dismissed L-1B Case: Software Development

identifyingdatadeletedto
preventclearlyunwarranted
invasionof personalprivecy
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000
Washington, DC 20529
u.s.Citizenship
and Immigration
Services
File: SRC 04 031 50257
LICCOPY
Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: JUL 1 8 2007
INRE:
Petition:
Petitioner:
Beneficiary:
Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L)
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:
INSTRUCTIONS:
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.
P
Rob rt P. Wiemann, Chief
tdministrative Appeals Office
'U
www.uscis.gov
SRC 04 031 50257
Page 2
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The matter is
now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal.
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to employ the beneficiary as an L-1B nonimmigrant
intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner, a Delaware corporation, claims that it is
engaged in the development and marketing of land record management software application. It states that it is a
subsidiary of located in Nova Scotia, Canada. The petitioner seeks to employ the
beneficiary as an application specialist.
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary possesses
specialized knowledge, or that she would be employed in the United States in a specialized knowledge capacity.
The petitioner subsequently filed an 1-290B Notice of Appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a
motion, and forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the
director improperly concluded that the beneficiary lacks specialized knowledge. Counsel claims that the director
imposes inappropriate requirements on the L 1-B classification. Counsel submits a brief and additional evidence in
support of the appeal.
To establish L-1 eligibility, the petitioner must meet the criteria outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L). Specifically, within three years preceding
the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, a qualifying organization must have employed
the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one
continuous year. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue
rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive,
or specialized knowledge capacity.
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be
accompanied by:
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section.
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed.
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of
the petition.
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior
education, training, and employment qualifies him/her to perform the intended
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services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the
same work which the alien performed abroad.
At issue in this matter is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary possesses specialized
knowledge, and that she would be employed in the United States in a specialized knowledge capacity.
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(B), provides the following:
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special knowledge
of the company product and its application in international markets or has an advanced level of
knowledge of processes and procedures of the company.
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(1)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as:
[S]pecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product,
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or, expertise in the organization's
processes and procedures.
The petition in this matter was filed on November 12, 2003. In a letter dated October 30, 2003, the petitioner
stated that the company "creates, markets, and supports proprietary software applications which manage and
analyze information relating to land records."
The petitioner submitted a brochure that briefly outlines the company's services. With respect to the
beneficiary's current role, the petitioner stated:
[The beneficiary] has been employed by NovaLIS Canada from October 21, 2002 to the present.
. .. [Her] present title is Application Specialist; she is one of only four senior technical leads
working with the proprietary suite of NovaLIS software applications, including Assessment
Office, Land Deeds Office, and Land Title Office. [The beneficiary's] duties at our Canadian
parent company have included serving as technical lead on projects to customize our product and
implement it at client sites; demonstrating products; assisting in request for proposal benchmark
events, documentation and presentations; and providing technical training to client staff and
business partners within the NovaLIS suite of products.
In performing these duties in the course of her employment with us, [the beneficiary] has
developed specialized knowledge about our proprietary products. For each of our products, she
is familiar with the potential uses, the various modifications which can be made, the work
required to implement various modifications, and the steps necessary to implement the products
at client sites.
The petitioner further stated that it is seeking to employ the beneficiary in the same role, performing the same
services described above, and that she would be "direct[ing] projects including customizing the company's
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applications to clients' specifications and needs, implementing them at client sites, and providing training as
needed by client personnel." The petitioner also submitted incorporation and ownership documentation for the
u.s. entity, a company brochure, a statement of wages paid to the beneficiary in 2002, and a copy of the
beneficiary's resume.
On January 13,2004, the director issued a request for further evidence (RFE). Specifically, the director instructed
the petitioner as follows:
• Submit evidence relating to the unique methodologies, tools, programs, and/or applications that
your company uses. Evidence may include your company's brochure or other literature
describing the tools your company uses. Please describe in detail how these are different from
the methodologies, tools, programs and/or applications used by other companies.
