dismissed L-1B Case: Software Development

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U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave.. N.W., Rm. A3042 
Washington. DT 20529 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
File: LlN-04-127-53 170 Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER Date: JUN 2 9 2005 
Petition: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section lOI(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 I Ol(a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
-i//aobert P. Wiernann, Director 
Administrative Appeals Office 
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Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Nebraska Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to employ the beneficiary as an L-1 B nonimmigrant 
intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to section IOl(a)(l5)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 9 1 101(a)(I 5)(L). The petitioner is a corporation organized in the State of 
Delaware that provides software development and consulting services. The petitioner claims that it is the 
subsidiary o located in Pune, India. The petitioner now seeks to employ the 
beneficiary for three years as a Design Engineer. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner failed to show that the beneficiary was 
employed abroad in a capacity that required specialized knowledge, and that the prospective position in the 
United States requires an individual with specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary 
qualifies for L-IB status, and that the director failed to offer substantive evidence to support the denial. In 
support of these assertions, counsel submits a brief. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section lOI(a)( l S)(L) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1 lOl(a)(lS)(L). Specifically, a qualifying 
organization must have employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a 
specialized knowledge capacity, for one continuous year within the three years preceding the beneficiary's 
application for admission into the United States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United 
States temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate 
thereof in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himlher to perform the intended 
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services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The first issue in the present matter is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary was 
employed abroad in a capacity that required specialized knowledge. See 8 C.F.R. $5 214.2(1)(3)(iv). 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1184(c)(2)(B), provides the following: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. $ 2 14.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines specialized knowledge as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes or procedures. 
In a letter submitted with the initial petition on March 30, 2004, the petitioner described the beneficiary's past 
experience with the foreign entity as follows: 
[The beneficiary] possesses advanced knowledge of reverse Engineering projects using scan 
data as input and carrying o in ProIEngineer that is useful 
for CAD Design areas. He ning Injection Moulded [sic] 
Plastic components, due to his level of expertise with the materials and process. 
[The beneficiary's] significant experience with the parent company . . . performing design- 
engineering duties for [the foreign entity's] products gives him the concentrated expertise and 
advanced level of knowledge of the product, engineering specifications and other 
technological requirements necessary to perform the proposed duties. 
[The beneficiary] joined [the foreign entity] in July 2002 and worked for [the foreign entity] 
performing the responsibilities of an Assistant Manager (CAD) until present . . . . 
Specifically, [the beneficiary] performed system design and modeling using tools such as 
ProiEngineer (2000; & 2000i2). He trained customers in the use of the above-mentioned 
software packages, conducted customer-specific system benchmarking, and provided expert 
consulting services regarding the use and optimization of the noted software packages. He is 
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also proficient in many of the prevalent software technologies and projects, particularly high- 
end software tools and modules. 
On March 3 1, 2004, the director requested additional evidence as follows: 
Submit evidence that the beneficiary possesses special knowledge of your product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its 
application in international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in 
the organization's processes and procedures. Although the beneficiary may possess an 
advanced knowledge of the processes and procedures of the company, evidence must be 
submitted to describe and distinguish that knowledge from the knowledge possessed by 
others within the organization, and the industry at large. In addition, the evidence must 
establish that the beneficiary's duties abroad for the qualifying employment abroad 
involved, & the duties in the United States, require a person with specialized 
knowledge. 
If the beneficiary attended any company-specific vocational, technical and/or professional 
development courses which are related to the company's equipment, products, processes 
and/or procedures, please provide docutnentation which supports that claim, i.e., diplomas, 
course completion certificates, etc. The documentation that you provide must identify the 
school and the beneficiary by name, identify the inclusive period of study, and specify, in 
detail, the course content. 
If the beneficiary acquired his "specialized knowledge" only through practical employment 
experience, please describe, in detail, how the beneficiary's training and/or experience differ 
from the training and experience an individual would receive who is similarly engaged within 
the same firm or industry. 
(Emphasis in original). 
In a response dated April 27, 2004, the petitioner submitted a statement addressing the director's concerns. As 
this statement is part of the record of proceeding, it will not be repeated entirely herein. However, in part the 
petitioner stated the following: 
[The beneficiary], in his capacity as a team member, has performed responsible functions on 
the basis of his advanced knowledge and expertise that has enabled [the foreign entity] to 
deliver various projects to international customers. 
