dismissed L-1B Case: Wrought Iron Manufacturing

U-S. Department of Homeland Security 
p*pd P-3 
 U S. Citizenship and Imm~grat~on Services 
ident:.fy& data 
+ 
Office ofAdm~nrstratlve Appeals MS 2090 
ir .,,+, l?:r'ml.~d 
prevxd,'~ 4kc- " 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
I 
ir;lcsi9fl ql rc:~gi*h" U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
L. 
File: WAC 08 027 51060 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: AUG 2 6 2009 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(] 5)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101 (a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
uohn F. Grissom 
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office 
WAC 08 027 5 1060 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office ("AAO") on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the 
appeal. 
The petitioner, a California corporation, filed this nonimmigrant visa petition to employ the beneficiary as an L- 
1 B intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 1 O 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act ("the Act"), 8 U.S.C. $ 1 101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner claims to be a subsidiary of the 
beneficiary's foreign employer, located in the Philippines. It intends to engage in the manufacture of wrought iron 
materials. The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary as the executive manager of its new office in the United 
States for a period of three years. 
1 
The director denied the petition based on two separate grounds. First, the director determined that the 
petitioner had failed to establish that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that he would be 
employed in a capacity requiring specialized knowledge. Second, the director determined that the petitioner 
did not provide evidence of the temporary nature of the beneficiary's services, as required by 8 C.F.R. fj 
2 14.2(1)(3)(vii). 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director 
"has mixed up the duties of a manager or executive with that of involving 'specialized skills,"' and "arbitrarily 
disregarded," the criteria for employment in a managerial or executive capacity. Counsel further contends that 
the record contains ample evidence to establish that the beneficiary's proposed U.S. employment is temporary. 
To establish L-1 eligibility under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the petitioner must demonstrate that the 
beneficiary, within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, has 
been employed abroad in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a capacity involving specialized 
knowledge, for one continuous year by a qualifying organization. The petitioner must also demonstrate that the 
beneficiary seeks to enter the United States temporarily in order to continue to render services to the same 
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized 
knowledge. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
1 
Pursuant to the regulation at 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(7)(i)(A)(3), if the beneficiary is coming to the United States 
to open or be employed in a new office, the petition may be approved for a period not to exceed one year. 
WAC 08 027 5 1060 
Page 3 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifiing organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
As a threshold issue, the AAO emphasizes that the evidentiary criteria to be applied in this matter are 
dependent upon which L-1 classification the petitioner requested as of the date of filing. Upon review of the 
Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker, filed on November 19, 2007, it is noted that at Part 2, item 
1, Requested Nonimmigrant Classification, the petitioner or its representative handwrote "LIB." On the L 
Classification Supplement, at Section 1, item 1, where asked to indicate the classification sought, the 
petitioner marked "L-1B specialized knowledge." The petitioner also responded to item #13 on the L 
Classification Supplement, which pertains to L-1 B employees. 
Based on the petitioner's statements on Form 1-129, the director properly determined that the petitioner filed 
an L-1 B classification petition. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. tj 214.2(1)(3)(vi) states that if the beneficiary is coming to the Untied States in a 
specialized knowledge capacity to open or to be employed in a new office, the petitioner shall submit 
evidence that: 
(A) 
 Sufficient physical premises to house the new office have been secured; 
(B) 
 The business entity in the United States is or will be a qualifying organization as 
defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section; and 
(C) 
 The petitioner has the financial ability to remunerate the beneficiary and to 
commence doing business in the United States. 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity involving specialized 
knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special knowledge of the company product and its 
application in international markets or has an advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the 
company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines specialized knowledge as: 
WAC 08 027 5 1060 
Page 4 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
The first issue addressed by the director is whether the petitioner established that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge and that he would be employed in the United States in a capacity requiring specialized 
knowledge. 
On the Form 1-129, the petitioner described the beneficiary's current foreign duties and proposed U.S. duties as 
the following: "Managing, designing, manufacturing wrought iron company and performing structural and steel 
industrial projects." 
