remanded L-1B Case: Software Development

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
Non-Precedent Decision of the
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: APR. 4, 2024 In Re: 30682218 
Appeal of California Service Center Decision 
Form I-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker (L-lB Specialized Knowledge Worker) 
The Petitioner, a software development company, seeks to temporarily employ the Beneficiary as a 
senior software engineer at a salary of $90,000 per year under the L-1 B nonimmigrant classification 
for intracompany transferees. Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 101(a)(15)(L), 
8 U.S.C . § 1101(a)(15)(L). The L-lB classification allows a corporation or other legal entity 
(including its affiliate or subsidiary) to transfer a qualifying foreign employee with "specialized 
knowledge" to work temporarily in the United States. 
The Director of the California Service Center denied the petition, concluding the Petitioner did not 
establish, as required, that the Beneficiary: (1) possesses specialized knowledge; (2) was employed 
abroad in a qualifying capacity; and (3) will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity in the 
United States. The matter is now before us on appeal under 8 C.F.R. § 103 .3. 
The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Matter ofChawathe, 25 l&N Dec. 369, 375-76 (AAO 2010). We review the questions in this matter 
de nova. Matter of Christo 's, Inc., 26 l&N Dec. 537, 537 n.2 (AAO 2015). Upon de nova review, 
we will withdraw the Director's decision and remand the matter for entry of a new decision consistent 
with the following analysis. 
To establish eligibility for the L-lB nonimmigrant visa classification, a qualifying organization must 
have employed the beneficiary "in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized 
knowledge," for one continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for 
admission into the United States. Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. In addition, the beneficiary must 
seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering their services to the same employer 
or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a specialized know ledge capacity. Id. The petitioner must also 
establish that the beneficiary's prior education, training, and employment qualify them to perform the 
intended services in the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(iv). 
A beneficiary is deemed to have specialized knowledge if they have: (1) a "special" knowledge of the 
petitioning organization's product and its application in international markets; or (2) an "advanced" 
level of knowledge of the processes and procedures of the petitioning organization. Section 
214(c)(2)(B) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(D). 
Special knowledge concerns knowledge of the petitioning organization's products or services and their 
application in international markets. To establish that a beneficiary has special knowledge, the petitioner 
may meet its burden through evidence that the beneficiary has knowledge that is distinct or uncommon 
in comparison to the knowledge of other similarly employed workers in the particular industry. 1 
Because "advanced knowledge" concerns knowledge of an organization's processes and procedures, 
the petitioning entity may meet its burden through evidence that the beneficiary has knowledge of or 
an expertise in the organization's processes and procedures that is greatly developed or further along 
in progress, complexity, and understanding in comparison to other workers in the employer's 
operations. Such advanced knowledge must be supported by evidence setting that knowledge apart 
from the elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others.2 
Once a petitioner articulates the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and type 
of evidence which establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized 
knowledge. We cannot make a factual determination regarding a given beneficiary's specialized 
knowledge if the petitioner does not, at a minimum, articulate with specificity the nature ofits products 
and services or processes and procedures, the nature of the specific industry or field involved, and the 
nature of the beneficiary's s knowledge. The petitioner should also describe how such knowledge is 
typically gained within the organization and explain how and when the individual beneficiary gained 
such knowledge. 
The Petitioner filed the petition in February 2023. The Petitioner described itself as "a software 
development company that specializes in Big Data Analytics," which "involves the use of computer 
systems to mine and process massive amounts of data for the purpose of identifying patterns, 
correlations, market trends, client preferences, and other information that . . . allows companies to 
make more informed and strategic business decisions." The Petitioner "develops and integrates 
software for medium and large corporations that manages, mines, processes, and analyzes those 
corporations' data." One of the Petitioner's proprietary tools, a "cloud accelerator" called! I 
helps customers to migrate large volumes of data. 
The Beneficiary began working for the Petitioner's foreign subsidiary as a senior software engineer in 
2019. The Petitioner stated: "Since March 2020, [ the Beneficiary] has been assigned to the Finance 
Analytics to Google Cloud Platform ('GCP') Project for our corporate client, 
I I
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on a project "to migrate the _______ legacy application to GCP." The 
Petitioner asserted: "The project requires specialized knowledge inl !software, which is used 
for analysis and design, data transformation, optimization, and validation. Knowledge of the 
legacy product is required for understanding of the original Oracle database that is being migrated." 
The Petitioner further stated: "Training a new resource on this I !application would be a time 
consuming and costly process. . . . Further, it would be especially difficult to find this replacement 
because this knowledge is not commonly held by software developers outside of our company." If 
granted L-lB status, the Beneficiary would continue to work on the same project for that he has 
been pursuing abroad. 
1 See generally 2 USCIS Policy Manual L.4(B)(l), https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual. 
2 See id. 
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The Director denied the petition in September 2023, citing several factors and asserting that "the job 
duties for the U.S. and foreign positions are identical" and therefore need not be discussed separately. 
On appeal, the Petitioner argues that factual errors in the denial notice indicate that the Director did 
not sufficiently consider the evidence ofrecord. We agree. 
The Petitioner observes on appeal that the foreign and U.S. job descriptions, while similar in many 
respects, are not identical. This is confomed by comparing the job descriptions for the Beneficiary's 
foreign and intended U.S. positions, beginning on pages 23 and 28 of the Petitioner's initial statement. 
The record shows more serious errors in the Director's decision. The Petitioner asserted that its 
Isoftware is not ... available for sale on the market for business or personal use." The 
Director disputed this claim, noting that the company offers a free trial version on its website. The 
Director also cited an "online video" by the director of data engineering for a commercial airline, who 
stated that the airline was usingl I and other tools provided by the Petitioner. 
If the Director intends to deny a petition based, in whole or in part, on derogatory inf01mation from 
outside the record, the Director must advise the Petitioner of that information before issuing the 
decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b )(16)(i). The Director did not provide such notice here. As the 
Petitioner observes on appeal, the Director referred to "a search ofl Isoftware" and an "online 
video," but did not provide web addresses or otherwise identity specific sources of the inf01mation 
newly cited in the denial notice. 
Also, on appeal, the Petitioner persuasively asserts that the Director misinterpreted the online 
information, and that the information does not show that the Petitioner offers I I for sale. 
Rather, the trial version serves to illustrate I Icapabilities, but if a potential customer seeks 
to fully implement the system, then it must be installed and maintained by the Petitioner's engineers. 
The cited video describes how I I was useful for the airline, but does not indicate that the 
airline purchased the software outright or that its own staff implemented it. Rather, the video indicates 
that the petitioning company used I I in its project for the airline. 
The Director acknowledged evidence that the Beneficiary undertook 475 hours of training, but 
concluded that "4 7 5 hours equates to approximately 20 days," which the Director concluded was a 
minimal amount of training. We agree with the Petitioner's observation on appeal that the Director's 
calculation assumes continuous training, 24 hours a day. Given a 40-hour work week, the training 
would have occupied at least 12 weeks, assuming the training filled each workday. 
The Director's erroneous conclusions appear to have heavily influenced the outcome of the decision. 
We will therefore withdraw that decision and remand the matter for a new decision that fully considers 
the evidence of record. If the Director discovers derogatory information outside the record, and 
intends to rely on that information in a new decision, then the Director must first notify the Petitioner 
of that information and allow the Petitioner an opportunity to respond as required by 8 C.F.R. 
§ 103.2(b)(l6)(i). 
ORDER: The Director's decision is withdrawn. The matter is remanded for the entry of a new 
decision consistent with the foregoing analysis. 
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