dismissed L-1B Case: Software Applications

IJ.S. Department of lIomeland Security 
20 Mass. Ave. N.W. Rrn. A3042 
Washington, DC 20529 
wfying dadl &leted to 
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of personal privacy 
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U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
PUBLIC COPY 
FILE: EAC 03 123 50054 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date: APf? 0 9 2006 
IN RE: Petitioner: 
Beneficiary: 
PETITION: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1 10 1 (a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned 
to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
- - 
C L 
Robert P. Wiemann, Director 
Administrative Appeals Office 
EAC 03 123 50054 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa, and 
the decision was upheld after reviewing subsequent motions to reopen and/or reconsider.' The matter is 
now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. 
The petitioner is engaged in the business of software applications. It seeks to extend the employment of 
the beneficiary as an applications engineer pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 9 1101(a)(15)(L). The director determined that the petitioner had not 
established that (1) the beneficiary possesses the requisite specialized knowledge for the intended position 
or that (2) the position required an individual with specialized knowledge. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner alleges that the director's decision was an abuse of discretion 
because the petitioner had submitted sufficient evidence to establish that the beneficiary would be 
employed in a position requiring specialized knowledge. In support of this contention, counsel submits a 
brief and additional evidence. 
To establish L-1 eligibility, the petitioner must meet the criteria outlined in section lOl(a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 8 1 10 1(a)(15)(L). Specifically, within three years 
preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, a qualifying organization 
must have employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized 
knowledge capacity, for one continuous year. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United 
States temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or 
affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 4 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall 
be accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of the 
petition. 
' This petition was originally denied due to abandonment on August 12, 2003. The petitioner filed a 
motion to reopen and/or reconsider on August 28, 2003, which was granted by the director. The director 
upheld the previous decision, and issued a second denial on October 10, 2003. On October 28, 2003, the 
petitioner filed an appeal which the director treated as a motion, and once again the decision was upheld 
on May 19, 2004. The petitioner now submits the same appeal of the October 10, 2003 decision to the 
AAO for consideration. 
Upon review, it is noted that since the director's decision of May 19, 2004 was unfavorable to the 
petitioner, the director should have promptly forwarded the decision to the AAO for consideration. See 8 
C.F.R. section 103.3(a)(2)(iii) and (iv). Had the director done so, the petitioner would not have been 
obligated to file a second appeal in this matter. 
EAC 03 123 50054 
Page 3 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himlher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
This matter presents two related, but distinct, issues: (1) whether the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge; and, (2) whether the proposed employment is in a capacity that requires specialized 
knowledge. 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1184(c)(2)(B), provides the following: 
For purposes of section lOl(a)(lS)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its 
application in international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the 
organization's processes and procedures. 
On the L Supplement to Form 1-129, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary was employed by the 
foreign entity for nearly two years before coming to the United States in May 2000. The petitioner 
further clarified that the beneficiary entered the United States as an L-1B intracompany transferee with 
specialized knowledge and described his position as follows: 
In the position of Applications Engineer, [the beneficiary] will be primarily responsible 
for working with Applications Consultants to design, develop, and implement 
improvements and additions to [the petitioner's] Rhythm Demand Management product 
suite of supply chain management software applications. In this position he will utilize 
his degree in Engineering as well as his highly specialized knowledge of [the petitioner's] 
Rhythm Demand Management product suite, including the Rhythm Demand Planner, 
Rhythm Demand Analyzer, and Rhythm Demand Administrator, and [the petitioner's] 
procedures and techniques for the design, development, implementation, integration, and 
testing of software applications for the Rhythm Demand Management product suite. His 
duties will include: consulting with Applications Consultants to plan, design, and develop 
supply chain management software applications to resolve specific needs of industrial 
clients; implement and integrate new applications and improvements with existing client 
systems and existing applications for the Rhythm Demand Management product suite; 
perform issue replication, resolution and verification for Rhythm Demand Management 
applications; and perform on-site systems, integration, and acceptance testing for new 
Rhythm Demand Management applications. 
