dismissed L-1B Case: Software Development

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"PUBLICCOpy
U:S.Department of Homeland Security
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. A3000
Washington, DC 20529
U.S.Citizenship .
and Immigration .
Services
File: LIN0604151312 Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER Date:
IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:
Petition: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 11 Ol(a)(l5)(L)
IN BEHALF OF BENEFICIARY:
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office .
.~~~
Ro~Wiemann, Chief·
Administrative Appeals Office
www.uscls.gov
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DISCUSSION : The Director , Nebraska Service Center , denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal.
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to employ the beneficiary in the position of business
systems analyst as an L-IB nonimmigrant intracompany transferee with special ized knowledge pursuant to
section IOl(a)(l5)(L) of the Immigration and National ity Act (the Act) , 8 U.S .C. § 1101(a)(15)(L) . The
petitioner isa software development company and claims a qualifying relationship with ••••••
of Japan . The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary for a period of three years.
The director denied the petition, -concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary had been
employed abroad in a specialized knowledge capacity for the requisite one-year period. 8 C.P ,R. §
214.2(1)(3)(iii)-(iv).
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the petitioner has satisfied the criteria for establishing that
the beneficiary has been employed abroad in a specialized knowledge capacity. Specifically , counsel asserts
that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge of the petitioner's proprietary Customer Relationship
Management (CRM) and Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) processes and methodologies as these apply to
the integration of CRM and ERP products with new systems features .
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification , the petitioner must meet the criteria
outlined in section 101(a)(l5)(L) of the Act. Specifically , a qualifying organization must have employed the
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity , for one
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary 's application for admission into the United
States. In addition, the benefic iary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in .. a managerial, executive, or
specialized knowledge capacity .
The regulation at 8 C .P.R. § 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be
accompanied by:
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section .
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive , managerial, or specialized
knowledge capacity , including a detailed description of the services to be performed.
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at l east one continuous year of full time employment
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of
the petition.
(iv) Evidence that the alien 's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior
education, training, and employment qualifies him/her to perform the intended
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services in the United States ; however, the work in the United States need not be the
same work which the alien performed abroad. "
At issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary had been employed
abroad in a specialized knowledge capacity for the requisite one-year period. 8 C .F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(iii)-(iv).
Section 2l4(c)(2)(B) ofthe Act, 8 U.S.C . § 1184(c)(2)(B), provides:
For purposes of section 101(a)(l5)(L) , an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if .the alien has a special
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company .
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 2l4.2(l)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as:
[S]pecial knowledge posses sed by an individual of the petitioning "organization 's product ,
service, research, equipment, techniques , management or other interests and its application in
international markets , or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's
processes and procedures.
In a letter dated No vember 17, 2005 appended to the petition, the petitioner described the beneficiary's job
duties and purported specialized knowledge as follows :
In [her capacity as business systems analyst] , [the beneficiary] will draw upon her specialized
knowledge of [the petitioner's] corporate structure, goals, and policies to provide support for
[the petitioner's] new business models from a business process and systems perspective. [The
beneficiary] will employ her advanced knowledge of [the petitioner's] proprietary products
and development methodology to analyze and develop requirement documentation for future
[petitioner] development initiatives. [The beneficiary] will implement strategies developed
by [the petitioner's] management to ensure that corporate objectives are achieved , carrying
out numerous complex assignments requiring her in-depth knowledge of [the petitioner' s]
methodologies and processes for the support of the development of new and enhanced
systems features.
[The beneficiary] will draw upon her e xperience working with ,[ttie petitioner's] proprietary
[CRM] and [ERP] processes and technologies to support the integration of [the.petitioner's]
CRM and ERP products with new systems features . [The benefic iary] will contribute to all
parts of [the petit ioner's] structured product development lifecyc1e and "will provide
knowledge transfer on indi vidual products and customized [petitioner] solutions. [The
beneficiary] will also employ her specialized knowledge of [the petitioner's] proprietary
technology to integrate solutions that address current and future client requirements within
the boundaries of the existing [petitioner] development framework. Furthermore , [the
beneficiary] will employ her advanced knowledge of [the petitioner's] corporate protocols to
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develop business specifications for application development and enhancement efforts, and
will also serve as a liai son between users and software developers.
\
The petitioner further explained that the beneficiary performed these duties abroad as a business systems
analyst, and that she has been employed abroad in that capacity since September 2004 without interruption.