The I" level of knowledge white handling such projects pertains to usage of the software and 
performing the function by operating the commands as directed by the supervisor. Second is 
the ability to design the component with engineering basics. The third basic level of 
knowledge is an ability to identify individual components of integration that will interface 
abilities of each module. 
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[The beneficiary] has an ability to understand software tools, their applications, and the 
deployment of tools for design processes and create the interfaces with an integrated 
approach. One more important aspect is to employ the various disciplines of knowledge in a 
structured manner by extracting the work from engineers who are performing individual 
operations. [The benetlciary] has supervised and delivered many such projects which 
involved [the] following aspects: 
- Application software. 
Tooling design and manufacturing 
Data conversions 
Systems integration 
Defining data management 
Manage heterogeneous operating systems 
Concurrent engineering 
It is very clear from the items listed above that he possesses multi-skills and advanced and 
specialized knowledge to integrate everything together to successfully deliver needs of the 
customers. 
[The beneficiary's] advanced and specialized knowledge and expertise gained through 
working at [the foreign entity] consists of [the] following factors: 
ProIEngineer 2001 3D models & 2D drawings making systems as used in 
[the foreign entity] and as will continue to be used in his duties at [the 
petitioner] 
[The petitioner's] CAD drawings checklists .... these are unique to [the 
foreign entity] and [the beneficiary] has undergone several weeks of training 
and knows how to use these lists for specialized services to [the petitioner] 
The petitioner submitted a resume for the beneficiary that reflects that he served as a team member on 
numerous projects, and his duties with the foreign entity included providing "[ajssistance to the Project 
Leader in planning the inputs and deliveries for [the] execution of projects." 
On May 7, 2004, the director denied the petition. The director determined that the petitioner failed to show 
that the beneficiary was employed abroad in a capacity that required specialized knowledge. Specifically, the 
director stated that, while the beneficiary's responsibilities require experience with ProIEngineer, this skill is 
not out of the ordinary for other professional engineers in the beneficiary's field. The director stated that "the 
LlN-04- 127-53 170 
Page 6 
petitioner is simply one of many firms using ProIEngineer and other professional engineering tools." The 
director stated that "it is presumed that most consulting firms have their own methodology in how to conduct 
a consulting engagement," thus calling into question whether the foreign entity's and petitioner's methodology 
can be considered different or uncommon. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary qualifies for L-1B status, and that the director 
failed to offer substantive evidence to support the denial. In an attached brief, counsel states the following: 
[Tlhe petitioner has never suggested that the tools being used by [the beneficiary] are unique 
to the petitioner. Petitioner has always stressed that [the beneficiary] possesses advanced 
knowledge of petitioner's design engineering standards and possesses expertise in applying 
those standards using specialized software (ProIEngineer, etc.), applications and 
methodologies. 
Counsel references previously provided letters and asserts that sufficient evidence has been submitted to 
establish that the beneficiary qualifies for L-IB classification. Counsel states that "Colther than simply 
disagreeing with petitioner's and counsel's statements, [Citizenship and lrnmigration Services (CIS)] offers no 
substantive evidence in opposition to [the beneficiary's] eligibility for L-1B classification." Counsel asserts 
that "[alt the very least, petitioner deserves an explanation as to why this case does not fit precisely within the 
Puleo and O'haru memos." Counsel futher states the following: 
[CIS] has explicitly acknowledged petitioner's "own methodology". By stating as much, 
[CIS] has conceded that the instant case falls precisely within point #5 of the Fukeo Memo 
and also fits precisely into the example used in the Puleo Memo. This alone qualifies [the 
beneficiary] for L- I B classification. 
Upon review, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary was employed abroad in a specialized 
knowledge capacity. See section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. Ij 1184(c)(2)(B); 8 C.F.R. 
9 214,2(I)(l)(ii)(D). 
In examining whether the beneficiary was emptoyed abroad in a specialized knowledge capacity, the AAO 
will look to the petitioner's description of the foreign job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 2 14.2(1)(3)(iv). The petitioner 
must submit a detailed description of the services performed sufficient to establish specialized knowledge. Id. 