EAC 03 123 50054 
Page 4 
In a statement submitted with the petition dated March 3, 2003, the petitioner further described the 
background for the beneficiary's qualifications as follows: 
[The beneficiary] was employed by [the foreign entity] in the position of Senior 
Consultant continuously and without interruptions from August, 1998 to May, 2000. 
During that time, [the beneficiary] was primarily responsible for the design, development, 
implementation, integration, and testing of supply chain management software 
applications for [the petitioner's] Rhythm Demand Management product suite. In this 
position he acquired highly specialized knowledge of [the petitioner's] Rhythm Demand 
Management product suite, including the Rhythm Demand Planner, Rhythm Demand 
Analyzer, and Rhythm Demand Administrator, and [the petitioner's] procedures and 
techniques for the design, development, implementation, integration, and testing of 
software applications for the Rhythm Demand Management product suite. 
The director found the initial evidence submitted with the petition insufficient to warrant a finding that the 
beneficiary possessed the required specialized knowledge. Consequently, a detailed request for evidence 
was issued on April 17, 2003, which specifically requested evidence that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge and that such knowledge was not general knowledge held commonly through the 
industry. The director advised that the petitioner should substantiate the beneficiary's advanced level of 
knowledge of the petitioner's processes or procedures that distinguished him from other employees, 
submit evidence of the training the beneficiary has received in contrast with that of less qualified 
employees, and provide an explanation as to how the beneficiary's knowledge is more specialized than the 
knowledge of other similarly qualified applications engineers throughout the industry. 
Counsel for the petitioner submitted a brief response on July 3 1, 2003. In this two page letter, counsel 
for the petitioner alleged that it had clearly explained in the petition that the beneficiary possessed 
specialized knowledge, and that such knowledge was acquired as a direct result of his employment with 
the foreign entity from August 1998 to May 2000. Instead of submitting additional evidence or 
responding to the specific requests of the director, counsel merely concluded that the beneficiary "fulfills 
the requirements for employment in a specialized knowledge professional capacity as required under 8 
C.F.R. §214.2(1)(l)(ii)(E) and under the U.S. INS memorandum for all service center directors dated 
December 20,2002. . . ." 
On August 12, 2003, the director denied the petition. The director noted that pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 
103.2(b)(8), the petitioner had been given twelve weeks to respond to the director's request for evidence 
issued on April 17, 2003. Noting that the due date for the response was July 13, 2003, and that the 
petitioner's response was not received until July 31, 2003, the director advised that the petition was 
considered abandoned and denied the petition pursuant to 8 C.F.R. tj 103.2(b)(15). The petitioner filed a 
motion to reopen on August 28, 2003, alleging that the required initial evidence was submitted with the 
petition. Counsel for the petitioner restated the claims of the beneficiary's qualifications presented with 
the petition, including copies of the original supporting evidence, and also submitted an e-mail statement 
from the beneficiary's manager dated August 20, 2003 which reiterates the qualifications of the 
beneficiary. 
On October 10, 2003, the director denied the petition. The director noted that the evidence submitted 
with the petition and in support of the motion was insufficient to establish that the beneficiary's 
EAC 03 123 50054 
Page 5 
knowledge was more specialized or distinct than that of other similarly qualified applications engineers. 
The director further noted that the petitioner failed to specifically respond to the deficiencies in the record 
identified by the director in the request for evidence and that counsel's response, while noteworthy, was 
of little probative value without evidence to support the claims. 
Counsel filed an appeal on October 28, 2003. The director treated the appeal as a motion to reopen 
andlor reconsider, and the director upheld the prior decision. Counsel now appeals the October 10, 2003 
decision to the AAO. 
On review, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge. 
When examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). As required in the regulations, the 
petitioner must submit a detailed description of the services to be performed sufficient to establish specialized 
knowledge. Id. 