In a letter dated November 5, 2007, counsel for the petitioner stated that, as executive manager of the new office 
in the United States, the beneficiary "will be in charge of cultivating business and procuring new accounts, 
staffing the company and strategizing its manufacturing operation, negotiating and entering into binding 
contracts; purchasing the required machinery, tools and other necessary equipment as well as executing checks 
and other negotiable documents." Counsel stated that the beneficiary "has been continuously employed by the 
parent company in an executive capacity since its foundation several years ago," and that "his skill in starting a 
business and stimulating and nurturing growth thereof is precisely the skill essential to the successful 
commencement of our company's operation." Counsel further noted the beneficiary's "intimate familiarity and 
connection with the operation of the parent company," and stated that "it is believed that only [the beneficiary] 
can successfully complete this task." 
The director issued a request for additional evidence (RFE) on December 21, 2007, in which she instructed the 
petitioner to submit additional evidence to establish that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. The 
director requested that the petitioner submit a more detailed description of the beneficiary's proposed duties and: 
(1) explain any special or advanced duties performed by the beneficiary that are different fiom other similarly 
employed workers; (2) explain in more detail exactly what it is the equipment, system, product, technique or 
service of which the beneficiary has specialized knowledge and whether it is used or produced by other 
employers in the United States or abroad; (3) explain how the beneficiary's training or experience is uncommon, 
noteworthy or distinguished by some unusual quality and not generally known by practitioners in his field; and 
(4) explain the training the beneficiary will provide to other employees, if applicable. 
Counsel for the petitioner submitted a letter dated January 10, 2008 in response to the WE. In response to the 
director's request that the petitioner explain any special or advanced duties the beneficiary will perform, counsel 
reiterated portions of his initial letter dated November 5, 2007, and noted that the beneficiary's "managerial skill, 
industrious character, experience, and knowledge are essential to the stability of the new operation." Counsel 
further described the petitioner's product as follows: 
WAC 08 027 5 1060 
Page 5 
The underlying industry involves in the wrought iron products and various supplies for industrial 
and constructional projects, including, but ot llimited [sic] to, designing, producing, assembling 
and erecting foundations, scaffoldings, and other durable structures as well as other related 
construction products that are essential in residential and commercial buildings. 
Counsel indicated that the beneficiary "will train U.S. workers to operate, manage and supervise a highly 
industrious operation, i.e. a wrought iron manufacturing [sic] which will design, produce, manufacture, assemble 
and erect foundations, scaffoldings, and other durable structures." Counsel concluded as follows: 
If Petitioner is unable to secure the Alien's services, it will remain all but unable to effectively 
start its operation. This is in particular due to the fact that the Alien is expected to bring his 
knowledge combined and enriched by his cultural heritage and artistic talents which have 
enormously enhanced his products and made them universally unique and distinguished. 
Consequently, if the Alien is not able to commence his services, the petitioner will have to fold 
and close its U.S. office. In such event, there will be no income and no business activities at all. 
The director denied the petition on February 20, 2008, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the 
beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that he would be employed in a capacity that requires specialized 
knowledge. In denying the petition, the director found that the petitioner had failed to articulate the nature of the 
beneficiary's specialized or advanced knowledge and had not described any duties that could be considered 
specialized. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner states: 
First and foremost, the within petition seeks beneficiary's services as an executive, Chief 
Executive Officer, and not as an individual with special or technical know how or knowledge, 
which is the characteristic of the latter. As such, the "special knowledge" test is inapplicable 
herein. Moreover, assuming arguendo, special knowledge of the company's operational policies 
was required. Still, more than ample evidence and tons of documents were submitted which 
readily satisfy this requirement. To illustrate, such evidence substantiates the fact that beneficiary 
has been an "insider" in the parent company with superior knowledge of its products, services 
and marketing strategies. Such indispensable knowledge could well satisfy the aforesaid test in 
that it's an integrated part of the within position and disposes of any further or additional 
argument. 
Counsel further states that "[allthough it can be argued that a company's president must have certain 'special 
knowledge' as how to run a company, it pertains to L-1A and does not fall within the purview of LIB which 
involves persons with specialized expertise as an indispensable requirement." Counsel contends that the director 
"has mixed up the duties of a manager or executive with that of involving 'specialized skills."' 
