dismissed L-1B Case: Software Engineering

US. Departmeat of Homeland Security 
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
Of3ce ofAdministrative Appeals, MS 2090 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
PUBLIC COPY 
File: EAC 03 186 5 1706 
 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER 
 Date: 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 10 l(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
- 
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office 
EAC 03 186 5 1706 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office ("AAO") on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the 
appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimrnigrant visa petition to employ the beneficiary an L-1B intracompany transferee 
with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("the Act"), 
8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is an Indian corporation with several branch offices in the United 
States. It provides software design services to the financial services, logistics and technology industries. The 
beneficiary has been employed by the petitioner in the United States since August 2002 and the petitioner now 
seeks to extend his L-1B status so that he may serve in the position of project leaderlsoftware engineer at its New 
York, New York office for three additional years. 
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary will be employed in a capacity requiring specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director 
erred by concluded that the beneficiary's proposed duties could be performed by "any trained programmer." 
Cousnel emphasizes that the minimum training required for the position is at least six months. Counsel further 
asserts that the director "completely discounted the continuous investment the petitioner has mad in the 
beneficiary," and its statements that the beneficiary is one of only 25 employees trained in the petitioner's 
mFrame flexible architecture. 
To establish L-1 eligibility under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the petitioner must demonstrate that the 
beneficiary, within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, has 
been employed abroad in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a capacity involving specialized 
knowledge, for one continuous year by a qualifying organization. The petitioner must also demonstrate that the 
beneficiary seeks to enter the United States temporarily in order to continue to render services to the same 
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized 
knowledge. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 
 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
EAC03 18651706 
Page 3 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himlher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
Under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, an alien is eligible for classification as a nonimmigrant if the alien, 
among other things, will be rendering services to the petitioning employer "in a capacity that is managerial, 
executive, or involves specialized knowledge." Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1184(c)(2)(B), 
provides the statutory definition of specialized knowledge: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special knowledge 
of the company product and its application in international markets or has an advanced level of 
knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F .R. 5 2 14.2(1)( 1 )(ii)(D) defines specialized knowledge as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
The sole issues addressed by the director are whether the petitioner established that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge and whether he has been and will be employed in a capacity requiring specialized 
knowledge. 
The petitioner filed the nonimmigrant petition on June 6, 2003. 
 In a letter dated May 23, 2003, the petitioner 
described its off-shore, on-site business model for delivery of projects to United States clients. The petitioner 
indicated that the beneficiary joined the foreign entity in August 2001, and was subsequently transferred to the 
U.S. branch office in August 2002. The petitioner described the beneficiary's duties as follows: 
With experience in J2EE and related technologies, and MQ Series and MQSI technologies, [the 
beneficiary] will continue to direct and supervise software engineers and programmer/analysts 
involved in the design, development and testing of software products and work of onsite and 
offshore teams. He will continue to identify data objects for target system. He will continue to be 
responsible for requirement specifications and design documentation for the system. He will 
continue to work with both onsite and offshore teams to development and implement software 
EAC 03 186 51706 
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products for major clients in the USA. Finally, he will continue to apply specialized knowledge 
of [the petitioner's] technologies, services andor offshore development activities to ensure 
compliance with specifications and standards including project requirements. 
[The beneficiary] has been working in the field of analysis, design, development and 
maintenance of software applications being executed offshore. He has special knowledge of the 
Company's computer software production and its application in the international markets along 
with an advanced level of Company processes and procedures. [The beneficiary] has been given 
significant assignments while employed in India that developed practical and workable solutions 
to clients' technical and business problems. He has worked on complex projects independently 
and on multiple phases of a project and is well versed with [the petitioner's] process and 
methodologies. [The beneficiary], as with all the employees of [the petitioner], has received both 
on the job and classroom training in [the petitioner's] methodology and process. He has 
continued to work in this area in [the foreign entity] without interruption. Based upon his work 
experience and his attendance at in-house development course and his Bachelor's Degree, he has 
acquired proprietary specialized technical knowledge of the Company's processes and 
procedures used in the international marketplace to assist clients with new and remediation plans 
for various software computer systems. This proprietary technical knowledge gained through his 
working experience contributes to [the petitioner's] competitiveness and financial position in the 
international marketplace. 
