dismissed L-1B Case: Semiconductor Manufacturing

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US. Department of Homeland Security 
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
Oflee of Administrative Appeals, MS 2090 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
I and 1rnmig;i&n 
Services 
File: WAC 08 201 50991 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: JUJ_ 0 8 3009 
IN RE: 
Petition: 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
Sdn F. Grissom 
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office 
WAC 08 201 50991 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office ("AAO") on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the 
appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant visa petition seeking to employ the beneficiary an L-1B intracompany 
transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
("the Act"), 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner, a semiconductor manufacturer, is the parent company of 
the beneficiary's foreign employer located in Malaysia. The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary as an 
equipment process engineer at its Aloha, Oregon facility for a period of approximately 8 months. 
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge or that he has been or will be employed in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. 
In denying the petition, the director observed that the record consisted primarily of the unsupported assertions 
of the petitioner, and that such assertions were insufficient to establish the beneficiary's eligibility. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director disregarded the petitioner's probative evidence of 
the beneficiary's eligibility for L-1B classification without consideration or analysis. Counsel asserts that the 
petitioner clearly differentiated the beneficiary's knowledge from that of the petitioning organization's 
remaining U.S. workforce. Counsel further asserts that the director requested evidence that "simply remains 
unavailable," and inappropriately denied the petition based on a lack of evidence. Counsel submits a detailed 
brief in support of the appeal. 
To establish L-1 eligibility under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the petitioner must demonstrate that the 
beneficiary, within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, has 
been employed abroad in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a capacity involving specialized 
knowledge, for one continuous year by a qualifying organization. The petitioner must also demonstrate that the 
beneficiary seeks to enter the United States temporarily in order to continue to render services to the same 
employer or a subsidiary or afiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized 
knowledge. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(~) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
WAC 08 201 50991 
Page 3 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The primary issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary has been 
and will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity and whether the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge. 8 C.F.R. $5 214.2(1)(3)(ii) and (iv). 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1184(c)(2)(B), provides: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
The petitioner filed the Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker, on July 14, 2008. In a letter dated July 
3, 2008, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary will be employed in the position of equipment process engineer, 
responsible for achieving TRDS (Tape Reel and Die Sort) tool stability and "achieving 85% AU goal." The 
petitioner described the proposed duties as follows: 
Tool problem troubleshooting; 
Monitoring AU% performance; 
Sustaining the tool stability via an excursion prevention plan; and 
Performing preventive maintenance. 
The position requires an employee who possesses specialized and advanced integrated 
knowledge of [the petitioner's] Die Prep processes, [the petitioner's] Tape Reel and Die Sort 
(TRDS) methodology and [the petitioner's] new product integration process. These processes 
and methodologies are proprietary to [the petitioner] as they were developed by [company] 
engineers. This knowledge is specialized because it is [company]-specific. It can only be 
acquired through on-the-job training at [the petitioner or its subsidiaries] and cannot be acquired 
through education or work experience with another company. 
The petitioner stated that the beneficiary has been employed by its subsidiary in Malaysia since December 1997, 
where he currently serves as an equipment process engineer, performing similar duties. The petitioner described 
the beneficiary's current duties as the following: 
WAC 08 20 1 5099 1 
Page 4 
At [the foreign entity], [the beneficiary] is responsible for facilitating documentation and 
implementation of improvement projects, and new processes and products. He manages and 
supervises preventive maintenance crews. He organizes machine preventive maintenance work, 
monitors tool performance, and works with the module owner to increase the tool stability, 
utilization and the product yield. He is also responsible for improving manufacturability, safety 
and robustness of production areas. 
The petitioner further described the beneficiary's qualifications as follows: 
The position requires familiarity of proprietary, advanced semiconductor equipment technology, 
including but not limited to [the petitioner's] proprietary manufacturing processes, as well as [the 
petitioner's] operational and production procedural guidelines. As a result of [the beneficiary's] 
specialized knowledge in these areas, he is at a more advanced level than other employees at the 
[foreign entity] who have the same job title. [The beneficiary] was selected for this temporary 
assignment because of his specialized knowledge of these [company] proprietary processes and 
systems. 
[The beneficiary] possesses an advanced level of specialized knowledge and expertise with 
respect to [the petitioner's] processes and technologies. 
The petitioner referred to a 1994 legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) memorandum that 
addresses the interpretation of specialized knowledge and stated that the beneficiary meets the criteria set forth in 
1 
the memorandum and the applicable regulations. 
 Specifically, the petitioner stated: 
[The beneficiary] possesses an advanced and specialized knowledge of [the petitioner's] Die Prep 
processes, [the petitioner's] Tape Reel and Die Sort (TRDS) methodology and [the petitioner's] 
new product integration process. He has expertise in [the petitioner's] manufacturing processes 
and products which he acquired at [the foreign entity] through on-the-job training and site 
training classes. Specifically, he has spent the last ten years in on-the-job training using [the 
petitioner's] proprietary manufacturing processes. 
The only evidence submitted in support of the petition was a partial copy of the petitioner's 2007 Annual Report. 
The director issued a request for additional evidence on July 23, 2008, advising the petitioner that the initial 
evidence was insufficient to establish that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. Specifically, the 
director instructed the petitioner to submit: (1) a more detailed description of the duties to be performed by the 
beneficiary in the United States; (2) information regarding the total number of foreign nationals employed at the 
location where the beneficiary will be employed, including their job titles and visa status; (3) the number of L- 1B 
visa holders transferred to the U.S. location over the last five years; (4) the number of persons at the U.S. location 
holding the same or similar positions as the beneficiary; (5) evidence regarding any special or advanced duties 
performed by the beneficiary, including an explanation as to how the beneficiary's duties abroad and in the United 
' Memorandum of James A. Puleo, Acting Exec. Assoc. Comm., INS, Interpretation of Special Knowledge 
(March 9, 1994)(hereinafter "Puleo memorandum"). 
