dismissed L-1B Case: Culinary

identifying data &let& to 
prevent clearly unwanantd 
invasion of pe~nal privacj 
PUBLIC COPY 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
OBce of Administration Appeals, MS 2090 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
FILE: EAC 07 0 13 52342 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date: AUG 2 3 2010 
PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1 101(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents 
related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that 
any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional 
information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The 
specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5. All motions must be 
submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, 
with a fee of $585. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5(a)(l)(i) requires that any motion must be filed 
within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen. 
Thank you, 
0 
hief, Administrative Appeals Office 
EAC 07 013 52342 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, initially approved the petition for a nonimmigrant 
visa. After a U.S. Department of State consular officer interviewed the beneficiary in Sao Paulo, Brazil, the 
officer refused visa issuance, returned the petition to the director, and recommended that the director 
commence revocation proceedings. Upon further review, the director determined that the petitioner was not 
eligible for the benefit sought. Accordingly, the director served the petitioner with notice of his intent to 
revoke the approval and subsequently, after reviewing the petitioner's rebuttal evidence, ordered that the 
approval be revoked. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The 
AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant visa petition seeking to extend the beneficiary's employment as an L-1B 
intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to section lOl(a)(l5)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act ("the Act"), 8 U.S.C. tj 1 10l(a)(l5Xi). The petitioner is engaged in the development and 
operation of Brazilian chuwasco-style restaurants. It states that it is the parent company of the beneficiary's 
foreign employer Fogo's Churrascaria Ltda, located in Brazil. The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary in 
the position of chunasqueiro, or gaucho chef, for a period of three years. 
The director approved the nonimmigrant petition on October 30, 2006. The U.S. Department of State refused 
to issue the visa to the beneficiary on or about March 30, 2007 and returned the petition to the director for 
review. After properly issuing a notice of intent to revoke, and after reviewing the petitioner's rebuttal to that 
notice, the director revoked the approval on March 13,2008, finding that the approval of the original petition 
involved gross error in that the evidence of record did not establish that the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge or that he would be employed in a position requiring specialized knowledge. Among other 
conclusions, the director found that, despite the petitioner's claim that it requires its chefs to complete two 
years of training, the beneficiary's resume shows that he began working as a churrasqueiro immediately upon 
commencing employment with the foreign entity, thus suggesting that the duties and skills required are 
actually typical in the petitioner's industry. 
On appeal, counsel submits a brief and asserts that the director's decision was arbitrary, capricious, and not in 
accordance with the law, the regulations, and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) policy. 
Counsel further asserts that the director applied an improper standard with regard to revoking the petition 
based on a finding of gross error. 
I. The Law 
To establish L-l eligibility, the petitioner must meet the criteria outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 5 1 10 l(a)(15)(L). Specifically, within three years 
preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, a qualifying organization must 
have employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized 
knowledge capacity, for one continuous year. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States 
temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof 
in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
EAC 07 0 13 52342 
Page 3 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(3) firther states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (I)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment aborad was in apposition that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training and employment qualifies himlher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
As previously stated, the petitioner seeks to classify the beneficiary as a nonimmigrant transferee with 
specialized knowledge. 
Section 2 14(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 184(c)(2)(B), provides the following: 
For purposes of section 101 (a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity involving 
specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special knowledge of the 
company product and its application in international markets or has an advanced level of 
knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, service, 
research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has previously affirmed the USCIS decision to deny L-IB petitions filed 
on behalf of churrasqueiros based on the petitioner's failure to submit evidence regarding individual 
beneficiaries' skills and abilities, and inability to establish that Brazilian cooking is sufficiently specialized to 
merit L-1B status. Boi Na Braza Atlanta, LLC v. Upchurch, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 2372846 
(N.D.Tex., 2005), afd 194 Fed.Appx. 248 (5th Cir. 2006). 