WAC 08 027 5 1060 
Page 6 
Counsel further suggests that the beneficiary possesses characteristics of an employee with specialized 
knowledge as outlined in a 1988 legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) memorandum from 
Richard  ort ton.^ Counsel notes that such employees possess knowledge that is valuable to the employer's 
competitiveness in the marketplace; are uniquely qualified to contribute to the U.S. employer's knowledge of 
foreign operating conditions; have been utilized as a key employee abroad and have been given significant 
assignments which have enhanced the employer's productivity, competitiveness, image and financial position; 
and possess knowledge that can be gained only through extensive prior experience with that employer. 
Counsel asserts that the director failed to consider whether the beneficiary possesses such characteristics. 
Counsel goes on to assert that the beneficiary's proposed position falls within the statutory definition for 
"managerial capacity, and that the petitioner submitted evidence sufficient for approval of a new office 
petition pursuant to 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(3)(~). Counsel contends that the director failed to apply the criteria 
applying to managerial employees, and emphasizes that the specialized knowledge classification "does not 
pertain to executive positions in general and to Chief Executive Officers in particular." 
Upon review, and for the reasons discussed herein, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary 
possesses specialized knowledge or that he will be employed in a position requiring specialized knowledge. 
Preliminarily, however, the AAO notes that counsel's suggestion that the director was required to apply the 
statutory and regulatory criteria pertaining to managerial and executive employees to the facts of the instant 
case is unpersuasive. As discussed above, the petitioner filed a Form 1-129 petition on which it unequivocally 
stated that it was seeking to classify the beneficiary as an L-1 B specialized knowledge worker. The request to 
have the AAO reconsider the petition on appeal as a request for L-1A classification is not properly before the 
AAO. If the petitioner seeks to classify the beneficiary as an L-1A manager or executive, then it will need to 
file a new or amended petition and supporting documentation with the Service Center. See 8 C.F.R. 
0 2 14.2(1)(7)(i)(C). 
Looking to the language of the statutory definition, Congress has provided USCIS with an ambiguous definition 
of specialized knowledge. In this regard, one Federal district court explained the infeasibility of applying a 
bright-line test to define what constitutes specialized knowledge: 
This ambiguity is not merely the result of an unfortunate choice of dictionaries. It reflects the 
relativistic nature of the concept special. An item is special only in the sense that it is not 
ordinary; to define special one must first define what is ordinary. . . . There is no logical or 
principled way to determine which baseline of ordinary knowledge is a more appropriate reading 
of the statute, and there are countless other baselines which are equally plausible. Simply put, 
specialized knowledge is a relative and empty idea which cannot have a plain meaning. CJ: 
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 537 (1982). 
2 See Memorandum from James A. Puleo, Assoc. Comm., INS, Interpretation of Special Knowledge, March 
4, 1994. (hereinafter "Puleo memorandum"). See Memo. of Richard Norton, Interpretation of Specialized 
Knowledge Under the L Classzfication, (Oct. 27, 1988), reproduced in 65 Interpreter Releases 1170, 1194 
(November 7, 1988). 
WAC 08 027 5 1060 
Page 7 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. 9, 14-15 (D.D.C., 1990).~ 
While Congress did not provide explicit guidance for what should be considered ordinary knowledge, the 
principles of statutory interpretation provide some clue as to the intended scope of the L-1B specialized 
knowledge category. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987) 
(citing llVSv. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207,94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)). 
First, the AAO must look to the language of section 214(c)(2)(B) itself, that is, the terms "special" and 
"advanced." Like the courts, the AAO customarily turns to dictionaries for help in determining whether a word in 
a statute has a plain or common meaning. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 109 F.3d 965, 967-68 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(using Webster's Dictionary for "therefore"). According to Webster's New College Dictionary, the word "special" 
is commonly found to mean "surpassing the usual" or "exceptional." Webster's New College Dictionary, 1084 
(3rd Ed. 2008). The dictionary defines the word "advanced" as "highly developed or complex" or "at a higher 
level than others." Id. at 17. 
Second, looking at the term's placement within the text of section 10 l(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the AAO notes that 
specialized knowledge is used to describe the nature of a person's employment and that the term is listed among 
the higher levels of the employment hierarchy together with "managerial" and "executive" employees. Based on 
the context of the term within the statute, the AAO therefore would expect a specialized knowledge employee to 
occupy an elevated position within a company that rises above that of an ordinary or average employee. See 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 14. 