• Explain, in more detail, exactly what is the equipment, system, product, technique or service of
which the beneficiary of this petition has specialized knowledge, and indicate if it is used or
produced by other employers in the United States and abroad.
Training records:
Provide the following evidence and any other documentation that you feel will present an
accurate description of the training required for the position.
• Please submit a record - as opposed to merely a letter - from your human resources department
detailing the manner in which the beneficiary has gained his/her specialized knowledge.
Documentation should indicate the pertinent training courses in which the beneficiary has been
enrolled while working at your company, as well as the duration of the courses, the number of
hours spent taking the courses each day, and certificates of completion of these courses.
• Indicate the minimum amount of time required to train an employee to fill the proffered position.
Specify how many workers are similarly employed by your organization. Of these employees,
please indicate how many have received training comparable to the training administered to the
beneficiary.
• If the petitioner is seeking to bring the beneficiary 0 the U.S. to provide training in the area of his
or her claimed specialized knowledge, describe in detail the training that the beneficiary will
give other workers.
• If the beneficiary will be receiving training upon his or her arrival in the U.S., describe in detail
the scope and length of such training.
The director also requested (1) a copy of the foreign company's organizational structure, showing where the
beneficiary's position falls within the company and the levels of supervision and the number and types of
positions the beneficiary supervises; (2) a copy of the U.S. company's organizational structure, showing where the
beneficiary's position would fall within the company and the levels of supervision and the number and types of
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positions the beneficiary would supervise; (3) payroll records to substantiate the staffing described for each
company; and (4) a list with the names, position descriptions and titles of all L-IB specialized knowledge
employees transferred to the U.S. location within the last 12 months who are still at the U.S. location.
The petitioner responded to the RFE on February 17,2004. With respect to the company's products and services,
the petitioner stated:
We develop, market, implement and support proprietary software applications which automate
various land records. [The beneficiary] is most experienced specifically with our application
"Land Development Office." ... This product is utilized by governmental land records agencies
to automate land management practices, including permitting and development records; code
compliance; subdivision approvals; licensing; inspections; plan review; and zoning. This
application is usually purchased by a governmental unit for use by several departments, for
example, building, zoning, planning, and development, which mist frequently maintain separate
manual records systems. Our Land Development Office product enables them to combine all
records relating to Land Development into one automated system to service all departments ....
While each of our application specialists concentrates their expertise on one product, they must
also have basic familiarity with the full NovaLIS suite of proprietary products. .. As many of
these technologies are proprietary, no one would have gained the requisite experience with a
different employer.
The petitioner submitted a promotional brochure which describes in brief the company's Land Development
Office product.
With respect to the beneficiary's training, the petitioner stated that as a small company, it does not maintain any
formal training record. The petitioner did submit copies of certificates of completion for the beneficiary in two
courses entitled "Introduction to Land Records Framework 8.1 Training Course" and "Advanced Land Records
Framework 8.1 Training Course." The petitioner explained that these courses are designed to give its staff a basic
introduction to the company's applications. The petitioner further described the beneficiary's training process as
comprising three phases. First, during a three-month period, under supervision, the beneficiary developed the
technical skills required to configure, customize, and install the NovaLIS products through actual use of the
NovaLIS tools and technologies until she had gained technical proficiency. Thereafter, the beneficiary spent
about four months in which she was assigned to assist in the installation of the NovaLIS suite of products at a
client site until she has gained enough proficiency to install the products and conduct training of client personnel
independently. Finally, for a period of two to three months, she developed her knowledge and skill in the Novalis
"business area analysis" process by attending on-site workshops to assess clients' needs as an assistant to a
NovaLIS Senior Applications Specialist, until she was deemed capable of conducting such workshop
independently. The petitioner stated that one full year after she had been employed by NovaLIS, the beneficiary
was deemed sufficiently proficient to be given her first assignment of full responsibility at a client site.