On June 29,2003, the director issued a request for additional evidence (WE) in which he instructed the petitioner 
to: (1) provide a more detailed description of the proprietary nature of the procedures used by the beneficiary and 
how knowledge of such procedures is truly special or advanced compared to knowledge commonly held in the 
industry; (2) identify the manner in which the beneficiary gained his specialized knowledge; (3) submit 
documentary evidence of the training the beneficiary received, including evidence of the duration and scope of 
each training session; (4) submit documentation showing the position the beneficiary occupied during his 
employment with the foreign entity; and (5) identify the number of L-1B nonimmigrant workers employed in the 
beneficiary's field in the United States and the duties they perform. 
In a response dated October 20,2003, the petitioner asserted that the beneficiary has received "both on the job and 
classroom training which would qualify him as a 'specialized knowledge' worker." The petitioner indicated that it 
operates an in-house training department, and stated that the beneficiary "has received training in three areas 
which distinguish him and his skills from those available generally with other software engineers." The petitioner 
stated that this training included: (1) three days of "MphasiS Quality Assurance Training," which covered the 
petitioner's quality methodology and process activities; (2) one day of training in "MIKE (MphasiS Interactive 
Exchange Knowledge) and Project by Net (PBN)" which gives employees "ability to use MIKE which provides 
employees with the resources and ability to navigate and use the knowledge management system"; and (3) one 
day of training in mFrame, which is described as a "proprietary tool used to customize [the petitioner's] 'flexible 
architecture' in implementing project by specialized knowledge workers and architects." 
EAC 03 186 5 1706 
Page 5 
Counsel stated that, in addition to this training, the beneficiary worked for the company in India where he 
"received on the job training and implemented the training received in classrooms and workshops . . . so as to 
provide him with knowledge on the [petitioner's] methodology and processes and distinguish him as a 'specialized 
knowledge' worker." The petitioner stated that the beneficiary worked on various client projects in the financial 
services industry and developed "domain expertise using [the petitioner's] methodology and processes." The 
petitioner further explained that the beneficiary has practical experience with "Project by Net" and as a result is 
successfully able to navigate the requirement at the client site using the petitioner's methodology. 
Counsel stated that the petitioner's software processes have received a Capability Maturity Model (CMM) Level 5 
certification, and emphasized that the beneficiary "has worked hands on using these methodologies while 
employed by [the petitioner] and in implementing projects" in India. 
In response to the director's query regarding the number of specialized knowledge workers employed by the 
company, counsel indicated that it employs over 1,000 software engineers worldwide and currently has 70 
specialized knowledge workers in the United States. Counsel stated that all of these workers "receive training in 
the [petitioner's] Quality Processes and Methodologies, which is an integral part of [the petitioner's] Quality 
Assurance to its clients and these employees are also trained on the VTR models." Counsel noted that on-the-job 
training varies from project to project and is focused on the employee's domain. Counsel explained that [the 
beneficiary] is a specialized knowledge w-orker by virtue of his expertise in the area of financial domain, in 
addition to the specialized knowledge he has in [the petitioner's] methodology and processes." 
The petitioner submitted a letter dated October 13, 2003 from 
 global head of human 
resources based at the petitioner's Indian headquarters. The petitioner stated that the beneficiary is one of 25 to 30 
employees who have received training in mFrame flexible architecture. ndicated that "once 
they have received this classroom education and on the job training the employee is a key employee for [the 
petitioner] and is used for onsite projects." He further stated that only 25 out of 1,000 software developers 
worldwide have training and experience in the mFrame methodology. 
The petitioner also provided an excerpt from a 20-page document providing an overview of mFrame architecture, 
a document titled "A Brief Introduction to ProjectByNet," and additional general company information. 
The director denied the petition on November 18, 2003, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the 
beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that he would be employed in a position requiring specialized 
knowledge. The director acknowledged the petitioner's claim that the beneficiary's training and experience with 
the petitioner's internal processes and methodologies, specifically, MIKE, PBN and mFrame, qualify him as a 
specialized knowledge worker, but noted that the beneficiary's formal training was limited to five days. The 
director concluded that it would take a "very short time for any qualified programmer to become familiar with 
these tools and methodologies." The director emphasized that knowledge that can be transferred to another 
qualified person is not considered to be specialized knowledge. 
