dismissed L-1B Case: Telecommunications

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
fd&@~t!!q~~~~: :* I .: L:.~ieked t~ 20 Massdchusetts Ave , N.W . Rm A3012 
U'ashlngton, DC 20529 
p:r- - y F ~t ~de;ai~Zy ~~3p731r~24 
* - JS$OB,& p&&~y U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
File: SRC-04-116-50588 Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: JUM 2 8 4flfliSi 
Petition: ' Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section I OI(a)(I 5)(L) of the Itnmigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1 101(a)(15)(L) 
INSTRUCTIONS,: 
This is the decision of thc Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any furtller inquiry must be made to that office. 
+belt P. Wiemann. Director 
Administrative Appeals Office 
SRC-04-116-50588 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimrnigrant visa. The matter 
is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. Thc AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant pctition seeking to employ the beneficiary as an L-IB nonimmigrant 
intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 10 1 (a)(] 5)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. (j 1 I Ol(a)(lS)(L). The petitioner is a corporation organized in the State of 
Texas that states that it is a GSM cellular and paging company. The petitioner claims that it is the ~arent of .-- a - 
, located in Ashgabat. Turkmenistan. The petitioner now seeks to 
employ the beneficiary for three years as a general manager. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that: (1) the beneficiary 
possesses specialized knowledge; and (2) the prospective duties in the United States require an individual 
with specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary 
possesses specialized knowledge. and that such knowledge is required for his position in the United States. In 
support of these assertions, counsel submits a brief, additional evidence, and previously submitted documents. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1101(a)(15)(L). Specifically, a qualifying 
organization must have employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a 
specialized knowledge capacity, for one continuous >ear within the three years preceding the beneficiary's 
application for admission into the United States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United 
States tcmporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate 
thereof in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed dcscription of the services to be performed. 
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment 
abroad with a qualifying' organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) Evidence that the alicn's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that mas 
managerial. executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training. and e~nploy~nent qualifies himlher to perform the intended 
SRC-04-116-50588 
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. services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien pcrformed abroad. 
The first issue in the present matter is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary's prior 
employment abroad was in a position that involved specialized knowledge, such that the beneficiary 
possesses speciali~ed knowledge. See 8 C.F.R. 5 2 14.2(1)(3)(iv). 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. 8 U.S.C. 5 1 184(c)(2)(B), provides the following: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alicn is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines specialized knowledge as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes or procedures. 
In an affidavit from the petitioner's chairman submitted with the initial petition on March 17, 2004, the 
petitioner described the beneficiary's job duties with the foreign entity as follows: 
[The beneficiary] has workcd with [the foreign entity] in Turkmenistan since 1996 when he 
was hired as a Lead Expert. Hc was promoted to Deputy General Manager in 1999, and then 
the General Manager in 2001. As general manager, he has been responsible for all functions 
of the company. Specifically, he has been responsible for conducting negotiations and 
solving economic and political problems with the Turkmenistan government. He has been 
responsible for expansion planning, reinvestment planning, marketing, public relations, and 
quality control on expansion of coverage for thc company, as an executive. He formulates 
and develops business strategies and solutions for improving company performance. He 
monitors and analyzes business performance. He has developed and overseen the 
implementation of GSM network in Turkmenistan. He negotiates and facilitates arrangements 
for intenlational roaming agreements. In addition, he is responsible for personnel decisions, 
including hiring and firing, and oversight of operations for approximately 6 regional offices 
and 10 local offices in Turkmenistal~. He reports each day to the undersigncd the results of 
every-day activities. 
Through his experience with the company. [thc beneficiary] has specialized knowledge of the 
company products, services and management and its application in international markets. He 
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is not simply a skilled worker. in that he has held an executive position for the company since 
1999 to the present. He possesses skllls, knowledge and understanding of the company's 
business and how it operates successfi~lly on an international scale that is invaluable to our 
expansion goals in the U.S. 
i 
He has been utilized as a key employee in Turkmenistan and has been given specific 
assignm'ents, which have enhanced our productivity, competitiveness, image, financial 
position, and has secured our leadership in a truly global marke? for technology. Our 
products, services, and business plan is [sic] knowledge that is proprietary and can only be 
obtained through extensive experience with our operations. 