WAC 08 201 50991 
Page 5 
States are different from those performed by others in similar positions; (6) evidence that the beneficiary's training 
or experience is uncommon, noteworthy or distinguished by some unusual quality and not generally known by 
others employed by the petitioner in the same field; and (7) information regarding the positions the beneficiary 
has held with the foreign entity and why the beneficiary was selected for the position in the United States. The 
director advised that the petitioner should submit probative evidence to corroborate the statements made in its 
initial filing. 
In response to the RFE, the petitioner submitted a letter dated September 2, 2008. The petitioner explained its use 
of the L-1B classification, noting that its design, fabrication and manufacturing sites are located around the world. 
The petitioner noted that each product is assigned to a particular business group, which often includes both U.S. 
and foreign employees, resulting in a need for U.S. and foreign sites to partner resources from conception to the 
final production phases of an assigned product. The petitioner emphasized that in cases where a business group 
has both U.S. and foreign employees working on a product, "the employees are not duplicating work or 
development. Rather each site contributes to a portion of the production, with an eye toward merging activities to 
generate a single, quality product." 
The petitioner stated that it utilizes the L-1B classification to temporarily bring the team lead of each business 
group to the U.S. for critical steps in the production cycle, and to "temporarily bring team leads and/or team 
members with specific advanced knowledge of [the petitioner's] proprietary processes and products to assist the 
U.S. team andlor site with new processes and/or tools" as required by production cycle deadlines. The petitioner 
stated that, in the instant matter, the beneficiary is needed to assist its Aloha, Oregon site "to prepare its tape and 
reel die sort ('TRDS') machinery/tools and to improve its tools stability and staff competency for an increased 
production ramp. " 
The petitioner provided additional background information regarding "the equipment and process at the core of 
the petition," as follows: 
One of the processes contained within [the petitioner's] overall semiconductor manufacturing 
process is the Die Prep Assembly process. This process incorporates tools and equipment to 
separate dice from [company]-manufactured wafers and transfer the dice to a carrier tape reel. 
The dice are then sealed in the carrier tape as an individual assembly lot and processed through 
to the chip attached module operation. This is a critical step in the manufacturing process, 
allowing large-scale, efficient die assembly and subsequent semiconductor production. 
The above process requires TRDS machinery and tools to complete the separation and transfer 
of the die. So that this step of the processes does not jeopardize the budget or deadline of the 
entire manufacturing process, the tool stability rate, or "actual utilization" of the tools, must be at 
85% or higher throughout the process. Maintaining this level of performance requires improving 
tool stability to comply with other [company] sites, identifying gaps in the tool actual utilization, 
expediting repair time, and utilizing on-site staff that can efficiently handle TRDS gaps, errors 
and maintenance. 
In this case, the particular specialized knowledge is the in-depth, on-the-job use of [the 
petitioner's] tools and equipment within the die prep assembly process. 
WAC 08 201 50991 
Page 6 
In response to the director's request for a more detailed description of the duties the beneficiary will perform in 
the United States, the petitioner stated: 
While in the U.S., the beneficiary will use his significant experience in TRDS tools to assist the 
Aloha site in preparing for a ramp in production. This will require the beneficiary to complete 
the following prior to returning to Malaysia: 
Improve the Aloha site's tool stability. Tool stability is measured by tool actual 
utilization, which decreases in relation to the amount of time the tooVequipment remains 
inoperable due to errorslgaps in operation. As stated above, [the petitioner] requires 85% 
actual utilization to meet production standards and remain within project budget and 
deadline. Improving tool stability requires hands-on inspection of machinery/tools, on-site 
review of the Aloha site's current tool stability and assembly die processes, repairing 
gapslerrors, and developing a maintainable plan to keep the actual utilization at 85% or 
higher. 
New TRDS tools installation. [The petitioner] requires new TRDS tools to be installed at 
the Aloha site in preparation for the ramp in production. The beneficiary's in-depth 
experience and training provide him with the needed expertise to correctly install the new 
TRDS tools with an eye towards increased production and maintaining an 85% or higher 
rate of actual utilization. Installing the new TRDS tools will include docking the tools into 
the current Aloha Die Prep Assembly process, installing and leveling the operation of the 
tools, and qualifying and validating each tool prior to tool-specific production activities. 
Training Aloha site staff on new TRDS tools and in maintaining 85% actual 
utilization. [The petitioner] seeks to utilize the beneficiary's training and experience to 
train the Aloha site's staff on using the new TRDS tools and maintaining the required 85% 
actual utilization rate needed to ensure the success of the ramp in production. [The 
petitioner's] Malaysian site is Best in Class among [the company's] worldwide sites in 
terms of actual utilization rate, and the beneficiary's experience and training have 
significantly contributed to this distinction. To ensure the success of the ramp in 
production, the beneficiary will increase staff capability and competency so that the Aloha 
site's assembly die process is on par with the Malaysia site. This will involve developing a 
plan to maintain the actual utilization rate, training staff on TRDS tools operation, 
maintenance and repair, and establishing TRDS best known methods, one point lesson, 
and response flow charts. 
The petitioner emphasized that performance of these duties "requires intricate knowledge of [the petitioner's] 
TRDS tools and equipment, TRDS tool actual utilization in relation to the assembly die process, and the specific 
assembly die process in relation to the overall Intel production cycle." The petitioner indicated that such 
knowledge "can only be gained through on-the-job experience with [the petitioner's] TRDS tools, [the 
petitioner's] assembly die process, and die equipment supplier-provided training." 