Third, a review of the legislative history for both the original 1970 statute and the subsequent 1990 statute 
indicates that Congress intended for USCIS to closely administer the L-1B category. Specifically, the original 
drafters of section 10 l(a)(15)(L) of the Act intended that the class of persons eligible for the L- 1 classification 
would be "narrowly drawn" and "carefully regulated and monitored" by USCIS. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91- 
85 1 (1 970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750, 2754, 1970 WL 58 15. The legislative history of the 1970 Act 
plainly states that "the number of temporary admissions under the proposed 'L' category will not be large." Id In 
addition, the Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended for "key personnel." 
See generally, id. The term "key personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "[olf 
crucial importance." Webster S New College Dictionary 620 (3"' ed., Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing 
Co. 2008). Moreover, during the course of the sub-committee hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically 
questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify under the proposed "L" category. In response 
to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that they understood the legislation would allow 
"high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, and that it would not include "lower 
3 
 Although 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General was decided prior to enactment of the statutory definition of 
specialized knowledge by the Immigration Act of 1990, the court's discussion of the ambiguity in the legacy 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) definition is equally illuminating when applied to the definition 
created by Congress. 
WAC 08 027 5 1060 
Page 8 
categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." See H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., lmmigration 
Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445,91g Cong. 210,218,223,240,248 (Nov. 12, 1969). 
Neither in 1970 nor in 1990 did Congress provide a controlling, unambiguous definition of "specialized 
knowledge," and a narrow interpretation is consistent with so much of the legislative intent as it is possible to 
determine. H. Rep. No. 91-85 1 at 6, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2754. This interpretation is consistent with legislative 
history, which has been largely supportive of a narrow reading of the definition of specialized knowledge and the 
L-1 visa classification in general. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 15-16; Boi Na Braza 
Atlanta, LLC v. Upchurch, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 2372846 at "4 (N.D.Tex., 2005), afd 194 
Fed.Appx. 248 (5th Cir. 2006); Fibermaster, Ltd. v. I.N.S., Not Reported in F.Supp., 1990 WL 99327 (D.D.C., 
1990); Delta Airlines, hc. v. Dept. of Justice, Civ. Action 00-2977-LFO (D.D.C. April 6, 2001)(on file with 
AAO). 
Further, although the Immigration Act of 1990 provided a statutory definition of the term "specialized 
knowledge" in section 214(c)(2) of the Act, the definition did not generally expand the class of persons eligible 
for L-IB specialized knowledge visas. Pub.L. No. 101-649, fj 206(b)(2), 104 Stat. 4978, 5023 (1990). Instead, 
the legislative history indicates that Congress created the statutory definition of specialized knowledge for the 
express purpose of clarifying a previously undefined term from the Immigration Act of 1970. H.R. Rep. 101- 
723(I) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6749, 1990 WL 200418 ("One area within the L visa that 
requires more specificity relates to the term 'specialized knowledge.' Varying interpretations by INS have 
exacerbated the problem."). While the 1990 Act declined to codify the "proprietary knowledge" and "United 
States labor market" references that had existed in the previous agency definition found at 8 C.F.R. 
3 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) (1988), there is no indication that Congress intended to liberalize its own 1970 definition of 
the L- 1 visa classification. 
If any conclusion can be drawn from the enactment of the statutory definition of specialized knowledge in section 
214(c)(2)(B), it would be based on the nature of the Congressional clarification itself. By not including any strict 
criterion in the ultimate statutory definition and further emphasizing the relativistic aspect of "special knowledge," 
Congress created a standard that requires USCIS to make a factual determination that can only be determined on a 
case-by-case basis, based on the agency's expertise and discretion. Rather than a bright-line standard that would 
support a more rigid application of the law, Congress gave the INS a more flexible standard that requires an 
adjudication based on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. Cj Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroji, 33 1 F.3d 
369,377 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89,91 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
To determine what is special or advanced, USCIS must first determine the baseline of ordinary. As a 
baseline, the terms "special" or "advanced" must mean more than simply "skilled" or "experienced." By 
itself, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically complex products will not equal "special 
knowledge." See Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 53 (Comm. 1982). In general, all employees can 
reasonably be considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the 
overall economic success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. 