In the present matter, the petitioner provided an abbreviated description of the beneficiary's employment in 
the foreign entity, his employment in the U.S. entity, and his responsibilities as an applications engineer 
within the U.S. entity. Despite specific requests by the director, namely to provide evidence of the training 
the beneficiary had received, the petitioner failed to provide such information. The petitioner has not 
sufficiently documented how the beneficiary's performance of the proposed job duties distinguishes his 
knowledge as specialized. The petitioner repeatedly states throughout the record that the beneficiary's 
knowledge is specialized and cites a number of job duties, the nature of which cannot be fully understood by 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) based on the description provided. The petitioner further asserts 
that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge as a result of his employment with the foreign entity 
from August 1998 to May 2000 and that such knowledge is far beyond that commonly found throughout the 
industry. 
It is also appropriate for the AAO to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the 
beneficiary's knowledge of the business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making 
process. Matter of Colley, 1 8 I&N Dec. 1 17, 120 (Comm. 198 1) (citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 
61 8 (R.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. 8 16 (R.C. 1971)).~ As stated by the Commissioner 
in Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 52 (Comm. 1982), when considering whether the beneficiaries 
possessed specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find that the occupations 
inherently qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." Rather, the beneficiaries were 
2 
 Although the cited precedents pre-date the current statutory definition of "specialized knowledge," the 
AAO finds them instructive. Other than deleting the former requirement that specialized knowledge had 
to be "proprietary," the 1990 Act did not significantly alter the definition of "specialized knowledge" from 
the prior INS interpretation of the term. The 1990 Committee Report does not reject, criticize, or even 
refer to any specific INS regulation or precedent decision interpreting the term. The Committee Report 
simply states that the Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of "[vlarying [i.e., not 
specifically incorrect] interpretations by INS," H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I), at 69, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
6749. Beyond that, the Committee Report simply restates the tautology that became section 214(c)(2)(B) 
of the Act. Id. The AAO concludes, therefore, the cited cases, as well as Matter of Penner, remain useful 
guidance concerning the intended scope of the "specialized knowledge" L-1B classification. 
EAC 03 123 50054 
Page 6 
considered to have unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. Id. 
 The 
Commissioner also provided the following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him 
or her to produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is 
employed primarily for his ability to carry out a key process or function which is 
important or essential to the business firm's operation. 
Id. at 53. In the present matter, the evidence of record demonstrates that the beneficiary is more akin to 
an employee whose skills and experience enable him to provide a specialized service, rather than an 
employee who has unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. 
It should be noted that the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the AAO to make 
comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The term "specialized 
knowledge" is not an absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed in 1756, Inc. v. 
Attorney General, "[slimply put, specialized knowledge is a relative . . . idea which cannot have a plain 
meaning." 745 F. Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990). The Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 
category was intended for "key personnel." See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2750. The term "key personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "of crucial 
importance." Webster's 11 New College Dictionaly 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). In general, all 
employees can reasonably be considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not 
contribute to the overall economic success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to 
employ that person. An employee of "crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of 
the petitioner's average employee. Accordingly, based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and 
the congressional record related to that term, the AAO must make comparisons not only between the 
claimed specialized knowledge employee and the general labor market, but also between that employee 
and the remainder of the petitioner's workforce. 
Additionally, in Matter of Penner, the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation 
of the specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. 49. The decision noted that the 1970 House Report, 
H.R. Rep. No. 91-851 stated that the number of admissions under the L-1 classification "will not be large" 
and that "[tlhe class of persons eligible for such nonimmigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be 
carefully regulated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id. at 5 1. The decision further noted 
that the House Report was silent on the subject of specialized knowledge but that, during the course of the 
sub-committee hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically questioned witnesses on the level of skill 
necessary to qualify under the proposed "L" category. In response to the Chairman's questions, various 
witnesses responded that they understood the legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts," 
individuals with "unique" slulls, and that it would not include "lower categories" of workers or "skilled 
craft workers." Id. at 50 (citing H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration Act of 1970: 
Hearings on H. R. 445, 9 1 st Cong. 210,2 18,223,240,248 (November 12, 1969)). 