On March 30. 2004, the director requested additional evidence. In part, the director instructed the petitioner 
as follows: 
You must provide evidence that the beneficiary's knowledge is uncommon, noteworthy; or 
distinguished by some unusual quality and not generally known by practitioners in the field. 
The evidcnce must also establish that the beneficiary's knowledge of thc processes and 
procedures of your company is apart from the elementary or basic knowledge possessed by 
others. 
In a response dated April 2, 2004, counsel for the petitioner submitted a letter that further discusses the 
beneficiary's prior experience with the foreign entity as follows: 
[Tlhe beneficiary has specialized knowledge of the petitioner's product, namely cellular and 
paging GSM ("Global System for Mobile") technology. He has been responsible for the 
development and implementation of our company's GSM network in Turkmenistan, a country 
which until recently had no cellular GSM technology. He has also been responsible for 
facilitating arrangements for international roaming agreements. Intimate knowledge of the 
technology is necessary for silccessful completion of this assignment. 
* * * 
The beneficiary has special knowledge regarding the company's management. He has 
served in management capacities since 1999, more than half the time the company has been 
in existence . . . . The combination of lcgal and nian&ement experience in the company are 
[sic] very unique and is apart from the knowledge possessed by others. 
The beneficiary has7 special knowledge as to the application of company procedures, 
techniques and products to international markets . . . . As one of the beneficiary's job 
duties, he is responsible for negotiating and facilitating the execution of . . . international 
roaming agreements. His ability to speak Turkmeni. Turkish, English and Russian have [sic] 
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also played a key role in his successful negotiation of the international roaming agreement 
vital to the petitioner's ability to provide access to its cellular customers. 
Counsel hrther asserted that the beneficiary's duties and experience meet that definition of specialized 
knowledge as discussed in an internal Immigration and Naturalization Service memorandum from James A. 
Puleo. See Memorandum from James A. Puleo, Acting Exec. Assoc. Commr., Office of Operations, 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Immigration and Nat~lralization Service, bzterpretation of 
Specialized Knowledge, CO 2 14L-P (Mar. 9, 1994). Counsel stated hat: 
Considering the amount of experience the beneficiary has with the company, and his network 
of contacts with foreign governments and businesses, his language ability, and his familiarity 
with the company products. technology, management and business model, it would be 
extremely difficult to impart this knowledge to another witllout significant economic 
inconvenience at least and damage at worst to the US operations and its future goals. 
On April 14, 2004, the director denied the petition. In part, the director dctermined that the petitioner failed 
to establish that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowlcdge. The director stated that "[the petitioner has] 
indicated that the position requires an individual who has an in-depth knowledge of [its] products and 
services, however [it has] not established that an understanding of these methods within [its] company is 
indicative of advanced knowlcdge." 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary's kllowledge differs from that of other gencral 
managers in the communications field, in that he has both legal and managerial experience. Counsel 
discusses thc descriptions of managerial positions in the IJnited States Department of Labor Dictionary of 
Occzpational Titles (DOT) and Uccz~,ctlional Ozr//ook Hmdbook (OOEI), and asserts that the beneficiary's 
duties do not fit within any of them. Counsel claims that this is evidencc that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge. Counsel repeats the discussion of the beneficiary's duties that was provided to the 
director in response to the request for evidence. as quoted above. 
