dismissed L-1B Case: Software Engineering

US. Department of Homeland Security 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
Office of Admlnrstratrve Appeals, MS 2090 
identifying data deretpd 
 Washington, DC 20529-2090 
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 U.S. Citizenship 
.~V&U aFpe=od mygoy and Immigration 
<PUBLIC COPY 
File: LIN 03 270 52892 Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER Date: 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
SELF-REPRESENTED 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. tj 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form 1-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. tj 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office 
LIN 03 270 52892 
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DISCUSSION: The Director, Nebraska Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to extend the beneficiary's employment as an L-1B 
nonimmigrant intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 10 1 (a)( 15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner, a provider of software 
products and services, claims to be the parent company of IT Solutions India Private Limited, located in Chennai, 
India. The petitioner has employed the beneficiary as a software engineer in L-1B status since March 2002 and 
now seeks to extend his status for two additional years. 
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge or that he had been employed by the foreign entity or would be employed in the United 
States in a position requiring specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and forwarded it 
to the AAO for review. On appeal, the petitioner disputes the director's findings and asserts that the beneficiary 
meets the standard for classification as a specialized knowledge worker. The petitioner submits a brief and copies 
of previously submitted materials in support of the appeal. 
To establish L-1 eligibility under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 
U.S.C. 5 1 10 1 (a)(15)(L), the petitioner must demonstrate that the beneficiary, within three years preceding the 
beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, has been employed abroad in a qualifying 
managerial or executive capacity, or in a capacity involving specialized knowledge, for one continuous year by a 
qualifying organization and seeks to enter the United States temporarily in order to continue to render his or her 
services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or 
involves specialized knowledge. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
LIN 03 270 52892 
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services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
Under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, an alien is eligible for classification as a nonimmigrant if the alien, 
among other things, will be rendering services to the petitioning employer "in a capacity that is managerial, 
executive, or involves specialized knowledge." Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1184(c)(2)(B), 
provides the statutory definition of specialized knowledge: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special knowledge 
of the company product and its application in international markets or has an advanced level of 
knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines specialized knowledge as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
Here, the sole issue addressed by the director is whether the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge and 
whether he has been and will be employed in a capacity requiring specialized knowledge. Upon review, the AAO 
concurs with the director's decision to deny the petition. 
The petitioner filed the nonimmigrant petition on September 18, 2003. In a letter dated September 15, 2003, the 
petitioner described the beneficiary's proposed duties as the following: 
As a Software Engineer with [the petitioner], [the beneficiary] will be responsible for the 
Customization, Design and Development of applications specific to client requirements in the 
areas such as IBM ASl400, JD Edwards, RPG, CL, Java, JSP, Servlets, HTML, Java Script, Java 
Servlets, EJB, etc. He will be primarily working on implementation/maintenance of existing 
system for Honeywell Corp, subsequently he will be involved in forthcoming projects from our 
client - Honeywell. He will be responsible to provide the necessary technical guidance and 
support for software implementation, maintenance & system testing activities for our clients. He 
will also be interacting with various [company] Clients and customizing the systems to their 
specific needs. 
The petitioner indicated that the beneficiary joined its foreign subsidiary in October 2000 and since that time "has 
gained valuable specialized and proprietary knowledge on various systems and applications." The petitioner 
further discussed the beneficiary's qualifications: 
Upon joining [the petitioning organization], [the beneficiary] has been trained extensively on 
various methodologies, techniques, processes and procedures to build the software applications 
LIN 03 270 52892 
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and maintain systems specific to our client needs. His duties involve in setting up workflow 
systems and Migration of applications to Open systems for [the petitioner's] clients as well as 
maintenance & testing of the same. In the past 36 months he has been with [the petitioning 
organization], [the beneficiary] has been involved in designing and developing several strategic 
and key applications based on [the petitioner's] processes and methodology for several of our 
clients. He is a key member of [the petitioner's] India offshore development team and has made 
several valuable contributions during his tenure with the company. 
In addition to the above, [the beneficiary] has also grained specialized knowledge of [the 
petitioner's] Internal processes, procedures and methodologies. [The foreign entity] has recently 
received SEI CMM Level 5 certification. . . . . The result of efforts to achieve a Level 5 
capability has given [the petitioner] extraordinary control over its software development costs, 
quality and on-time delivery. [The beneficiary] is a key member of our staff and has specialized 
knowledge of our processes and procedures. 
