dismissed L-1B Case: Software Consulting

idenwyhg dsfa deleted to 
prevent clearly unwarranted 
ilmdon ofperswal privacy 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Rm A3042 
Wash~ngton, DC 20529 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
File: EAC 04 088 52895 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date: 
IN RE: 
Petition: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 3 1 10 l(a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
Administrative Appeals Office 
EAC 04 088 52895 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimrnigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary as an intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge 
pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101(a)(15)(~).' The 
United States petitioner, a corporation organized in the State of New Jersey, is a comprehensive software 
consulting company and claims to be the subsidiary of KPIT Curnrnins Infosystems, Ltd., located in Mumbai, 
India. 
The director denied the petition concluding that (1) the petitioner did not establish that the beneficiary 
possessed specialized knowledge; and (2) the beneficiary did not have the required one year of experience 
with the foreign entity abroad prior to the filing of the petition. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that of the two 
reasons for the denial, the first is erroneous and contrary to current law, and the second has been overcome by 
evidence accompanying the appeal. In support of this assertion, counsel submits a brief statement on the 
Form I-290B and additional evidence. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
1 It should be noted for the record that, according to 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(5)(i), the U.S. Department of State 
has jurisdiction over individual petitions seeking L classification under a blanket petition for non-visa-exempt 
beneficiaries outside the United States. Therefore, under the procedures provided for under 8 C.F.R. 
§214.2(1)(5)(ii), the petitioner incorrectly filed this petition with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (CIS). Consequently, the director should have rejected the petition and instructed the pet~tioner to 
provide the required documentation to the beneficiary to apply for a visa with a consular officer abroad. As 
the petition was accepted by the director for processing, however, the AAO will proceed to issue a decision in 
this matter. 
EAC 04 088 52895 
Page 3 
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1184(c)(2)(B), provides the following: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
The first issue in this matter is whether the beneficiary possesses the required one year of employment abroad 
with a qualifying entity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. fj 214.2(1)(3)(iii) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment abroad with 
a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of the petition. 
The petition in this matter was filed on February 6, 2004. The director, relying on the regulation above, 
accordingly determined that the beneficiary should have had at least one year of continuous employment 
abroad during the period from February 6, 2001 to February 6, 2004. Since the record indicates that the 
beneficiary began working for the foreign entity in May 2003, the director denied the petition concluding that 
the required one year of continuous employment abroad had not been met. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner addresses the regulation at section 214(c)(2)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 
1 184(c)(2)(A), which provides: 
The Attorney General shall provide for a procedure under which an importing employer which 
meets requirements established by the Attorney General may file a blanket petition to import 
EAC 04 088 52895 
Page 4 
aliens as nonirnmigrants described in section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) instead of filing individual petitions 
under paragraph (1) to import such aliens. Such procedures shall permit the expedited 
processing of visas for admission of aliens covered under such a petition. In the case of an alien 
seelung admission under section 10 1 (a)(15)(L), the one-year period of continuous employment 
required under such section is deemed to be reduced to a 6-month period if the importing 
employer has filed a blanket petition under this subparagraph and met the requirements for 
expedited processing of aliens covered under such petition. 
Counsel resubmits a copy of the petitioner's blanket petition, approved on April 17, 2003, and asserts that 
pursuant to the above regulation, the beneficiary's time employed abroad has met the requirements in this 
matter and that the director's reliance on 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(3)(iii) was erroneous. 
Upon review, the AAO concurs with counsel's assertions. The petitioner submitted a copy of the blanket 
petition's approval notice with the initial petition. Consequently, the record contained the documentation 
necessary for the director to determine that the beneficiary's eight months of employment abroad, while not 
sufficient otherwise, certainly satisfied the time requirements in this matter since the petitioner had filed and 
had been approved for a blanket petition. Based on this evidence, the director's decision as it pertains to this 
issue is hereby withdra~n.~ 
The second issue in this matter is whether the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. 
In a letter dated January 30, 2004, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary had been employed as a systems 
executive by the foreign entity since May 2003. With regard to the beneficiary's qualifications and 
specialized knowledge, the petitioner stated: 
[The beneficiary] has the necessary specialized and advanced knowledge gained at our 
overseas parent, in the area of analysis and design, coordination, coding, implementing, query 
tuning testing and trouble shooting projects specific to [the foreign entity's] Global HRMS 
Implementation (using Oracle ERP popularly referred to as Oracle Applications). A lot of 
her experience has been to work with and guide the team and the project. 