EAC 03 186 51706 
Page 6 
The director noted that software engineers working for a consulting company will reasonably develop different 
skills and knowledge based upon their project assignments, but found that any project-specific knowledge could 
not be equated to specialized knowledge. The director observed that the beneficiary "uses what is available to any 
trained programmer and customizes and installs it under contract to another company." The director further found 
that learning to use the petitioner's specific tools for project implementation does not rise to the level of 
specialized knowledge, and found that the primary knowledge required for the beneficiary's position is "common 
to any trained programmer. " 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director erred in denying the petition and states: 
It is respectfully submitted that while the classroom training provided to the beneficiary is for 
short durations, the basis of qualifLing the beneficiary is not limited to the classroom training. 
On the contrary, the petitioner hires qualified personnel and the classroom training is the 
beginning of the process of providing the employees with specialized knowledge and training. 
Given that the petitioner is a professional organization providing high end custom solutions for 
complex systems, the petitioner has determined that the most effective method of training the 
employees in its proprietary knowledge is to provide them on the job hands on training. 
Counsel objects to the director's finding that "it takes only a short time for any qualified programmer to become 
familiar with these tools and methodologies" and asserts that, "on the contrary, once an employee is provided with 
the necessary classroom training, it is imperative that the employee be engaged and employed in a project 
whereby he uses these tools and methodologies before he can be used as a specialized knowledge employee at an 
onsite project location." 
Counsel further objects to the director's observation that the petitioner does not develop software products for the 
market, noting that the regulations do not limit the visa category to employees of companies that develop 
commercial software products. Counsel asserts that "the specialized knowledge may exist in the unique and 
custom applications developed by a petitioner and the high end methodology used by the petitioner to implement 
custom solutions." Counsel objects to the director's conclusion that the work to be performed could be performed 
by any programmer, noting that only a qualified employee with six months of training would in fact be qualified 
for the position. 
Finally, counsel asserts that the director disregarded 
 statement that the beneficiary "is one of 
25 key employees with training and experience" in the mFrame methodology, out of 1,000 software developers 
employed by the petitioner's group. 
Upon review, and for the reasons discussed herein, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary 
possesses specialized knowledge or that he has been or would be employed in a capacity requiring specialized 
knowledge. 
The Standard for Specialized Knowledge 
EAC 03 186 51706 
Page 7 
Looking to the language of the statutory definition, Congress has provided USCIS with an ambiguous definition 
of specialized knowledge. In this regard, one Federal district court explained the infeasibility of applying a 
bright-line test to define what constitutes specialized knowledge: 
This ambiguity is not merely the result of an unfortunate choice of dictionaries. It reflects the 
relativistic nature of the concept special. An item is special only in the sense that it is not 
ordinary; to define special one must first define what is ordinary. . . . There is no logical or 
principled way to determine which baseline of ordinary knowledge is a more appropriate reading 
of the statute, and there are countless other baselines which are equally plausible. Simply put, 
specialized knowledge is a relative and empty idea which cannot have a plain meaning. CJ: 
Westen, The Empty Idea ofEquality, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 537 (1982). 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. 9, 14-1 5 (D.D.C., 1990)' 
While Congress did not provide explicit guidance for what should be considered ordinary knowledge, the 
principles of statutory interpretation provide some clue as to the intended scope of the L-1B specialized 
knowledge category. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 1 12, 123 (1 987) 
(citing INSv. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207,94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)). 
First, the AAO must look to the language of section 214(c)(2)(B) itself, that is, the terms "special" and 
"advanced." Like the courts, the AAO customarily turns to dictionaries for help in determining whether a word in 
a statute has a plain or common meaning. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 109 F.3d 965,967-68 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(using Webster's Dictionary for "therefore"). According to Webster's New College Dictionary, the word "special" 
is commonly found to mean "surpassing the usual" or "exceptional." Webster's New College Dictionary, 1084 
(3rd Ed. 2008). The dictionary defines the word "advanced" as "highly developed or complex" or "at a higher 
level than others." Id. at 17. 
Second, looking at the term's placement within the text of section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the AAO notes that 
specialized knowledge is used to describe the nature of a person's employment and that the term is listed among 
the higher levels of the employment hierarchy together with "managerial" and "executive" employees. Based on 
the context of the term within the statute, the AAO therefore would expect a specialized knowledge employee to 
occupy an elevated position within a company that rises above that of an ordinary or average employee. See 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 14. 