The petitioner submitted a copy of the beneficiary's resume, in which he indicates that he has five years of 
experience developing business application software, including centralized, distributed and web applications. The 
beneficiary indicates that his technical skills include: Java, Cobol, JCL, PL-SQL, SQLl400, RPGl400 
programming languages; Hawkeye, Power Builder Robot and Rational Rose tools; ILE, UML, OOAD and J2EE 
design concepts; web technologies such as JSP, Servlets and EJB; experience in maintaining JD Edwards ERP 
system; Gentran1400 ED1 software; Oracle 8.X, DB21400 and IMS databases, VSS and Turnover configuration 
tools; and script languages such as JavaScript and HTML. 
The beneficiary indicates that, since January 2003, he has served as technical leadlonsite coordinator, on a seven- 
member team providing maintenance and support for information systems at Honeywell Friction Materials in 
Troy, Michigan. According to the project description, the client "uses a custom-built information system built on 
AS1400 platform along with JD Edwards and other distributed systems and web technologies in its day to day 
operation in Manufacturing, Sales, Distribution, Finance etc." The beneficiary indicated that his role involves 
understanding the client's business and information systems applications and compiling information into 
documentation to be used by the petitioner's offshore resources; understanding business requirements and 
communicating with technical resources and end users; maintenance and support for custom-built AS1400 
applications, and interfaces between various applications; establishing ED1 with new trading 
partners; providing technical support for day-to-day operations for all applications; and providing estimates for 
enhancements to the client's existing system. Prior to his current assignment, the beneficiary served as a lead 
programmerlanalyst responsible for maintenance and support of information systems for Honeywell Advanced 
Circuits in Minnesota. The beneficiary indicates that his role involved production support and minor 
enhancements to the client's existing system, project planning, and coordination with offshore team for major 
enhancements. According to his resume, the beneficiary was assigned to three different client projects between 
October 2000 and March 2002, during his tenure with the petitioner's foreign subsidiary. He did not work on a 
Honeywell project prior to his transfer to the United States. 
The director issued a request for additional evidence (WE) on October 30, 2003. The director advised the 
petitioner that the initial evidence was insufficient to show that the offered position requires specialized or 
LIN 03 270 52892 
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advanced knowledge. Rather, the director noted that it appeared that the beneficiary would be performing duties 
"commensurate with most software engineers" using technologies that are common in the industry. The director 
further noted that the petitioner submitted no evidence to corroborate its claim that the beneficiary would be 
working with "proprietary knowledge." Accordingly, the director instructed the petitioner to submit evidence that 
the beneficiary's knowledge is uncommon, noteworthy or distinguished by some unusual quality and not 
generally known by practitioners in the field, as well as evidence to establish that the beneficiary's knowledge of 
company policies and procedures is apart fiom the elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others. 
The petitioner submitted a detailed letter dated January 21, 200[4] in response to the RFE. The petitioner 
emphasized that the beneficiary is a "key member of our Honeywell team" The petitioner indicated that it 
develops proprietary products for Honeywell in the United States and at its development center in India, and that 
the beneficiary, as a member of the Honeywell team "is privy to key knowledge regarding the relationship." The 
petitioner emphasized that the beneficiary "has excellent experience in the software development field and with 
[the petitioner] specifically," and that he has "come to harbor unique and special knowledge of [the petitioner's] 
development processes for Honeywell." The petitioner further described the beneficiary's role as follows: 
As a Project Leader with [the petitioner], [the beneficiary] plays a key role in the design and 
development of applications specific to Honeywell requirements in areas such as AS400, Java, 
JSP, Servlets, J2EE, EDI, JD Edwards and Rational UML. He is also responsible for providing 
the necessary technical guidance & support for project, high-level analysis, design, software 
implementation, maintenance & system testing activities for Honeywell. 
The specific project the beneficiary is working on is the Honeywell Friction Materials projects. 
This system has a number of interfaces to an external system. Therefore Honeywell requires a 
person to work onsite (during its maintenance phase) who has played a key role in the 
application development and has unique knowledge about the system. During the initial phases 
of the project, [the beneficiary] underwent Honeywell project specific in house training on 
various tools, methodologies and Honeywell blue printing concepts. [The beneficiary's] 
experience offshore with this project, combined with his unique knowledge he gained in this 
project offshore, is critical to success in performing project maintenance. 
Honeywell is continually customizing and enhancing the products we create to accommodate the 
ongoing business changes and restructuring. Customization and adding enhancements requires 
experienced individuals who have worked on the project from the beginning. 
The petitioner provided a two-page list of the beneficiary's "specific specialized skills," which contains multiple 
references to ASl400, Java, EDI, JDEdwards, and web technologies. The petitioner noted that the beneficiary is 
an expert in "FOCUS System," which is described as "a custom-developed system in AS1400 using LANSA for 
enhancing Aftermarket operations." The petitioner indicated that the beneficiary received six months of on-the- 
job training in maintaining the FOCUS system. The petitioner further stated that the beneficiary was trained on 
"Baseline Support Tool" or BST, an internal tool used by the petitioning company to track critical customer 
requests. The petitioner indicated that the beneficiary received training in company procedures and standards in 
implementing software solutions for more than 18 months while employed by the foreign entity. 