It is also appropriate for the AAO to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the i~nportance of the 
beneticiary's knowledge of the business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making 
process. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. I1 7, 120 (Comm. 198 I)(citing Mutter of Ruulin, 13 I&N Dec. 61 8 
(R.C. 1970) and Muller of LeBlmc, 13 I&N Dec. 8 16 (R.C. 1971)).' As stated by the Commissioner in 
Although the cited precedents pre-date the current statutory definition of "specialized knowledge," the AAO 
finds them instructive. Other than deleting the former requirement that specialized knowledge had to be 
"proprietary," the I990 Act did not significantly alter the definition of "specialized knowlcdge" from the prior 
INS regulation or precedent decision interpreting the term. The Committee Report simply states that the 
Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of "[vlarying [i.e., not specifically incorrect] 
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Mutter ~,fPenner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 52 (Comm. 1982), when considering whether the beneficiaries possessed 
specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Ruulin decisions did not find that the occupations inherently 
qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have 
unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. Id. The Commissioner also provided the 
following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or her to 
produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed primarily 
for his ability to carry out a key process or function which is important or essential to the 
business' operation. 
Id. at 53. 
It should be noted that the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the AAO to make 
comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The term "specialized 
knowledge" is not an absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed in 1756. Inc. v. Attorney 
Generul, "[slimply put, specialized knowledge is a relative . . . idea which cannot have a plain meaning." 745 
F. Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990). The Congressional record specifically states that the L-l category was intended 
for "key personnel." See generally, H.R. Rep. No. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key 
personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." Webster's II New 
C'ollege Diclionury 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). in general, all employees can reasonably be 
considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic 
success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. An employee of 
"crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average employee. 
Accordingly, based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record related to that 
term, the AAO must make comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge employee and 
the general labor market, but also between that employee and the remainder of the petitioner's workforce. 
Moreover, in Matter of Penner, the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of the 
specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comrn. 1982). The decision noted that the 1970 House 
Report, H.R. No. 91-851, stated that the number of admissions under the L-1 classification "will not be large" 
and that "[tlhe class of persons eligible for such nonimmigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be carefully 
regulated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id. at 51. The decision further noted that the 
House Report was silent on the subject of specialized knowledge, but that during the course of the sub- 
committee hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary 
to qualify under the proposed "I," category. In response to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses 
responded that they understood the legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts," individuals with 
"unique" skills, and that it would not include "lower categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." Mutter 
interpretations by INS," H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I), at 69, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. Beyond that, the 
Committee Report simply restates the tautology that became section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Id. The AAO 
concludes, therefore, that the cited cases, as well as Mutter of Penner, remain useful guidance concerning the 
intended scope of the "specialized knowledge" L- 1 B classification. 
LTN-04- 127-53 170 
Page 8 
of Penner, id, at 50 (citing H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., lmmigration Act of 1970: Hearings on 
H.R. 445,9 1 st Cong. 2 10,2 18,223,240,248 (November 12, 1969)). 
Reviewing the Congressional record, the Commissioner concluded in Mutter of Penner that an expansive 
reading of the specialized knowledge provision, such that it would include skilled workers and technicians, is 
not warranted. The Commissioner emphasized that that the specialized knowledge worker classification was 
not intended for "all employees with any level of specialized knowledge." Mutter ofPenner, 18 1&N Dec. at 
53. Or, as noted in Mutter ofColley, "[mlost employees today are specialists and have been trained and given 
specialized knowledge. However, in view of the House Report, it can not be concluded that all employees 
with specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
intracompany transferees." 18 I&N Dec. 1 17, 1 19 (Comm. 198 I). According to Mutter of Penner, "[sluch a 
conclusion would permit extremely large numbers of persons to qualify for the 'L-I' visa" rather than the 
"key personnel" that Congress specifically intended. 18 I&N Dec. at 53; see also, 1756, Inc., 745 F. Supp. at 
15 (concluding that Congress did not intend for the specialized knowledge capacity to extend to all employees 
with specialized knowledge, but rather to "key personnel" and "executives.") 
In the instant matter, the petitioner provides explanation of the beneficiary's technical skills and knowledge 
used with the foreign entity, including substantial experience with engineering software such as ProIEngineer. 
However, as pointed out by the director and confirmed by counsel on appeal, ProIEngineer is not a 
proprietary product exclusive to the foreign entity or the petitioner. ProiEngineer is a suite of design 
programs developed by a separate company, and it is available to anyone working within the beneficiary's 
field. Thus, knowledge and experience with Pro/Engineer does not constitute specialized knowledge of the 
petitioner's or foreign entity's products or processes. See 8 C.F.R. Q: 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). The petitioner has not 
named any other design tools or software packages with which the beneficiary has significant expertise. 