The current petition was , filed on November 23, 2005. According to the pet ition, prior to her employment
with the petitioner's subsidiary, the beneficiary was employed by Accenture as a business systems analyst for
approximately five years.
On November 30, 2005 , the director requested additional evidence establishing that the beneficiary's
knowledge is indeed specialized. The director requested, inter alia, evidence that the beneficiary possesses
specialized knowledge of the petitioner's product, service, research, equipment , techniques, management, or
other interests in its application in international markets , or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in
the organization's processes or procedures. The director also requested evidence distinguishing the
beneficiary's knowledge from that possessed by others employed in similar p,ositions within the petitioner's
organization and in the industry at large.
In response, the petitioner provided a letter dated December 15, 2005. In that letter , the petitioner provided
further details regarding the beneficiary's purported specialized knowledge abroad , asserting that:
[The beneficiary's] experience at [the foreign subsidiary] has not been of a generic or
common nature , but has involved significant and sustained exposure to , and training in, [the
petitioner's] processes and methodologies for [CRM] and [ERP], as these relate to [the
petitioner's] proprietary technological products . To perform in this position, a complete
understanding of these products is required. [The beneficiary's] background is thus not
common to the software industry, let alone the business software consulting industry.
The petitioner further asserts:
Such technologies are extraordinarily sophisticated , and it is simply not possible , as described
below, for a generic Business Systems Analyst from outside the [petitioner's] organization ,
however broad his or her experience in the field of enterprise software , to assume these duties
immediately. It is also not practical to train such a generic software engineer to the requisite
level of competence within a time frame that would be acceptable to our projects expedited
schedules.
Furthermore, the petitioner attempts to distinguished the beneficiary's knowledge from other employees
within its organization as follows:
[The petitioner] selected [the beneficiary] for an intracompany transfer to serve as a Business
Systems Analyst as a result of her unparalleled specialized knowledge of [the petitioner's]
products, proprietary technology , project end-goals, and procedures for the Japanese
marketplace . .[The petitioner] currently does not possess another employee within its
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organization who possesses the skill-set and specialized knowledge of [the beneficiary]. In
fact, no other individual within [the petitioner's organization] has specialized knowledge of
.the [petitioner's] proces ses and methodologies referred to above that is equivalent to that of
[the beneficiary]. Recruiting or training another individual to he on par with [the beneficiary]
would prove to be a time-consuming and expensive undertaking.
The petitioner also reemphasizes the proprietary nature of the beneficiary's purported specialized knowledge
and asserts that such knowledge is only available to employees or those in close association with the
petitioner. Finally , the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary developed her specialized knowledge after
"extensive and rigorous training on the unique and proprietary nature of [the petitioner's] products." The
petitioner, however, did not provide any details regarding this training program.
On December 30, 2005 , the director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that
the beneficiary had been employed abroad in a specialized knowledge capacity for the requisite one-year
period.
On appeal , counsel argues that the petitioner has satisfied the criteria for establi shing that the beneficiary has
_been emplo yed abroad in a specialized knowledge capacity. Counsel argues that the director erred in
determining that the beneficiary 's two months of on-the-job training abroad did not impart the described
specialized knowledge to the beneficiary , that the petitioner established that the position abroad required
specialized knowledge, and that the director failed to follow the adjudication standards set forth in a
Memorandum from James A . Puleo, Acting Associate Commissioner , Immigration and Naturalization
Service, Interpretation ofSpecialized Knowl edge , CO 214L-P (March 9 , 1994).
Upon review, the petitioner's assertions are not persuasive in demonstrating that the beneficiary had been
employed abroad in a specialized knowledge capacity as defined at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(1)(ii)(D) for the
requisite one-year period .
In examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's
. description of the job duties . See 8.C.F.R. §§ 214.2(I)(3)(ii) and (iv). The petitioner must submit a detailed job
description of the services performed sufficient to establish specializ~d knowledge. In this case , while the
beneficiary's job description adequately describes her duties as a business systems analyst, the petitioner fails
to establish that this position required an employee with specialized knowledge or , even if it did , that-the
beneficiary had been employed in a specialized knowledge capacity for the requisite one year abroad .