LIN 03 270 52892 
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The petitioner emphasized that the beneficiary currently serves as the project lead in providing "mission critical 
application support, maintenance, development and training to Honeywell Friction Materials." The petitioner 
noted that Honeywell is a major client, and further described the beneficiary's claimed specialized knowledge of 
this project as follows: 
The Friction Materials system is a custom developed system in AS1400 and significant complex 
business rules implemented of which very few people currently possess good knowledge of the 
system. [The beneficiary] spent more than 6 months understanding the system functionality 
overseas and had utilized that knowledge here in the US. Additionally, he has set up 
methodologies on the project and has the knowledge of how these must be implemented. [The 
beneficiary's] presence at the client locations is very critical for the day-to-day maintenance, he 
has been providing 2417 support to this system for the past year and his knowledge is very much 
needed in business decisions. 
The petitioner stated that the client system has undergone many changes over a period of 15 years, is highly 
complex and "does not have any documentation." The petitioner indicated that new users need considerable 
training to learn to use the system and the beneficiary has successfully provided such training. The petitioner 
further emphasized that the client's system has "many interfaces to systems of varying platforms," and noted that 
the beneficiary's expertise in ASl400, EDI, Java programming skills, web-based systems, and legacy systems are 
all critical to the assignment. Further, the petitioner stated that the client utilizes customized JD Edwards modules, 
which the beneficiary has studied and analyzed. The petitioner emphasized that the client also utilizes the 
petitioner's BST tool to manage production and maintenance activities, and that knowledge of such tool is 
exclusive to the petitioning company. Finally, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary has gained "proprietary and 
specialized knowledge of the processes and procedures developed by [the foreign entity] to achieve CMM Level 
5 certification." 
The petitioner also submitted evidence of the beneficiary's educational and professional training credentials, 
which included a Bachelor of Technology in Chemical Engineering; a "Sun Certification" issued by Sun 
Microsystems, Inc., indicating the beneficiary's certification as a Sun Certified Programmer for the Java 2 
Platform; and a Certificate of Completion for a four-week AS1400 Basic Training Course issued by Symmetrix 
Consulting Pvt. Ltd. 
The director denied the petition on March 17, 2004, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the 
beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that he had been or would be employed by the petitioner in a 
position requiring specialized knowledge. 
The director acknowledged the position descriptions submitted by the petitioner at the time of filing and in 
response to the RFE, emphasizing that the duties "appear to be commensurate to similar positions throughout the 
industry and are not specialized or advanced." The director observed that the petitioner did not provide 
documentary evidence of the beneficiary's "specific in house training" nor did it provide any explanation or 
discussion of the training and what it entailed. The director further noted that the petitioner alluded to the 
beneficiary's "proprietary" knowledge of processes and procedures, but submitted no evidence to illustrate the 
LIN 03 270 52892 
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existence or specialized nature of such procedures. The director therefore concluded that the record did not 
support a finding that the beneficiary possesses knowledge that is special or advanced within the petitioning 
organization, or within the industry at large. 
In addition, the director questioned whether the beneficiary was employed by the foreign entity in a capacity 
requiring specialized knowledge for the requisite period of six months prior to applying for an L-1B visa under 
the petitioner's Blanket L petition in February 2002. The director noted the petitioner's statement that the 
beneficiary was "trained on the job for more than 18 months" while employed by the foreign entity, after joining 
the company in October 2000. The director found that "if the beneficiary was undergoing on-the-job training 
during the entire eighteen months of employment abroad, he was obviously not performing duties in a specialized 
knowledge capacity and therefore it appears that he was ineligible at the time he applied for status." 
On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the evidence submitted establishes that the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge based on his familiarity with the petitioner's "business model" along with his participation in "our 
unique one-off development of the Honeywell Friction Materials System." The petitioner further addresses the 
claimed specialized knowledge as follows: 
Being a company focused on providing unique software systems, [the petitioner] must establish 
procedures and process technology for each specific software development project. Once a 
project has reached a stage in its development cycle where we have created the design and 
underlying structure of the system and its integration, our engineers cannot be pulled from a 
project without great hardship and economic loss to our company. Our procedures on the 
Honeywell Friction Materials System present just such a circumstance. As the Project Leader on 
this particular project, [the beneficiary] has knowledge that is different and advanced from that 
generally held within the industry. 