The petitioner further stated that during her employment abroad, the beneficiary was involved in the 
following areas: 
Although the beneficiary's eight months of employment abroad has been deemed acceptable under the 
provisions of section 214(c)(2)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. fj 1184(c)(2)(A), the AAO notes that the language 
contained in this section has since been amended. Section 413(a) of Pub. L. 108-447, Consolidated 
Appropriations Act 2005, has amended this provision by striking the last sentence. Effective June 6, 2005, 
petitions for initial classification in which the petitioner is covered by a blanket petition are no longer 
afforded a six-month reduction in the beneficiary's requisite year of employment abroad. 
EAC 04 088 52895 
Page 5 
1. On the technical side she has been involved in application software design, development 
and implementation of web based e-commerce type applications using Oracle 
Applications, PLISQL, Java, D2K, etc. 
2. Most of her recent experience at [the foreign entity] (i.e. the past 8 months) has been, to 
work with teams to develop a variety of projects including business applications and ERP 
applications. Her primary function has been to identify resources (i.e. appropriately 
skilled professionals) and activities; select the appropriate team for the project; set the 
goals and the priorities, plan the activities and assist in the execution of the project; 
monitor the activities and plan; work with the on-site and off-shore team and deliver the 
project. 
Additionally, the petitioner discussed the beneficiary's training while abroad and stated: 
We, obviously, have our own way of addressing all these areas. We do have formal and in- 
formal training sessions in order to port this collective specialized knowledge to new 
employees or employees not versed in it. Be we do not issue certificates of this training. 
This knowledge not only includes our methods and procedures of handling software projects, 
but it also includes knowledge of our individual employees of off-shore teams and their skill 
set and relationships. Clearly [the beneficiary] has this knowledge since she has been 
working for four plus years performing these duties and has, in fact, contributed to 
developing some of these methods and procedures. Thus, she is that uniquely qualified 
individual to the extent that we would experience a significant interruption in our business 
were we to train a US worker to perform these duties. In fact, it would be very expensive and 
difficult to train a US worker since to do so, we would have to employ hider for some time. 
Thus [the beneficiary] does possess the requisite specialized and advanced knowledge 
without which we would experience a loss of substantial business and goodwill. 
Finally, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary possessed a Bachelor of Engineering degree and several 
unidentified course certificates, and that her work experience with the foreign entity equipped her with the 
requisite specialized knowledge. The petitioner concluded that it would be impossible to train a US worker to 
fill the same position proposed to the beneficiary since it would take at least six months to one year of 
experience working with the foreign entity to possess the same qualifications as those of the beneficiary. 
The director found this initial evidence to be insufficient, and consequently issued a request for evidence on 
February 18, 2004. In this request, the director asked the petitioner to submit evidence which demonstrated 
that the beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner's processes and procedures was "advanced" in relation to 
other employees or that the beneficiary's knowledge could be differentiated in any way from similar positions 
at other companies. The director further asked for evidence showing that the beneficiary's knowledge is 
uncommon, noteworthy, or distinguished by some unusual quality and not generally known by practitioners in 
the beneficiary's field of endeavor, or that hislher advanced level of knowledge of the processes and 
procedures of the company distinguish her from those with only elementary or basic knowledge. The director 
also provided a list of specific types of evidence the petitioner should submit, such as human resources 
records documenting the beneficiary's training and the hours spent in such training, more details regarding the 
EAC 04 088 52895 
Page 6 
training provided by the petitioner and the foreign entity, including the minimum amount of time required for 
an employee to be adequately trained to fill the proffered position, and information regarding the training, if 
any, the beneficiary would provide to others or receive herself upon arrival at the U.S. entity. 
