word "advanced" as "highly developed or complex" or "at a higher 
level than others." Id. at 17. 
Although 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General was decided prior to enactment of the statutory definition of 
specialized knowledge by the Immigration Act of 1990, the court's discussion of the ambiguity in the legacy 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) definition is equally illuminating when applied to the definition 
created by Congress. 
, WAC 08 207 50885 
Page 10 
Second, looking at the term's placement within the text of section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the AAO notes that 
specialized knowledge is used to describe the nature of a person's employment and that the term is listed among 
the higher levels of the employment hierarchy together with "managerial" and "executive" employees. Based on 
the context of the term within the statute, the AAO therefore would expect a specialized knowledge employee to 
occupy an elevated position within a company that rises above that of an ordinary or average employee. See 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 14. 
Third, a review of the legislative history for both the original 1970 statute and the subsequent 1990 statute 
indicates that Congress intended for USCIS to closely administer the L-1B category. Specifically, the original 
drafters of section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act intended that the class of persons eligible for the L-1 classification 
would be "narrowly drawn" and "carefully regulated and monitored" by USCIS. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91- 
851 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750, 2754, 1970 WL 5815. The legislative history of the 1970 Act 
plainly states that "the number of temporary admissions under the proposed 'L' category will not be large." Id. In 
addition, the Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended for "key personnel." 
See generally, id. The term "key personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "[olf 
crucial importance." Webster 's New College Dictionary 620 (3rd ed., Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing 
Co. 2008). Moreover, during the course of the sub-committee hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically 
questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify under the proposed "L" category. In response 
to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that they understood the legislation would allow 
"high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, and that it would not include "lower 
categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." See H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration 
Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445,91St Cong. 210,218,223,240,248 (Nov. 12, 1969). 
Neither in 1970 nor in 1990 did Congress provide a controlling, unambiguous definition of "specialized 
knowledge," and a narrow interpretation is consistent with so much of the legislative intent as it is possible to 
determine. H. Rep. No. 91-851 at 6, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2754. This interpretation is consistent with legislative 
history, which has been largely supportive of a narrow reading of the definition of specialized knowledge and the 
L-1 visa classification in general. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 15-16; Boi Na Braza 
Atlanta, LLC v. Upchurch, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 2372846 at *4 (N.D.Tex., 2005), afSd 194 
Fed.Appx. 248 (5th Cir. 2006); Fibermaster, Ltd. v. INS., Not Reported in F.Supp., 1990 WL 99327 (D.D.C., 
1990); Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Dept. of Jwtice, Civ. Action 00-2977-LFO (D.D.C. April 6, 2001)(on file with 
AAO). 
Further, although the Immigration Act of 1990 provided a statutory definition of the term "specialized 
knowledge" in section 214(c)(2) of the Act, the definition did not generally expand the class of persons eligible 
for L-1B specialized knowledge visas. Pub.L. No. 101-649, 8 206(b)(2), 104 Stat. 4978, 5023 (1990). Instead, 
the legislative history indicates that Congress created the statutory definition of specialized knowledge for the 
express purpose of clarifying a previously undefined term from the Immigration Act of 1970. H.R. Rep. 101- 
723(I) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6749, 1990 WL 200418 ("One area within the L visa that 
requires more specificity relates to the term 'specialized knowledge.' Varying interpretations by INS have 
exacerbated the problem."). While the 1990 Act declined to codify the "proprietary knowledge" and "United 
States labor market" references that had existed in the previous agency definition found at 8 C.F.R. 
$ 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(D) (1988), there is no indication that Congress intended to liberalize its own 1970 definition of 
the L-1 visa classification. 