An employee of "crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average 
WAC 08 027 51060 
Page 9 
employee. In other words, specialized knowledge generally requires more than a short period of experience; 
otherwise special or advanced knowledge would include every employee in an organization with the 
exception of trainees and entry-level staff. If everyone in an organization is specialized, then no one can be 
considered truly specialized. Such an interpretation strips the statutory language of any efficacy and cannot 
have been what Congress intended. 
Considering the definition of specialized knowledge, it is the petitioner's, not USCIS's, burden to articulate 
and prove that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" knowledge. Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 
8 U.S.C. fj 11 84(c)(2)(B). USCIS cannot make a factual determination regarding the beneficiary's specialized 
knowledge if the petitioner does not, at a minimum, articulate with specificity the nature of the claimed 
specialized knowledge, describe how such knowledge is typically gained within the organization, and explain 
how and when the beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
Once the petitioner articulates the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and type of 
evidence which establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized knowledge. A 
petitioner's assertion that the beneficiary possesses advanced knowledge of the processes and procedures of 
the company must be supported by evidence describing and distinguishing that knowledge from the 
elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others. Because "special" and "advanced" are comparative 
terms, the petitioner should provide evidence that allows USCIS to assess the beneficiary's knowledge 
relative to others in the petitioner's workforce or relative to similarly employed workers in the petitioner's 
specific industry. 
In examining the specialized knowledge of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's description of 
the job duties and the weight of the evidence supporting any asserted specialized knowledge. See 8 C.F.R. 
fj 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed job description of the services to be performed sufficient to 
establish specialized knowledge. At a minimum, the petitioner must articulate with specificity the nature of the 
claimed specialized knowledge. Merely asserting that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" 
knowledge will not suffice to meet the petitioner's burden of proof. 
Upon review, the petitioner in this case has failed to establish either that the beneficiary's position in the 
United States requires an employee with specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has specialized 
knowledge. 
Counsel, while apparently conceding that the petitioner never intended to establish that the beneficiary 
possesses specialized knowledge and that the criteria for specialized knowledge are inapplicable to the 
petition, nevertheless claims that the petitioner submitted "ample evidence and tons of documents" to 
establish that the beneficiary also qualifies for L-1 classification as a specialized knowledge employee. 
Counsel's claim is based on the beneficiary's status as an "insider" in the parent company and his "superior 
knowledge of its products, services and marketing strategies." Counsel has previously mentioned the 
beneficiary's managerial skills and "intimate familiarity and connection with the operation of the parent 
company." These statements represent the only claims regarding the beneficiary's specialized knowledge. 
WAC 08 027 5 1060 
Page 10 
Here, as noted by the director, the beneficiary's proposed job duties do not identify services to be performed 
by the beneficiary in a specialized knowledge capacity. The beneficiary's responsibilities for "cultivating 
business and procuring new accounts," staffing the company, entering contracts, purchasing equipment and tools, 
and executing checks are all duties typically performed by any employee responsible for overseeing a start-up 
operation in a new market. The record is devoid of any documentary evidence that the beneficiary's proposed 
position would involve the application of special knowledge of the petitioning organization's product, service, 
research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests as required in the regulations. Counsel has 
asserted that the beneficiary's "cultural heritage and artistic talents . . . have enormously enhanced his products 
and made them universally unique and distinguished." However, there is no other reference in the record to the 
"unique" nature of the petitioner's products or any particular artistic or cultural influences which would set 
them apart from similar products manufactured by other companies in the industry. Without documentary 
evidence to support the claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfjr the petitioner's burden of proof. The 
unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 
(BLA 1988); Matter of laureano, 19 I&N Dec, 1 (BIA 1983); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 
506 (BIA 1980). While the beneficiary's familiarity and experience with the foreign entity's operations is 
undoubtedly valuable to the petitioner, the evidence of record fails to establish that any prior experience with 
the foreign entity would actually be required to perform the general oversight activities proposed. 