The petitioner indicated that the minimum amount of time required to train an employee to be fully competent to
fill the responsibilities of the beneficiary's position is approximately one year, and that the training period that the
beneficiary underwent is typical training for new employees who hold the title of "senior applications SPecialist"
for any of its products. The petitioner stated that it has one other employee with the title of senior applications
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specialist who underwent a similar training program over a similar period of time. This person specializes in a
different product called "Assessment Office" and is currently in the United States on an L-1B work authorization,
having been transferred to the U.S. office within the previous 12 months.
The petitioner stated that there are nine employees who are trained in the Land Development Office product line.
In addition to the beneficiary, there is a land development office services manager, a project manager, five
applications specialists, and one contract employee. Based on the organizational chart of the foreign company,
the land development office services manager apparently supervises all other employees working with that
product line. The project manager, according to the petitioner, holds a position similar to that of the senior
applications specialist, but with a managerial rather than technical role. The petitioner stated that the applications
specialists are not trained in performing business requirements or business area analysis.
The petitioner provided organizational charts for the foreign entity and the U.S. entity and copies of the
beneficiary's Personnel Status/Change Forms, indicating that she began her employment with the foreign entity
on October 21, 2002 with the title "Applications Specialist," and on October 14, 2003, her title was changed to
"Senior Applications Specialist." The petitioner did not submit payroll records for the foreign and U.S. entities as
the director requested.
The director denied the petition on March 16, 2004. The director found the evidence does not establish that the
beneficiary's duties warrant the expertise of someone possessing truly specialized knowledge. Noting that the
beneficiary was hired by the petitioner in October of 2002 and was in training from that time until shortly before
the petition was filed in November 2003, the director found that "[t]his fact tends to support the idea that her
knowledge is not advanced. The beneficiary does not have an exclusive basis of knowledge in the company's
systems or services. There is no evidence that the beneficiary's knowledge is uncommon, noteworthy, or
distinguished by some unusual quality and is not generally known by practitioners in the field." The director
concluded that the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that she
will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity.
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director's decision incorrectly requires more than one year of
employment at the foreign company. Counsel maintains, "the regulation requires only that the alien be employed
at the foreign company for one year 'in a position that ... involved specialized knowledge' [and] does not require
the alien to have been fully proficient in the specialized knowledge throughout the entire course of the year of
employment at the foreign company." Counsel contends that since an employee would be unlikely to possess
specialized knowledge about a company's processes and procedures before working there, such a requirement
would result in requiring the employee to work at the foreign company for more than a year, which would be
"beyond the authority of the regulation."
Counsel also asserts that in denying the petition in part because "the beneficiary does not have an exclusive basis
of knowledge in the company's systems or services," the director's decision erroneously requires the advance
knowledge to be narrowly held through out the company. Counsel cites to a 1994 legacy Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) memorandum which provides guidance in interpreting the current statutory and
regulatory definitions, stating that "the statute does not require that the advanced knowledge be narrowly held
throughout the company, only that the knowledge be advanced." See Memorandum from James A. Puleo, Acting
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Executive Assoc. Commissioner, Office of Operations, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Interpretation of
Special Knowledge, CO 214L-P, (Mar. 9, 1994)("Puleo memorandum").'
Again relying on the Puleo memorandum, counsel asserts that the director's decision improperly compares the
duties of the beneficiary's position with the duties of others in similar jobs in the industry and fails to consider the
specialized knowledge required to perform the duties of this particular job. Finally, counsel contends that it
would be significant hardship for the petitioner to have to train a U.S. employee to assume the duties of the
beneficiary. Counsel submits a copy of the Puleo memorandum and a letter in support of the petition from a U.S.
business partner of the petitioner.
On review, the AAO finds the record does not sufficiently establish that the beneficiary possesses "specialized
knowledge" as defined in section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(B), and the regulation at 8 C.F.R.
§ 214.2(l)(1)(ii)(D), or that she was employed by the foreign entity or would be employed by the United States
entity in a specialized knowledge capacity.