WAC 08 207 50885 
Page 11 
If any conclusion can be drawn from the enactment of the statutory definition of specialized knowledge in section 
2 14(c)(2)(B), it would be based on the nature of the Congressional clarification itself. By not including any strict 
criterion in the ultimate statutory definition and further emphasizing the relativistic aspect of "special knowledge," 
Congress created a standard that requires USCIS to make a factual determination that can only be determined on a 
case-by-case basis, based on the agency's expertise and discretion. Rather than a bright-line standard that would 
support a more rigid application of the law, Congress gave the INS a more flexible standard that requires an 
adjudication based on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. CJ: Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 33 1 F.3d 
369,377 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89,91 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
To determine what is special or advanced, USCIS must first determine the baseline of ordinary. As a 
baseline, the terms "special" or "advanced" must mean more than simply "skilled" or "experienced." By 
itself, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically complex products will not equal "special 
knowledge." See Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 53 (Comm. 1982). In general, all employees can 
reasonably be considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the 
overall economic success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. 
An employee of "crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average 
employee. In other words, specialized knowledge generally requires more than a short period of experience; 
otherwise special or advanced knowledge would include every employee in an organization with the 
exception of trainees and entry-level staff. If everyone in an organization is specialized, then no one can be 
considered truly specialized. Such an interpretation strips the statutory language of any efficacy and cannot 
have been what Congress intended. 
Considering the definition of specialized knowledge, it is the petitioner's, not USCIS1s, burden to articulate 
and establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" 
knowledge. Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1184(c)(2)(B). USCIS cannot make a factual 
determination regarding the beneficiary's specialized knowledge if the petitioner does not, at a minimum, 
articulate with specificity the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, describe how such knowledge is 
typically gained within the organization, and explain how and when the beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
Once the petitioner articulates the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and type of 
evidence which establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized knowledge. A 
petitioner's assertion that the beneficiary possesses advanced knowledge of the processes and procedures of 
the company must be supported by evidence describing and distinguishing that knowledge from the 
elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others. Because "special" and "advanced" are comparative 
terms, the petitioner should provide evidence that allows USCIS to assess the beneficiary's knowledge 
relative to others in the petitioner's workforce or relative to similarly employed workers in the petitioner's 
specific industry. 
In examining the specialized knowledge of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's description of 
the job duties and the weight of the evidence supporting any asserted specialized knowledge. See 8 C.F.R. 
9 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed job description of the services to be performed sufficient to 
establish specialized knowledge. At a minimum, the petitioner must articulate with specificity the nature of the 
claimed specialized knowledge. Merely asserting that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" 
knowledge will not suffice to meet the petitioner's burden of proof. 
WAC 08 207 50885 
Page 12 
Upon review, the petitioner in this case has failed to establish either that the beneficiary's position in the 
United States or abroad requires an employee with specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has 
specialized knowledge. Although the petitioner repeatedly asserts that the beneficiary has been and will be 
employed in a "specialized knowledge" capacity, the petitioner has not adequately articulated any basis to 
support this claim, particularly with respect to the beneficiary's employment with the foreign entity. The 
petitioner has failed to identify and document any special or advanced body of knowledge which would 
distinguish the beneficiary's role from that of other physical design engineers employed by the company. 
Going on record without documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof 
in these proceedings. Matter of Soflci, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft 
of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
Therefore, the petitioner's claim primary fails on an evidentiary basis. As noted above, counsel asserts that "the 
petitioner's statements/documentation regarding employment, the critical need for the beneficiary's services, 
and the beneficiary's training and education are the applicable and appropriate 'hard evidence' of specialized 
knowledge." The record as presently constituted contains little of the applicable and appropriate "hard 
evidence" to which counsel refers, and specifically contains little information regarding the beneficiary's 
employment with the foreign entity, and no documentation of the beneficiary's claimed company-specific 
training and education. This evidence is critical, as the petitioner claims that the beneficiary's classroom 
training, on-the-job training and experience gained during his three years of employment with the foreign 
entity render him the only employee within the petitioner's multinational organization who is readily able to 
perform the proposed services in the United States. The AAO does not agree with the director's determination 
that the petitioner's claim is "disingenuous," but does concur with the director's determination that 
documentary evidence is needed to establish the claim that the beneficiary's knowledge is indeed specialized 
or advanced. The director clearly emphasized the lack of evidence in the record regarding the beneficiary's 
training and advanced knowledge. 