Similar to the facts of this case, the Boi Na Braza petitioner had claimed that its churrasqueiros possessed 
skills and abilities unavailable elsewhere, and contended that its churrascarias specialize in an exclusive, 
EAC 07 013 52342 
Page 4 
flamboyant method of preparing and serving meat. In denying the petition, USCIS had found that the 
petitioner failed to distinguish its cooking and serving techniques fiom those used by other similar Brazilian 
restaurants, and failed to adequately describe and document the beneficiaries' skills, abilities and company- 
specific training such that it could be determined that any of the beneficiaries has knowledge of any aspect of 
Brazilian cooking that is sufficiently unusual in the Brazilian culinary industry. The court rejected the 
plaintiffs argument that the decisions to deny the 20 petitions were improper simply because the same USCIS 
service center had previously and recently granted extensions to certain other beneficiaries performing in the 
same employment capacity. 2005 WL 2372846 at *9. 
11. Procedural History 
The primary issues raised on appeal are first, whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary will 
be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity; and second, the related issue of whether the director 
properly revoked the approval after approving the petition in gross error. However, before the AAO may 
examine these issues, it is necessary to review the complex history of this petition and the circumstances that 
led to the petition's revocation. 
A. The Initial Petition 
The petitioner filed the nonimmigrant petition on October 19, 2006. In an asdavit dated October 10, 2006, 
the petitioner explained that it seeks to employ the beneficiary temporarily in the United States as a 
churrasqueiro, which is generally translated into English as a barbeque chef. Simultaneously, the 
beneficiary's proposed position requires him to act in a theatrical manner as a "gaucho," or cowboy, which 
also, according to evidence submitted, refers to "a simple and hospitable man." The petitioner's restaurant 
endeavors to provide its customers with an authentic taste of Southern Brazil and its culture, requiring its 
gaucho chefs to not only cook meats to order but also be well-versed in cultural facts and storytelling. 
The petitioner described the churrasqueiro position as one involving "specialized knowledge, in that "it is the 
key position in our organization; it requires an advanced knowledge of the [the petitioner's] processes and 
procedures that underlie its business model; and it would be difficult to impart this knowledge without 
significant economic inconvenience or disruption to the U.S. company." 
The petitioner's affidavit included a list of twenty processes and procedures implemented by its international 
organization to ensure "consistent execution of its business model." These procedures include forecasting 
business flow within the restaurant; identifLing top quality meat; implementing cold storage and sanitary 
handling procedures; assessing meat quality for use in preparing churrasco; estimating quantities of each type 
of meat needed at the start of the shift; pre-cutting and skewering meats using the petitioner's standards; 
preparing marinades and seasoning for meats; safely operating an open flame grill; controlling grill 
temperature; ensuring the safety of guests; keeping pace with customer's needs and requests; communicating 
with co-workers to ensure optimal customer service; and "reading" the dining room and adding meats and 
adjusting the grill temperature accordingly. 
EAC 07 013 52342 
Page 5 
The list of "processes and procedures" also included several that are ancillary to preparing, cooking and 
serving meats, which included the following: 
Balance and integrate culinary and performance aspects with tableside carving service to 
each of 300+ customers daily; 
Act the role of Brazilian gaucho of the 1 9th century; 
Interact with Brazilian gaucho persona; 
Communicate to customers the history, hospitality, traditions, values, cultural attributes 
and the lifestyle of gauchos in southern Brazil. 
The petitioner noted that it has been transferring churrasqueiros from Brazil in the course of developing six 
restaurants in the United States since 1997, and emphasized that its claim that these employees qualifL as 
possessing specialized knowledge has never been "solely because of their culinary skills and knowledge." 
The petitioner stated that the churrasqueiros, in addition to having "high level cooking skills," must perform 
both guest service and entertainment duties, and that the combination of all three aspects of the position is 
what constitutes the claimed specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner also briefly addressed the beneficiary's prior employment abroad stating that he "has acquired 
an advanced knowledge of the processes, procedures and techniques . . . for consistently executing [the 
petitioner's] business model." The petitioner stated that the beneficiary has been continuously employed by 
the foreign entity since November 2003, and was selected for transfer to the United States because "he 
possessed advanced knowledge of the company's system for producing an authentic experience of the gaucho 
culture of southern Brazil." The petitioner stated that knowledge of its processes and procedures is 
unavailable in the United States, can only be gained with the foreign entity, and cannot easily be transferred to 
a U.S. worker. 
