dismissed L-1B

dismissed L-1B Case: Aeronautical Engineering

📅 Date unknown 👤 Company 📂 Aeronautical Engineering

Decision Summary

The AAO withdrew the Director's initial grounds for denial related to the qualifying relationship, the 'doing business' requirement for a new office, and the beneficiary's qualifications. However, the appeal was ultimately dismissed because the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary's position abroad, or his proposed position in the United States, involved the required specialized knowledge.

Criteria Discussed

Specialized Knowledge Qualifying Relationship Doing Business In The U.S. New Office Requirements Beneficiary'S Qualifications

Sign up free to download the original PDF

View Full Decision Text
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
MATTER OF P-A-S-USA INC. 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
DATE: OCT. 29, 2019 
APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER DECISION 
PETITION: FORM 1-129, PETITION FOR A NONIMMIGRANT WORKER 
The Petitioner, an aeronautical engineering company, seeks to temporarily employ the Beneficiary as an 
aircraft mechanic in its new office1 under the L-lB nonimmigrant classification for intracompany 
transferees. Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 101(a)(15)(L), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L). 
The L-lB classification allows a corporation or other legal entity (including its affiliate or subsidiary) to 
transfer a qualifying foreign employee with "specialized knowledge" to work temporarily in the 
United States. 
The Director of the California Service Center denied the petition on multiples grounds, concluding that 
the Petitioner did not establish that: 1) it had a qualifying relationship with the Beneficiary's foreign 
employer, 2) it was doing business in the United States as defined by the regulations, 3) the Beneficiary 
was employed in a specialized knowledge capacity abroad, 4) the Beneficiary was qualified to perform 
the intended services in the United States, and 5) the Beneficiary's proposed position in the United States 
would involve specialized knowledge. 
On appeal, the Petitioner contends that it has provided sufficient evidence to establish that the 
Petitioner and the Beneficiary's foreign employer are affiliates owned and controlled by the same 
foreign parent company . The Petitioner also asserts that since it filed a new office petition, it was not 
required to demonstrate that it was doing business as of the date the petition was filed. Lastly, the 
Petitioner states that it provided sufficient evidence to establish by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the Beneficiary's position abroad involved specialized knowledge and that he would act in a 
specialized knowledge capacity in the United States. 
Upon de nova review, we conclude that the Petitioner has submitted sufficient evidence to demonstrate 
that it has a qualifying relationship with the Beneficiary's foreign employer; as such, this basis for 
denial is withdrawn. 2 In addition, we concur with the Petitioner's reasoning on appeal that since it 
1 The term "new office " refers to an organization which has been doing business in the United States for less than one year. 
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(F). 
2 The Petitioner provided stock certificates and other corporate documentation to sufficiently establish that the Petitioner 
and the Beneficiary 's foreign employer are affiliates, both commonly owned indirectly through various companies by the 
same corporate parent company. 
Matter of P-A-S-USA Inc. 
filed a new office petition, it was not required to establish that it was doing business as defined by the 
regulations as of the date the petition was filed. 3 Therefore, this ground for denial is also withdrawn. 
Lastly, the submitted evidence demonstrates that the Beneficiary would more likely than not be 
qualified to perform his proposed duties in the United States. 4 We will also withdraw this basis for 
denying the petition. 
However, the Petitioner has not established that the Beneficiary's position abroad, or his position in 
the United States, involved specialized knowledge. For this reason, we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
To establish eligibility for the L-lB nonirnrnigrant visa classification, a qualifying organization must 
have employed the beneficiary "in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized 
knowledge," for one continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for 
admission into the United States. Section 10l(a)(l5)(L) of the Act. In addition, the beneficiary must 
seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same 
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a specialized knowledge capacity. Id. The petitioner 
must also establish that the beneficiary's prior education, training, and employment qualify him or her 
to perform the intended services in the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3). 