The AAO acknowledges that it is possible for an individual employed in a managerial role to meet the criteria 
for specialized knowledge capacity set forth at section 214(c)(2)(B). However, the petitioner has not 
established that the particular position offered to the beneficiary requires an individual with knowledge, 
experience or characteristics not typically possessed by managers in the petitioner's industry. The petitioner, 
like the foreign company, will produce wrought iron products and provide services for industrial and 
construction projects, such as erecting foundations and scaffolding. Again, there is no evidence that the 
beneficiary would rely on "special" or "advanced knowledge of the petitioner's products or processes in 
order to perform his duties as executive manager responsible for establishing the new office. The petitioner 
has not established that the particular position offered to the beneficiary requires an individual with 
knowledge, experience or characteristics beyond possession of general knowledge related to the petitioner's 
industry and general business and management skills. The beneficiary's knowledge and expertise do not 
include the type of special or advanced knowledge of the petitioner's products, processes or other interests as 
required by the regulations. The fact that the petitioner's parent company considers the beneficiary the best 
qualified, or even the only qualified manager, capable of successfully establishing a U.S. subsidiary is 
insufficient to establish that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that the offered position 
requires specialized knowledge. Again, the petitioner has not demonstrated how the U.S. position requires 
more than management skills and general knowledge that is common in the U.S. construction industry. 
The AAO does not disagree with counsel's assertion that the beneficiary will be employed primarily to carry 
out a key process or function, or that he has been utilized as a key employee abroad. If this were all the 
petitioner needed to establish, almost any senior employee would qualify as a specialized knowledge worker. 
However, the statute and regulations require the petitioner to demonstrate that the beneficiary possesses, and 
that the proposed employment requires, special knowledge of the petitioning organization's product, service, 
research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests, or an advanced level of knowledge or 
WAC 08 027 5 1060 
Page 11 
expertise in the organization's processes and procedures. As noted above, the beneficiary's knowledge and 
expertise, while valuable to the petitioner, does not include the type of special or advanced knowledge of the 
petitioning organization required by the regulations. The petitioner has not submitted evidence to establish 
that the beneficiary possesses, or that the position requires, knowledge that can only be gained through 
extensive experience with the foreign employer, or that the beneficiary will be employed to contribute to the 
U.S. company's knowledge of foreign operating conditions. 
Regardless, counsel's reliance on the Norton memorandum is misplaced. It is noted that the memorandum 
was intended solely as a guide for employees and will not supersede the plain language of the statute or the 
regulations. Therefore, by itself, counsel's assertion that the beneficiary's qualifications are analogous to the 
examples outlined in the memorandum is insufficient to establish the beneficiary's qualification for 
classification as an intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge. Specifics are clearly an important 
indication of whether a beneficiary's duties encompass specialized knowledge; otherwise meeting the 
definition would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. See, e.g., Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 
F. Supp. 1 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff', 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). While the beneficiary may possess 
knowledge that is valuable to the petitioner's productivity, competitiveness, and financial position and has held 
key assignments abroad, these factors, by themselves, do not constitute the possession of specialized knowledge. 
While the beneficiary's contribution to the economic success of the company may be considered, the regulations 
specifically require that the beneficiary possess an "advanced level of knowledge" of the organization's processes 
and procedures, or a "special knowledge" of the petitioner's product, service, research, equipment, techniques, or 
management. 
 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). 
 As determined above, the beneficiary does not satisfy the 
requirements for possessing specialized knowledge. 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary possesses special 
knowledge of the petitioner's products or services, or an advanced level of knowledge of the company's 
processes and procedures, nor has it established that the position of executive manager within its organization 
requires specialized knowledge. 
The plain meaning of the term "specialized knowledge" is knowledge or expertise beyond the ordinary in a 
particular field, process, or function. The petitioner has not furnished evidence sufficient to demonstrate that 
the beneficiary's duties involve knowledge or expertise beyond what is commonly held by management-level 
employees in his field. There is nothing in the record to suggest that any other experienced employee within 
the parent company's organization, or any employee with a record of success in a similar role within the 
petitioner's industry, could not adequately perform the proposed duties. 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F. Supp. at 16. Based on the foregoing, the record does 
not establish that the beneficiary would be employed by the U.S. entity in a specialized knowledge capacity. 