The petitioner submitted a copy of the beneficiary's resume, which indicates that he has been employed by the 
foreign entity in the position of churrasqueiro since joining the company in November 2003. Immediately 
prior to joining the foreign entity, the beneficiary served as a churrasqueiro for an unrelated Brazilian 
restaurant from August 2001 until January 2003. The beneficiary also lists two additional years of experience 
as apassador (gaucho assistant) and waiter in Brazilian churrasco-style restaurants between 1998 and 2001. 
In support of its contention that the proposed position in the United States involves specialized knowledge, 
counsel submitted three opinion letters. The first opinion was prepared by - President of 
Concept Management, Inc. In a letter dated March 4,2004, states that he is qualified to assess 
the nature of the proposed position based on his experience managing and consulting in the restaurant 
industry for over thirty years. He indicates that he was engaged to "provide a third party review and analysis 
of [the petitioner's] Business/Concept Model and employment as they pertain to the company's competitive 
advantage/differential in the marketplace." 
The business model is dependent on achieving a unique, high quality, top of market Southern 
EAC 07 013 52342 
Page 6 
petitioner] must maintain strict adherence to the Southern Brazilian Churrascaria traditions 
and culture or its business model differentiation will be lost. 
Simply put, [the petitioner's restaurant] must be in all ways authentic; not an imitation or 
Americanized version of the originallreal thing. There is a theater-like, entertainment 
component of the concept that [the petitioner's] guests have come to expect as a part of their 
dining experience. At the $70.00 per person check average . . . [the petitioner's] guests expect 
to be engaged by authentic "gauchos." This Portuguese term, sometimes translated as 
"cowboy," stands for the true Southern Brazilian culture, traditions and values that [the 
petitioner] incorporates into its business concept/model. As discussed in [the petitioner's] 
training materials, the gaucho ethic is summarized by the phrase, "a simple and hospitable 
man." 
are the primary driver of [the petitioner's] Business/Concept Model. The 
entire business- from the customer's standpoint as well as from the managers' and the 
owners' - is organized around these key personnel. They are unique in the industry in that 
they perform a combination of professionally trained skill level roles each day, both "back of 
the houselkitchen" and "front of house/customer service." [The petitioner's] "churrasqueiros" 
possess uncommon knowledge and skills that clearly distinguish them from others in the 
industry. 
emphasized that the selection process for churrasqueiros and future management "begins in 
Southern Brazil," and stated that selection criteria favors candidates who possess related spit fire roasting - 
experience. " noted that many candidates acquire such knowledge during boyhood as part of 
as well as "personal cultural/behavior characteristics that symbolize and 
convey the authentic lifestyle." He stated that the initial period of the foreign entity's training process is "at 
least two years to be certified or promoted to the position," and that the foreign entity invests between 
$40,000 and $45,000 in the training and development of chuwasqueiros who are certified and eligible for a 
position in the United States. 
In addition, stated: 
There is an observable difference between the performance of [the petitioner's] 
"churrasqueiros" and those of its competitors. [The petitioner's] competitors do not re-create 
the same traditional, authentic experience of Southern Brazil, but instead offer an 
Americanized version of the real thing. By not investing in specialized training and 
EAC 07 013 52342 
Page 7 
retraining of churrasqueiros to the same extent, competitors do not deliver the true authentic 
experience. 
1 
The second opinion was a declaration prepared by-founder of the First Center 
for Traditions of. In a statement dated August 26, 2004, he comments on the proposed 
position and its cultural relevance, as set forth in the excerpts below. 
traditional barbeque of - 
nd forms, using the method of Grill over 
o Sul since the 19Ih Century in pastoral 
* 
d the very success of [the petitioner] is directed to the 
meats to the guests in the best traditional way of Rio 
Grande do Sul. They are trained to wear the traditional clothing of the State; talk to the guests 
about songs and poetry; talk to them, answering the most varied questions. In general, the 
barbeque chefs explain questions not only regarding to [sic] the meats served; the method for 
cutting, seasoning and grilling, further providing an historical overview of their clothing, boots, 
and equipment, of our customs and of the location from where they came and now represent. 
It is pleasant to see that [the petitioner] has expanded the culture of o Sul throughout 
the globe, and its employees will certainly show the North American people the traditions, 
customs, gastronomy, and values of Rio Grande do Sul. 