Third, a review of the legislative history for both the original 1970 statute and the subsequent 1990 statute 
indicates that Congress intended for USCIS to closely administer the L-1B category. Specifically, the original 
Although 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General was decided prior to enactment of the statutory definition of 
specialized knowledge by the Immigration Act of 1990, the court's discussion of the ambiguity in the legacy 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) definition is equally illuminating when applied to the definition 
created by Congress. 
EAC 03 186 5 1706 
Page 8 
drafters of section lOl(a)(IS)(L) of the Act intended that the class of persons eligible for the L-1 classification 
would be "narrowly drawn" and "carefully regulated and monitored" by USCIS. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91- 
85 1 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750, 2754, 1970 WL 58 15. The legislative history of the 1970 Act 
plainly states that "the number of temporary admissions under the proposed 'L' category will not be large." Id. In 
addition, the Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended for "key personnel." 
See generally, id. The term "key personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "[olf 
crucial importance." Webster S New College Dictionary 620 (3'd ed., Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing 
Co. 2008). Moreover, during the course of the sub-committee hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically 
questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify under the proposed "L" category. In response 
to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that they understood the legislation would allow 
"high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, and that it would not include "lower 
categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." See H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration 
Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445,91d Cong. 210,218,223,240,248 (Nov. 12, 1969). 
Neither in 1970 nor in 1990 did Congress provide a controlling, unambiguous definition of "specialized 
knowledge," and a narrow interpretation is consistent with so much of the legislative intent as it is possible to 
determine. H. Rep. No. 91-851 at 6, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2754. This interpretation is consistent with legislative 
history, which has been largely supportive of a narrow reading of the definition of specialized knowledge and the 
L-1 visa classification in general. See 17.76, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 15-16; Boi Nu Braza 
Atlanta, LLC v. Upchurch, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 2372846 at "4 (N.D.Tex., 2005), afld 194 
Fed.Appx. 248 (5th Cir. 2006); Fibermaster, Ltd v. I.N.S., Not Reported in F.Supp., 1990 WL 99327 (D.D.C., 
1990); Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Dept. of Justice, Civ. Action 00-2977-LFO (D.D.C. April 6, 2001)(on file with 
AAO). 
Further, although the Immigration Act of 1990 provided a statutory definition of the term "specialized 
knowledge" in section 214(c)(2) of the Act, the definition did not generally expand the class of persons eligible 
for L-IB specialized knowledge visas. Pub.L. No. 101-649, 5 206(b)(2), 104 Stat. 4978, 5023 (1990). Instead, 
the legislative history indicates that Congress created the statutory definition of specialized knowledge for the 
express purpose of clarifying a previously undefined term from the Immigration Act of 1970. H.R. Rep. 101- 
723(I) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6749, 1990 WL 200418 ("One area within the L visa that 
requires more specificity relates to the term 'specialized knowledge.' Varying interpretations by INS have 
exacerbated the problem."). While the 1990 Act declined to codify the "proprietary knowledge" and "United 
States labor market" references that had existed in the previous agency definition found at 8 C.F.R. 
5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) (1988), there is no indication that Congress intended to liberalize its own 1970 definition of 
the L- 1 visa classification. 
If any conclusion can be drawn from the enactment of the statutory definition of specialized knowledge in section 
2 14(c)(2)(B), it would be based on the nature of the Congressional clarification itself. By not including any strict 
criterion in the ultimate statutory definition and further emphasizing the relativistic aspect of "special knowledge," 
Congress created a standard that requires USCIS to make a factual determination that can only be determined on a 
case-by-case basis, based on the agency's expertise and discretion. Rather than a bright-line standard that would 
EAC 03 186 5 1706 
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support a more rigid application of the law, Congress gave the INS a more flexible standard that requires an 
adjudication based on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. CJ: Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 33 1 F.3d 
369, 377 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89,91 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
To determine what is special or advanced, USCIS must first determine the baseline of ordinary. As a 
baseline, the terms "special" or "advanced" must mean more than simply "skilled" or "experienced." By 
itself, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically complex products will not equal "special 
knowledge." See Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 53 (Comm. 1982). In general, all employees can 
reasonably be considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the 
overall economic success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. 
An employee of "crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average 
employee. In other words, specialized knowledge generally requires more than a short period of experience; 
otherwise special or advanced knowledge would include every employee in an organization with the 
exception of trainees and entry-level staff. If everyone in an organization is specialized, then no one can be 
considered truly specialized. Such an interpretation strips the statutory language of any efficacy and cannot 
have been what Congress intended. 