For example, the petitioner indicates that the beneficiary currently serves in the position of Physical Design 
Engineer at the foreign entity's Bangalore facility. However, the petitioner has not specified when he was 
assigned to the Sodaville Project, how long the Sodaville project has been in development, how his role in the 
project differs from that of other physical design engineers assigned to the same project, or how the 
knowledge and experience required for this project differs from that required for other projects based on 
similar te~hnolo~ies.~ Such background information regarding his employment is important given the claim 
that the beneficiary has developed a unique skill set that is not possessed by any other employee in India or 
the United States. 
Furthermore, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's position with the foreign entity was only two 
sentences long and made no reference to a specific project or the specific product on which the beneficiary 
has been working. The petitioner stated that the foreign position requires "familiarity of proprietary, advanced 
The petitioner submits on appeal a company news release dated July 24, 2008, which indicates that the 
Consumer Electronic (CE) chip codenamed "Sodaville" is one of 15 "System on Chip" (SOC) products being 
developed by the company, and is the second-generation version of a CE chip codenamed "Canmore" that 
was scheduled for a 2008 release. The news release also indicates that the company is making the SoC chip 
designs based on the same blueprint as the company's existing processors. 
WAC 08 207 50885 
Page 13 
semiconductor equipment technology including. . . [the petitioner's] proprietary manufacturing processes, as 
well as [the petitioner's] operational and product procedural guidelines." The petitioner went on to state that 
the beneficiary is "at a more advanced level than other employees" at the same worksite with the same job 
title, noting that the beneficiary acquired "an advanced and specialized knowledge of [the petitioner's] 
architecture-based platform for home entertainment, [the petitioner's] specific design techniques and 
processes, and [the petitioner's] P1266.8 process design rules and design methodology." The petitioner 
further stated that the beneficiary has expertise in the company's manufacturing products and processes gained 
through "on the job training and site training classes" and that he had spent the last three years in on-the-job 
training using the company's proprietary manufacturing processes. 
The AAO notes that the petitioner provided little basis for its conclusion that the beneficiary's knowledge is 
"more advanced" that that of similarly-employed workers, who also would also reasonably complete company 
training in the petitioner's products and processes, nor did it provide any documentation of the beneficiary's 
claimed training. 
Therefore, the director asked the petitioner to explain how the beneficiary's duties performed abroad are 
different from those of other workers in the same type of position, and to explain how the beneficiary's 
training or experience is uncommon, noteworthy or distinguished by some unusual quality and not generally 
known by the petitioner's employees working in the same field. The director noted that the petitioner should 
submit "probative evidence to corroborate the statements made in its initial filing." It should be noted that 
this request was separate from the director's request for evidence regarding the number of similarly-employed 
workers in the United States and the number of L-1B visa holders located at the U.S. facility to which the 
beneficiary will be transferred. 
In response to the director's request for additional information and evidence regarding the beneficiary's 
training and experience, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary "has spent the last five years working with 
physical verification techniques and DDR design." The petitioner stated that this experience, "coupled with 
his previous DDR layout experience" provides the beneficiary with "precise product knowledge." As noted 
above, the evidence of record indicates that the beneficiary has been working for the foreign entity for three 
years, not five years, and indicates that he had no prior work experience at the time he was hired by the 
foreign entity. The beneficiary was in his third semester of technical school five years before the petition was 
filed. In light of these facts, these statements from the petitioner do not appear to be accurate. It is incumbent 
upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any 
attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent 
objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). 
In response to the director's request for evidence as to how the beneficiary's duties differ from those of other 
employees in the petitioner's workforce, the petitioner emphasized that the beneficiary's duties in India are 
specific to the Sodaville project and DDR layout design for that project. The petitioner acknowledged that the 
DDR layout design has been confined to the Bangalore facility, but stated that other design engineers 
assigned to this project component in India do not have the beneficiary's "in-depth knowledge and training in 
physical verifications and DDR design." The AAO notes that the job description provided for the 
beneficiary's foreign position at the time of filing did not explicitly mention his responsibility for or 
experience in performing DDR design or physical verifications, and the petitioner did not submit evidence of 
WAC 08 207 50885 
Page 14 
any training he has received in these areas. There is also no information in the record regarding the size of the 
project team in India or the number of physical design engineers working on the DDR design aspect of the 
project. 