The petitioner indicated that it currently employs only four foreign nationals at the Aloha, Oregon site, out of 
1,011 employees, although it submitted a chart indicating that it requested L-1B visas for 22 employees in 2008, 
WAC 08 201 50991 
Page 7 
including 14 manufacturing technicians, a manufacturing technical supervisor, a manufacturing equipment 
technician, and a preventive maintenance technician, among other positions. 
The petitioner indicated that it currently employs one equipment process engineer who holds the job title "TRDS 
Engineer" at the Aloha, Oregon worksite, and notes that the beneficiary will work directly with this employee to 
accomplish his objectives in the United States. The petitioner stated that the TRDS Engineer "possesses a much 
lower level of experience working solely with TRDS tools and much lower level of training than the beneficiary 
has completed." The petitioner explained that the beneficiary's proposed assignment is in response to an 
upcoming ramp in production, so the duties have not been previously performed in the United States. In addition, 
the petitioner explained that the beneficiary "is only traveling to the U.S. very briefly to assist the TRDS Engineer 
providing paths to establishing and maintaining the required actual utilization rate." 
In response to the director's request that the petitioner explain any special or advanced duties performed by the 
beneficiary, the petitioner stated: 
The beneficiary's duties differ from the other [company] employees because his duties have 
focused solely on [the petitioner's] TRDS tools and their actual utilization. [The petitioner] 
employs similar engineers, but the beneficiary is the only engineer with his level of experience 
and training that has played a central role in allowing [the foreign entity's Malaysian] Die Prep 
Assembly process to earn the distinction of Best in Class. [The petitioner's] Malaysian Die Prep 
Assembly process is the model for other [company] sites and the beneficiary's duties operate at 
the higher level needed to bring other [company] sites up to par. The beneficiary's training and 
experience, addressed below, provide the skills needed to ensure the proper installation and 
maintenance of TRDS tools/machinery within the Die Prep Assembly process. This elevated 
level of knowledge separates and elevates the beneficiary above the other engineers working 
within Die Prep Assembly. 
[The petitioning organization] has continuously employed the beneficiary in highly specialized 
position. He is a key process equipment engineer, and the only engineer with the level of 
experience in TRDS tools that will be present at the Aloha site to assist in preparing for the 
upcoming ramp in production. Other workers, whether employed by [the petitioner] or not, 
cannot step into the beneficiary's role because of the specific [company] TRDS tools knowledge, 
experience and training needed to prepare the Aloha site's Die Prep Assembly process for 
increased production. 
In response to the director's request that the petitioner explain how the beneficiary's training or experience is 
uncommon, noteworthy, or distinguished by some unusual quality, the petitioner explained that the beneficiary 
has spent the last five years working with TRDS tools, including TRDS stability, developing establishing and 
maintaining TRDS best known methods, and acting as the first stage of escalation for TRDS errors and/or gaps. 
The petitioner noted that he beneficiary has completed "vital training programs that provide him with specific 
knowledge that can be applied to [the petitioner's] specific assembly die process and TRDS tools." The petitioner 
described this training as follows: 
WAC 08 201 50991 
Page 8 
In May 2005, the beneficiary completed Level 3 module training for die bonding equipment, 
SWISSLINE 9021 MT. The beneficiary also completed additional training for the above in 
2008. Both training sessions were conducted by Kulicke & Soffa, the world's leading supplier of 
semiconductor assembly equipment, tools and materials. . . . 
The beneficiary is the only Equipment Process Engineer within the prep die assembly unit that 
possesses the above training and five-plus years experience working solely with [the petitioner's] 
TRDS tools. Furthermore, and more importantly, the beneficiary will one of only two Equipment 
Process Engineers at the Aloha site, and the only Equipment Process Engineer with the training 
and narrowly tailored experience listed above. 
Finally, the petitioner noted that the beneficiary has been chosen as the foreign entity's "Employee of the Year" 
for the last four years "due to his exceptional work with [the petitioner's] TRDS toosl within [the foreign entity's] 
assembly die process." 
The petitioner submitted the following documents in support of its response: (1) a certificate recognizing the 
beneficiary's completion of the training course titled "Swissline 9021MT: L1, L2, L3 DAF & UPI" with Kulicke 
& Soffa, Inc. between August 11, 2008 and August 15, 2008; (2) a certificate recognizing the beneficiary's 
completion of Swissline 9021MT ModuleILevel 3 Training with Alphasem Training between May 8, 2005 and 
May 12, 2005; and (3) a copy of the beneficiary's "Employee of the Year 2007" award issued by the foreign 
entity. 
The director denied the petition on September 12, 2008, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the 
beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge, or that he has been and would be employed in a capacity that 
requires specialized knowledge. In denying the petition, the director found inadequate support for the petitioner's 
claim that the beneficiary possesses a specialized or advanced body of knowledge beyond what is commonly 
found in the industry. The director emphasized that the record consists primarily of the petitioner's unsupported 
assertions. The director determined that the petitioner did not demonstrate that the beneficiary's duties are so 
exceptional and out of the ordinary that the beneficiary's knowledge constitutes special or advanced knowledge. 
The director noted that the record does not distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge as more advanced than the 
knowledge possessed by other similarly trained and experienced persons employed by the petitioner's 
organization or in the industry as a whole. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director failed to consider the evidence submitted in response 
to the RFE, and instead relied on "boilerplate" language that did not include a meaningful analysis of the 
petitioner's evidence. Counsel asserts that the petitioner submitted significant probative evidence to establish that 
the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge and satisfied all statutory and regulatory criteria for L-1B status. 