If a beneficiary is corning in a specialized knowledge capacity to open a new office, the petitioner must 
submit evidence that it secured sufficient physical premises to house its operation, evidence that the 
new business entity is or will be a qualifying organization, and evidence that it has the financial ability 
to remunerate the beneficiary and to commence doing business in the United States. See generally, 8 
C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(vi). 
II. BACKGROUND 
The Petitioner indicated that it and its affiliated companies are "world leader[ s] in defense and security 
innovation," including aerospace and aircraft. The Petitioner farther stated that the Beneficiary is 
employed abroad in the "mechanical design and service arm" of the company and explained that its 
"primary operations involve the mechanical upgrade and operation of various types of aircraft ... as 
well as providing turnkey air operations solutions and an aviation training academy." 
In addition, the Petitioner indicated that its group of companies "is the world's foremost 
knowledgeable company with respect to the maintenance, servicing, and reconditioning of the I I 
fighter and assault craft." It also stated that its foreign parent company purchased! Is from 
thel I air force in 2005, "including the aircraft, training aids, documentation, tools, special 
3 A petitioner filing a new office petition need only demonstrate that it will be a qualifying organization, it has the financial 
ability to remunerate the Beneficiary, and the ability to commence doing business. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(vi)(B)-(C). 
Further, a new office is defined as an organization which has been doing business in the United States for less than one 
year. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)( I )(ii)(F). As such, a new office petitioner need not demonstrate that it is doing business as of 
the date the petition is filed, only that it is more likely than not to commence doing business during its first year ofoperation. 
4 The Petitioner provided documentation indicating that the Beneficiary completed the foreign employer's two and a half 
year mechanic's training course. Therefore, it is likely that he would be qualified to perform the duties of an aircraft 
mechanic for the company. The nexus of our analysis should be whether the Beneficiary's knowledge is specialized. 
2 
Matter of P-A-S-USA Inc. 
and test equipment, spare parts, and pilot training simulators;" and that it has been training and hiring 
key employees since this time to become the "sole complete solutions provider for the I I" 
aircraft. The Petitioner explained that it has contracts in place with two U.S. defense contractors, both 
of whom had purchased fleets of non-operational! 
0 
k, to properly restore and maintain them. 
It stated that it was incorporated in the United States and would be funded to commence the restoration 
of these aircraft for these defense contractors, "so that these companies can provide much needed 
adversary air services to the~----------~·" Further, it indicated that "many of the 
specialized technicians who have made [the Beneficiary's foreign employer] so successful, including 
the Beneficijryl will be transferred to [the Petitioner] to undertake the restoration of the [defense 
contractors'] s." 
The Petitioner explained that the Beneficiary had just completed a two and half year apprenticeship 
with the foreign employer during which he was "trained in servicing of the I O ts I I 
engine ... at the [foreign employer's] Training Academy" and indicated that he had completed "well 
over 6000 hours over three years in hands-on training and servicing of thel O I." It stated that 
the Beneficiary began this training in January 2016 and been certified to maintain the0 aircraft in 
June 2018. 5 The Petitioner noted that the Beneficiary's knowledge related to theOaircraft is "special, 
unusual, uncommon, rare and extremely advanced compared to mechanics, artisans and technicians 
employed in the industry" and that "U.S. aircraft mechanics would not begin to know how to restore 
them to active duty." 
The Petitioner further stated that trainin~ on the I I aircraft was only previously attained 
through military service with the I ~ I Air Force, or through the company 
that formerly manufactured these planes which no longer provides support and maintenance on them. 
The Petitioner indicated that knowledge on the restoration and maintenance of thP-1 0 I could 
only be attained through its group of companies. It stated that this left an "enormous gap" between its 
mechanics and those in the industry that could only be closed by spending at least three years of 
training on thel O l The Petitioner also explained that the Beneficiary would continue to work 
as a "Junior Artisan 6" while performing services for its two defense contractor customers in the United 
States, further noting that he had "only recently completed his apprenticeship." 
The Petitioner stated in the Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker, that the Beneficiary 