On review, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary possesses "specialized knowledge" as 
defined in section 214(c)(2)(B) of thc Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1184(c)(2)(B), and the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 
5 2 14.2(1)(1 )(ii)(D). 
in examining the special~ed knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's 
description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.K. tj 2 14.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed description 
of the services to be performed sufficient to establish specialized knowledge. Id. It is also appropriate for the 
AAO to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the beneficiary's knowledge of the 
business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making process. Matter of Coiley, 18 I&N 
Dec. 117, 120 (Comm. 198l)(citing Matter of Ruulin, 13 I&N Dec. 61 8 (R.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBloizc, 
13 I&N Dec. 81 6 (R.C. 1971 )).I As stated by the Conirnissioner in itlatter of Penijer, I 8 I&N Dec. 49, 52 
' Although the cited precedents pre-date the current statutory definition of "specialized knowledge," the AAO 
finds them instructive. Other than deleting the fonner requirement that specialized knowledge had to be 
SRC-04-116-50588 
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(Comm. 1982), when considering whether the beneficiaries possessed specialized knowledge, ''tl~e LeBIanc 
and Raulin decisions did not find that the occupations inhcrently qualified the beneficiaries for the 
classifications sought." Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have unusual duties, skills, or knowledge 
beyond that of a skilled worker. Id The Commissioner also provided the following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or her to 
produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed primarily 
for his ability to carry out a key process or function which is important or essential to the ' 
business' operation. 
Id. at 53. 
It should be noted that the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the AAO to make 
comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized knowledge, The term "specialized 
knowledge" is not an absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed in 1756, Inc. v. Atorney 
General, "[slimply put, specialized knowledge is a relative . . . idea which cannot have a plain meaning." 745 
F. Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990). The Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended 
for "key personnel." See generally, H.R. Rep. No. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key 
personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." Webster's 1INe~rp 
College Dictionriry 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). In general, all employees can reasonably be 
considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic 
success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. An ernployec of 
"crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise abovc thc level of the petitioner's average employee. 
Accordingly, based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record related to that 
term. the AAO must make comparisons not only behvecn the claimed specialized knowledge employee and 
the general labor market, but also between that employee and the remainder of the petitioner's workforce. 
Moreover, in Mutter oJPeiiner, the Com~nissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of the 
specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comn~. 1982). The decision noted that the 1970 House 
Report, H.R. No. 91 -85 1, stated that the number of admissions under the L-1 classification "will not be large" 
and that "[tlhe class of persons eligible for such nonimmigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be carefully 
regulated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id. at 5 1. I'he decision further noted that the House 
Report was silent on the subject of specialized knowledge, but that during the course of the sub-committee 
hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify 
under the proposed "L" category. In response to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that 
"proprietary," the 1990 Act did not significant11 alter the definition of "specialized knowledge" from the prior 
MS regulation or precedent decision interpreting thc term. The Committee Report simply states that the 
Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of "[vlarying [i.e., not specifically incorrect] 
interpretations by INS," 1I.R. Rep. No. 101-723(1), at 69. 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. Beyond that. the 
Committee Report simply restates the tautology that became section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Id. The AAO 
cpncludes, therefore, that the cited cases. as well as Mcct1t.r of Penner, remain useful guidance concerning the 
intended scope of the "specialized knowledge" L- 1 B class~fication. 
SRC-04-116-50588 
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they understood the legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, 
and that it woild not include "Iowcr categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." Matter of Pelmer, id. at 
50 (citing H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445, 91st 
Cong. 210,218,223,240,248 (November 12: 1969)). 
Reviewing the Congressional record, the Commissioner concluded in Matter of Penner that an expansive 
reading of the specialized knowledge provision, such that it would include skilled workers and technicians, is 
not warranted. The Commissioner emphasized that that the specialized knowledge worker classification was 
not intended for "all employees with any level of specialized knowledge." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 
53. Or, as noted in Mutter of Colley, "[mlost employees today are specialists and have been trained and given 
specialized knowledge. However, in view of the House Report, it can not be concluded that all employees 
with specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
intracompany transferees." 1 8 I&N Dec. 1 1 7, 1 1 9 (Comm. 1 98 1 ). According to Matter off'eimer, "[s]uch a 
conclusion would permit extremely large numbers of persons to qualify for the 'L-1' visa" rather than the 
"key personnel" that Congress specifically intended. 18 I&N Dec. at 53; see also, 1756, Inc., 745 F. Supp. at 
15 (concluding that Congress did not intend for the specialized knowledge capacity to extend to all employees 
with specialized knowledge, but rather to "key personnel" and "executives.") 