[The petitioner] cannot simply replace [the beneficiary] with an engineer off of the street. The 
nature of our business and projects is such that our people are intricate parts of a larger puzzle in 
the development of one-off software solutions that must meet specific requirements from our 
clients. These are not common products or simplistic software packages that any engineer can 
create. [The petitioner] spends months performing project requirement studies before we begin 
actual work on our largest projects . . . . 
The petitioner emphasizes that the beneficiary "is educated not only in the specific processes required to develop 
systems at [the petitioner], but is also specialized in the processes and procedures of our client Honeywell." The 
petitioner contends that the beneficiary's knowledge "clearly relates to [the petitioner's] business in that without 
his skill and expertise on the project, the Honeywell Friction Materials System would fail." The petitioner 
concludes by stating that the beneficiary's knowledge is essential to the petitioner's ongoing relationship with 
Honeywell. 
Upon review, and for the reasons discussed herein, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary 
possesses specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary would be employed in the United States in a capacity 
requiring specialized knowledge. 
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Standard for Specialized Knowledge 
As enacted by the Immigration Act of 1990, section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
 1184(c)(2)(B), provides 
the statutory definition of specialized knowledge: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity involving 
specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special knowledge of the 
company product and its application in international markets or has an advanced level of 
knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Looking to the plain language of the statutory definition, Congress has provided USCIS with an ambiguous 
definition of specialized knowledge. In this regard, one Federal district court explained the infeasibility of 
applying a bright-line test as to what constitutes specialized knowledge to the nature of the term itself: 
This ambiguity is not merely the result of an unfortunate choice of dictionaries. It reflects the 
relativistic nature of the concept special. An item is special only in the sense that it is not 
ordinary; to define special one must first define what is ordinary. . . . There is no logical or 
principled way to determine which baseline of ordinary knowledge is a more appropriate reading 
of the statute, and there are countless other baselines which are equally plausible. Simply put, 
specialized knowledge is a relative and empty idea which cannot have a plain meaning. CJ: 
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 537 (1 982). 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. 9, 14-1 5 (D.D.C., 1990).' 
While Congress did not provide explicit guidance for what should be considered ordinary knowledge, the 
principles of statutory interpretation provide some clue as to the intended scope of the L-1B specialized 
knowledge category. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987) 
(citing IiVSv. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207,94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)). 
First, the AAO must look to the language of section 214(c)(2)(B) itself, that is, the terms "special" and 
"advanced." Like the courts, the AAO customarily turns to dictionaries for help in determining whether a word in 
a statute has a plain or common meaning. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 109 F.3d 965, 967-68 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(using Webster's Dictionary for "therefore"). According to Webster's New College Dictionary, the word "special" 
is commonly found to mean "surpassing the usual" or "exceptional." Webster's New College Dictionary, 1084 
(3rd Ed. 2008). The dictionary defines the word "advanced" as "highly developed or complex" or "at a higher 
level than others." Id. at 17. 
- - 
1 
 Although 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General was decided prior to enactment of the statutory definition of 
specialized knowledge by the Immigration Act of 1990, the court's discussion of the ambiguity in the former 
INS definition is equally illuminating when applied to the definition created by Congress. 
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Second, looking at the term's placement within the text of section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the AAO notes that 
specialized knowledge is used to describe the nature of a person's employment and that the term is listed among 
the higher levels of the employment hierarchy together with "managerial" and "executive" employees. Based on 
the context of the term within the statute, the AAO therefore would expect a specialized knowledge employee to 
be within an elevated class of workers within a company and not that of an ordinary or average employee. See 
1 756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F. Supp. at 14. 
Third, a review of the legislative history for both the original 1970 statute and the subsequent 1990 statute 
indicates that Congress intended for USCIS to closely administer the L-1B category. Specifically, the original 
drafters of section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act intended that the class of persons eligible for the L-1 classification 
would be "narrowly drawn" and "carefully regulated and monitored" by USCIS. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91- 
851 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750,2754, 1970 WL 5815. The legislative history of the 1970 Act 
plainly states that "the number of temporary admissions under the proposed 'L' category will not be large." Id. 
This legislative history has been widely viewed as supporting a narrow reading of the definition of specialized 
knowledge and the L-1 visa classification in general. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 15- 16; 
Boi Na Braza Atlanta, LLC v. Upchurch, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 2372846 at *4 (N.D.Tex., 2005), 
afd 194 Fed.Appx. 248 (5th Cir. 2006); Fibermaster, Ltd. v. INS., Not Reported in F.Supp., 1990 WL 99327 
(D.D.C., 1990). 