Preliminarily, the AAO acknowledges counsel's assertion that there is no statutory or regulatory requirement that
the beneficiary be "fully proficient in the specialized knowledge throughout the entire course of [a] year of
employment at the foreign company" prior to the filing of a nonimmigrant intracompany transferee petition
requesting classification as a specialized knowledge worker. However, counsel's assertion is not persuasive.
Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act states:
... an alien who, within 3 years preceding the time of his application for admission into the
United States, has been employed continuously for one year by a firm or corporation or other
legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof and who seeks to enter the United States
temporarily in order to continue to render his services to the same employer or a subsidiary or
affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial, executive or involves specialized knowledge.
(Emphasis added.)
In order to "continue to" render services in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves, specialized
knowledge, it is necessary for the beneficiary to have been employed in one of these qualifying capacities during
his or her employment abroad. Contrary to counsel's contentions, the evidentiary requirements for the filing of an
1 It must be noted that in making a determination as to whether the knowledge possessed by a beneficiary is
special or advanced, the AAO relies on the statute and regulations, legislative history and prior precedent.
Although counsel places emphasis on the above-referenced Puleo memorandum, the memorandum was issued as
guidance to assist Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) employees in interpreting a term that is not clearly
defined in the statute, not as a replacement for the statute or the original intentions of Congress in creating the
specialized knowledge classification, or to overturn prior precedent decisions that continue to prove instructive in
adjudicating L-1B visa petitions. Merely establishing that the facts of the instant petition resemble a particular
example provided in the 1994 memo is insufficient to establish that the beneficiary qualifies for this visa
classification. The AAO will weigh guidance outlined in policy memoranda accordingly, but not to the exclusion
of the statutory and regulatory definitions, legislative history or prior precedents.
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L-l petition, as set forth by the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(3)(iv), further confirm the petitioner's burden to
establish that the beneficiary was employed in a qualifying capacity. Specifically, the petitioner is required to
submit "evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was managerial,
executive, or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior education, training, and employment
qualifies him/her to perform the intended services in the United States."
Therefore, the director's decision was not "beyond the authority of the regulation" as asserted by counsel. The
petitioner clearly stated that "the minimum amount of time required to train an employee to be fully competent to
fill the responsibilities of [the beneficiary's] position is approximately one year." Based on the petitioner's
representations, the beneficiary , who joined the foreign entity on October 21, 2002 , would have reached a
minimum level of competence in her position approximately two weeks before the petition was filed.
Accordingly, the director reasonably concluded that the beneficiary's previous twelve months of employment did
not involve one full year of employment which would be considered to be at the level of a "specialized
knowledge" employee. Even if the beneficiary's period of training could be considered to "involve" specialized
knowledge, as discussed further below, the L-IB visa classification was not intended for employees who are
minimally qualified to perform their stated duties.
The AAO also acknowledges counsel's argument that the director's decision creates a de facto requirement that
the beneficiary have been employed by the foreign entity for more than one year. It must be noted that the
regulations require evidence that the qualifying year of employment be in a managerial or executive capacity, or
in a capacity requiring specialized knowledge. Therefore, if some portion of the beneficiary's foreign
employment is not in a qualifying capacity, an employee who has been employed with a qualifying entity for
many years may not meet this eligibility requirement. A determination as to whether a beneficiary was employed
in a qualifying capacity for the requisite one-year period must necessarily be made on a case-by-case basis. In
this case, the petitioner's stated one-year training requirement for the type of position offered effectively made it
impossible to find that the beneficiary , after a little over twelve months of employment, could have been
employed in a position involving specialized knowledge for one full year. To the extent that a requirement that
the beneficiary be employed for more than one year was imposed, the petitioner's statements regarding its training
program and the minimum requirements for the beneficiary's position imposed it.
In examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's
description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed description of
the services to be performed sufficient to establish specialized knowledge. Id. It is also appropriate for the AAO
to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the beneficiary's knowledge of the business's
product or service, management operations, or decision-making process. Matter ofColley , 18 I&N Dec. 117, 120
(Comm. 1981)(citing Matter ofRaulin, 13 I&N Dec. 618 (R.C . 1970) and Matter ofLeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. 816
(R.C. 1971»? As stated by the Commissioner in Matter ofPenner , 18 I&N Dec. 49, 52 (Comm . 1982), when
2 Although the cited precedents pre-date the current statutory definition of "specialized knowledge ," the AAO
finds them instructive. Other than deleting the former requirement that specialized knowledge had to be
"proprietary," the 1990 Act did not significantly alter the definition of "specialized knowledge" from the prior
INS regulation or precedent decision interpreting the term. The Committee Report simply states that the
Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of "[v]arying [i.e., not specifically incorrect]
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considering whether the beneficiaries possessed specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did
not find that the occupations inherently qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." Rather, the
beneficiaries were considered to have unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. Id.
The Commissioner also provided the following clarification:
A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or her to
produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed primarily
for his ability to carry out a key process or function which is important or essential to the
business' operation.
Id. at 53.
It should be noted that the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the AAO to make comparisons
in order to determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The term "specialized knowledge" is not an
absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed in 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, "[s]imply put,
specialized knowledge is a relative ... idea which cannot have a plain meaning." 745 F. Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C.
1990). The Congressional record specifically states that the L-l category was intended for "key personnel." See
generally, H.R. Rep. No. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key personnel" denotes a position within
the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." Webster's II New College Dictionary 605 (Houghton
Mifflin Co. 2001). In general, all employees can reasonably be considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise.
If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic success of an enterprise, there would be no rational
economic reason to employ that person. An employee of" crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above
the level of the petitioner's average employee. Accordingly, based on the definition of "specialized knowledge"
and the congressional record related to that term, the AAO must make comparisons not only between the claimed
specialized knowledge employee and the general labor market, but also between that employee and the remainder
of the petitioner's workforce.
Moreover, in Matter of Penner, the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of the
specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comm. 1982). The decision noted that the 1970 House
Report, H.R. No. 91-851, stated that the number of admissions under the L-l classification "will not be large" and
that "[t]he class of persons eligible for such nonimmigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be carefully regulated
by the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id. at 51. The decision further noted that the House Report was
silent on the subject of specialized knowledge, but that during the course of the sub-committee hearings on the
bill, the Chairman specifically questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify under the proposed
"L" category. In response to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that they understood the
legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, and that it would not
include "lower categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 50 (citing
H.R. Subcomm. No.1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445, 91st Congo 210,218,
223,240,248 (November 12, 1969)).
interpretations by INS," H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(1), at 69, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. Beyond that, the
Committee Report simply restates the tautology that became section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Id. The AAO
concludes, therefore, that the cited cases, as well as Matter of Penner, remain useful guidance concerning the
intended scope of the "specialized knowledge" L-IB classification.
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Reviewing the Congressional record, the Commissioner concluded in Matter ofPenner that an expansive reading
of the specialized knowledge provision, such that it would include skilled workers and technicians, is not
warranted. The Commissioner emphasized that that the specialized knowledge worker classification was not
intended for "all employees with any level of specialized knowledge." Matter ofPenner, 18 I&N Dec. at 53. Or,
as noted in Matter ofColley, "[m]ost employees today are specialists and have been trained and given specialized
knowledge. However, in view of the House Report, it can not be concluded that all employees with specialized
knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as intracompany transferees." 18
I&N Dec. 117, 119 (Comm. 1981). According to Matter ofPenner, "[s]uch a conclusion would permit extremely
large numbers of persons to qualify for the 'L-l' visa" rather than the "key personnel" that Congress specifically
intended. 18 I&N Dec. at 53; see also, 1756, Inc., 745 F. Supp. at 15 (concluding that Congress did not intend for
the specialized knowledge capacity to extend all employees with specialized knowledge, but rather to "key
personnel" and "executives.")
