sustained L-1B Case: Digital Entertainment Software

MfY~daLadeletedto 
ptvcnt clearly unw-ted 
in~of~nalpri~ 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. A3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
~ File: WAC-04-182-53293 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: JUN 2 6 2006 
-- -- - 
IN RE: Petitioner: 
Benefici 
Petition: 
 101 (a)(lS)(L) of the Immigration 
." 
 and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1 101 (a)(lS)(L) 
s 15 IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry mwt be made to that office. 
/- 
Robert P. Wiemann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
WAC-04-182-53293 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The decision of the director will 
be withdrawn, and the appeal will be sustained. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to employ the beneficiary as an L-1B nonimrnigrant 
intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L). The foreign petitioner is a digital entertainment 
software company formed under the laws of the state of California and provides digital entertainment 
software. The petitioner is a subsidiary of Sega Corporation, located in Tokyo, Japan. 
The director denied the petition conduding that beneficiary's claimed specialized knowledge was not 
exclusive and significantly unique. The director reasoned that the beneficiary's duties were not so out of the 
ordinary as to require specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, &me1 for the petitioner asserts that the director 
failed to consider important evidence establishing specialized knowledge. In support of this assertion, the 
petitioner submits letters in suppoft. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(~). Specifically, a qualifying 
organization must have employed the beneficiary in a qualifjmg managerial or executive capacity, or in a 
specialized knowledge capacity, for one continuous year within the three years preceding the beneficiary's 
application for admission into the United States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United 
States temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate 
thereof in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifjmg organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of fufl time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himlher to perform the intended 
Page 3 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The primary issue to be discussed in the present matter is whether the petitioner has established that the 
beneficiary's position in the United States will involve specialized knowledge as required by the regulation at 
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii), and whether beneficiary was employed in a capacity that utilized such specialized 
knowledge as required by 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(3)(ii). 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1184(c)(2)(B), provides the following: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines specialized knowledge as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes or procedures. 
In examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's 
description of the job duties and the weight of the evidence supporting any asserted specialized knowledge. 
See 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed description of the services to be 
performed sufficient to establish specialized knowledge. Id. It is also appropriate for the AAO to then look 
beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the beneficiary's knowledge of the business's 
product or service, management operations, or decision-making process. A specific occupation will not 
inherently qualifL a beneficiary as possessing specialized knowledge. Matter of Colley, 1 8 I&N Dec. 1 1 7,120 
(Comrn. 1 98 l)(citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 61 8 (R.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. 
816 (R.C. 1971)).' 
' Although the cited precedents predate the current statutory defdtion of "specialized knowledge,"the AAO 
finds them instructive. Other than deleting the former requirement that specialized knowledge had to be 
"proprietary," the 1990 Act did not significantly alter the definition of "specialized knowledge" from the prior 
INS regulation or precedent decisions interpreting the term. The Committee Report simply states that the 
Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of "[vlarying [i.e., not specifically incorrect] 
interpretations by INS," H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I), at 69, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. Beyond that, the 
Committee Report simply restates the tautology that became section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Id. The AAO 
concludes, therefore, that the cited cases, as well as Matter of Penner, remain useful guidance concerning the 
intended scope of the "specialized knowledge" L-1B classification. 
WAC-04-182-53293 
Page 4 
A review of the record reveals that the petitioner has provided substantial probative evidence that the position 
in which the beneficiary will be employed is crucial to the coordination of accounting operations of the 
petitioner and its affiliates. Evidence in the record supports that the beneficiary is regarded as a key 
employee. The record also establishes a unique and complex operation with distinct needs and unique 
information collection procedures not commonly found in the digital entertainment or accounting industry. In 
support of these facts, the petitioner has submitted financial statements, annual reports, organizational charts 
and other corporate documentation. The petitioner has detailed the distinctions between the beneficiary and 
the petitioner's other employees, as well as the unique requirements of this position with regard to 
commensurate positions within this particular industry. 
The foreign organization's size and position within the particular industry, along with a complex and varying 
organizational structure among its subsidiaries and affiliates, demonstrate a unique and complex operation 
having distinct needs and unique requirements not commonly found in the general accounting industry. The 
record indicates that a beneficiary would rely on an advanced knowledge of the company's process and 
procedure, and would require that the position being filled have a selection process to clearly distinguish an 
employee among a pool of industry candidates. The positional tier occupied by the beneficiary, as indicated 
by the record and as articulated by the petitioner, requires experience not common among the company's 
finance department employees or what might be available in this particular industry. 
On review, counsel has demonstrated that the beneficiary possesses "specialized knowledge" as defined in 
section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. fj 1184(c)(2)(B), and the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 9 214,2(1)(l)(ii)(D), 
and counsel demonstrated that the beneficiary would be employed in a capacity utilizing any such specialized 
knowledge as required by 8 C.F.R. fj 214.2(1)(3)(ii). Therefore, the appeal will be sustained. 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has demonstrated that the beneficiary should be 
considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized knowledge. See 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F. Supp. 9, 16 (D.D.C. 1990). Based on the evidence presented, it is 
concluded that the beneficiary was employed abroad, and will be employed in the future, in a specialized 
knowledge capacity. 
In visa proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. fj 1361. Here, that burden has been met. Accordingly, the 
director's decision will be overturned and the petition will be approved. 
ORDER: The appeal is sustained.