Counsel contends that, contrary to the director's findings, the petitioner provided significant probative evidence to 
establish that the beneficiary is a key employee possessing specialized knowledge. Specifically, counsel states: 
[The petitioner] provided significant evidence of [the beneficiary's] specialized knowledge in the form of 
training certifications and an Employee of the Year award. 
WAC 08 201 50991 
Page 9 
Specifically, [the beneficiary] has completed training programs conducted by Kulicke & Soffa, 
the world's leading supplier of semiconductor assembly equipment, tools and materials, and 
Alphasem, which is owned by Kulicke & Soffa. . . . [The beneficiary] completed training 
programs in Swissline 9021 MT L1, L2, L3, DAP & UP1 and Swissline MT Level 3 Module 
Training, which are Kulicke & Soffa die sorting and bonding platforms. Such training is not 
provided by [the petitioner], but by the supplier, at a significant cost to [the 
petitioner]. As [the petitioner] stated in the response to the RFE, not all [company] employees 
receive this advanced training, and the beneficiary is the only employee within the Malaysian 
DPA group that was provided the opportunity to complete this training. . . . The beneficiary's key 
status within [the petitioner] is demonstrated by his inclusion in the select few that received the 
supplier-provided training. 
[The beneficiary's] critical importance to [the petitioner] is further evidenced by the Employee of 
the Year award granted to the beneficiary in 2007, and [the petitioner's] confirmation that he has 
been named Malaysia Employee of the Year for the last four years, evidence of which was 
provided in response to the RFE. 
Counsel emphasizes that the beneficiary's five years of employment focused solely on a specific technology has 
allowed the beneficiary to create "a niche of expertise with TRDS tools, and contribute to [the foreign entity's] 
standard-setting DPA tool actualization rate." Counsel further asserts that the exclusivity of the beneficiary's 
training "instills the beneficiary with knowledge that surpasses the "elementary or basic knowledge" possessed by 
others and is "tangible evidence of advanced training that [the petitioner] does not provide to the majority of its 
workforce." In addition, counsel asserts that "it is incongruous that an employer would grant an employee of the 
year award to an employee that exercises mere 'elementary or basic knowledge' in the work environment." 
Counsel claims that the award "further establishes the beneficiary's key, integral role within [the petitioner] and 
his specialized knowledge in the area of TRDS tools and DPA process." 
In addition, counsel asserts that the petitioner provided sufficient evidence in response to the director's specific 
requests to establish that the petitioner has employed the beneficiary in a position requiring specialized 
knowledge, including a detailed description of the DPA process and the crucial part the process plays in the 
petitioner's large-scale manufacturing of semiconductor products. Counsel contends that the director disregarded 
the critical nature of the DPA process, and states that the petitioner's decision to "provide the beneficiary with 
exclusive training in DPA technology while concentrating his duties exclusively on DPA tools and processes 
signifies the crucial role [the petitioner] has expected the beneficiary to play within the DPA process." Counsel 
contends that the detail the petitioner provided regarding the DPA process is "evidence that [the petitioner] 
employed [the beneficiary] in a specialized knowledge capacity." 
Moreover, counsel asserts that the director implemented an untenable standard by requiring that the petitioner 
distinguish the beneficiary from other workers in the semiconductor industry. Counsel emphasizes that the 
petitioner does not have access to and cannot provide information that pertains to the confidential and proprietary 
standards of its competitors. Counsel further asserts that the standard of comparing an L-1B beneficiary to 
employees outside the petitioner's operations is not mandated by statute or regulation. Counsel asserts: 
WAC 08 20 1 5099 1 
Page 10 
The L-1B classification is based on employment with a petitioner and a beneficiary's 
qualifications; thus, the petitioner's statement/documentation regarding employment and the 
beneficiary's documentation of training and education are the applicable and appropriate "hard 
evidence" of specialized knowledge. 
Ultimately, the comparative evidence requested by [the director] cannot be provided, and 
therefore, creates a standard that is impossible to meet. [The petitioner] properly established 
specialized knowledge by detailing the importance of the process at hand and documenting the 
beneficiary's specialized training and exemplary performance. This viable "hard" evidence 
establishes [the beneficiary] as a key employee possessing specialized knowledge and provides 
the requisite basis for approving [the petitioner's] L-1B petition. 
Counsel contends that the director's decision should be reversed because the director ignored the evidence it 
requested to establish specialized knowledge, which counsel asserts was included in the petitioner's response to 
the WE. Counsel states that the director's "failure to consider the significance of the process at hand, and simply 
decide, without basis or analysis, that [the beneficiary] is not playing a critical role in an essential process erodes 
the validity of [the] denial. Counsel requests that in light of the director's failure to consider the petitioner's 
response to the WE, the director's decision should be overturned. 
Upon review, counsel's assertions are not persuasive. The petitioner has not established that the beneficiary 
has specialized knowledge or that she has been or will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity as 
defined at 8 C.F.R. Cj 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). 
As a preliminary matter, the AAO acknowledges counsel's argument that the director did not consider the 
evidence submitted in response to the RFE. When denying a petition, a director has an affirmative duty to 
explain the specific reasons for the denial; this duty includes informing a petitioner why the evidence failed to 
satisfy its burden of proof pursuant to section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. Cj 1361. See 8 C.F.R. 5 103.3(a)(l)(i). 
While the AAO concurs with the director's ultimate conclusion, the notice of decision could have been more 
detailed in its analysis, particularly with regard to explaining why the documentary evidence submitted in 
response to the RFE was insufficient to establish the beneficiary's eligibility. As the AAO's review is 
conducted on a de novo basis, the AAO will herein address the petitioner's evidence and eligibility. The AAO 
maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a de novo basis. 5 U.S.C. 557(b) ("On appeal from or 
review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision 
except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); see also, Janka v. US. Dept. of Transp., NTSB, 925 
F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO's de novo authority has been long recognized by the federal 
courts. See, e.g. Dor v. INS, 89 1 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989). 