If, as stated by the petitioner, the beneficiary's specialized knowledge is solely based on his experience with a 
narrow aspect of the Sodaville project that is not possessed by any other employee within the multinational 
company, then it is reasonable to expect the petitioner to explain exactly what that knowledge is, what makes 
it "special" within the company, when and how the beneficiary gained it, and how much experience he has in 
the role of Physical Design Engineer for this project. The record shows that the beneficiary was hired by the 
foreign entity when he was barely 19 years old, and that he had no professional work experience at the time. 
Therefore, information regarding the beneficiary's training and employment history within the company, and 
information regarding his project assignments and duties abroad, is critical to support a claim that his 
knowledge is indeed specialized and advanced. At a minimum, the petitioner must establish that the 
beneficiary has been employed in a capacity involving the claimed specialized knowledge of DDR layout 
design and physical verification for the Sodaville project for at least one year at the time the petition was 
filed. 
Overall, the petitioner's response to the RFE offered little evidence to corroborate its initial claim that the 
beneficiary "is at a more advanced level than other employees at the [company's] India site who have the 
same job title," other than explaining that all physical design engineers are assigned to specific products 
within particular divisions within larger business groups and therefore have acquired product and project- 
specific knowledge that is not shared by other persons with the same job title. The petitioner specifically 
requested "probative evidence" to corroborate the claims made in the initial filing regarding the beneficiary's 
advanced knowledge of products and processes and his level of training and experience. The petitioner's 
response did not directly address these concerns or include supporting evidence to substantiate its claims 
regarding the beneficiary's classroom and on-the-job training which form the basis of the claimed specialized 
knowledge. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of 
meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soflci, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) 
(citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Failure to submit 
requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 
103.2(b)(14). The petitioner has not established that the instant beneficiary has "advanced knowledge of the 
company's processes and procedures." 
Therefore, the remaining question before the AAO is whether the beneficiary's knowledge of and experience 
with the petitioner's proprietary products and processes alone constitutes specialized knowledge. While the 
current statutory and regulatory definitions of "specialized knowledge" do not include a requirement that the 
beneficiary's knowledge be proprietary, the petitioner cannot satisfy the current standard merely by 
establishing that the beneficiary's purported specialized knowledge is proprietary. The knowledge must still 
be either "special" or "advanced." As discussed above, the elimination of the bright-line "proprietary" 
standard did not, in fact, significantly liberalize the standards for the L-1B visa classification. 
Reviewing the precedent decisions that preceded the Immigration Act of 1990, there are a number of 
conclusions that were not based on the superseded regulatory definition, and therefore continue to apply to the 
adjudication of L- 1 B specialized knowledge petitions. In 198 1, the INS recognized that " [tlhe modern 
WAC 08 207 50885 
Page 15 
workplace requires a high proportion of technicians and specialists." The agency concluded that: 
Most employees today are specialists and have been trained and given specialized knowledge. 
However, in view of the [legislative history], it can not be concluded that all employees with 
specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
intracompany transferees. The House Report indicates the employee must be a "key" person 
and associates this employee with "managerial personnel." 
Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. at 119-20. 
In a subsequent decision, the INS looked to the legislative history of the 1970 Act and concluded that a "broad 
definition which would include skilled workers and technicians was not discussed, thus the limited legislative 
history available therefore indicates that an expansive reading of the 'specialized knowledge' provision is not 
warranted." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 5 1. The decision continued: 
[I]n view of the House Report, it cannot be concluded that all employees with any level of 
specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
intra-company transferees. Such a conclusion would permit extremely large numbers of 
persons to qualify for the "L-1" visa. The House Report indicates that the employee must be 
a "key" person and "the numbers will not be large." 
Id. at 53. 