Considering the definition of specialized knowledge, it is the petitioner's, not USCIS's, burden to articulate 
and establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" 
knowledge. Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1184(c)(2)(B). USCIS cannot make a factual 
determination regarding the beneficiary's specialized knowledge if the petitioner does not, at a minimum, 
articulate with specificity the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, describe how such knowledge is 
typically gained within the organization, and explain how and when the beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
Once the petitioner articulates the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and type of 
evidence which establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized knowledge. A 
petitioner's assertion that the beneficiary possesses advanced knowledge of the processes and procedures of 
the company must be supported by evidence describing and distinguishing that knowledge from the 
elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others. Because "special" and "advanced" are comparative 
terms, the petitioner should provide evidence that allows USCIS to assess the beneficiary's knowledge 
relative to others in the petitioner's workforce or relative to similarly employed workers in the petitioner's 
specific industry. 
In examining the specialized knowledge of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's description of 
the job duties and the weight of the evidence supporting any asserted specialized knowledge. See 8 C.F.R. 
5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed job description of the services to be performed sufficient to 
establish specialized knowledge. Merely asserting that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" 
knowledge will not suffice to meet the petitioner's burden of proof. 
Upon review, the petitioner in this case has failed to establish either that the beneficiary's position in the 
United States requires an employee with specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has specialized 
EAC 03 186 5 1706 
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knowledge. While the petitioner has provided a detailed description of the beneficiary's duties, such duties 
are typical of a software engineer and require him to use technologies that are widely available in the industry, 
including MQ Series MQSI and "J2EE and related technologies." The petitioner suggests, however, that 
some aspects of the position require the use of the petitioner's proprietary tools and systems and therefore 
could not be performed by the typical skilled worker. 
Therefore, the first question before the AAO is whether the beneficiary's knowledge of and experience with 
the petitioner's proprietary tools and methodologies alone constitutes specialized knowledge. While the 
current statutory and regulatory definitions of "specialized knowledge" do not include a requirement that the 
beneficiary's knowledge be proprietary, the petitioner cannot satisfy the current standard merely by 
establishing that the beneficiary's purported specialized knowledge is proprietary. The knowledge must still 
be either "special" or "advanced." As discussed above, the elimination of the bright-line "proprietary" 
standard did not, in fact, significantly liberalize the standards for the L-I B visa classification. 
Reviewing the precedent decisions that preceded the Immigration Act of 1990, there are a number of 
conclusions that were not based on the superseded regulatory definition, and therefore continue to apply to the 
adjudication of L-1B specialized knowledge petitions. In 198 1, the INS recognized that "[tlhe modern 
workplace requires a high proportion of technicians and specialists." The agency concluded that: 
Most employees today are specialists and have been trained and given specialized knowledge. 
However, in view of the [legislative history], it can not be concluded that all employees with 
specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
intracompany transferees. The House Report indicates the employee must be a "key" person 
and associates this employee with "managerial personnel." 
Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. at 1 19-20. 
In a subsequent decision, the INS looked to the legislative history of the 1970 Act and concluded that a "broad 
definition which would include skilled workers and technicians was not discussed, thus the limited legislative 
history available therefore indicates that an expansive reading of the 'specialized knowledge' provision is not 
warranted." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 5 1. The decision continued: 
[I]n view of the House Report, it cannot be concluded that all employees with any level of 
specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
intra-company transferees. Such a conclusion would permit extremely large numbers of 
persons to qualify for the "L-1" visa. The House Report indicates that the employee must be 
a "key" person and "the numbers will not be large." 
Id. at 53. 
According to the reasoning of Matter of Penner, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically 
complex products, by itself, will not equal "special knowledge." USCIS must interpret specialized knowledge 
to require more than fundamental job skills or a short period of experience. An expansive interpretation of 
specialized knowledge in which any experienced employee would qualify as having special or advanced 
EAC 03 186 51706 
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knowledge would be untenable, since it would allow a petitioner to transfer any experienced employee to the 
United States in the L-1B classification. 
The proprietary specialized knowledge in this matter is stated to include proprietary tools and methodologies 
developed by the petitioner for the management of the company's software and systems development projects. 