In a response dated April 5, 2004, counsel for the petitioner submitted a letter from the petitioner addressing 
the director's request for further evidence and challenged the director's request that the petitioner show that 
the beneficiary's knowledge was uncommon, noteworthy, or distinguished. Relying on requirements for 
specialized knowledge as outlined in a 1994 Immigration and Naturalization Service (now CIS) 
memorandum, and interpreted by a subsequent 2002 memorandum which states that "[tlhere is no 
requirement in current legislation that the alien's knowledge be unique, proprietary, or not commonly found," 
counsel asserted that the director's request for this evidence was inappropriate and contrary to the law and the 
regulations. See Memo. from James A. Puleo, Acting Exec. Assoc. Commr., Office of Operations, 
Immigration and Naturalization Serv., to All Dist. Dir. et al., Interpretation of Special Knowledge, 1-2 
(March 9, 1994) (copy on file with Am. Immig. Law Assn.). 
The petitioner's letter, dated April 1, 2004, provided an identical description of the beneficiary's qualifications 
to that provided in the letter accompanying the petition. Apparently relying on counsel's assertion that the 
director was not justified in requesting evidence that distinguished the beneficiary's knowledge as uncommon 
or noteworthy, the petitioner declined to address any of the director's requests for evidence. The petitioner 
provided a copy of payroll records from its human resources department which verified the dates of the 
beneficiary's employment, but did not provided a human resources record of the petitioner's training or the 
time spent working on specific projects. 
The director determined that the record did not establish that the beneficiary possessed specialized knowledge. 
The director stated that, although the beneficiary appears to have received significant training, her duties 
appeared to be comparable to those that would be performed by any consultant in a parallel position. 
Although the director notes the petitioner's claim that the beneficiary's knowledge was specialized and 
advanced, the director also notes that the petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence to corroborate this 
claim and further did not provide the evidence requested in the request for evidence as to how the beneficiary 
acquired her specialized knowledge. The director concluded that the petitioner, described as a software 
consulting company, did not design and sell software products, nor did the beneficiary work on a team 
designing software. Instead, the director concluded from the evidence provided that the beneficiary merely 
used the tools available to her to customize and install software, which is the same practice used by other 
consultants in her field. 
On appeal, counsel submits a detailed brief in support of the petitioner's assertions that the beneficiary 
possesses specialized knowledge. Counsel again relies on the language of the 2002 memorandum and 
attempts to refute many of the key points of the director's decision. Counsel further submits a letter from the 
petitioner which provides a detailed overview of the beneficiary's training and the manner in which she 
obtained her specialized knowledge. 
On review, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge. 
EAC 04 088 52895 
Page 7 
When examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). As required in the regulations, the 
petitioner must submit a detailed description of the services to be performed sufficient to establish specialized 
knowledge. Id. 
In the present matter, the petitioner provided an abbreviated description of the beneficiary's employment in the 
foreign entity, her intended employment in the U.S. entity, and her general responsibilities as a systems executive. 
Despite specific requests by the director for evidence showing, for example, the length of time and amount of 
training necessary for an employee to work in the beneficiary's position, the types of training courses the 
beneficiary received while working abroad, the types of training she would receive andlor provide to fellow 
employees while in the United States, and the manner in which the beneficiary's knowledge was advanced in 
comparison to other similarly qualified employees, the petitioner failed and/or refused to provide such 
information. The petitioner merely submitted the same language contained in its letter accompanying the 
petition, which had been deemed insufficient by the director. 
On appeal, however, the petitioner provides a detailed overview of the beneficiary's specific tasks and duties and 
the training associated therewith. This evidence, however, will not be considered. The regulation states that the 
petitioner shall submit additional evidence as the director, in his or her discretion, may deem necessary. The 
purpose of the request for evidence is to elicit further information that clarifies whether eligibility for the 
benefit sought has been established, as of the time the petition is filed. See 8 C.F.R. $5 103.2(b)(8) and (12). 
The failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying 
the petition. 8 C.F.R. 3 103.2(b)(14). 
Where, as here, a petitioner has been put on notice of a deficiency in the evidence and has been given an 
opportunity to respond to that deficiency, the AAO will not accept evidence offered for the first time on 
appeal. See Matter of Soriano, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988); see also Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 
533 (BIA 1988). If the petitioner had wanted the submitted evidence to be considered, it should have 
submitted the documents in response to the director's request for evidence. Id. Under the circumstances, the 
AAO need not and does not consider the sufficiency of the evidence submitted on appeal. 