Further, although the Immigration Act of 1990 provided a statutory definition of the term "specialized 
knowledge" in section 214(c)(2) of the Act, the definition did not generally expand the class of persons eligible 
for L-1B specialized knowledge visas. Pub.L. No. 101-649, 5 206(b)(2), 104 Stat. 4978, 5023 (1990). Instead, 
the legislative history indicates that Congress created the statutory definition of specialized knowledge for the 
express purpose of clarifying a previously undefined term from the Immigration Act of 1970. H.R. Rep. 101- 
723(I) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6749, 1990 WL 200418 ("One area within the L visa that 
requires more specificity relates to the term 'specialized knowledge.' Varying interpretations by INS have 
exacerbated the problem."). While the 1990 Act declined to codify the "proprietary knowledge" and "United 
States labor market" references that had existed in the previous agency definition found at 8 C.F.R. 
5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) (1988), there is no indication that Congress intended to liberalize its own 1970 definition of 
the L- 1 visa classification. 
If any conclusion can be drawn from the enactment of the statutory definition of specialized knowledge in section 
2 14(c)(2)(B), it would be based on the nature of the Congressional clarification itself. By not including any strict 
criterion in the ultimate statutory definition and further emphasizing the relativistic aspect of "special knowledge," 
Congress created a standard that requires USCIS to make a factual determination that can only be determined on a 
case-by-case basis, based on the agency's expertise and discretion. Rather than a bright-line standard that would 
support a more rigid application of the law, Congress gave legacy INS a more flexible standard that requires an 
adjudication based on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. CJ: Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroji, 33 1 F.3d 
369,377 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89,91 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
In effect, Congress has charged the agency with making a comparison based on a relative idea that has no 
plain meaning. To determine what is special or advanced, USClS must first determine the baseline of 
ordinary. As a baseline, the terms "special" or "advanced" must mean more than simply "skilled" or 
LIN 03 270 52892 
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"experienced." By itself, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically complex products will not 
equal "special knowledge." See Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 53 (Comm. 1982). Specialized 
knowledge generally requires more than a short period of experience, otherwise special or advanced 
knowledge would include every employee in an organization with the exception of trainees and entry-level 
staff. If everyone in an organization is specialized, then no one can be considered truly specialized. 
Considering the definition of specialized knowledge, it is the petitioner's, not USCIS's, burden to articulate 
and prove that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" knowledge. Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 
8 U.S.C. 5 1 184(c)(2)(B). USCIS cannot make a factual determination regarding the beneficiary's specialized 
knowledge if the petitioner does not, at a minimum, articulate with specificity the nature of the claimed 
specialized knowledge, describe how such knowledge is typically gained within the organization, and explain 
how and when the beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
Once the petitioner articulates the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and type of 
evidence which establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized knowledge. A 
petitioner's assertion that the beneficiary possesses an advanced level of knowledge of the processes and 
procedures of the company must be supported by evidence describing and setting apart that knowledge from 
the elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others. Because "special" and "advanced" are comparative 
terms, the petitioner should provide evidence that allows USCIS to assess the beneficiary's knowledge relative 
to others in the petitioner's workforce or relative to similarly employed workers in the petitioner's industry. 
Analysis 
In examining the specialized knowledge of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's description of 
the job duties and the weight of the evidence supporting any asserted specialized knowledge. See 8 C.F.R. 
5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed job description of the services to be performed sufficient to 
establish specialized knowledge. At a minimum, the petitioner must articulate with specificity the nature of the 
claimed specialized knowledge. Merely asserting that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" 
knowledge will not suffice to meet the petitioner's burden of proof. 
Upon review, the petitioner in this case has failed to establish either that the beneficiary's position in the 
United States requires an employee with specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has specialized 
knowledge. While the petitioner has provided a detailed description of the beneficiary's duties, such duties 
appear to be typical of a software engineer working in the petitioner's industry. The beneficiary, like any 
software engineer providing business application consulting services, is required to be proficient in different 
types of software, hardware and tools across multiple platforms. The petitioner asserts, however, that the 
position requires knowledge of proprietary processes and systems developed by the petitioner, as well as 
client-specific project experience. The implication of such claims, therefore, is that the duties could not be 
performed by the typical skilled worker, even one with a similar educational and professional background 
compared to the beneficiary. 
Therefore, the first question before the AAO is whether the beneficiary's knowledge of and experience with 
the petitioner's claimed proprietary tools, processes and methodologies alone constitute specialized 
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knowledge. While the current statutory and regulatory definitions of "specialized knowledge" do not include a 
requirement that the beneficiary's knowledge be proprietary, the petitioner cannot satisfy the current standard 
merely by establishing that the beneficiary's purported specialized knowledge is proprietary. The knowledge 
must still be either "special" or "advanced." As discussed above, the elimination of the bright-line 
"proprietary" standard did not, in fact, significantly liberalize the standards for the L-1B visa classification. 