Looking to the language of the statutory definition of specialized knowledge at section 2 14(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 
Congress has provided USCIS with an ambiguous definition. In this regard, one Federal district court explained 
the infeasibility of applying a bright-line test to define what constitutes specialized knowledge: 
WAC 08 20 1 5099 1 
Page 11 
This ambiguity is not merely the result of an unfortunate choice of dictionaries. It reflects the 
relativistic nature of the concept special. An item is special only in the sense that it is not 
ordinary; to define special one must first define what is ordinary. . . . There is no logical or 
principled way to determine which baseline of ordinary knowledge is a more appropriate reading 
of the statute, and there are countless other baselines which are equally plausible. Simply put, 
specialized knowledge is a relative and empty idea which cannot have a plain meaning. CJ: 
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 537 (1 982). 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. 9,14-15 (D.D.C., 1990)~ 
While Congress did not provide explicit guidance for what should be considered ordinary knowledge, the 
principles of statutory interpretation provide some clue as to the intended scope of the L-1B specialized 
knowledge category. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987) 
(citing INSv. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207,94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)). 
First, the AAO must look to the language of section 214(c)(2)(B) itself, that is, the terms "special" and 
"advanced." Like the courts, the AAO customarily turns to dictionaries for help in determining whether a word in 
a statute has a plain or common meaning. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 109 F.3d 965, 967-68 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(using Webster's Dictionary for "therefore"). According to Webster's New College Dictionavy, the word "special" 
is commonly found to mean "surpassing the usual" or "exceptional." Webster's New College Dictionavy, 1084 
(3rd Ed. 2008). The dictionary defines the word "advanced" as "highly developed or complex" or "at a higher 
level than others." Id. at 17. 
Second, looking at the term's placement within the text of section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the AAO notes that 
specialized knowledge is used to describe the nature of a person's employment and that the term is listed among 
the higher levels of the employment hierarchy together with "managerial" and "executive" employees. Based on 
the context of the term within the statute, the AAO therefore would expect a specialized knowledge employee to 
occupy an elevated position within a company that rises above that of an ordinary or average employee. See 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 14. 
Third, a review of the legislative history for both the original 1970 statute and the subsequent 1990 statute 
indicates that Congress intended for USCIS to closely administer the L-1B category. Specifically, the original 
drafters of section 101 (a)(] 5)(L) of the Act intended that the class of persons eligible for the L-1 classification 
would be "narrowly drawn" and "carefully regulated and monitored" by USCIS. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91- 
851 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750,2754, 1970 WL 5815. The legislative history of the 1970 Act 
plainly states that "the number of temporary admissions under the proposed 'L' category will not be large." Id In 
addition, the Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended for "key personnel." 
See generally, id. The term "key personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "[olf 
crucial importance." Webster S New College Dictionary 620 (3rd ed., Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing 
Although 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General was decided prior to enactment of the statutory definition of 
specialized knowledge by the Immigration Act of 1990, the court's discussion of the ambiguity in the legacy 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) definition is equally illuminating when applied to the definition 
created by Congress. 
WAC 08 201 50991 
Page 12 
Co. 2008). Moreover, during the course of the sub-committee hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically 
questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify under the proposed "L" category. In response 
to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that they understood the legislation would allow 
"high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, and that it would not include "lower 
categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." See H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration 
Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445,9 1 st Cong. 2 10,2 18,223,240,248 (Nov. 12, 1969). 
Neither in 1970 nor in 1990 did Congress provide a controlling, unambiguous definition of "specialized 
knowledge," and a narrow interpretation is consistent with so much of the legislative intent as it is possible to 
determine. H. Rep. No. 9 1-85 1 at 6, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2754. This interpretation is consistent with legislative 
history, which has been largely supportive of a narrow reading of the definition of specialized knowledge and the 
L-1 visa classification in general. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 15-16; Boi Na Braza 
Atlanta, LLC v. Upchurch, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 2372846 at *4 (N.D.Tex., 2005), afd 194 
Fed.Appx. 248 (5th Cir. 2006); Fibermaster, Ltd. v. INS., Not Reported in F.Supp., 1990 WL 99327 (D.D.C., 
1990); Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Dept. of Justice, Civ. Action 00-2977-LFO (D.D.C. April 6, 2001)(on file with 
AAO). 
Further, although the Immigration Act of 1990 provided a statutory definition of the term "specialized 
knowledge" in section 214(c)(2) of the Act, the definition did not generally expand the class of persons eligible 
for L-1B specialized knowledge visas. Pub.L. No. 101-649, 5 206(b)(2), 104 Stat. 4978, 5023 (1990). Instead, 
the legislative history indicates that Congress created the statutory definition of specialized knowledge for the 
express purpose of clarifying a previously undefined term from the Immigration Act of 1970. H.R. Rep. 101- 
723(I) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6749, 1990 WL 200418 ("One area within the L visa that 
requires more specificity relates to the term 'specialized knowledge.' Varying interpretations by INS have 
exacerbated the problem."). While the 1990 Act declined to codify the "proprietary knowledge" and "United 
States labor market" references that had existed in the previous agency definition found at 8 C.F.R. 
214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) (1988), there is no indication that Congress intended to liberalize its own 1970 definition of 
the L-1 visa classification. 