Therefore, a review of the evidence in the record prior to adjudication indicates that the petitioner has not 
sufficiently documented how the beneficiary's performance of the proposed job duties distinguishes her 
knowledge as specialized. The petitioner repeatedly states throughout the record and again on appeal that the 
beneficiary performs a multitude of complex job duties, and possesses specialized knowledge as a result of her 
specialized training abroad and that such knowledge is far beyond that commonly found throughout the 
industry. The record prior to adjudication, however, is devoid of evidence that would corroborate the 
contentions of the petitioner and of counsel. As stated by the director in the request for additional evidence, 
whlch sought corroboration of the claims of the petitioner and counsel, insider knowledge of a company's 
operations does not automatically constitute special or advanced knowledge. It is to be expected that job 
training at any company will provide any employee with knowledge about the procedures that are germane to 
that organization. Therefore, the petitioner's failure to provide evidence of the training received and the 
manner in which the beneficiary's knowledge was distinguished fi-om that of others systems executives 
EAC 04 088 52895 
Page 8 
prohibits a finding in the petitioner's favor. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not 
sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Sof$ci, 22 I&N Dec. 
158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 
1972)). Without documentary evidence to support these claims, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the 
petitioner's burden of proof. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. at 534; Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N 
Dec. 503,506 (BIA 1980). 
The director's request for evidence was extremely specific. In fact, the director's request directly quoted 
characteristics identified by the 1994 Puleo memorandum as indicative of an alien's specialized knowledge. 
The director, therefore, was clearly acting in accordance with the Puleo memorandum and afforded the 
petitioner all available measures to supplement the record with additional evidence. However, counsel 
maintained his position and belief that the director's request ran contrary to the 1994 memorandum. In 
addition to relying on language contained in the Puleo memorandum, the director's request advised the 
petitioner that examples of acceptable evidence included copies of certificates, human resources records, 
and/or statements from authorized representatives of the petitioner attesting to the training provided to the 
beneficiary, including both classroom and on-the-job training. Although specifically requested by the 
director, the petitioner did not provide any evidence of the beneficiary's training, experience, daily duties, or 
level of expertise. As discussed above, the failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line 
of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 3 103.2(b)(14). 
It is also appropriate for the AAO to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the 
beneficiary's knowledge of the business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making 
process. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. 1 17, 120 (Comm. 198 1) (citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 61 8 
(R.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. 816 (R.C. 1971)).~ As stated by the Commissioner in 
Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 52 (Comm. 1982), when considering whether the beneficiaries possessed 
specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find that the occupations inherently 
qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have 
unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. Id. The Commissioner also provided the 
following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or 
her to produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed 
3 Although the cited precedents pre-date the current statutory definition of "specialized knowledge," the AAO 
finds them instructive. Other than deleting the former requirement that specialized knowledge had to be 
"proprietary," the 1990 Act did not significantly alter the definition of "specialized knowledge" from the prior 
INS interpretation of the term. The 1990 Committee Report does not reject, criticize, or even refer to any 
specific INS regulation or precedent decision interpreting the term. The Committee Report simply states that 
the Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of "[vlarying [i.e., not specifically incorrect] 
interpretations by INS," H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I), at 69, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. Beyond that, the 
Committee Report simply restates the tautology that became section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Id. The AAO 
concludes, therefore, the cited cases, as well as Matter of Penner, remain useful guidance concerning the 
intended scope of the "specialized knowledge" L-1B classification. 
EAC 04 088 52895 
Page 9 
primarily for his ability to carry out a key process or function which is important or 
essential to the business firm's operation. 
Id. at 53. In the present matter, the evidence of record demonstrates that the beneficiary is more akin to an 
employee whose skills and experience enable him to provide a specialized service, rather than an employee 
who has unusual duties, slulls, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. 
It should be noted that the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the AAO to make 
comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The term "specialized 
knowledge" is not an absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed in 1756, Inc. v. Attorney 
General, "[slimply put, specialized knowledge is a relative . . . idea which cannot have a plain meaning." 745 
F. Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990). The Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended 
for "key personnel." See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key 
personnel" denotes a position wlthin the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." Webster's N New 
College Dictionaly 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). In general, all employees can reasonably be 
considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic 
success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. An employee of 
"crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average employee. 
Accordingly, based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record related to that 
term, the AAO must make comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge employee and 
the general labor market but also between that employee and the remainder of the petitioner's workforce. 