According to the reasoning of Matter of Penner, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically 
complex products, by itself, will not equal "special knowledge." USCIS must interpret specialized knowledge 
to require more than fundamental job skills or a short period of experience. 
The AAO acknowledges that the specialized knowledge need not be narrowly held within the organization in 
order to be considered "advanced." However, it is equally true to state that knowledge will not be considered 
"special" or "advanced" if it is universally or even widely held throughout a company. If all similarly 
employed workers within the petitioner's organization receive essentially the same training, then mere 
possession of knowledge of the petitioner's processes and methodologies does not rise to the level of 
specialized knowledge. The L-1B visa category was not created in order to allow the transfer of all 
employees with any degree of knowledge of a company's processes. If all employees are deemed to possess 
"special" or "advanced" knowledge, then that knowledge would necessarily be ordinary and commonplace. 
Overall, the record does not establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is substantially different from the 
knowledge possessed by other employees of the petitioning organization. The fact that the beneficiary and a 
select group of workers possess a very specific set of skills does not alone establish that the beneficiary's 
knowledge is indeed special or advanced. All employees can be said to possess unique skill sets to some 
degree. Moreover, the proprietary or unique qualities of the petitioner's process or product do not establish 
that any knowledge of this process is "specialized." Here, based on the petitioner's representations, each 
physical design engineer within the petitioner's organization is assigned to work on a specific component of a 
specific product within a specific division within a specific business group of the company and therefore the 
WAC 08 207 50885 
Page 16 
knowledge possessed by each engineer, even within a specific project, is different. 
Given this scenario, it appears that any physical design engineer employed by the petitioner's group of 
companies would be deemed to have specialized knowledge, because they would all have "narrowly tailored" 
knowledge not possessed by any other person within the company. This interpretation of "specialized 
knowledge" is untenable as it would essentially allow the petitioner to utilize the L-IB classification for any 
technical employee who had one year of project experience. Rather, the petitioner must establish that qualities 
of the particular process or product require an individual to have knowledge beyond what is common among 
its workforce, or to establish that the beneficiary has advanced knowledge of the product. This has not been 
established in this matter. The fact that other workers may not have the same level of experience with a 
particular product is not enough to equate to special or advanced knowledge if the gap could be closed by the 
petitioner by simply revealing the information to a similarly trained or experienced employee who has worked 
on a similar product. 
While the AAO acknowledges that there will be exceptions based on the facts of individual cases, an 
argument that an alien is unique among a small subset of workers, will not be deemed facially persuasive if a 
petitioner's definition of specialized knowledge is so broad that it would include the majority of its workforce. 
The AAO acknowledges counsel's assertion regarding the essential nature of the process to be carried out by 
the beneficiary, and counsel's assertion that the fact the beneficiary was selected for the U.S. assignment 
"points to his distinguished standing within [the petitioner] and the significance of his contributions to [the 
petitioner's] operations." The AAO does not doubt that the beneficiary is a valuable employee who is capable 
of performing the work described, nor does it doubt that the work is important to the petitioner's product 
development efforts. However, the fact that the petitioner does not employ a Physical Design Engineer with 
the same project experience as the beneficiary in Chandler, Arizona who could readily perform the intended 
duties does not automatically lead to a conclusion that the instant beneficiary must possess specialized and 
advanced knowledge. Contrary to counsel's assertions on appeal, the petitioner did not distinguish the 
beneficiary in terms of his training and experience and the record remains devoid of information regarding his 
claimed classroom training, his claimed three-years of on-the-job training, and the duties he performed for the 
offshore component of the Sodaville project that established him "at a level above his peers." Counsel's 
references on appeal to several training courses completed by the beneficiary are of little probative value. The 
unsupported statements of counsel on appeal or in a motion are not evidence and thus are not entitled to any 
evidentiary weight. See INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 188-89 n.6 (1984); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 
I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1980). 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, supra at 16. The record does not establish that the 
beneficiary has specialized knowledge or that the position offered with the United States entity requires 
specialized knowledge. Accordingly, the petition may not be approved. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
WAC 08 207 50885 
Page 17 
appeal will be dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.