If any conclusion can be drawn from the enactment of the statutory definition of specialized knowledge in section 
2 14(c)(2)(B), it would be based on the nature of the Congressional clarification itself. By not including any strict 
criterion in the ultimate statutory definition and further emphasizing the relativistic aspect of "special knowledge," 
Congress created a standard that requires USClS to make a factual determination that can only be determined on a 
case-by-case basis, based on the agency's expertise and discretion. Rather than a bright-line standard that would 
support a more rigid application of the law, Congress gave the INS a more flexible standard that requires an 
adjudication based on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. CJ: Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 33 1 F.3d 
369, 377 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89,91 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
To determine what is special or advanced, USCIS must first determine the baseline of ordinary. As a 
baseline, the terms "special" or "advanced" must mean more than simply "skilled" or "experienced." By 
itself, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically complex products will not equal "special 
knowledge." See Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 53 (Comm. 1982). In general, all employees can 
reasonably be considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the 
overall economic success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. 
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An employee of "crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average 
employee. In other words, specialized knowledge generally requires more than a short period of experience; 
otherwise special or advanced knowledge would include every employee in an organization with the 
exception of trainees and entry-level staff. If everyone in an organization is specialized, then no one can be 
considered truly specialized. Such an interpretation strips the statutory language of any efficacy and cannot 
have been what Congress intended. 
Considering the definition of specialized knowledge, it is the petitioner's, not USCIS's, burden to articulate 
and establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" 
knowledge. 
 Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1184(c)(2)(B). USCIS cannot make a factual 
determination regarding the beneficiary's specialized knowledge if the petitioner does not, at a minimum, 
articulate with specificity the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, describe how such knowledge is 
typically gained within the organization, and explain how and when the beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
Once the petitioner articulates the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and type of 
evidence which establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized knowledge. A 
petitioner's assertion that the beneficiary possesses advanced knowledge of the processes and procedures of 
the company must be supported by evidence describing and distinguishing that knowledge from the 
elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others. Because "special" and "advanced" are comparative 
terms, the petitioner should provide evidence that allows USCIS to assess the beneficiary's knowledge 
relative to others in the petitioner's workforce or relative to similarly employed workers in the petitioner's 
specific industry. 
In examining the specialized knowledge of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's description of 
the job duties and the weight of the evidence supporting any asserted specialized knowledge. See 8 C.F.R. 
9 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed job description of the services to be performed sufficient to 
establish specialized knowledge. Merely asserting that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" 
knowledge will not suffice to meet the petitioner's burden of proof. 
Upon review, the petitioner in this case has failed to establish either that the beneficiary's position in the 
United States or abroad requires an employee with specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has 
specialized knowledge. Although the petitioner repeatedly asserts that the beneficiary has been and will be 
employed in a "specialized knowledge" capacity, the petitioner has not adequately articulated any basis to 
support this claim, particularly with respect to the beneficiary's employment with the foreign entity. The 
petitioner has not sufficiently described and documented any special or advanced body of knowledge which 
would distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge from that of other equipment process engineers employed by 
the company, other than providing two training certificates and an employee of the year award. One of the 
two training certificates was for a course completed in August 2008, subsequent to the filing of the petition. 
The petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing the nonimmigrant visa petition. A visa petition 
may not be approved at a future date after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of 
facts. Matter of Michelin Tire Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Comm. 1978). 
Evidence of the beneficiary's training and experience is critical as, the petitioner appears to claim that the 
beneficiary's specific training and experience render him uniquely qualified within the petitioner's 
WAC 08 201 50991 
Page 14 
multinational organization to perform the proposed services in the United States. The petitioner's initial filing 
contained little more than conclusory assertions regarding the beneficiary's specialized knowledge. 
While the petitioner did submit documentary evidence in response to the director's request for evidence, the 
AAO is not persuaded that completion of a five-day course in Swissline 9021MT Level 3 training delivered 
by the equipment supplier renders the beneficiary's knowledge relatively "advanced" within the organization. 
The petitioner offers no explanation regarding the purpose of the training, what the training entails, who is 
eligible to complete "Level 3" training, and how training provided by a third-party organization imparts 
advanced knowledge specific to the petitioning company. The entity that provided the training appears to be 
the main supplier of die bonding equipment for the semiconductor industry and neither the equipment nor 
training on the equipment has been shown to be exclusive to the petitioning company. 
The petitioner manufactures semiconductors at various facilities worldwide. It is reasonable to assume, given 
the size and scope of the organization, that it routinely manufactures its semiconductor products at a high 
volume and therefore uses the assembly Die Prep Process and Tape Reel and Die Sort (TRDS) methodologies 
to do so. The petitioner has not provided information regarding the training normally received by equipment 
process engineers and other technical staff working with these processes, such that the AAO could reasonably 
conclude that one week of supplier-provided training renders the instant beneficiary's knowledge advanced and 
uncommon within the company. It seems more likely than not that the petitioner ensures that all of its employees 
are well-trained in the equipment that they use. The petitioner has not identified the criteria it uses to select 
employees for supplier-provided training out of the pool of employees performing the same or similar duties, or 
working on the same equipment or processes. Essentially, the petitioner's somewhat circular logic indicates that 
employees who have completed the supplier-provided training possess advanced knowledge and that the 
beneficiary's knowledge is advanced because he was selected to complete the training. The record as presently 
constituted does not provide any context within which to evaluate the petitioner's claims regarding the 
beneficiary's "advanced" knowledge. 