would be paid $16,000 per year in his proposed position in the United States. In a request for evidence 
(RFE), the Director made light of this salary and how it appeared very low compared to typical aircraft 
mechanics working in the United States. In response, the Petitioner stated that while the Beneficiary's 
level of specialized knowledge was high, his tenure was relatively short. However, it noted that the 
Beneficiary would also receive a per diem of $100 while employed in the United States which "over 
the course of one year. .. would bring his base compensation to $52,000." 
In addition, the Petitioner explained that the Beneficiary's knowledge was "distinct and uncommon as 
compared to others similarly employed throughout the aircraft maintenance industry." It also 
submitted a letter from one of its customers explaining the unique nature of the Beneficiary's 
knowledge as follows: 
5 The petition was filed on December 12, 2018. 
6 
3 
Matter of P-A-S-USA Inc. 
The Dare materially different from commercial planes and Dmilitary planes in 
terms of their ejection seats, hydraulic systems, engine systems, test kits, tooling and 
avionics. These planes have technology that is and would remain obsolete if [the 
foreign employer] had not created and perfected the means of modifying and updating 
these systems. These systems are not digital; the mechanic cannot plug them into a 
computer, read some codes and follow the repair instructions. These planes have 
analog systems. Diagnosing and repairing them is an art that is perfected through many 
years of hands-on experience - experience that only [ foreign employer] artisans like 
the Beneficiary possess in the modem aviation industry. 
Lastly, the Petitioner provided a breakdown of the training the Beneficiary received on the D 
indicating that he received "hands-on training" in the restoration and maintenance of Os amounting 
to 2000 hours in 2016, 2200 hours in 2017, and 2300 hours in 2018. 
III. SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE 
The primary issue in this matter is whether the Petitioner has established that the Beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge and whether he has been employed abroad and will be employed in the United 
States in a specialized knowledge capacity. 
As a threshold issue, we must determine whether the Petitioner established that the Beneficiary 
possesses specialized knowledge. If the evidence is insufficient to establish that the Beneficiary 
possesses specialized knowledge, then we cannot conclude that his past and intended future 
employment involve specialized knowledge. 7 
A beneficiary is deemed to have specialized knowledge ifhe or she has: (1) a "special" knowledge of 
the company product and its application in international markets; or (2) an "advanced" level of 
knowledge of the processes and procedures of the company. Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. A 
petitioner may establish eligibility by submitting evidence that the beneficiary and the proffered 
position satisfy either prong of the statutory definition. 
As both "special" and "advanced" are relative terms, determining whether a given beneficiary's 
knowledge is "special" or "advanced" inherently requires a comparison of the beneficiary's 
knowledge against that of others. With respect to either special or advanced knowledge, the petitioner 
ordinarily must demonstrate that the beneficiary's knowledge is not commonly held throughout the 
particular industry and cannot be easily imparted from one person to another. The ultimate question 
is whether the petitioner has met its burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the beneficiary's knowledge or expertise is special or advanced, and that the beneficiary's position 
requires such knowledge. 
The Petitioner only claims that the Beneficiary has "special" knowledge and does not specifically 
assert that he has knowledge that is "advanced." As such, we will only address whether the Petitioner 
has established that the Beneficiary's knowledge is special. Determining whether a beneficiary has 
7 The Petitioner does not claim that the Beneficiary was employed abroad in an executive or managerial capacity. 
4 
Matter of P-A-S-USA Inc. 
"special knowledge" requires review of a given beneficiary's knowledge of how the petitioning 
organization manufactures, produces, or develops its products, services, research, equipment, 
techniques, management, or other interests. Because "special knowledge" concerns knowledge of the 
petitioning organization's products or services and its application in international markets, a petitioner 
may meet its burden through evidence that the beneficiary has knowledge that is distinct or uncommon 
in comparison to the knowledge of other similarly employed workers in the particular industry. 
Knowledge that is commonly held throughout a petitioner's industry or that can be easily imparted 
from one person to another is not considered special knowledge. 