Finally, the petitioner submitted a letter dated January 10, 2004 fro-ssociate Professor 
of Hospitality Management at the University of North  exa as. states that the petitioner's current 
organizational structure allows for the "consistent and uniform creation of the complete churrascaria 
experience at each one of their units every time, all the time." 
stated that his review and analysis of the petitioner's operations was based, in part, on 
unannounced observation and assessment of four competitor churrascaria restaurants in the United States. He 
also indicated that he met with and interviewed the petitioner's executive officer, restaurant level management, 
churrasqueiros and other restaurant employees; analyzed the petitioner's employee selection, training and 
development documents; observed operations at two of the petitioner's restaurants, and relied on his "historical 
experience and observations as a restaurant industry expert and consultant." 
stated that, as part of his evaluation, he dined at the petitioner's Dallas, Texas restaurant, dined at 
a competing restaurant in the area, reviewed the petitioner's training materials and videos, read newspaper and 
magazine reviews of the petitioner's U.S. and Brazilian restaurants, researched the culture, cuisine and 
lifestyle of the Pampas Region of Brazil, and conducted interviews with the petitioner's managers, wait staff, 
and gauchos. 
EAC 07 013 52342 
Page 8 
[The petitioner] is successful in the highly competitive upscale-restaurant marketplace 
because it has an identifiable system that enables it to consistently to deliver an authentic, 
genuine, experience of the lifestyle and cuisine of the cowboys of the Brazilian Pampas to an 
extremely sophisticated and knowledgeable clientele. The Gaucho is at the core of this 
concept. [The petitioner] is able to consistently deliver this experience because it utilizes 
carefully selected Brazilian Gauchos, who are then painstakingly trained to combine culinary 
and service and dramaturgy skills carefully aligned with [the petitioner's] corporate 
philosophy. Such unusual expertise is NOT imparted by any college, university or culinary 
academy in the USA, nor is it generally known in the industry. It clearly distinguishes [the 
petitioner]. 
(Emphasis in original.) concludes by stating that "it is clear that the Gauchos of [the petitioner] 
possess distinctive knowledge of the company's system and methods for consistently creating an authentic 
experience of Brazilian culture and cuisine." 
Additionally, counsel submitted a letter dated October 18, 2006 in support of the petition. In addition to 
restating much of the information outlined in the opinions quoted above, counsel referred to three internal 
agency memoranda which discuss the term "specialized knowledge." -, 
Executive Asso 
Memorandum"); 
(Dec. 20, 2002) 
Operations, USCIS, Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge for Chefs and Specialty Cooks Seeking L-IB 
Status, (September 9,2004) ("2004 Ohata Memorandum"). 
Counsel asserted that according to these memoranda, "the foreign employee must have advanced knowledge 
of the process or product of the petitioning company that 'would be difficult to impart to another (U.S.) 
individual without significant economic inconvenience to the U.S. or foreign firm."' Counsel stated that the 
petitioner was submitting "significant evidence to satis3 this standard." Counsel emphasized that the 
churrasqueiros are the "main attraction" of the petitioner's restaurants and provide the petitioner with the 
ability to differentiate itself in the marketplace by providing an "authentic gaucho experience." Counsel 
further stated that the petitioner met the requirements outlined in the 2004 Ohata Memorandum in that the 
gaucho chef plays a "key role" in the uninterrupted operation of the petitioners business and its ability to 
"replicate is success in the United States." 
In addition, counsel asserted that the petitioner established that the position involves specialized knowledge as 
defined at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). Briefly, counsel asserted that the knowledge possessed by a 
churrasqueiro is specialized because the petitioner recruits individuals with knowledge of the gaucho lifestyle 
of southern Brazil, and completes this knowledge "by imparting to the individual the company's unique 
techniques, and their application in international markets . . . during its two-year training program." Counsel 
further stated that the position of churrasqueiro is one that involves "advanced knowledge of [the petitioner's] 
processes and procedures for consistently producing a genuine experience of southern Brazilian gaucho 
culture, cuisine and customs." Counsel stated that the claimed specialized knowledge "is uncommon," 
EAC 07 013 52342 
Page 9 
"exceedingly rare within the restaurant industry," and not generally known by specialty chefs in Brazil or in 
the United States. 