The petitioner also indicates that its employees are typically assigned to specific business groups with their 
work confined to a specific product, thus suggesting that it is normal within the company for employees to 
develop narrowly tailored experience and skill sets. However, the petitioner has not identified the specific 
product or products with which the beneficiary has worked in Malaysia or will work in the United States, and 
his claimed specialized knowledge is described generally as the "Die prep assembly process" and TRDS 
methodologies. While the petitioner repeatedly refers to a "ramp in production" to take place at the Aloha 
facility, it is unclear what product is being manufactured and whether the beneficiary has specific prior 
experience in the die prep assembly and TRDS processes for that product. As noted above, some level of 
knowledge of die prep assembly and TRDS processes and methodologies would necessarily be found among 
personnel at any of the company's semiconductor manufacturing and assembly factories. 
The only known equipment with which the beneficiary has worked is Swissline 9021MT die bonding 
equipment. Although the petitioner states that the beneficiary will participate in the installation of "new" 
equipment at the Aloha, Oregon site, the petitioner has not specified what the exactly what the "new" 
equipment is, or what type of equipment is already present at the site. Given that the site already employs a 
"TRDS Engineer," it is evident that TRDS equipment and methodologies are already being used at the site. 
Furthermore, the fact that only one person at the site has exactly the same job title as the beneficiary does not 
WAC 08 201 50991 
Page 15 
exclude the likelihood that other workers at the site are trained and experienced in the die prep assembly 
process and TRDS equipment and methodologies. It is reasonable to believe that assembly and manufacture 
of semiconductors using these processes would require the participation of multiple levels of staff, including 
technicians, engineers and supervisors. 
As further evidence of the beneficiary's advanced knowledge, the petitioner emphasizes that the beneficiary's 
duties have been concentrated exclusively on DPA tools and processes, and that such singular focus "signifies the 
crucial role [the petitioner] has expected the beneficiary to play within the DPA process." The AAO has no basis 
to evaluate this statement, as it is not known if equipment process engineers within the organization typically 
specialize on one area of the manufacturing process or whether they typically rotate to different assignments to 
learn different equipment and methodologies. The role of the equipment process engineer in the overall assembly 
and manufacturing process and relative to other manufacturing positions is also unclear. The petitioner indicates 
that the beneficiary was hired as a technician and later promoted to his current position, but there is insufficient 
basis to conclude that equipment process engineers in general, or the beneficiary in particular, are employed in a 
"crucial role." Again, the petitioner has not explained how the beneficiary's role in the manufacturing process 
differs from other employees who work with die prep assembly processes and tools, other than indicating that he 
has worked with such processes for five years and completed one week of supplier-provided training in the 
equipment he uses to perform his duties. Such background information regarding the beneficiary's employment 
is important given the claim that the beneficiary has developed a highly unusual skill set that is rare within the 
organization. 
Overall, the petitioner in its initial filing provided little basis for its assertion that the beneficiary's knowledge 
is "more advanced" that that of similarly-employed workers, who also would also reasonably complete 
company training in the petitioner's products and processes, nor did it provide any documentation of the 
beneficiary's claimed training. Therefore, the director asked the petitioner to explain how the beneficiary's 
duties performed abroad are different from those of other workers in the same type of position, and to explain 
how the beneficiary's training or experience is uncommon, noteworthy or distinguished by some unusual 
quality and not generally known by the petitioner's employees working in the same field. The director noted 
that the petitioner should submit "probative evidence to corroborate the statements made in its initial filing." 
It should be noted that this request was separate from the director's request for evidence regarding the number 
of similarly-employed workers in the United States and abroad, and the number of L-1B visa holders located 
at the U.S. facility to which the beneficiary will be transferred. 
In response to the director's request for evidence as to how the beneficiary's training or experience differ from 
those of other employees in the petitioner's workforce, the petitioner stated that his duties differ because "his 
duties have focused solely on [company] TRDS tools and their actual utilization," and because "he is the only 
engineer with his level of experience and training that has played a central role in allowing [the foreign 
entity's] Die Prep Assembly process to earn the distinction of 'Best in Class."' This response does not explain 
in any detail how his duties differ from those of other engineers. Being an employee of the facility that earned 
the "Best in Class" distinction does not automatically impart the beneficiary with advanced or specialized 
knowledge of the petitioner's processes. Neither is the beneficiary's "Employee of the Year" award alone 
evidence that the beneficiary has made a significant contribution to developing a key process or evidence of 
his advanced knowledge of the petitioner's processes. Clearly, the beneficiary has successfully performed his 
job duties and is a valued employee, but the exact reason for the issuance of the award has not been explained 
WAC 08 20 1 5099 1 
Page 16 
and cannot be assumed to directly relate to the claimed specialized knowledge. 
The AAO acknowledges the petitioner's claim that the beneficiary has been responsible for "developing, 
establishing and maintaining TRDS best known methods," but again, the petitioner's explanation is general 
and fails to explain the nature and extent of the beneficiary's contribution to the development of these 
methods. Overall, there is a lack of detail in the petitioner's explanations regarding the beneficiary's claimed 
specialized knowledge, and therefore, insufficient context in which to make a reasoned determination that his 
knowledge can be considered "special" or "advanced" within the company. Given the lack of detail and the 
lack of any supporting evidence beyond the statements of counsel and the petitioner's human resources 
manager, one training certificate and the Employee of the Year Award, the AAO agrees that there is a lack of 
"probative evidence." 
The AAO finds, therefore, that the petitioner's response to the RFE offered insufficient evidence to 
corroborate its initial claim that the beneficiary "is at a more advanced level than other employees at the 
[company's] Malaysia site who have the same job title" The petitioner has not established that the instant 
beneficiary has "advanced knowledge" of the company's processes and procedures. 
Therefore, the remaining question before the AAO is whether the beneficiary's knowledge of and experience 
with the petitioner's proprietary products and processes alone constitutes specialized knowledge. While the 
current statutory and regulatory definitions of "specialized knowledge" do not include a requirement that the 
beneficiary's knowledge be proprietary, the petitioner cannot satisfy the current standard merely by 
establishing that the beneficiary's purported specialized knowledge is proprietary. The knowledge must still 
be either "special" or "advanced." As discussed above, the elimination of the bright-line "proprietary" 
standard did not, in fact, significantly liberalize the standards for the L-1B visa classification. 