In the instant matter, the petitioner explained that its "products, services, and business plan is [sic] knowledge 
that is proprietary and can only be obtained through extensive expcrience with our operations." However, the 
petitioner has failed to adequately describe ~ts products such to distinguish them from those offered by other 
telecommunications companies. GSM technology is utilized and provided by numerous wireless 
communications companies worldwide, and thus more detail is needed to establish that the petitioner's 
technology is specific to its own family of companies. The petitioner asserts that "[ilntimate knowledge of 
the technology is necessary for successful completion of this assignment." Yet, the petitioner has not 
established that the beneficiary possesses or requires technical knowledge that is not commonly found by 
other individuals working within the telecommunications field, such that his technical knowledge can be 
considered specialized knowledge. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not 
sufficient for purposes of mceting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Ilfutter of Sufjci, 22 I&N Dec. 
158, 165 (Comm. 1998)(citing Mutter of Treusure CraB of Cnlifornicr, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Cotnm. 
1972)). 
The petitioner states that the beneficiary's foreign duties have led to "spccial knowledge regarding the 
company's management." The evidence of record sho\vs that the beneficiary has functioned as a general 
manager for the foreign entity for over two years. Yet, thc petitioner has not described the foreign entity's 
management methods, procedures, or structure such to differentiate them from those used by other 
companies. The mere fact that the beneficiary served as a manager does not distinguish his knowledge of the 
petitioner's management from the managerial experience held by other managers in the telecommunications 
field. More detailed is required in order for Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) to determine if 
knowledge of the foreign entity's management constitutes specialized knowledge. Again, going on record 
without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in 
these proceedings. Matter of Sofici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. 
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Page 8 
The petitioner stated that the beneficiary's "ability to speak Turluneni. Turkish, English and Russian have [sic] 
also played a key role in his successful negotiation of the international roaming agreement vital to the 
petitioner's ability to provide access to its cellular customers." While the beneficiary's language skills are 
valuable to the foreign entity and petitioner, they do not constitute specialized knowledge. Such skills are 
available to anyone wishing to study the named languages. Thus, mastery of languages cannot be deemed 
specialized knowledge of the petitioner's or foreign entity's particular products or processes. See 8 C.F.R. 
5 2 14.2(1)(1)(ii)(D). 
Counsel asserts that the beneficiary's knowledge differs from that of other general managers in the 
communications field, in that he has both legal and managerial experience. However, while the beneficiary 
may possess a unique combination of skills that is well suited to his duties, such skills, without further 
explanation, do not constitute specialized knowledge. The petitioner must clearly show that the beneficiary 
possesses knowledge that pertains only to the petitioner's family of companies. See 8 C.F.R. 
8 21 4.2(l)(l)(ii)(D). 
Counsel discus.;cs the descriptions of managerial positions in the United States Department of Labor 
Dictionary of Occupationul Titles (DOT) and Occtpational Outlook Handbook (OOEI), and asserts that the 
beneficiary's duties do not tit within any of them. Counsel claims that this is evidence that the beneficiary 
possesses specialized knowledge. While the DOT and OOH are generally instructive regarding the 
descriptions of various occupations, the fact that a position does not fit neatly within a single definition 
contained in the guides does not establish that the position involves specialized knowledge. As discussed 
above, the fact that the beneficiary's duties abroad require an unusual combination of skills does not render his 
experience in the position specialized knowledge. 
In the instant matter, the petitioner has not submitted a sufficiently detailed description of the beneficiary's 
f0rei.g; duties to show that they involve specialized knowledge as defined in 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). 