Finally, counsel again referred to the 2004 Ohata Memorandum as being particularly relevant to the 
petitioner's claims. Counsel acknowledged that the memorandum provides that a foreign specialty chef, in 
general, will not qualify for L-1B classification, but noted that the memorandum also provides that specialty 
chefs who perform duties "ancillary to cooking" such as singing or entertaining, may qualify. Counsel notes 
that the memorandum requires adjudicators to "assess the length and complexity of in-house training required 
to perform such duties." Counsel emphasized that the churrasqueiro's "ancillary" duties include serving 
guests continuously, on demand, from the "espeto," a sword-like skewer, playing the role of a 19' century 
gaucho, and entertaining guests with information and explanation regarding the gaucho culture. Counsel 
asserted that the petitioner's training program was developed by a degreed training specialist, requires two 
years to complete, and is, according to Mr. Hornbeck, "rigorous and intensive." 
In addition to the letter of support from counsel, the petitioner submitted a copy of its "Training and 
Development Program for ChurrasqueiroIChef." The training program is divided into "general," "specialist," 
"cultural" and "language" modules. The two "specialist modules" provide training in: (1) operation of the 
churrasqueira, encompassing meat inspection, storage, hygiene and handling techniques, preparation, 
planning and organization; and (2) the petitioner's customer service standards, encompassing posture when 
carrying the roasting spit, verbal communication and body language in the dining room, knowledge about 
meat, appropriate techniques for serving meat, and "customer service rules." The "cultural" modules include 
"gaucho culture" and "general culture and current events." 
The petitioner also submitted copies of its training materials regarding "Gaucho Culture." The document is 
comprised of information regarding the State of Rio Grande de Sol (including a brief history and demographic 
information), descriptions of typical garb of a gaucho, typical implements, "gaucho cuisine," and "typical 
dances." The training materials also contain a list of 18 questions and answers regarding gaucho culture "to 
enable each employee to answer questions from our clients in the best way possible." The information is 
presented in summary form. 
Upon review of the initial evidence, the director approved the nonimmigrant petition on October 30, 2006, 
for a three-year period commencing on November 1,2006. 
B. Notice of Intent to Revoke 
Subsequent to the approval of the petition, the beneficiary submitted an application for an L-1 visa to the U.S. 
Consulate in Sao Paolo, Brazil. After interviewing the beneficiary, a U.S. Department of State consular 
officer in Sao Paulo, Brazil returned the petition to the director, with a memorandum recommending that the 
director review the petition for possible revocation. 
According to the consular officer's memorandum dated June 21, 2007, a copy of which was provided to the 
petitioner, the beneficiary indicated to the officer during his interview that his job was that his skills are 
knowing how to select and season meats and how to work with a lot of energy. He indicated that he learned 
the trade at home in the south of Brazil. Based on this information, the oficer concluded that the beneficiary 
EAC 07 01 3 52342 
Page 10 
did not appear to possess specialized knowledge, an essential element that must be established to warrant 
approval of the L-1 B nonimmigrant petition. Accordingly, the consular officer refused visa issuance. 
The director conducted a review of the file, and issued a notice of intent to revoke the approval of the petition 
on October 25, 2007. In the notice of intent to revoke, the director noted that the beneficiary's claimed 
specialized knowledge, obtained during his employment with the foreign entity, was more akin to the 
knowledge and training obtained by all chefs and wait staff in the restaurant industry. The director noted that 
the training program appears to rely heavily on the practical application of standard restaurant practices for 
safety, food management and preparation, customer service and presentation skills. Specifically, the director 
noted that although the petitioner and foreign entity offer culturally specific cuisine and service based on a 
theme, this factor alone did not constitute uncommon service and thus impart specialized knowledge to the 
beneficiary. The director found insufficient evidence to establish that the beneficiary's knowledge of the 
petitioner's products is "special" or that his knowledge is advanced compared to other churrasqueiros 
employed by the petitioner and foreign entity. 
Consequently, the director requested additional evidence to show how the beneficiary's knowledge is 
uncommon, noteworthy, or distinguished by some usual quality. The director instructed the petitioner to 
elaborate upon the training required to perform the duties of the position and provide documentation to 
corroborate that the training is above and beyond what a chef or waiter would receive at any restaurant. The 
director also requested: a complete course syllabus for the training program; information regarding the 
amount of time required to achieve master of each element; the specific teach materials, manuals, books, slide 
shows, files, equipment, etc., used during the program; and an explanation as to how long an employee is 
given to learn the information. 