Although the petitioner repeatedly asserts that the beneficiary's position abroad required "specialized
knowledge" and that the beneficiary had been employed abroad in a "specialized knowledge" capacity , the
petitioner has not adequately articulated any basis to support this claim. The petitioner has failed to identify
any s pecialized or advanced bod y of knowledge which would distinguish the beneficiary 's role from that of .
other business systems analysts employed by the foreign entity or in the industry at large . Going on record
.without documentary evidence i s not suffic ient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these
proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998)' (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of
California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a
LIN 06 041 51312
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beneficiary's duties involve specialized knowledge ; otherwise, meeting the defin itions would simply be a
matter of reiterating the regulations. See Fedin Bros . Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724, F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989),
aff'd, 905, F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). .
Counsel asserts that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge of the petitioner's corporate structure ,
goals, and policies as well as the petitioner's proprietary products and development methodology. Counsel
refers specifically to her knowledge of proprietary CRM and ERP processes and technologies as applied to
the integration of CRM and ERP products with new systems features. Finally , counsel argues that this
knowledge is extremely sophisticated, that it was acquired through extensive and rigorous training, and that
"no other individual w ithin [the petitioner's organization] has specialized knowledge of the [petitioner's]
processes and methodologies referred to above that is equivalent to that of [the beneficiary]." It is important
to note that counsel does not assert that the beneficiary is the only employee in possession of the purported
"specialized knowledge" or that she is the most knowledgeable of the petitioner's , or the foreign entity's ,
employees.
In support of its petition , the petitioner relies heavily on its position that the processes , methodologies , and
products involved are unique and proprietary , and that the beneficiary's knowledge could only have been
gained through experience and training with the foreign ent ity. However, despite this assertion , the record
does not reveal the material difference between the skill s and knowledge needed to work with the petitioner's
proprietary processes , methodologies, and products, and similar processes , methodologies, and products in the
software industry. While the petitioner asserts repeatedly that the beneficiary gained her knowledge of the
software through extensive training and experience , the record does not establi sh that the beneficiary 's
knowledge is different from the knowledge possessed by business systems analysts generally throughout the
industry or by other employees of the foreign entity . The fact that no other employee possesses "equivalent"
knowledge does not establ ish that the beneficiary's knowledge is indeed uncommon . All employees can be
said to possess "unique" and "unparalleled" skill sets to some degree; however , a unique skill set that can be
imparted to another similarly experienced and educated employee without significant economic
inconvenience is not "specialized knowledge." Moreover, the proprietary or unique qualities of the
petitioner's processes, methodologies, or products do not establish that any knowledge of these is
"specialized." Rather, the petitioner must establish that qualities of the unique or proprietary processes ,
methodologies , or products require employees to have knowledge beyond what is common in the industry .
Like any well-kept secret, it is likely that there are certain a spects to this , and all , proprietary processes,
.methodologies , and products which are known only by certain employees. Howev er, this does not establ ish
that this knowledge is . "specialized" for purposes of this visa classification . The petitioner cannot
manufacture specialized knowledge by refusing to share information with others . Rather, the petitioner must
establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is specialized because she gained the knowledge through extensive
training or experience which could not easily be transferred to another employee. In this matter, the petitioner
has not e stablished that the beneficiary's knowledge is materially different from that possessed by similar
employees with experi ence with similar products or processes . The fact that other professionals may not have
very specific, proprietary knowledge regarding the petitioner 's processes , methodologies, or products is not
relevant to the se proceedings if this knowledge gap could be closed by the petitioner by simply revealing the
information and knowledge to a newly hired employee after a short introductory tra ining period.
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Finally; as recognized by the d irector, it is simply not credible that the beneficiary, who was employed abroad
for a total of 14 months, acquired truly "specialized knowledge" through two months of on-the-job training
and thereafter worked in a "specialized knowledge" capac ity for at least one year before the filing of the
instant petition. First, while the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary was exposed to "extensive and rigorous
training on the unique and proprietary nature of [the petitioner's] products," the petitioner provided no detail s
regarding this training. Going on record without documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of
meeting the burden ofproof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici , 22 I&N Dec. at 165.