Here, the petitioner's only contention that the beneficiary's knowledge is more advanced than other systems 
executives 1s its assertion that the beneficiary's training with the foreign entity equipped her with specialized 
and advanced knowledge of the petitioner's processes and methodologies. Again, the petitioner has not 
provided any information pertaining to the duties and training of the beneficiary or of the other systems 
executives employed by the petitioner, nor has it focused on any specific process or procedure in which the 
beneficiary has expertise. The lack of tangible evidence in the record makes it impossible to classify the 
beneficiary's knowledge of the foreign entity's methodologies and software systems as advanced or special 
and precludes a finding that the beneficiary's role is of crucial importance to the organization. As stated 
previously, simply going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for the purpose 
of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soflci, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. 
Instcad of providing relevant documentation in response to the director's request for evidence, the petitioner, 
through counsel, refused to address the director's requests or acknowledge the stated deficiencies in the 
record and relied on the Puleo memorandum as a means for justifying this position. In reference to the Puleo 
memorandum, counsel claims that the beneficiary's knowledge is valuable to the petitioner's competitiveness and 
is critical to prevent~ng significant interruption of business. While the beneficiary's sllls and knowledge may 
contribute to the successfulness of the petitioning organization, thls factor, by itself, does not constitute the 
possession of specialized knowledge. Therefore, while the beneficiary's contribution to the economic success of 
the corporation may be considered, the regulations specifically require that the beneficiary possess an "advanced 
level of knowledge" of the organization's process and procedures or a "special knowledge" of the petitioner's 
EAC 04 088 52895 
Page 10 
product, service, research, equipment, techniques, or management. 8 C.F.R. 4 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). As determined 
above, the beneficiary does not satisfy the requirements for possessing specialized knowledge. 
Additionally, in Matter of Penner, the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of 
the specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. 49. The decision noted that the 1970 House Report, H.R. 
Rep. No. 9 1-85 1, stated that the number of admissions under the L-1 classification "will not be large" and that 
"[tlhe class of persons eligible for such nonimmigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be carefully regulated 
by the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id. at 5 1. The decision further noted that the House Report 
was silent on the subject of specialized knowledge but that, dulng the course of the sub-committee hearings 
on the bill, the Chairman specifically questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify under the 
proposed "L" category. In response to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that they 
understood the legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, and 
that it would not include "lower categories" of workers or "slulled craft workers." Id. at 50 (citing H.R. 
Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445, 91st Cong. 210, 218, 
223,240,248 (November 12, 1969)). 
Reviewing the Congressional record, the Commissioner concluded in Matter of Penner that an expansive 
reading of the specialized knowledge provision, such that it would include skilled workers and technicians, is 
not warranted. The Commissioner emphasized that that the specialized knowledge worker classification was 
not intended for "all employees with any level of specialized knowledge." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 
53. Or, as noted in Matter of Colley, "[mlost employees today are specialists and have been trained and given 
specialized knowledge. However, in view of the House Report, it can not be concluded that all employees 
with specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
intracompany transferees." 18 I&N Dec. at 1 19. According to Matter ofPenner, "[s]uch a conclusion would 
permit extremely large numbers of persons to qualify for the 'L-1 ' visa" rather than the "key personnel" that 
Congress specifically intended. 18 I&N Dec. at 53; see also 1756, Inc., 745 F. Supp. at 15 (concluding that 
Congress did not intend for the specialized knowledge capacity to extend to all employees with specialized 
knowledge, but rather to "key personnel" and "executives."). 
The petitioner's burden was to establish that the beneficiary possessed the requisite specialized knowledge, and 
the petitioner was given ample opportunity to furnish supporting evidence in support of its contentions. The 
petition was denied because the record of proceeding did not contain sufficient evidence to meet that burden, and 
therefore the petitioner's reliance on the allegedly erroneous request for evidence as a basis to overturn the denial 
is misplaced and unpersuasive. 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc., 745 F. Supp. at 16. Based on the evidence presented, it is concluded that the 
beneficiary does not possess specialized knowledge; nor would the beneficiary be employed in a capacity 
requiring specialized knowledge. For this reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
EAC 04 088 52895 
Page 11 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), affd. 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the MO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
director's decision will be affirmed and the petition will be denied. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.