The director also instructed the petitioner to explain how the knowledge documented in the syllabus requires 
24 months to complete, to identify which components are taught in a classroom, and what components are 
taught on-the-job, and to indicate at what point during the 24-month training period a worker begins to 
perform the duties associated with the position. The director requested documentary evidence to establish that 
the foreign entity's processes and methodologies are different from those used by other comparable 
restaurants, and to highlight specific processes that are not widely used by or available to workers outside the 
petitioner's international organization. 
Finally, the director requested evidence that would assist in comparing the beneficiary's credentials with those 
of similarly employed workers within the petitioner's organization. In this regard, the director instructed the 
petitioner to describe a typical work week for the beneficiary, highlight specific job duties that require 
specialized knowledge, and explain how the beneficiary's duties are different from those performed by other 
gaucho chefs within the organization. The petitioner was also instructed to specify the number of workers 
similarly employed by the organization at the foreign entity and at the United States locations, and to indicate 
how many employees have received training comparable to the training provided to the beneficiary. 
C. Petitioner's Response to Notice of Intent to Revoke 
The petitioner, through counsel, submitted a rebuttal to the proposed grounds for revocation on November 16, 
2007. In the response, counsel's primary contention was that the director's basis for issuing the notice of 
EAC 07 013 52342 
Page 11 
intent to revoke, was legally insufficient and improper. Specifically, counsel argued that the U.S. Consular 
Officer had no proper basis to return the petition to USCIS, and that the director failed to show how the 
approval of the petition constituted "gross error" pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(2)(1)(9)(iii). These arguments 
will be addressed further below. 
Regarding the specific inquiries of the director regarding the beneficiary's specialized knowledge, counsel 
argued that USCIS cannot require the petitioner to comply with criteria that do not comprise the "current 
specialized knowledge standard." In this regard, counsel asserted that the director inappropriately looked 
beyond the regulatory definition of "specialized knowledge" to the dictionary definition of the word "special." 
Counsel stated that "the Service must instead focus on explanations of the definition of specialized knowledge 
in the 1994 Puleo Memorandum and the September 2004 Ohata Memorandum that clarify the specialized 
knowledge definition." Counsel asserted that while the instant petition relied on the tests set forth in these 
memoranda, the director failed to mention the memoranda in the notice of intent to revoke. 
Counsel further argued that the notice of intent to revoke contained a reference to specialized knowledge 
employees as "key personnel," thus suggesting that the director had framed his review of the instant petition 
according to Congress's original intent in creating the L-1 visa category. Counsel emphasized that such an 
analysis would have been appropriate prior to the Immigration Act of 1990, which "sought to broaden the 
usefulness of the L-1 classification for international companies, and defined specialized knowledge." Counsel 
noted that the statutory definition, regulations and interpretive memoranda released since 1990 contain no 
references to "key personnel" or any similar requirements based on such a standard. Counsel stated that 
churrasqueiros are in fact key personnel within the petitioner' business, but that USCIS cannot require the 
petitioner to submit evidence that the beneficiary "is among the few 'key personnel' within the company." 
Counsel further objected to the director's request for evidence as to how the beneficiary's duties differ from 
those of other churrasqueiros, noting that there is no requirement that the beneficiary's specialized knowledge 
be narrowly held within the company. Citing to the Puleo Memorandum, counsel stated that the petitioner 
only needs to establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is advanced. 
In response to the director's request that the petitioner submit evidence to demonstrate that the beneficiary's 
knowledge is uncommon, noteworthy and not generally known by practitioners in his field, counsel stated 
that the director appeared to have "simply ignored the detailed robative evidence on these issues in the form 
of the extensive studies of and d." Counsel resubmitted copies of = 
opinion letters and provided a summary of each. Counsel argued that the notice 
ven acknowledge the opinion evidence submitted, much less consider the weight 
to be given to the evidence in terms of the writers' expertise, the industry's acceptance of their expertise, the 
strength of the law and facts that they advanced in reaching their conclusions, or the process of their reasoning 
by which they concluded that the petitioner's churrasqueiros possess specialized skills and knowledge that are 
not easily transferable. Counsel contended that the opinions "must be allowed to stand for the propositions 
they advance." 