The petitioner stated that, in addition to experience with ProIEngineer, the beneficiary's "advanced and 
specialized knowledge and expertise gained through working at [the foreign entity] consists of . . . [the 
petitioner's] CAD drawings checklist." The petitioner indicated that the checklists are "unique to [the foreign 
entity] and [the beneficiary] has undergone several weeks of training and knows how to use these lists for 
specialized services to [the petitioner.]" However, the petitioner has failed to clearly describe what the 
checklists are, for what purpose they are used, or how they differentiate the foreign entity's methods from 
those used by other companies. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient 
for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Mutter of Sofflci, 22 l&N Dec. 158, 165 
(Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure CruJ! of C'ulifornia, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
In the request for evidence, the director instructed the petitioner to provide documentation of training the 
beneficiary received, including "any company-specific vocational, technical andlor professional development 
courses which are related to the company's equipment, products, processes and/or procedures." While the 
petitioner claims that the beneficiary completed "several weeks of training" regarding the foreign entity's 
checklists, it did not submit documentation to support this assertion. Nor did the petitioner explain whether 
such documentation is available, or the reason for such omission. The regulation states that the petitioner 
shall submit additional evidence as the director, in his or her discretion, may deem necessary. The purpose of 
the request for evidence is to elicit further information that clarifies whether eligibility for the benefit sought 
LIN-04- 127-53 170 
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has been established, as of the time the petition is filed. See 8 C.F.R. $5 103.2(b)(8) and (12). Counsel claims 
that the director did not "explain what substantive evidence would have convinced [CIS] of [the beneficiary's] 
eligibility as an L-1B intra-company transferee." Yet, the director gave clear guidance as to what detailed 
explanation was required. The director specifically instructed the petitioner to provide documentation of the 
beneficiary's training, yet the petitioner failed to submit such evidence. Counsel's assertion is not persuasive. 
Counsel asserts that "[the beneficiary] possesses advanced knowledge of [the] petitioner's design engineering 
standards and possesses expertise it1 applying those standards using specialized software (Pro/Engineer, etc.), 
applications and methodologies." However, the petitioner has failed to clearly describe its or the foreign 
entity's particular methods, standards, or procedures, such to establish that they are different from those used 
by other consulting firms. The petitioner discusses the beneficiary's tasks abroad, including performing 
system design and training customers in non-proprietary software, yet the petitioner has not shown that the 
beneficiary's methods for completing his duties differed from any consultant performing similar work for 
other companies. It is not sufficient to merely state that "[the beneficiary's] responsibilities require in-depth 
and extensive knowledge of [the foreign entity's] engineering products and systems development services." 
As requested by the director, the petitioner must provide adequate detail and documentation to establish that 
the beneficiary's knowledge is different from that commonly held in his field. Again, going on record without 
supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these 
proceedings. Matter of Soflci. 22 l&N Dec. at 165. 
Counsel references the director's statement that "most consutting firms have their own methodology in how to 
conduct a consulting engagement." Counsel asserts that "[CIS] has explicitly acknowledged [the] petitioner's 
'own methodology."' Yet, counsel misconstrues the context of the director's comment. The director 
referenced the fact that most consulting companies have internal methods and procedures to illustrate that the 
petitioner's broad assertions do not meet its burden to distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge from that held 
by consultants with other firms. It is inaccurate to assume that any consultant working with any firm 
possesses specialized knowledge simply by working for the company. The L-1B program was not intended to 
encompass such a broad class of workers. See genrrullv, H.R. Rep. No. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. 
The petitioner must submit sufficiently detailed evidence to establish that the foreign entity's methods and 
procedures, and the beneficiary's use thereof, are specific to it and the foreign entity. The petitioner has failed 
to meet this burden. 
Counsel asserts that the beneficiary satisfies the requirements of specialized knowledge as discussed in an 
internal Immigration and Naturalization Service memorandum from James A. Puleo. See Memorandum From 
James A. Pdeo, Acting Exec. Assoc. Commr., Office of Operations, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
Inrerpretulion qf Speciulized Knowledge, CO 21412 (Mar. 9, 1994). Counsel claims that the beneficiary 
meets one of several named criteria for establishing specialized knowledge, and that the beneficiary's foreign 
duties fall directly within one of the examples of specialized knowledge provided in the memorandum. 