Reviewing the Congressional record, the Commissioner concluded in Matter of Penner that an expansive 
reading of the specialized knowledge provision, such that it would include skilled workers and 
technicians, is not warranted. The Commissioner emphasized that the specialized knowledge worker 
classification was not intended for "all employees with any level of specialized knowledge." Matter of 
Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 53. Or, as noted in Matter of Colley, "[mlost employees today are specialists and 
have been trained and given specialized knowledge. However, in view of the House Report, it can not be 
concluded that all employees with specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are 
EAC 03 123 50054 
Page 7 
eligible for classification as intracompany transferees." 18 I&N Dec. at 119. According to Matter of 
Penner, "[sluch a conclusion would permit extremely large numbers of persons to qualify for the 'L-I' 
visa" rather than the "key personnel" that Congress specifically intended. 18 I&N Dec. at 53; see also 
1756, Inc., 745 F. Supp. at 15 (concluding that Congress did not intend for the specialized knowledge 
capacity to extend to all employees with specialized knowledge, but rather to "key personnel" and 
"executives."). 
Here, the petitioner's main contention is that the beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner's Rhythm 
Demand Management product suites is "highly specialized." Specifically, the petitioner alleges that the 
beneficiary's past experience with the foreign entity has solidified his specialized knowledge of this 
particular application. However, the petitioner has not provided any information pertaining to the duties 
and training of the beneficiary or of the other similarly qualified persons employed by the petitioner. Nor 
did the petitioner distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge, work experience, or training from those of 
other employees. 
The lack of tangible evidence in the record makes it impossible to classify the beneficiary's knowledge of 
the applications used by the petitioner as advanced or special and precludes a finding that the 
beneficiary's role is of crucial importance to the organization. The director specifically requested 
evidence in the form of training documentation and history, as well as a specific discussion of the manner 
in which the beneficiary's knowledge and experience sets him apart from other similarly qualified 
applications engineers in the field or other employees of the petitioner with similar training and 
qualifications. The petitioner, however, ignored this request, and continually asserted that the evidence 
submitted, despite the director's discussion of the deficiencies, was adequate to establish that the 
beneficiary possessed specialized knowledge. 
The director's request for evidence was extremely specific in requesting clarification that the beneficiary's 
claimed specialized knowledge was not merely general knowledge held commonly through the industry. 
The director afforded the petitioner all available measures to supplement the record with additional 
evidence. However, although specifically requested by the director, the record contains no evidence of 
the beneficiary's training, experience, daily duties, or level of expertise. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 9 
214.2(1)(3)(viii) states that the director may request additional evidence in appropriate cases. Although 
specifically and clearly requested by the director, the petitioner refused to provide documentary evidence 
to support its claims that the beneficiary obtained a specialized level of knowledge through his training 
and work experience with the petitioner andlor foreign employer. The failure to submit requested 
evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. See 8 C.F.R. 
9 103.2(b)(14). In this case, the petitioner appears to base its appeal on the expectation that the AAO will 
accept its uncorroborated assertions that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. Going on 
record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of 
proof in these proceedings. Matter of Sofici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of 
Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
The claim that the beneficiary has been employed by the petitioner and the foreign entity since 1998 and 
that most of this period was devoted primarily to work with the Rhythm Demand Management product 
suite does little to establish that the beneficiary is equipped with specialized knowledge, for the petitioner 
EAC 03 123 50054 
Page 8 
has provided no independent evidence that sets the beneficiary apart fiom all other employees who have 
gained a similar "expertise" after working for the petitioner for a similar period. 
On appeal, counsel submits for the first time additional evidence in support of its claims that the 
beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner's applications is highly specialized. Counsel submits a copy of 
the petitioner's Demand Management Brochure, an academic evaluation for the beneficiary, and 
continues to rely on the December 20, 2002 Memorandum for All Service Directors regarding the 
Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge by Fujie 0. Ohata as evidence that the beneficiary is qualified 
for an extension of his L-1B status. The petitioner's burden was to establish that the beneficiary 
possessed the requisite specialized knowledge, and the petitioner was given ample opportunity to furnish 
evidence in support of its contentions. Counsel makes no attempt to overcome the reasons for the 
director's stated grounds for denial, which specifically address the petitioner's failure to respond to the 
request for evidence and failure to support its statements with corroborating documentary evidence. 
