dismissed L-1B Case: Solar Energy

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Mass. Ave. N.W. Rnl. A3042 
Washington, DC 20529 
'-m!l-ut. --- hvasian ol-~ prim 
FILE: 
IN RE: 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
SRC 04 032 50574 Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: DEC 0 
Petitioner: 
Beneficiary: 
PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1 101(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned 
to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
2 -7 
-4- /-- -& 
" ~obd&k%?e&ann, Director 
Administrative Appeals Office 
SRC 04 032 50574 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. 
The petitioner is engaged in the business of export and distribution of solar industry products. It seeks to 
extend the employment of the beneficiary as its president pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. $ 1 101(a)(15)(L). The director determined that the 
petitioner had not established that the beneficiary possesses the requisite specialized knowledge for the 
intended position. 
Counsel for the petitioner filed an appeal, alleging that the director erred in her application of the 
definition of specialized knowledge in that she ignored the beneficiary's specialized knowledge as relating 
to international markets referred to in 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2 (l)(l)(ii)(D). 
To establish L-1 eligibility, the petitioner must meet the criteria outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. $ 1101(a)(15)(L). Specifically, within three years 
preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, a qualifying organization 
must have employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized 
knowledge capacity, for one continuous year. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United 
States temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or 
affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall 
be accompanied by: 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of the 
petition. 
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies hider to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The primary issue in this matter is whether the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1184(c)(2)(B), provides the following: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
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knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individuql of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its 
application in international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the 
organization's processes and procedures. 
On the L Supplement to Form 1-129, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary has been employed by the 
foreign entity for twelve years before coming to the United States in 2001. The petitioner further clarified 
that the beneficiary entered the United States as an L-1A manager/executive in 2001 and was 
subsequently reclassified as an intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge in 2002. In a letter 
submitted with the petition dated November 6, 2003, the petitioner described the beneficiary's 
qualifications as follows: 
[The beneficiary] possesses specialized knowledge of the companies [sic] products, 
services, equipment, and management. It is our company's intention that [the beneficiary] 
will utilize his knowledge and experience to continue to develop and implement strateges 
which are compatible with the needs of both companies. He will continue to utilize his 
specialized knowledge to analyze and meet the demands of the overseas market and will 
continue to cultivate relationships with vendors and clients. [The beneficiary] will merge 
the technical and business process of the products by continuing to keep abreast of the 
ever-changing solar power industry. He will continue to review relevant financial data 
and analyze the market in order to devise a plan to access the market and gain market 
share. 
The director found the initial evidence submitted with the petition insufficient to warrant a finding that the 
beneficiary possessed the required specialized knowledge. Consequently, a detailed request for evidence 
was issued on January 12, 2004, which specifically requested evidence that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge of the petitioner's product, service, research, equipment, techniques, management 
or other interests and its application in international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or 
expertise in the organization's processes and procedures, and that such knowledge was not general 
knowledge held commonly through the industry. The director advised that the petitioner should submit 
the following: (1) evidence relating to the unique methodologies, tools, programs, andlor applications that 
the petitioner used; (2) an explanation with regard to the equipment, system, product, technique or service 
of which the beneficiary has specialized knowledge; (3) billing records establishing the length of time the 
beneficiary worked on specific projects abroad with supporting evidence or contracts from the clients; and 
(4) evidence establishing the amount of training required to fill the proffered position, as well as a record 
of the training the beneficiary had received abroad. 
The petitioner submitted a detailed response to the director's request. In a letter dated February 19, 2004, 
the petitioner discussed the field of solar technology, and stated: 
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Those who possess knowledge of solar powered energy sources, inverters and 
resistivelinductive devices can not be compared to the normal electrician who works with 
Alternative Current sources provided by conventiona11govemment sources. 
Through his years of experience, the beneficiary has employed the specialized skills and 
knowledge more akin to that of a solar technology engineer. Installation required the 
specialized knowledge of separately required panel breakers, pypassing] equipment 
which [is] not adaptable and thereby drain solar batteries and the knowledge of adaptable 
equipment. 
Maintenance of systems involved the supervision of technician and engineers, the 
development and upgrading of preventative maintenance procedures for batteries, 
inverters and relating equipment, maintaining logs and manuals for testing. 