1
Second, while
counsel correctly observes that a beneficiary need not be subjected to a specific type of training program for
any specific length of time, the petitioner nevertheless must establish that the knowledge in question "would
be difficult to impart to another individual without significant economic inconvenience" to the petitioner or
the foreign employer. Memorandum from James A. Puleo, Acting Associate .Commissioner, Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Interpr etation ofSpecialized Knowledge, CO 214L-P (March 9 ,'1994). In this matter,
if the purported "specialized knowledge" could be imparted to an employee with a similar education and with
similarwork experience after approximately two months of on-the-job training , then the petitioner has not
established that this knowledge i s indeed specialized since it could be imparted to another individual without
significant economic inconvenience. In visa petition proceedings , the burden of proving eligibility for the
benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U .S.C. § 1361. Third , even
assuming that the beneficiary does possess "specialized knowledge," the petitioner has not established that she
acquired this knowledge in time for her to have been employed in a specialized knowledge capacity for at
least one year. As explained above, the record is devoid of evidence regarding the beneficiary's training
program abroad and does not reveal when , exactly, the beneficiary commenced working in a specialized
knowledge capacity . Therefore , the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary was a key employee of
crucial importance abroad and that she was employed in a specialized knowledge capacity for at least one
year before the instant petition wa s filed.
The AAO does not dispute the likelihood that the benefic iary is a skilled and experienced employee who has
been, and would be , a valuable asset to the petitioner. However, it is appropriate for the AAO to look beyond
the stated job duties and consider the importance of the beneficiary's knowledge of the business's product or
service, management operations , or decision-making process. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. 117 , 120
(Comm. 1981)(citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec . 618(R.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec.
816 (R.C. 1971)) . As stated by the Comm issioner in Matter of Penner, when con sidering whether the
beneficiaries posse ssed specialized knowledge , "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find that the
occupations inherently qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." 18 I&N Dec. at 52 . Rather,
1Although counsel states -on appeal that the petitioner "would have prepared a detailed response" if the
director had made it clear in the Request for Evidence that he had concerns regarding the beneficiary's
training record abroad , counsel nevertheless failed on appeal to provide any further ev idence regarding the
beneficiary's training. Even if it could be argued that the director's Request for Evidence did not clearly
solicit further evidence regarding the beneficiary's train ing abroad, it is not clear what remedy would be
appropriate beyond the appeal process itself. It would serve no useful purpose to remand the case simply to
afford the petitioner the opportunity to supplement the record with new evidence since the petitioner has had
an opportunity to supplement th e record on appeal and chos e not to do so.
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the beneficiaries were considered to have unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker.
Id. The Commissioner also provided the following clarification:
A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or her to
. produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed primarily for
his ability to carry out a key process or function which is important or essential to the business
firm's operation.
!d. at 53.
It should be noted that the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the AAO to make
comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The term "specialized knowledge"
is not an absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined . As observed in 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General,
"[s]imply put, specialized knowledge is a relative ... idea which cannot have a plain meaning. " 745 F. Supp.
9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990). The Congressional record specifically states that the L-l category was intended for "key
personnel." See generally, H.R. REp. No. 91-851, 1970 U.S .C.C.A.N. 2750. The ,term "key personnel" ­
denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." Webster 's II New College
Dictionary 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). In general, all employees can reasonably be considered
"important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic success of
an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. An employee of "crucial
importance" or "key personnel " must rise above the level of the petitioner's average employee. Accordingly,
based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record related to that term, the AAO
must make comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge employee and the general labor
market, but also between the employee and the remainder of the petitioner 's workforce. Whileit may be
correct to say that the beneficiary in the instant case is a highly skilled and productive employee , this fact
alone is not enough to bring the beneficiary to the level of "key personnel."
Moreover, in Matter of Penner , the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of the
specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comm. 1982). The decision noted that the 1970 House
Report, H.R. REp. No. 91-851, stated that the number of admissions under the L-l classification "will not be
large" and that "[t]he class of persons eligible for such nonimmigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be
carefully regulated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id. at 51. The decision further noted that
the House Report was silent on the subject of specialized knowledge, but that during the course of the sub­
committee hearings on the bill , the Chairman specifically questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary
to qualify under the proposed "L " category. In response to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses
responded that they understood the legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts," individuals with
"unique" skills, and that it would not include "lower categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers ." Matter
of Penner, id. at 50 (citing H.R . Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud . Comm., Immigration Act of 1970: Hearings on
H.R. 445, 91
s1
Congo 210,'218, 223, 240, 248 (November 12, 1969)).
Reviewing the Congressional record , the Commissioner concluded in Matter of Penner than an expansive
reading of the sp~cialized knowledge provision , such that it would include skilled workers and technicians, is
not warranted. The Commissioner emphasized that the specialized knowledge worker classification was not
. LIN 06 041 513 12
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intended for "all employees with any level of specialized knowledge ." Matter ofPenner , 18 I&N Dec. at 53.