The petition was denied by the director because the record of proceeding did not contain sufficient 
evidence to meet the petitioner's burden. As previously stated, failure to submit evidence that precludes a 
material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 103.2(b)(14). The petitioner 
was put on notice of required evidence and given a reasonable opportunity to provide it for the record 
before the visa petition was adjudicated. The petitioner failed to submit the requested evidence and now 
submits it on appeal. However, the AAO will not consider this evidence for any purpose. See Matter of 
Soriano, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988); Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533 (BIA 1988). The appeal 
will be adjudicated based on the record of proceeding before the director. 
Furthermore, the AAO notes that the counsel for the petitioner relies heavily on the prior approval of the 
beneficiary's L-1B status as evidence that the beneficiary does in fact possess specialized knowledge. 
The director's decision does not indicate whether he reviewed the prior approvals of the other 
nonimmigrant petition. If the previous nonimmigrant petition was approved based on the same 
unsupported assertions that are contained in the current record, the approval would constitute material and 
gross error on the part of the director. The AAO is not required to approve applications or petitions where 
eligibility has not been demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. 
See, e.g. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm. 1988). It would be 
absurd to suggest that CIS or any agency must treat acknowledged errors as binding precedent. Sussex 
Engg. Ltd. v. Montgomely, 825 F.2d 1084, 1090 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988). 
Furthermore, the AAO1s authority over the service centers is comparable to the relationship between a 
court of appeals and a district court. Even if a service center director had approved the nonimmigrant 
petition on behalf of the beneficiary, the AAO would not be bound to follow the contradictory decision of 
a service center. Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS, 2000 WL 282785 (E.D. La.), affd, 248 F.3d 
1 139 (5th Cir. 200 l), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 5 1 (200 1). The prior approval does not preclude CIS from 
denying an extension of the original visa based on reassessment of petitioner's qualifications. Texas A&M 
Univ. v. Upchurch, 99 Fed. Appx. 556,2004 WL 1240482 (5th Cir. 2004). 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
EAC 03 123 50054 
Page 9 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc., 745 F. Supp. at 16. Based on the evidence presented, it is concluded that the 
beneficiary does not possess specialized knowledge; nor would the beneficiary be employed in a capacity 
requiring specialized knowledge. For this reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has failed to establish that a qualifying relationship 
continues to exist between the U.S. petitioner and a foreign entity.3 See 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(14)(ii)(A). 
Although the petitioner claims that the foreign entity is a wholly owned subsidiary of the U.S. petitioner, 
no documentary evidence was submitted to support the claim. The petitioner failed to submit evidence 
which clearly establishes the ownership structure of the U.S. and the foreign entity and which 
corroborates the petitioner's claims. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not 
sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Sof$ci, 22 I&N 
Dec. at 165. A petitioner must establish ownership and control in order to show a qualifying relationship 
exists. Stock certificates, the corporate stock certificate ledger, stock certificate registry, corporate 
bylaws, and the minutes of relevant annual shareholder meetings must also be examined to determine the 
total number of shares issued, the exact number issued to the shareholder, and the subsequent percentage 
ownership and its effect on corporate control. Additionally, a petitioning company must disclose all 
agreements relating to the voting of shares, the distribution of profit, the management and direction of the 
subsidiary, and any other factor affecting actual control of the entity. See Matter of Siemens Medical 
Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986). Without full disclosure of all relevant documents, CIS is 
unable to determine the elements of ownership and control. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied 
by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial 
decision. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), 
afd. 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting 
that the AAO reviews appeals on a de novo basis). 
When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a challenge 
only if she shows that the AAO abused it discretion with respect to all of the AAO's enumerated grounds. 
See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043, affd. 345 F.3d 683. 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit 
sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1361. Here, that burden 
has not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
3 
 Although the petitioner presented evidence of an approved blanket petition that showed that the foreign 
employer was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the petitioner, this petition expired on May 2, 2002, nearly 
one year prior to the date the present petition was filed. No evidence was presented to show that the same 
qualifying relationship continued to exist.