The [tlesting and [rlepair of solar powered systems involves the application of unique 
methodologies, tools and programs. These include the use of NDT (non-destructive 
testing) devices such as the "oscilloscope" used to monitor the 3 different forms of 
electrical waves . . .square wave, modifying sign wave and pure sign wave. Other tests 
employ the use of the "AMP Meter" which controls the inputloutput amperage produced 
by the inverters. "DC power supply" and "Digital Volt" meters are employed to control 
the voltage. "Lead Welders" are used to fuse connections and "Inductive Motors" are 
utilized on devices that draw a high surge before stabilizing to normal wattage (required 
by such devices as water pumps and refrigerators). 
Over the past twelve years, the beneficiary has attained specialized knowledge of those 
devices as aforementioned but more importantly the very special application and 
employment of these systems to a unique market such as Haiti, when conventional power 
sources have become even more reliable. 
The petitioner also submitted the beneficiary's resume, which indicated that he had served since 1988 as 
the foreign entity's owner, technical supervisor, and general manager. It further indicated that the 
beneficiary possessed the equivalent of an Associate's degree in business administration and hotel 
management, in addition to pursuing several courses in political science and power plant technology. 
Finally, with regard to his special qualifications, the beneficiary's resume indicated that he had the 
"ability to install, reprogram, adapt and repair power systems: solar panelslstations, wind energy power 
systems, inverters, batteries, etc. with full understanding of systems performance and limitations." 
On July 13, 2004, the director denied the petition. The director noted that a review of the evidence 
submitted with the initial petition and in response to the request for evidence did not offset the 
beneficiary's qualifications from those of any other solar engineer. The director further noted that 
although the petitioner claimed that the beneficiary had specialized knowledge of NDT (non-destructive 
testing) devices as well as the ability to perform tests using the AMP meter and controlling voltage with 
DC power supply and digital volt meters, there was no evidence to show exactly how uncommon this 
knowledge was. 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the director erred in the application of the definition of specialized 
knowledge. More specifically, counsel asserts that the director ignored the beneficiary's specialized 
SRC 04 032 50574 
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knowledge as it related to international markets. Although counsel indicated that she would forward a 
brief to the AAO within thirty days of the filing of the appeal, counsel declined to submit any additional 
evidence as set forth in her letter dated September 9, 2004. 
On review, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge. 
When examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3)(ii). As required in the regulations, the 
petitioner must submit a detailed description of the services to be performed sufficient to establish specialized 
knowledge. Id. 
In the present matter, the petitioner provided an abbreviated description of the beneficiary's employment in 
the foreign entity, his employment in the U.S. entity, and hts responsibilities as president of the U.S. entity as 
well as of a solar engineer. Despite specific requests by the director, namely, whether the beneficiary had 
worked abroad on specific projects through which he obtained specialized knowledge of the company's 
methodologies, tools, programs, and/or applications, the petitioner failed to provide such information. The 
petitioner has not sufficiently documented how the beneficiary's performance of the proposed job duties 
distinguishes his knowledge as specialized. The petitioner repeatedly states throughout the record that the 
beneficiary's knowledge is specialized and cites a number of job duties, the nature of which are not fully 
understood by CIS. The petitioner mher asserts that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge as a 
result of his more than twelve years of experience as the owner and president of the foreign entity and that 
such knowledge is far beyond that commonly found throughout the industry. 
The director's request for evidence was extremely specific in requesting clarification that the beneficiary's 
claimed specialized knowledge was not merely general knowledge held commonly through the industry. 
The director afforded the petitioner all available measures to supplement the record with additional 
evidence. However, although specifically requested by the director, the record contains no evidence of 
the beneficiary's training, experience, daily duties, or level of expertise. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 3 
214.2(1)(3)(viii) states that the director may request additional evidence in appropriate cases. Although 
specifically and clearly requested by the director, the petitioner refused to provide documentary evidence 
to support its claims that the beneficiary obtained a specialized level of knowledge through his training 
and work experience with the petitioner. The failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a 
material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. See 8 C.F.R. 9 103.2(b)(14). In this 
case, the petitioner seems to expect that the AAO will accept its uncorroborated assertions that the 
beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence 
is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 
I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. 
Comm. 1972)). 
It is also appropriate for the AAO to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the 
beneficiary's knowledge of the business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making 
process. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. 117, 120 (Comm. 1981) (citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 
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618 (R.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. 816 (R.C. 1971)).' As stated by the Commissioner 
in Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 52 (Comm. 1982), when considering whether the beneficiaries 
possessed specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find that the occupations 
inherently qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." Rather, the beneficiaries were 
considered to have unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a slulled worker. Id. The 
Commissioner also provided the following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose slulls and knowledge enable him 
or her to produce a product through physical or slulled labor and the person who is 
employed primarily for his ability to cany out a key process or function which is 
important or essential to the business firm's operation. 