Or, as noted in Matter of Colley, "[m]ost employees today are specialists and have been trained and given '
. specialized knowledge. However , in view of the House Report , it can not be concluded that all employees
with specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as
intracompany transferees ." 18 I&N Dec. at 119. According to Matter of Penner, "[s]uch a conclusion would
permit extremely large numbers of persons to qualify for the 'L-l ' visa" rather than the "key personnel " that
Congress specifically intended . 18' I&N Dec . at 53 ; see also, 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F. Supp. at
15 (concluding that Congress did not intend for the spec ialized knowledge capacity to extend to all employees
with specialized knowledge, but rather to "key personnel" and "executives.")
A 1994 Immigration and Naturalization Service (now Citizenship and Immigration Services (CI~»
memorandum ' written by the then Acting Associate Commissioner also directs CIS to compare the
beneficiary's knowledge to the general United States labor market and the petitioner 's workforce in order to
distinguish between specialized and general knowledge. The Associate Commissioner notes in the
memorandum that "officers adjudicating petitions involving specialized knowledge must ensure that the
knowledge .possessed by the beneficiary is not general knowledge held commonly throughout the industry but
that it is truly specialized ." Memorandum from James A . Puleo, Acting Associate Commissioner ,
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Interpretation of Specialized Knowl edge, CO 2l4L-P (March 9 ,
1994). A compari son of the beneficiary's knowledge to the knowledge possessed by others in the field is
therefore necessary in order to determine the level of the beneficiary's skills and knowledge an,d to ascertain
whether the beneficiary 's knowledge is advanced . In other words, absent an outside group to which to
compare the beneficiary 's knowledge, CIS would not be able to "ensure that the knowledge possessed by the
beneficiary is truly specialized. " Id. The analysis for specialized knowledge therefore requires a test of the
knowledge possessed by the United States labor market , but does not consider whether workers are available
in the United States to perform the beneficiary's job duties.
As explained above, the record does not distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge as more advanced than the
knowledge possessed by other people employed by the foreign entity or by business systems analysts
employed elsewh~re. · As the petitioner has failed to document any materially unique qualities to the
beneficiary's knowledge , the petitioner's claims are not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary, while
perhaps highly skilled , would be a "key" employee . There is no indication that the beneficiary has any
knowledge that exceeds that of any other business systems analysts or that she has received special training in
the company 's methodologies or processes which would separate her from any other software professional
employed with the foreign entity or elsewhere . It is simply not reasonable to Classify this relatively new
employee who has undergone a short two-month introductory , on-the-job training period as a key employee
of crucial importance to the organization.
The legislative history of the term "specialized knowledge " provides ample support for a restrictive
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, ' the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary
should be . considered a member of the "narrowly drawn " class of individuals possessing specialized
knowledge. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, supra at 16. Based on the evidence presented, it is concluded
that the beneficiary was not employed abroad in a c .apacity involving specialized knowledge. For this reason ,
the appeal will be dismissed .
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Beyond the decision of the director and for the same reasons articulated above , the petitioner has not
established that the beneficiary will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity in the United States or
that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge. See 8 C .F.R. § 214 .2(l)(3)(ii) . As explained previously , the,
petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner's processes , methodologies ,
and products constitutes a specialized or advanced body of knowledge which would distinguish the
beneficiary 's role from that of other business systems analysts employed bythe petitioner or in the industry at
large. Also , the pet itioner has not established that two-months of on-the-job trairiing imparted specialized
knowledge to the beneficiary .
Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be employed in the United States in a
specialized knowledge capacity as required by 8 C.F .R. § 214.2(l)(3)(ii), or that she has specialized
knowledge, and the petition may not be approved for these additional reasons .
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law ma y be denied by
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial -decision . See
Spencer Enterpris es, Inc. v. United States, 229 F . Supp . 2d 1025 , 1043 (E.D . Cal. 2001) , aff'd, 345 F .3d 683
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting thatthe AAO rev iews
appeals on a de novo basis).
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons , with each considered as an .independent and
alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a petit ion on multiple alternat ive grounds , a plaintiff can
succeed on a challenge only if it is shownthat the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's
. enumerated grounds . See Spencer Enterpris es, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043 .
In visa petition proceed ings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the
appeal will be dismissed.
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.