Reviewing the precedent decisions that preceded the Immigration Act of 1990, there are a number of 
conclusions that were not based on the superseded regulatory definition, and therefore continue to apply to the 
adjudication of L-1B specialized knowledge petitions. In 1981, the INS recognized that "[tlhe modern 
workplace requires a high proportion of technicians and specialists." The agency concluded that: 
Most employees today are specialists and have been trained and given specialized knowledge. 
However, in view of the [legislative history], it can not be concluded that all employees with 
specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
intracompany transferees. The House Report indicates the employee must be a "key" person 
and associates this employee with "managerial personnel." 
Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. at 119-20. 
In a subsequent decision, the INS looked to the legislative history of the 1970 Act and concluded that a "broad 
definition which would include skilled workers and technicians was not discussed, thus the limited legislative 
history available therefore indicates that an expansive reading of the 'specialized knowledge' provision is not 
warranted." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 5 1. The decision continued: 
WAC 08 201 50991 
Page 17 
[I]n view of the House Report, it cannot be concluded that all employees with any level of 
specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
intra-company transferees. Such a conclusion would permit extremely large numbers of 
persons to qualify for the "L-1" visa. The House Report indicates that the employee must be 
a "key" person and "the numbers will not be large." 
Id. at 53. 
According to the reasoning of Matter of Penner, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically 
complex products, by itself, will not equal "special knowledge." USCIS must interpret specialized knowledge 
to require more than fundamental job skills or a short period of experience. 
The AAO acknowledges that the specialized knowledge need not be narrowly held within the organization in 
order to be considered "advanced." However, it is equally true to state that knowledge will not be considered 
"special" or "advanced" if it is universally or even widely held throughout a company. If all similarly 
employed workers within the petitioner's organization receive essentially the same training, then mere 
possession of knowledge of the petitioner's processes and methodologies does not rise to the level of 
specialized knowledge. The L-1B visa category was not created in order to allow the transfer of all 
employees with any degree of knowledge of a company's processes. If all employees are deemed to possess 
"special" or "advanced" knowledge, then that knowledge would necessarily be ordinary and commonplace. . 
Overall, the record does not establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is substantially different from the 
knowledge possessed by other equipment process engineers employed by the petitioning organization. The 
fact that the beneficiary and a select group of workers possess a very specific set of skills does not alone 
establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is indeed special or advanced. All employees can be said to possess 
unique skill sets to some degree. Moreover, the proprietary or unique qualities of the petitioner's process or 
product do not establish that any knowledge of this process is "specialized." Here, based on the petitioner's 
representations, its employees are assigned to work on a specific component of a specific product within a 
specific business group of the company and therefore the knowledge possessed by different technical 
employees, even those assigned to the same product, may be considered uncommon to some extent. 
Given this scenario, it appears that any technical employee working for the petitioning company would be 
deemed to have specialized knowledge, because they would all have "narrowly tailored" knowledge that is 
relatively rare within the company. This interpretation of "specialized knowledge" is untenable as it would 
essentially allow the petitioner to utilize the L-1B classification for virtually any employee who had one year 
of experience. Rather, the petitioner must establish that qualities of the particular process or product require 
an individual to have knowledge beyond what is common among its workforce, or to establish that the 
beneficiary has advanced knowledge of the product. This has not been established in this matter. The fact 
that other workers may not have the same level of experience with a particular product or process is not 
enough to equate to special or advanced knowledge if the gap could be closed by the petitioner by simply 
revealing the information to a similarly trained or experienced employee who has worked on a similar 
product. While the AAO acknowledges that there will be exceptions based on the facts of individual cases, 
an argument that an alien is unique among a small subset of workers, will not be deemed facially persuasive if 
a petitioner's definition of specialized knowledge is so broad that it would include the majority of its 
WAC 08 20 1 5099 1 
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workforce. 
The AAO acknowledges counsel's assertion regarding the essential nature of the process to be carried out by 
the beneficiary, and counsel's assertion that the fact the beneficiary was selected for the U.S. assignment 
points to his status as a critical employee. The AAO does not doubt that the beneficiary is a valuable 
employee who is capable of performing the work described, nor does it doubt that the work is important to the 
petitioner's manufacturing efforts. As discussed above, beneficiaries of L-1B petitions should be more than 
merely skilled, but rather must be shown to carry out key processes or functions. Based on the context of the 
term "specialized knowledge" within the statute, the AAO therefore would expect a specialized knowledge 
employee to occupy an elevated position within a company that rises above that of an ordinary or average 
employee. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 14. 
The claim that the petitioner does not employ an equipment process engineer with exactly the same 
experience as the beneficiary in Aloha, Oregon who could readily perform the intended duties does not 
automatically lead to a conclusion that the instant beneficiary must possess specialized or advanced 
knowledge. Contrary to counsel's assertions on appeal, the petitioner did not sufficiently distinguish the 
beneficiary in terms of his training and experience and the record remains lacking in information regarding 
his claimed on-site training, ten years of on-the-job training, and the duties he performed at the foreign entity 
that put him at a level above his peers in the manufacturing process. Again, the beneficiary's receipt of one 
week of training and an employee of the year award are not sufficient to establish the beneficiary's knowledge 
of the petitioner's processes as "advanced." 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, supra at 16. 
 The record does not establish that the 
beneficiary has specialized knowledge or that the position offered with the United States entity requires 
specialized knowledge. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
appeal will be dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.