Id. at 53. In the present matter, the evidence of record demonstrates that the beneficiary is more akin to 
an employee whose skills and experience enable him to provide a specialized service, rather than an 
employee who has unusual duties, slulls, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. 
It should be noted that the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the AAO to make 
comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The term "specialized 
knowledge" is not an absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed in 1756, Inc. v. 
Attorney General, "[slimply put, specialized knowledge is a relative . . . idea which cannot have a plain 
meaning." 745 F. Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990). The Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 
category was intended for "key personnel." See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2750. The term "key personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "of crucial 
importance." Webster's 11 New College Dictionary 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). In general, all 
employees can reasonably be considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not 
contribute to the overall economic success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to 
employ that person. An employee of "crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of 
the petitioner's average employee. Accordingly, based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and 
the congressional record related to that term, the AAO must make comparisons not only between the 
claimed specialized knowledge employee and the general labor market, but also between that employee 
and the remainder of the petitioner's workforce. 
Additionally, in Matter of Penner, the Commissioner discussed the legslative intent behind the creation 
of the specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. 49. The decision noted that the 1970 House Report, 
H.R. Rep. No. 91-85 1 stated that the number of admissions under the L-1 classification "will not be large" 
and that "[tlhe class of persons eligible for such nonimmigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be 
carefully regulated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id. at 5 1. The decision further noted 
1 Although the cited precedents pre-date the current statutory definition of "specialized knowledge," the 
AAO finds them instructive. Other than deleting the former requirement that specialized knowledge had 
to be "proprietary," the 1990 Act did not significantly alter the definition of "specialized knowledge" from 
the prior INS interpretation of the term. The 1990 Committee Report does not reject, criticize, or even 
refer to any specific INS regulation or precedent decision interpreting the term. The Committee Report 
simply states that the Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of "[vlarying [i.e., not 
specifically incorrect] interpretations by INS," H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I), at 69, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
6749. Beyond that, the Committee Report simply restates the tautology that became section 214(c)(2)(B) 
of the Act. Id. The AAO concludes, therefore, the cited cases, as well as Matter of Penner, remain useful 
guidance concerning the intended scope of the "specialized knowledge" L-1B classification. 
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that the House Report was silent on the subject of specialized knowledge but that, during the course of the 
sub-committee hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically questioned witnesses on the level of skill 
necessary to qualify under the proposed "L" category. In response to the Chairinan's questions, various 
witnesses responded that they understood the legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts," 
individuals with "unique" skills, and that it would not include "lower categories" of workers or "skilled 
craft workers." Id. at 50 (citing H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration Act of 1970: 
Hearings on H. R. 445,91 st Cong. 2 10,218,223,240,248 (November 12, 1969)). 
Reviewing the Congressional record, the Commissioner concluded in Matter of Penner that an expansive 
reading of the specialized knowledge provision, such that it would include skilled workers and 
technicians, is not warranted. The Commissioner emphasized that the specialized knowledge worker 
classification was not intended for "all employees with any level of specialized knowledge." Matter of 
Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 53. Or, as noted in Matter of Colley, "[mlost employees today are specialists and 
have been trained and given specialized knowledge. However, in view of the House Report, it can not be 
concluded that all employees with specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are 
eligible for classification as intracompany transferees." 18 I&N Dec. at 119. According to Matter of 
Penner, "[sluch a conclusion would permit extremely large numbers of persons to qualify for the 'L-1' 
visa" rather than the "key personnel" that Congress specifically intended. 18 I&N Dec. at 53; see also 
1756, Inc., 745 F. Supp. at 15 (concluding that Congress did not intend for the specialized knowledge 
capacity to extend to all employees with specialized knowledge, but rather to ''key personnel" and 
"executives."). 
Here, the petitioner's main contention is that the beneficiary's knowledge of solar powered energy 
sources, inverters, and resistive/inductive devices "can not be compared to the normal electrician," and 
claims that it is more akin to the knowledge of a solar engineer. Specifically, the petitioner alleges that 
the beneficiary's twelve years of experience with the foreign entity and his work with Xantrex, its client 
who specializes in renewable power systems, has solidified his specialized knowledge of solar and related 
devices. However, the petitioner has not provided any information pertaining to the duties and training of 
the beneficiary or of the other similarly qualified persons employed by the petitioner. Nor did the 
petitioner distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge, work experience, or training from those of other 
employees. 