As discussed, the Petitioner contends that the Beneficiary's knowledge of restoring and maintaining 
thel I aircraft is uncommon as this knowledge is held exclusively by the company. Upon 
review, we acknowledge that the Petitioner has provided credible evidence showing that it, and the 
foreign employer, hold distinct or uncommon knowledge of the I I aircraft. However, the 
question we must resolve is whether the Beneficiary himself holds this level of uncommon knowledge 
in the I I aircraft. 
We conclude that the evidence does not demonstrate that the Beneficiary more likely than not holds 
distinct or uncommon knowledge in the I I aircraft when compared to typical aircraft 
mechanics in the industry. As noted, the Petitioner submitted evidence reflecting that the Beneficiary 
had very recently completed the foreign employer's aircraft mechanic training in June 2018 and that 
he had only a short time ago began work as a junior artisan abroad. Further, it indicated that the 
Beneficiary would continue to work in this junior level position in the United States. As a preliminary 
matter, the Beneficiary's junior status and lack of experience raises question as to whether his 
knowledge could be deemed distinct and uncommon in the industry, or in turn, even within his own 
compan:. Although we recognize that the Petitioner as a whole likely has uncommon knowledge in 
thd I aircraft and its restoration and maintenance, the Beneficiary's lack of experience leaves 
question as to whether or not his junior level knowledge could not be easily imparted to other more 
experienced, or typical, aircraft mechanics in the industry; including those working for the Petitioner; 
group of companies. 
The Petitioner submitted training documentation which only heightened the uncertainty as to whether 
the Beneficiary's knowledge of thel I aircraft is distinct and uncommon in the industry. The 
Petitioner asserts that the Beneficiary completed "hands-on training" in the restoration and 
maintenance otQs amounting to over 6000 hours from 2016 through 2018. Ifwe assume reasonably 
that the Beneficiary worked foll-time during these three years, or for a total of 156 weeks 8, this 
indicates that the Petitioner claimed he received approximately a little more than 38 hours per week 
of training on the I I In other words, this would appear to amount to nearly folltime training 
on this aircraft for three years. 
However, the supporting training documentation submitted by the Petitioner does not support that the 
Beneficiary completed this folltime three year training in the I I aircraft. For instance, a 
portion of the Beneficiary's "Experiential Training Logbook" reflected that the Beneficiary completed 
a total of 1400 "basic training hours" on what appear to elementary aircraft maintenance and operation 
concepts such as "power tools" ( 60 hours), "hand tools" ( 56 hours), "mechanics of flight" ( 50 hours), 
8 We estimate that there are approximately 52 weeks in one year. Over three years, this would amount to 156 weeks. 
5 
Matter of P-A-S-USA Inc. 
"control rigging" (52 hours), "introduction to reciprocating and gas turbine engines" (84 hours), 
amongst others introductory concepts. Likewise, another part of the Beneficiary's training log titled 
"summary of work training experience" also reflected a total of over 2835 hours of training in 
seemingly basic aircraft repair and maintenance topics, including "airframe inspection" (378.5 hours), 
"flight control systems" (381 hours), "landing gear" (368.5 hours), "fuel systems" (259.5), "helicopter 
servicing and maintenance" (23 hours), among others such topics. Therefore, in total, the 
Beneficiary's training log reflects that he completed a total of 4235 hours of training on basic aircraft 
operation and maintenance concepts during his approximately three years of training, leaving 
significant question as to the Petitioner's assertion that he spent 6000 hours of training exclusively on 
the I I aircraft. 
In fact, other portions of his training log further indicate that the Beneficiary s ent time workin on 
several other types of aircraft, including worksheets reflecting hisrw_o_rk_o_n_t_h_e~,_ ______ ____J 
f
a total of approximately 52 hours), the I I ( 4 hours), '.__~ ___ _. ( 4 hours)," and the 
t (1 hour). Meanwhile, these same worksheets reflected that the Beneficiary devoted 
approximately 45 hours of similar training on thel I or less time than he spent on the other 
plane models combined. Further, in su ort of the etition, the Petitioner stated that the Beneficiary 
also "worked and qualified on the as well as .__ ______ __. light jet 
aircraft that the company operates as a part of its .__ ____ __, operations," but later indicated in 
response to the request for evidence (RFE) that nearly all of his training and experience in his 
approximately three years with the company had been on the I I In sum, the 
Petitioner's training logs and assertions do not support its claim that the Beneficiary completed three 
years of full time training in the I I aircraft. Indeed, the weight of the evidence suggests that 