These tools and methodologies are said to include MIKE (MphasiS Interactive Exchange Knowledge), Project 
by Net, and mFrame. The petitioner emphasizes that its quality procedures are IS0 9001 and SEI-CMM Level 
5 certified, thus further setting apart its employees' knowledge from that generally possessed by similarly 
employed workers in the information technology industry. However, all IT consulting firms develop internal 
tools, methodologies, procedures and best practices for documenting project management, technical life cycle 
and software qualify assurance activities. It is also industry standard practice for such companies to seek IS0 
9001 and SEI-CMM assessment of their processes and methodologies. The software Capability Maturity 
Model is not particular to the petitioner's organization. 
Other than stating that its software development processes have been given the highest rating from the 
Software Engineering Institute, the petitioner did not attempt to explain how its processes and methodologies 
differ significantly from those utilized by other IT companies who have also adopted and followed the 
software CMM. As noted above, the beneficiary received three days of training in the petitioner's quality 
processes and methodologies, one day of training in MIKE and one day of training in mFrame. While the 
petitioner claims that its employees are not considered to have specialized knowledge until they have used 
these tools in a project-based setting for six months or longer, the evidence of record does not establish that 
the petitioner's tools or procedures are particularly complex or different compared to those utilized by other 
companies in the industry, or that it would take a significant amount of time to train an experienced 
information technology consultant who had no prior experience with the petitioner's family of companies. 
Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the 
burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soflci, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter 
of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
The AAO acknowledges the petitioner's claim that the beneficiary is one out of only 25 to 30 workers 
worldwide who have received formal training in mFrame. However, the petitioner provided no context on 
which to analyze this assertion, such as information regarding how employees are identified to receive the 
training or how widely mFrame is used within the company. While it may be accurate to state that the 
petitioner has not trained its workforce extensively in the mFrame architecture, the fact remains that training 
in mFrame can be completed in one day, and based on the evidence submitted, the mFrame architecture can 
be summarized in a 20-page document. Therefore, the fact that the beneficiary is one of a relatively small 
number of employees who completed the one-day formal training course in mFrame is not sufficient to 
establish his knowledge as specialized or advanced. 
Overall, the minimal evidence submitted suggests that the petitioner's employees are not required to undergo 
any extensive training in the company's processes and methodologies. The petitioner has not provided a 
detailed description of the beneficiary's project assignments and it is unclear when or how he received the 
claimed six months of "on-the-job training" in the petitioner's methodologies. The beneficiary was transferred 
to the United States after completing barely one year of employment with the Indian entity, and the petitioner 
indicated that, during that year, the beneficiary "has been given significant assignments . . . that developed 
EAC 03 186 51706 
Page 12 
practical and workable solutions to clients' technical and business problems." The petitioner also stated that 
the beneficiary "worked on complex projects independently," while in India. Therefore, while the petitioner 
made a reference to the beneficiary's on-the-job training, there is no indication that he has not been fully 
performing the duties of his position since the date he was hired by the foreign entity. 
Based on the petitioner's representations, its proprietary processes and tools, while highly effective and 
valuable to the petitioner, are simply customized versions of standard practices used in the industry that can 
be readily learned on-the-job by employees who otherwise possess the requisite technical background in 
software and systems development. For this reason, the petitioner has not established that knowledge of its 
processes and procedures alone constitutes specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner argues that the second component of the beneficiary's purported specialized knowledge is his 
domain knowledge in the financial services industry and project experience with the petitioner's major clients 
in this industry. The beneficiary's familiarity with a specific sector of the software development industry or 
familiarity with the petitioner's clients' systems and requirements, while valuable to the petitioner, cannot be 
considered knowledge specific to the petitioning organization and cannot form the basis of a determination 
that he possesses specialized knowledge. All software development employees within the petitioning 
organization would reasonably be familiar with its proprietary internal processes and methodologies for 
carrying out client projects. Similarly, most employees would also possess project-specific knowledge relative 
to one or more international clients or experience in developing software for clients engaged in a particular 
industry. However, the fact that the beneficiary possesses very specific experience with a particular 
international client project or projects, or domain knowledge of the financial services industry, does not 
establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is indeed special or advanced. 
In addition, even assuming arguendo that the beneficiary's familiarity with the petitioner's clients' projects 
could be considered "specialized knowledge," it is unclear how the beneficiary, who worked for the foreign 
entity for barely one year prior to his transfer to the United States, is considered to have "advanced" 
knowledge of the petitioner's processes and methodologies relative to any particular client project or to the 
financial services industry at large. 
All employees can be said to possess unique skill or experience to some degree. Moreover, the proprietary 
qualities of the petitioner's process or product do not establish that any knowledge of this process is "specialized." 