Specifically, counsel asserts that the petitioner has shown that the beneficiary possesses knowledge of a 
product or process which cannot be easily transferred or taught to another individual. Yet, as discussed 
above, the petitioner has failed to sufficiently describe the foreign entity's methods and procedures, and it 
does not claim that the foreign entity offers any products that are specific to its company. Counsel claims that 
the beneficiary satisfies an example provided in the memorandum which notes that "the United States firm 
LlN-04-127-53 170 
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would experience a significant interruption of business in order to train a United States worker to assume [the 
beneficiary's] duties." As the petitioner has failed to distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge and experience 
from that held outside of the foreign entity or petitioner, it has not shown that it would incur any interruption 
of business if not permitted to employ the beneficiary in L-I B status. 
Counsel further asserts that the petitioner is only required to meet one of the criteria listed in the Puleo memo 
in order to establish that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. However, the memorandum 
prefaces the list of criteria by stating that "[tlhe following are some of the possible characteristics of an alien 
who possesses specialized knowledge. They are not at all inclusive." Thus, the criteria are intended as 
general guidance for CIS personnel, and not definitive legal requirements. Counsel's assertion that meeting 
one criterion "alone qualifies [the beneficiary] for L-1 B classification" is not persuasive. For example, the 
first criterion in the list states that a beneficiary "[p]ossesses knowledge that is valuable to the employer's 
competitiveness in the market place." Most employees that have worked for a company for a year or more 
meet this criterion. Clearly more is required than satisfying a single criterion named in the Pulro 
memorandum. 
Further, the petitioner failed to distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge from that generally held among the 
foreign entity's employees, such to establish that the beneficiary qualifies as key personnel. See Mutter of 
Penner, I8 I&N Dec. 49, 53 (Comm. 1982). The petitioner has not explained whether the beneficiary has 
received training or experience that is different from other consultants working for the foreign entity. In fact, 
the beneficiary's resume states that his duties with the foreign entity include providing "[alssistance to the 
Project Leader in planning the inputs and deliveries for execution of projects." The resume lists I I projects 
the beneficiary worked on, and in each it specifies that he was a "Team Member" on teams ranging from one 
to five employees. Thus, the beneficiary's resume reflects that he has not served in a lead role with the 
foreign entity, which undermines a finding that he is distinguished among the foreign entity's employees. 
Counsel states that the director "offers no substantive evidence in opposition to [the beneficiary's] eligibility 
for L-I B classification." However. in visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the 
benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. When denying a 
petition, a director has an affirmative duty to explain the specific reasons for the denial; this duty includes 
informing a petitioner why the evidence failed to satisfy its burden of proof pursuant to section 291 of the 
Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 103.3(a)(l)(i ). In this case, the director has discussed the deficiencies in the petitioner's 
evidence and adequately explained how he arrived at his decision to deny the petition. Counsel's argument is 
not persuasive. 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has demonstrated that the beneficiary should be 
considered a member of a "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized knowledge. See 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, supru at 16. Based on the foregoing, the AAO concludes that the petitioner 
has not established that the beneficiary was employed abroad in a capacity that involved specialized 
knowledge. 8 C.F.R. 4 214.2(1)(3)(iv). For this reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
LlN-04-127-53 170 
Page 1 1 
The second issue in the present matter is whether the prospective position in the United States requires an 
individual with specialized knowledge. See 8 C.F.R. 5 2 14.2(1)(3)(ii). 
In a letter submitted with the initial petition, the petitioner described the beneficiary's prospective duties as 
fo t lows: 
In this position, [the beneficiary] will perform extremely complex engineering duties to 
design, develop, integrate and set-up network systems and applications using [the petitioner's] 
systems integration approach. As a member of [the petitioner's] Engineering Team, [the 
beneficiary] will make technical contributions, including recommendations for improving 
current projects and enhancing the software development lifecycle. 