Reviewing the precedent decisions that preceded the Immigration Act of 1990, there are a number of 
conclusions that were not based on the superseded regulatory definition, and therefore continue to apply to the 
adjudication of L-1B specialized knowledge petitions. In 1981, the INS recognized that "[tlhe modern 
workplace requires a high proportion of technicians and specialists." The agency concluded that: 
Most employees today are specialists and have been trained and given specialized knowledge. 
However, in view of the [legislative history], it can not be concluded that all employees with 
specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
intracompany transferees. The House Report indicates the employee must be a "key" person 
and associates this employee with "managerial personnel." 
Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. at 1 19-20. 
In a subsequent decision, the INS looked to the legislative history of the 1970 Act and concluded that a "broad 
definition which would include skilled workers and technicians was not discussed, thus the limited legislative 
history available therefore indicates that an expansive reading of the 'specialized knowledge' provision is not 
warranted." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 5 1. The decision continued: 
[I]n view of the House Report, it cannot be concluded that all employees with any level of 
specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
intra-company transferees. Such a conclusion would permit extremely large numbers of 
persons to qualify for the "L-1" visa. The House Report indicates that the employee must be 
a "key" person and "the numbers will not be large." 
Id. at 53. 
According to the reasoning of Matter of Penner, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically 
complex products, by itself, will not equal "special knowledge." USCIS must interpret specialized knowledge 
to require more than fundamental job skills or a short period of experience. An expansive interpretation of 
specialized knowledge in which any experienced employee would qualify as having special or advanced 
knowledge would be untenable, since it would allow a petitioner to transfer any experienced employee to the 
United States in the L-1B classification. 
The proprietary specialized knowledge in this matter is stated to include "proprietary methods of software 
design development and maintenance," and the petitioner's Baseline Support Tool, which is used to track 
customer requests. The petitioner also indicated that the beneficiary received "on-the-job training" in FOCUS, 
but did not specify whether this is an internal or proprietary tool or system or knowledge which is available 
LIN 03 270 52892 
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outside the organization. As noted by the director, the petitioner did not submit any evidence or further 
explanation regarding the claimed proprietary knowledge. Other than stating that its software development 
processes have been given the highest rating from the Software Engineering Institute, the petitioner did not 
attempt to explain how its processes and methodologies differ significantly from those utilized by other IT 
companies who have also adopted and followed the software CMM. 
Here, the director specifically requested that the petitioner provide evidence that the beneficiary's knowledge 
is uncommon, noteworthy, or distinguished by some unusual quality and not generally known by practitioners 
in his field of endeavor. The petitioner was also advised that any assertions regarding the beneficiary's 
advanced level of knowledge of the company's processes and procedures must be supported by evidence 
describing and setting apart that knowledge from that possessed by other similarly employed workers. The 
petitioner failed to submit the requested description of the beneficiary's "advanced knowledge" or any 
documentary evidence related to the claimed knowledge. The petition cannot be approved based on the 
petitioner's unsupported assertion that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge of the company's 
processes when those processes and their application to the proffered position in the United States have not 
been documented. Failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be 
grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 9 103.2(b)(14). 
The petitioner has not specified the amount or type of training its technical staff members receive in the 
company's tools and procedures and therefore it cannot be concluded that the petitioner's processes are 
particularly complex or different compared to those utilized by other companies in the industry, or that it 
would take a significant amount of time to train an experienced software consultant who had no prior 
experience with the petitioner's family of companies. Going on record without supporting documentary 
evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soflci, 
22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. 
Comm. 1972)). The petitioner did not distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge, work experience, or training 
from those of the other employees. The lack of evidence in the record makes it impossible to classify the 
beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner's processes and procedures as advanced, and precludes a finding that 
the beneficiary's role is "of crucial importance" to the organization. Although knowledge need not be 
narrowly held within an organization in order to be specialized knowledge, the L-1B visa category was not 
created in order to simply allow the transfer of experienced employees, with any degree of knowledge of a 
company's products or processes. It may be correct to say that the beneficiary is a highly skilled employee, 
but this is not enough to bring the beneficiary to the level of an employee with specialized knowledge. 
To the contrary, the minimal evidence submitted suggests that the petitioner's employees are not required to 
undergo any extensive training in the company's processes and methodologies. The claim that the beneficiary 
completed an 18-month on-the-job training program with the foreign entity is not supported by any 
documentary evidence. Rather, based on the information in the beneficiary's resume, it appears that he was 
hired by the foreign entity and immediately assigned to work as a lead programmer analyst on a project for a 
U.S. client, with peer review responsibilities, despite the fact that he had no prior experience with the 
company's processes or methodologies for software development or project management. 