he received basic training to become an aircraft mechanic and that he worked on a variety of planes 
during this process. The Petitioner must resolve this inconsistencies and discrepancies in the record 
with independent, objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 
591-92 (BIA 1988). 
Further, the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires us to make comparisons in order to 
determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The term "specialized knowledge" is not an 
absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed in 1756, Inc. v. Atty Gen., 745 F. Supp. 
9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990), "[s]imply put, specialized knowledge is a relative ... idea which cannot have a 
plain meaning." The Congressional record states that the L-1 category was intended for "key 
personnel." See H.R. Rep. No. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key personnel" denotes 
a position that is "of crucial importance." Webster's II New Coll. Dictionary 605 (Houghton Mifflin 
Co. 2001). In general, all employees can reasonably be considered "important" to a petitioner's 
enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic success of an enterprise, there 
would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. An employee of "crucial importance" 
or "key personnel" must rise above the level of a petitioner's average employee. Accordingly, based 
on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record related to that term, we 
must make comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge employee and the 
general labor market, but also between that employee and the remainder of the Petitioner's workforce. 
However, the Petitioner submits no specific comparisons of the Beneficiary's training and experience 
as compared to his colleagues working for the company. For instance, the Petitioner's and foreign 
employer's organizational charts reflect that there are over 30 mechanics within the department the 
6 
Matter of P-A-S-USA Inc. 
Beneficiary worked in abroad and the one he would operate in the United States, but the Petitioner 
submits no information on these colleagues nor does it compare them to the Beneficiary as necessary 
to demonstrate that he rises above the level of an average employee. In fact, the Petitioner submits 
evidence reflecting that the Beneficiary had only relatively recently completed his aircraft mechanic 
training with the company and that he works as a junior artisan, suggesting that he is something less 
than the company's average employee, considering the number of mechanics it employs. Given that 
the Petitioner has submitted credible evidence to indicate that it is a world leader in servicing theD 
aircraft and that is has been in this market position for years, it is reasonable to assume that many of 
these other mechanics working for the company hold high levels of knowledge and experience in the 
aircraft. Therefore, without specific comparisons of the Beneficiary against his colleagues, we cannot 
conclude that his knowledge is special. As the Petitioner states that anyone with knowledge of the0 
aircraft possesses "special knowledge," we must conclude that, while it may be correct to say that the 
Beneficiary is a skilled employee, these skills do not constitute specialized knowledge as defined at 8 
C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(D) and§ 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. 
Therefore, the evidence does not support that the Beneficiary holds special knowledge as asserted; 
namely, that his knowledge is distinct or uncommon in comparison to that held by similarly employed 
workers in the particular industry. The supporting documentation suggests that the Beneficiary largely 
completed basic or introductory training on performing maintenance on aircraft, with only a small 
amount of this time specifically devoted to the I I aircraft. As such, the evidence indicates 
that the Beneficiary's knowledge of working on this aircraft could likely be easily imparted to another 
typical, or experienced, aircraft mechanic in the industry, particularly given his junior status within 
the company and the industry. 
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the Petitioner has not established that the Beneficiary's 
knowledge is specialized. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The appeal will be dismissed for the above stated reasons. In visa petition proceedings, it is the 
petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 
8 U.S.C. § 1361. The Petitioner has not met that burden. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
Cite as Matter of P-A-S-USA Inc., ID# 6196285 (AAO Oct. 29, 2019) 
7 
Using this case in a petition? Let MeritDraft draft the argument →

Avoid the mistakes that led to this denial

MeritDraft learns from dismissed cases so your petition avoids the same pitfalls. Get arguments built on winning precedents.

Avoid This in My Petition →

No credit card required. Generate your first petition draft in minutes.