While the record reflects that the beneficiary is an experienced manager, evidence does not show that his 
responsibilities require a greater level of knowledge and ability than that possessed by other managers in the 
telecommunicatio~~s field. The legislative historq for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample 
support for a restrictive interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated 
that the beneficiary should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing 
specialized knowledge. See 1756. Inc. v. Attortle~v C;e~iernl, szrprrr at 16. Bascd on the evidence presented, it 
is concluded that the beneficiary was not ernployed abroad in a specialized knowledge capacity. For this 
reason, thc appeal will be dismissed 
The second issue in thc present matter is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary's position 
in the United States will involve specialized knowledge as required by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 
5 2 14.2(1)(3)(ii). 
In an affidavit submitted with the initial petition, the petitioner's chairman described the beneficiary's 
prospective duties as follows: 
SRC-04- 1 16-50588 
Page 9 
While in the US. [the beneficiary] will be responsible for planning, directing and coordinating 
all operations and functions. He will formulate company policies and strategies for 
implementation on an international scale. He will manage daily operations through 
subordinate management personnel. He will be responsible for personnel decisions, 
including hiring and firing, and for financial development, records, and growth. He will be 
responsible for expansion planning, rcinvestment planning, marketing, public relations, and 
quality control on expansion of cellular coverage for the company. He will formulate and 
develop business strategies and solutions for improving company performance and opening 
new offices. He will monitor and analyze business performance and develop the 
implementation of GSM network. He will facilitate arrangements of international roaming 
agreements and continue to report each day to the Chairman results of every-day activities. 
In response to the director's request for evidence. the petitioner further dcscribed the beneficiary's prospective 
duties in the United States as follows: 
Considering the amount of'expericnce the beneficiary has with the company, and his network 
of contacts with foreign governments and businesses, his language ability, and his familiarity 
with the company products, technology, management and business model, it would be 
extremely difficult to impart this howledge to another without significant economic 
inconvenience at least and damage at worst to the US operations and its future goals. 
The beneficiary has skills that are required for successful accomplishment of the goals set by 
the Directors of the US operations of [the foreign entity], namely continued international 
development and growing the operations and functions of the IJS office. The beneficiary's 
intimate knowledge of the petitioner's products, technology. management and procedures, 
and in particular how those are applied and exploited in international markets, is specialized 
and required. The knowledge he has cannot easily be imparted to another, and can only be 
gained through experience within the company. Because of his unique combination of 
rnanagemcnt and legal experience, as well as his language ability, he has the skills the 
company needs to succeed. 
In denying the petition. the director concluded that the petitioner failed to show that the prospective position 
in the United States requires an individual with speciali~ed knowledge. The director stated that the 
beneficiary's prospective duties "do not appear to be significantly different from those of any other manager 
in the communications industry. Therefore, it has not been established that the duties warrant thc expertise of 
someone possessing truly specialized knowledge." 
On appeal, counsel's brief is framed as a simultaneous response to both grounds for denial. Thus, counsel's 
arguments discussed above also apply to whether the beneficiary will be employed in the United States in a 
capacity involving specialized knowledge. Counsel repeats the discussion of the,beneficiary's prospective 
duties that was provided to the director in response to the request for evidence, as quoted above. 
Page 10 
As with the beneficiary's duties abroad. the petitioner has not indicated that the beneficiary will utilize 
technical knowledge in the United Statcs that is specific to the petitioner's family of companies. Nor has the 
petitioner shown that the position in the United States requires knowledge of management processes or 
procedures that are specific to the petitioner or the foreign entlty. As discussed above, the petitioner has 
failed to adequately describe the management structure used by it and the foreign entity, such to establish that 
knowledge of the companies' management constitutes specialized lulowledge. 'The beneficiary's prospective 
duties involve general managerial tasks. and do not reflect a need for skills or knowledge that are unique to 
the petitioner or foreign entity. Thus. the evidence of record does not support that the petitioner requires an 
employee with greater knowledge than that held by other managcrs in the beneficiary's field. Accordingly, 
the petitioner has failed to show that the prospective position in the United States requires an individual with 
specialized knowledge. See 8 C.F.R. S; 214.2(1)(3)(ii). For this additional reason, the appeal will be 
dismissed. 
In visa proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
director's decision will be affirmed and the appeal will be dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.