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It appears that the petitioner's claimed proprietary processes, tools, and methods, while highly effective and 
valuable to the company, can be readily learned on-the-job by employees who otherwise possess the requisite 
technical background in business applications software and systems development. The petitioner has not 
articulated or documented how specialized knowledge is typically gained within the organization, or explained 
exactly how and when the beneficiary gained such knowledge. For this reason, the petitioner has not 
established that knowledge of its internal processes and procedures alone constitutes specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner argues that the second component of the beneficiary's purported specialized knowledge is his 
existing knowledge of Honeywell's information systems, specifically, the custom-built AS1400 system 
utilized by Honeywell Friction Materials. The petitioner has made a number of unsubstantiated and 
conflicting claims regarding this system and the beneficiary's experience with the system. According to the 
beneficiary's resume, he has worked on a project for Honeywell Friction Materials since January 2003. The 
project involves maintenance and support of the customer's existing information system and related 
applications and interfaces, providing enhancements, and day-to-day technical support. Notwithstanding the 
petitioner's claim that the beneficiary devoted six months to studying the system prior to his transfer to the 
United States, the beneficiary indicates in his resume that he worked for three unrelated clients during his 
tenure with the petitioner's foreign subsidiary, and worked on a Honeywell project for the first time upon his 
arrival in the United States. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by 
independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice 
unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 
I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). Therefore, the record shows that the beneficiary was assigned to 
coordinate maintenance and support functions for Honeywell Friction Materials without any prior experience 
or training in the client's specific system. These facts undermine the petitioner's claims regarding the 
advanced nature and complexity of the system. In addition, the record shows that the majority of the 
beneficiary's relevant training and experience in the LBM AS1400 platform was gained during his employment 
with a prior employer. The beneficiary spent the first 15 months of his tenure with the foreign entity working 
in a completely different technological environment. 
The AAO acknowledges the petitioner's claim that the beneficiary's experience with Honeywell projects is 
indicative of his possession of knowledge that is specific to the petitioner's proprietary interests. Even if the 
petitioner had established that the beneficiary worked for this client while employed by the foreign entity, the 
beneficiary's familiarity with a client's systems and requirements, while valuable to the petitioner, cannot be 
considered knowledge specific to the petitioning organization and cannot form the basis of a determination 
that she possesses specialized knowledge. All software development employees within the petitioning 
organization would reasonably be familiar with its proprietary internal processes and methodologies for 
carrying out client projects. Similarly, most employees would also possess project-specific knowledge relative 
to one or more international clients, which the petitioner would equate to knowledge of the application of the 
petitioner's methodologies and processes in "international markets." However, the fact that a beneficiary 
possesses very specific experience with a particular international client project does not establish that the 
beneficiary's knowledge is indeed special or advanced. 
In addition, even assuming arguendo that the beneficiary's familiarity with the client's systems could be 
considered "specialized knowledge," it is unclear how the beneficiary, who has less than 18 months of 
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experience working on Honeywell projects, is considered to have "advanced" knowledge of the petitioner's 
processes and methodologies relative to the unaffiliated employer's projects. 
All employees can be said to possess unique skill sets or experience to some degree. 
 Moreover, the 
proprietary qualities of the petitioner's process or product do not establish that any knowledge of this process 
is "specialized." Rather, the petitioner must establish that qualities of the unique process or product require 
this employee to have knowledge beyond what is common in the industry. This has not been established in 
this matter. The fact that other workers may not have the same level of experience with the petitioner's 
methodologies as applied to a specific client project is not enough to establish the beneficiary as an employee 
possessing specialized knowledge. 
It is appropriate for USCIS to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the 
beneficiary's knowledge of the business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making 
process. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. at 120 (citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. at 618 and Matter of 
LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. at 816). As stated by the Commissioner in Matter of Penner, when considering 
whether the beneficiaries possessed specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find 
that the occupations inherently qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." 18 I&N Dec. at 52. 
Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled 
worker. Id. 
The AAO acknowledges that the specialized knowledge need not be narrowly held within the organization in 
order to be considered "advanced." However, it is equally true to state that knowledge will not be considered 
"special" or "advanced" if it is universally or even widely held throughout a company. If all similarly 
employed workers within the petitioner's organization receive essentially the same training, then mere 
possession of knowledge of the petitioner's processes and methodologies does not rise to the level of 
specialized knowledge. The L-1B visa category was not created in order to allow the transfer of all 
employees with any degree of knowledge of a company's processes. If all employees are deemed to possess 
"special" or "advanced" knowledge, then that knowledge would necessarily be ordinary and commonplace. 