The lack of tangible evidence in the record makes it impossible to classify the beneficiary's knowledge of 
the devices used by Xantrex systems as advanced or special and precludes a finding that the beneficiary's 
role is of crucial importance to the organization. The director specifically requested evidence in the form 
of contracts with clients such as Xantrex, payroll records establishing the amount of time the beneficiary 
spent working with particular clients andlor projects, and specific evidence of the training the beneficiary 
received. The petitioner, however, ignored this request. As previously stated, simply going on record 
without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in 
these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. The claim that the beneficiary has been 
employed by the petitioner for almost twelve years and that most of this period was devoted primarily to 
work with Xantrex and its systems and devices does little to establish that the beneficiary is equipped 
with specialized knowledge, for the petitioner has provided no independent evidence that sets the 
beneficiary apart from all other employees who have gained a similar "expertise" after working for the 
petitioner for a similar period. 
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Instead of providing additional assertions or new evidence on appeal, counsel for the petitioner declined 
to submit a brief and claims that "review by the AAO of the documents and arguments provided with the 
initial petition and followed up by the request on January 12, 2004 will support the petitioner's position 
that the denial was in error." The petitioner's burden was to establish that the beneficiary possessed the 
requisite specialized knowledge, and the petitioner was given ample opportunity to furnish supporting 
evidence in support of its contentions. Counsel makes no attempt to overcome the reasons for the 
director's stated grounds for denial. The petition was denied because the record of proceeding did not 
contain sufficient evidence to meet that burden. As previously stated, failure to submit evidence that 
precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. fj 103.2(b)(14). 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc., 745 F. Supp. at 16. Based on the evidence presented, it is concluded that the 
beneficiary does not possess specialized knowledge; nor would the beneficiary be employed in a capacity 
requiring specialized knowledge. For this reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has failed to establish that a qualifying relationship 
exists between the U.S. petitioner and a foreign entity. Although the petitioner claims that the U.S. 
petitioner is an affiliate of the foreign entity in this matter, insufficient evidence has been submitted to 
establish this relationship. Although the petitioner submits a corporate document (similar to a ledger) that 
indicates that the beneficiary and his wife own 100 shares of the petitioner as tenants by the entireties, this 
document does not establish that Amalgame Trading, th,e foreign entity, has an interest in the petitioner. 
Although the Form 1-129 indicates that the beneficiary and his wife also own the foreign entity, no 
evidence of their ownership and control of that entity has been submitted. Furthermore, the corporate 
document submitted in response to the request for evidence is insufficient by itself to establish the 
ownership of the U.S. entity. 
The petitioner failed to submit evidence which clearly establishes the ownership structure of the U.S. and 
the foreign entity and which corroborates the petitioner's claims. Going on record without supporting 
documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. 
Matter of Soflci, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. A petitioner must establish ownership and control in order to show 
a qualifying relationship exists. Stock certificates, the corporate stock certificate ledger, stock certificate 
registry, corporate bylaws, and the minutes of relevant annual shareholder meetings must also be 
examined to determine the total number of shares issued, the exact number issued to the shareholder, and 
the subsequent percentage ownership and its effect on corporate control. Additionally, a petitioning 
company must disclose all agreements relating to the voting of shares, the distribution of profit, the 
management and direction of the subsidiary, and any other factor affecting actual control of the entity. 
See Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986). Without full disclosure of all 
relevant documents, CIS is unable to determine the elements of ownership and control. 
In addition, the petitioner indicates that the beneficiary owns a significant portion of both companies. If 
this fact is established, it remains to be determined that the beneficiary's services are for a temporary 
period. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. fj 214.2(1)(3)(vii) states that if the beneficiary is an owner or major 
stockholder of the company, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that the beneficiary's services 
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are to be used for a temporary period and that the beneficiary will be transferred to an assignment abroad 
upon the completion of the temporary services in the United States. In the absence of persuasive 
evidence, it cannot be concluded that the beneficiary's services are to be used temporarily or that he will 
be transferred to an assignment abroad upon completion of hs services in the United States. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied 
by the MO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial 
decision. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), 
affd. 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting 
that the MO reviews appeals on a de novo basis). 
When the MO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a challenge 
only if she shows that the MO abused it discretion with respect to all of the MO's enumerated grounds. 
See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), affd. 345 
F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit 
sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1361. Here, that burden 
has not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.