Rather, the petitioner must establish that qualities of the unique process or product require this employee to have 
knowledge beyond what is common in the industry. This has not been established in this matter. The fact that 
other workers may not have the same level of experience with the petitioner's methodologies as applied to a 
specific client project or a specific domain is not enough to equate to special or advanced knowledge if the gap 
could be closed by the petitioner by simply revealing the information to a similarly educated or experienced 
employee. 
Overall, the petitioner's argued standard for specialized knowledge is overbroad and untenable, since it would 
allow the petitioner to transfer any employee with a few days of formal classroom training, six months of "on- 
the-job training," and six months project experience to the United States in the L-1B classification. All of the 
petitioner's software engineers would reasonably have received similar training, and the petitioner has not 
differentiated what separates "specialized knowledge" software engineers from those who do not possess 
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Page 13 
specialized knowledge, other than the six months of work experience. However, by itself, work experience 
and knowledge of a firm's technically complex products will not equal "special knowledge." Matter of 
Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 53. The terms "special" or "advanced" must mean more than experienced or skilled. 
Specialized knowledge requires more than a short period of experience, such as six months, otherwise 
"special" or "advanced" knowledge would include every employee with the exception of trainees and recent 
recruits. 
Overall, the record does not establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is substantially different from the 
knowledge possessed by similar workers generally throughout the industry or by other employees of the 
petitioning organization. The fact that the beneficiary and a select group of workers possess a very specific set of 
skills does not alone establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is indeed special or advanced. All employees can 
be said to possess unique and unparalleled skill sets to some degree. Moreover, the proprietary or unique 
qualities of the petitioner's process or product do not establish that any knowledge of this process is "specialized." 
Rather, the petitioner must establish that qualities of the unique process or product require this employee to have 
knowledge beyond what is common in the industry. This has not been established in this matter. The fact that 
other workers may not have the same level of training or experience with the petitioner's MIKE, PBN, and 
mFrarne methodologies is not enough to equate to special or advanced knowledge if the gap could be closed by 
the petitioner by simply revealing the information to a similarly educated or experienced employee. 
The AAO does not dispute the possibility that the beneficiary is a skilled and experienced employee who has 
been, and would be, a valuable asset to the petitioner. However, as explained above, the record does not 
distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge as more advanced than the knowledge possessed by other people 
employed by the petitioning organization or by workers employed elsewhere. The beneficiary's duties and 
technical skills demonstrate that he possesses knowledge that is common among software engineers in the 
information technology consulting field. Furthermore, it is not clear that the performance of the beneficiary's 
duties would require more than basic proficiency with the company's internal processes and methodologies. 
The petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary's training, work experience, or knowledge of the 
company's processes is more advanced than the knowledge possessed by others employed by the petitioner, 
or that the processes used by the petitioner are substantially different from those used by other technology 
consulting companies. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary's knowledge is any more 
advanced or special than the knowledge held by a skilled worker. See Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 52. 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. 
 See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, supra at 16. 
 The record does not establish that the 
beneficiary has specialized knowledge or that the position offered with the United States entity requires 
specialized knowledge. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed. 
The AAO acknowledges that the beneficiary was previously issued an L-1 classification visa pursuant to the 
petitioner's Blanket L petition and admitted to the United States in L-1B status. The prior approval does not 
preclude USCIS from denying an extension of the original visa based on reassessment of the petitioner's 
qualifications. Texas A&M Univ. v. Upchurch, 99 Fed. Appx. 556,2004 WL 1240482 (5th Cir. 2004). Each 
nonimmigrant petition filing is a separate proceeding with a separate record of proceeding and a separate 
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burden of proof. See 8 C.F.R. 5 103.8(d). In making a determination of statutory eligibility, USCIS is limited 
to the information contained in that individual record of proceeding. See 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(16)(ii). USCIS 
does not have access to the beneficiary's prior L-1 visa petition approved by the U.S. Consulate in Bombay. 
Despite any number of previously approved petitions, USCIS does not have any authority to confer an 
immigration benefit when the petitioner fails to meet its burden of proof in a subsequent petition. See section 
291 of the Act. Neither the director nor the AAO is required to approve applications or petitions where 
eligibility has not been demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. See, 
e.g. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm. 1988). 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 29 1 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 136 1. Here, that burden has not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.