He will analyze product requirements and product architectures and produce network designs 
and implementation that will enable our clients to maintain state-of-the-art product offerings 
and technology. He will use ProiEngineer (2000i & 2000i2) software and simulations for 
assignments and also use other leading edge software tools. He will be responsible for 
application customization, re-creation and transfer of data, finite element analysis, and system 
design and modeling. [The beneficiary] will evaluate user requests for new or modified 
systems to determine feasibility, cost and time required, cotnpatibility with current system 
and computer capabilities. He will consult with users to identify current operating procedures 
and clarify program objectives and will formulate plans outlining the steps required to 
develop the program, using product knowledge and design. [The beneficiary] will also be 
required to provide technical training regarding the programs he develops and monitor post- 
implementation performance. 
[The beneficiary] possesses an advanced level of knowledge of [the petitioner's] 
methodologies, applications and software packages and will continue to apply his knowledge 
during his assignment in the United States. [The beneficiary] will continue to perform 
engineering and design duties using high-end software applications. [The beneficiary's] 
advanced level of knowledge involves the application and deployment of the engineering 
tools and their integration towards the successful completion of the assigned project. [The 
beneficiary] will be using [the petitioner's] systems integration approach in all aspects of his 
duties. In performing his duties, [the beneficiary] will combine the knowledge of mechanical 
engineering, add-on programs and customization of software using [the petitioner's] 
methodologies and training. He has acquitted [sic] a unique blend of ProIEngineer software 
expertise combined with design/modeling standards in surface modeling. 
As noted, the position requires a thorough knowledge of the specifications and technical 
requirements, which have been developed at our Indian office. 
In response to the director's request for evidence, the petitioner further described the beneficiary's prospective 
duties in the United States as follows: 
LIN-04- 127-53 170 
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[The petitioner] uses the specialized software ProJEngineer 2001 Solid; Surface modeling, 
Sheet metal, advanced assembly, Piping & Cabling modules. 
[The beneficiary] has worked on projects for clients (includin from the United 
States, Germany, and India. Some of these projects include: Product design support of 
Plastic parts, castings, sheet metal parts, Piping layout design, Reverse engineering of plastic 
parts in the area of Cab design of tractor. [The beneficiary] will continue to perform similar 
engineering and design duties using high-end software application packages, in particular 
ProIEngineer 2001, for our clients in the United States. 
[The beneficiary's] advanced level of knowledge with [the petitioner's] design engineering 
standards and his expertise in applying those standards using specialized software, 
applications, methodologies and training sets his knowledge apart and makes him uniquely 
qualified to continue these services for our clients in the United States. 
(Emphasis in original). 
In denying the petition, the director concluded that the petitioner failed to show that the prospective position 
in the United States requires an individual with specialized knowledge. The director stated that "the petitioner 
is simply one of many firms using ProIEngineer and other professional engineering software tools." 
On appeal, counsel's brief is framed as a simultaneous response to both grounds for denial. Thus, counsel's 
arguments discussed above also apply to whether the beneficiary will be employed in the United States in a 
capacity involving specialized knowledge. 
As with the beneficiary's duties abroad, the petitioner has not indicated that the beneficiary will utilize 
software or products in the United States that are specific to the petitioner's family of companies. Thus, the 
petitioner's primary representation is that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge due to having 
"advanced knowledge of [the] petitioner's design engineering standards and . . . expertise in applying those 
standards . . . ." However, as discussed above, the petitioner has failed to adequately describe the standards 
used by it and the foreign entity, such to establish that knowledge of them constitutes specialized knowledge. 
The evidence of record does not support that the petitioner requires an employee with greater knowledge than 
a skilled worker in the beneficiary's field. Thus, the petitioner has failed to show that the prospective position 
in the United States requires an individual with specialized knowledge. See 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). For 
this additional reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
It is noted that the director stated that the petitioner's petition for L-IB status on behalf of the beneficiary 
appears to be an attempt to circumvent numerical limits on approvals of petitions for H-I B status, as H-1 B is 
the appropriate classification for the beneficiary. Counsel asserts that the beneficiary is eligible for L-1 B 
status, and that the director's comment regarding the petitioner's alleged attempt to circumvent the H- I B cap 
is "not related to the merits of this case." The director should focus on applying the statute and regulations to 
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the facts presented by the record of proceeding. The director's comment regarding the H-1 B cap constitutes 
the director's personal impression that has no material bearing on the present matter. Accordingly, the 
director's comment in this regard will be withdrawn. 
In visa proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 29 1 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
director's decision will be affirmed and the appeal will be dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.