The director's reference to "high" and "low" levels of specialized knowledge, to which counsel objects, was 
made in this context. 
The specialized knowledge classification requires USCIS to distinguish between those employees that possess 
specialized knowledge from those that do not possess such knowledge. On one end of the spectrum, one may 
find an employee with the minimal one year of experience and the basic job-related skill or knowledge that 
was acquired through that employment. Such a person would not be deemed to possess specialized 
knowledge under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. On the other end of the spectrum, one may find an 
employee with many years of experience and advanced training who has an advanced level of knowledge of 
company processes and procedures that is limited to a few people within the company. That individual would 
clearly meet the statutory standard for specialized knowledge. In between these two extremes would fall, 
however, the whole range of professional experience and knowledge. 
The petitioner has not successfully demonstrated that the beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner's processes 
and procedures gained during his 17 to 18 months of employment with the foreign entity is advanced 
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compared to other similarly employed workers within the organization. As noted above, the petitioner's 
attempts to distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge as advanced relative to a specific client project are 
unpersuasive. All of the foreign entity's technical employees would reasonably have project-specific 
knowledge in addition to knowledge of the company's proprietary tools and processes for implementing 
projects. By this logic, any of them would qualify for L-1B classification if offered a position working on the 
same project in the United States. 
According to the reasoning of Matter of Penner, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically complex 
products, by itself will not equal "special kn~wledge."~ An expansive interpretation of specialized knowledge in 
which any experienced employee would qualify as having special or advanced knowledge would be untenable, 
since it would allow a petitioner to transfer any experienced employee to the United States in L-1B classification. 
The term "special" or "advanced" must mean more than experienced or skilled. In other terms, specialized 
knowledge requires more than a short period of experience, otherwise, "special" or "advanced" knowledge would 
include every employee with the exception of trainees and recent recruits. 
The AAO does not dispute the possibility that the beneficiary is a skilled and experienced employee who has 
been, and would be, a valuable asset to the petitioner. However, as explained above, the record does not 
distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge as more advanced than the knowledge possessed by other people 
employed by the petitioning organization or by workers employed elsewhere. The beneficiary's duties and 
technical skills demonstrate that he possesses knowledge that is common among software engineers. 
Furthermore, it is not clear that the performance of the beneficiary's duties would require more than basic 
proficiency with the company's internal processes and methodologies. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate 
that the beneficiary's training, work experience, or knowledge of the company's processes is more advanced 
than the knowledge possessed by others employed by the petitioner, or that the processes used by the 
petitioner are substantially different from those used by other technology consulting companies. The 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary's knowledge is any more advanced or special than the 
knowledge held by a skilled worker. See Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 52. 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, supra at 16. 
 The record does not establish that the 
beneficiary has specialized knowledge or that the position offered with the United States entity requires 
specialized knowledge. 
As observed above, the AAO notes that the precedent decisions that predate the 1990 Act are not categorically 
superseded by the statutory definition of specialized knowledge, and the general issues and case facts themselves 
remain cogent as examples of how the INS applied the law to the real world facts of individual adjudications. 
USCIS must distinguish between skilled workers and specialized knowledge workers when making a 
determination on an L-IB visa petition. The distinction between skilled and specialized workers has been a 
recurring issue in the L-1B program and is discussed at length in the INS precedent decisions, including Matter of 
Penner. See 18 I&N Dec. at 50-53. (discussing the legislative history and prior precedents as they relate to the 
distinction between skilled and specialized knowledge workers). 
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The AAO acknowledges that USCIS previously approved an L-1B nonimmigrant petition filed on behalf of 
the beneficiary. The prior approval does not preclude USCIS from denying an extension of the original visa 
based on reassessment of the petitioner's qualifications. Texas A&M Univ. v. Upchurch, 99 Fed. Appx. 556, 
2004 WL 1240482 (5th Cir. 2004). Each nonimmigrant petition filing is a separate proceeding with a 
separate record of proceeding and a separate burden of proof. See 8 C.F.R. 5 103.8(d). In making a 
determination of statutory eligibility, USCIS is limited to the information contained in that individual record 
of proceeding. See 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(16)(ii). Despite any number of previously approved petitions, USCIS 
does not have any authority to confer an immigration benefit when the petitioner fails to meet its burden of 
proof in a subsequent petition. See section 291 of the Act. 
If other nonimmigrant petitions were approved based on the same unsupported assertions that are contained in 
the current record, the approvals would constitute material and gross error on the part of the director. Neither 
the director nor the AAO is required to approve applications or petitions where eligibility has not been 
demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. See, e.g. Matter of Church 
Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm. 1988). 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 29 1 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 136 1. Here, that burden has not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.