In the instant matter, the petitioner submitted descriptions of the beneficiary's employment in the foreign entity
and her intended employment in the United States entity. However, the petitioner has not sufficiently documented
that the job duties to be performed require specialized knowledge as defmed at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(1)(ii)(D). The
beneficiary's job descriptions are insufficiently detailed and do not distinguish her knowledge as more advanced
or distinct among other specialists employed by the foreign or U.S. entities or by other unrelated companies. The
petitioner initially described the beneficiary's duties at the foreign company in general terms such as "serving as
technical lead on projects to customize our product and implement it at client sites; demonstrating products;
assisting in request for proposal benchmark events, documentation and presentations; and providing technical
training to client staff and business partners within the NovaLIS suite of products." Later, in response to the RFE,
the petitioner indicated that the beneficiary's job responsibilities would be to "oversees the customization,
implementation and acceptance of the Land Development Office application at our client sites, as well as post­
implementation training of client personnel." Other than declaring that its products are proprietary, and that the
beneficiary would be working with the Land Development Office products, the petitioner's descriptions of the
beneficiary's current and proposed duties are too vague to demonstrate that beneficiary has been or would be
required to utilize specialized knowledge of the petitioner's products, or advanced knowledge of its processes and
procedures.
The petitioner stated that in the course of her employment with the foreign entity, the beneficiary "has developed
specialized knowledge about [the company's] proprietary products," but the petitioner has not submitted evidence
to establish that the beneficiary's familiarity with the petitioner's proprietary products alone is sufficient to
constitute specialized knowledge. In the RFE, the director requested that the petitioner "[s]ubmit evidence
relating to the unique methodologies, tools, programs, and/or applications that your company uses [and] describe
in detail how these are different from the methodologies, tools, programs and/or applications used by other
companies." The petitioner responded with a one-paragraph description of the company's products and also
submitted a general promotional brochure on its Land Development Office applications. The petitioner further
stated in its response to the RFE, "while our competitors offer their own applications for the automation of
various types of lands records systems, none of their products are based on our proprietary applications and shell
language; none of their applications interact with each other the way that ours do; and none of our competitors
provide the customization that we do. Thus our products and services are unique in the lands records industry."
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These assertions are not supported by documentary evidence that would establish that the petitioner's products
and services are actually significantly different from those utilized by other companies in the same field.
The petitioner has not described with adequate specificity its own line of products and services, nor has it
established how or whether its products and services differ from those offered by any other company. As such,
the petitioner has not established how its "proprietary" methodologies and applications might be more than
customized versions of standard practices used in the industry. Going on record without supporting documentary
evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter ofSoffici, 22
I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft ofCalifornia, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm.
1972)). For this additional reason, the petitioner has not established that knowledge of its processes and
procedures alone constitutes specialized knowledge. Moreover, failure to submit requested evidence that
precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l4).
Beyond the decision of the director, the AAO notes that the petitioner failed to comply with the director's RFE
and, accordingly, has not established that the beneficiary has at least one continuous year of full-time employment
abroad with the overseas company as required under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(3)(iii). Despite the director's specific
request for payroll records, the petitioner failed to submit these critical documents, nor did the petitioner submit
any other documentation that would sufficiently demonstrate that the beneficiary was employed full-time for one
continuous year with the foreign entity. Again, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not
sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. at
165. Moreover, failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for
denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l4). For this additional reason, the petition will be denied.
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the
AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See Spencer
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), affd. 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir.
2003); see also Dar v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a de
novo basis). When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a
challenge only if she shows that the AAO abused it discretion with respect to all of the AAO's enumerated
grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043.
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative
basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains
entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.
Accordingly, the director's decision will be affirmed and the petition will be denied.
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.