For this reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
The second issue addressed by the director is whether the petitioner established that the beneficiary's 
proposed employment in the United States is temporary. 
WAC 08 027 5 1060 
Page 12 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 214.2(1)(3)(vii) states: 
If the beneficiary is an owner or major stockholder of the company, the petition must be 
accompanied by evidence that the beneficiary's services are to be used for a temporary period 
and evidence that the beneficiary will be transferred to an assignment abroad upon the 
completion of the temporary services in the United States. 
While a petitioner seeking L-1 classification generally need submit only a simple statement of the facts and a 
listing of dates to demonstrate the intent to employ the beneficiary in the United States temporarily, where the 
beneficiary is the ownerlmajor stockholder of the petitioning company, a greater degree of proof is required. 
See Matter of Isovic, 18 I&N Dec. 361 (Comm. 1980). 
The petitioner indicates that the U.S. company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the foreign entity, which, 
based on the evidence of record, is a sole proprietorship owned and operated by the beneficiary. Therefore, 
the beneficiary is the sole owner of both the U.S. and foreign entities. 
The petitioner indicated on Form 1-129 that it was seeking to employ the beneficiary for two years. In his 
letter dated November 5, 2007, counsel for the petitioner stated: 
If [the beneficiary's] contemplated status is granted, he will travel to the U.S. with his wife 
and minor child on a temporarily [sic] basis for duration of his approved stay. Upon 
completion of his assignment, he will install other qualified U.S. employees and executives 
and return to the Philippines. 
Counsel further stated that "once the operation of the U.S. entity is fully established and has proven to be 
successful in the U.S. market, it is planned to have [the beneficiary] resume his position in the Philippines." 
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner did not provide evidence that the beneficiary's 
services are for a temporary period and that the beneficiary will be transferred abroad upon completion of the 
assignment. In denying the petition, the director determined that the petitioner failed to submit evidence, such 
as a business plan or other documentation, indicating the duration of the beneficiary's intended stay. 
On appeal, counsel emphasizes that the petitioner indicated on Form 1-129 that it intends to employ the 
beneficiary for two years, and that such statement is sufficient. Counsel asserts that "the extent that 
'temporariness' will continue to be a factor has been lessened as a result of the recognition of the doctrine of 
'dual intent' for L petitions under the Immigration Act of 1990." 
Upon review, the petitioner has not satisfied the regulatory requirement at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(vii). 
Counsel has essentially asserted on appeal that the regulations do not require evidence that the beneficiary's 
services will be for a temporary period or evidence that the beneficiary will be transferred abroad upon 
completion of his assignment. Counsel's suggestion that no such requirement exists, when the requirement is 
stated in the plain language of the regulations, is not persuasive. The petitioner's evidence in this regard 
WAC 08 027 5 1060 
Page 13 
consists of the employment dates indicated on Form 1-129, and the unsupported statements of counsel. 
Without documentary evidence to support the claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's 
burden of proof. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 
I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter oflaureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Matter of Rarnirez-Sanchez, 
17 I&N Dec. 503,506 (BIA 1980). 
Furthermore, the director requested that the petitioner provide an organizational chart depicting the staffing of 
the foreign company and instructed the petitioner to "explain how the parent company will continue to 
function with the absence of [the beneficiary] for an extended period." The petitioner did not respond to these 
specific requests, or otherwise indicate who would manage the foreign company during the beneficiary's U.S. 
assignment. Failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for 
denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(14). For this additional reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has not established that sufficient physical premises to 
house the new office have been secured as required by 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(vi)(A). 
In support of its assertion that it has secured sufficient physical premises to house the United States operation, 
the petitioner submitted a copy of a "Virtual Office Agreement" dated September 19, 2007, in which the 
petitioner is designated as "licensee." The agreement grants the petitioner mail services and a directory listing 
for a base monthly fee of $75, and the non-exclusive right to use a conference room, based on its availability, 
for an hourly fee. The petitioner has not submitted evidence that it has secured any physical premises for its 
exclusive use, or premises which would be suitable for operation of an iron works and construction services 
business. Therefore, the petitioner has not secured sufficient physical premises, and the petition may not be 
approved for this additional reason. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the 
AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 200 I), affd, 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can 
succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's 
enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
appeal will be dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.