Counsel asserted that there are "thousands of chefs of Brazilian citizenship" who lack the knowledge to be a 
churrasqueiro, and noted that the foreign entity only selects approximately one out of every 100 applicants to 
EAC 07 013 52342 
Page 12 
be hired and trained to be a churrasqueiro. Counsel stated that the petitioner's churrasqueiro "is not simply a 
barbeque chef dressed as a gaucho," and explained the following requirements: 
To function as [the petitioner's] churrasqueiro, an individual must have advanced knowledge 
not only of how to select cuts of meat for churrasco based on the customer's specifications, 
and of how to prepare it over the open flame grill to the patron's order and present it, but also 
the special knowledge of how to perform those duties while portraying an authentic gaucho 
of Rio Grande de Sul. As a churrasqueiro, the beneficiary is required to perform a 
combination of duties involved advanced culinary skills, traditional, "espeto corridor" service 
skills, and acting or entertainment skills, as they play the role of 19~~ century gaucho. These 
skills, as possessed by [the beneficiary] are clearly not commonly held throughout the 
restaurant industry. . . . 
The Petition and evidence supporting it establish that [the beneficiary] has a highly developed 
level of knowledge of the [petitioner's] business concept, and the company's methods and 
procedures (stated above) for consistently creating the experience that its brand represents in 
the marketplace. His knowledge of that concept and its underlying methods and procedures is 
clearly at a higher level than others in the restaurant industry or even in the churrascaria 
industry. 
Counsel emphasized that it screens "large numbers of rural residents of southern Brazil who can realistically 
convey the gaucho experience to its customers in the United States, and selects those who could be successful 
in the company's training program." Counsel stated that the first screening phase identifies those individuals 
who already possess some of the "special knowledge of Southern Brazil, where the churrasco experience is an 
important part of that region's history and culture." 
In addition, referring to the 2004 Ohata Memorandum regarding foreign specialty chefs, counsel asserted that 
the beneficiary's job description "clearly distinguishes his duties from those required of ordinary foreign 
specialty cooks or chefs." Counsel stated that "churrasqueiros are not ordinary foreign specialty cooks or 
chefs, who generally work in the kitchen, unseen by the customer." Counsel noted that, according to the 2004 
Ohata Memorandum, the petitioner needs to establish that the beneficiary's skill set "is so complex that it 
contributed directly to the success of the foreign entity," or that all of the company's chefs "must undergo 
rigorous in-house training in order to satisfactorily perform their job duties." Counsel stated that the 
memorandum also requires the petitioner to submit evidence that the company now wishes to replicate its 
success in the United States by transferring such personnel to the United States in order to establish 
"substantially similar operations." Counsel asserted that the petitioner meets these requirements as the 
petitioner's churrasqueiros possess complex skills that contribute to the success of the company in Brazil and 
that they are key to the continued successfid replication of the Brazilian business concept in the United States. 
Counsel also contended that the director's notice of intent to revoke ignored evidence that the beneficiary's 
training and experience is uncommon and not generally known by specialty chefs in Brazil or in the United 
States. Counsel noted that the beneficiary was selected for transfer because he "possesses an advanced 
knowledge of [the petitioner's] system for producing an authentic experience of the gaucho culture of 
southern Brazil." With respect to the petitioner's two-year training program, counsel noted that the petitioner 
EAC 07 013 52342 
Page 13 
"more thoroughly documented" its established program in 2007, and submitted the updated document. 
Counsel asserted that the new program documentation describes in detail the objectives, teaching 
methodologies, teaching resources and duration of the churrasqueiro training program. 
Counsel emphasized that the petitioner now operates ten restaurants in the United States, each of which 
employs approximately ten churrasqueiros, all of whom have received at least two years of experience and 
training with the foreign entity prior to their transfer to the United States. According to counsel, the updated 
training program includes information regarding the amount of time required to achieve mastery of each 
training element, including mastery of all "meat service" which involves knowledge and skills relative to 
"mozzarella, pork sausage, chicken, port heart, ribs, loin, chops, top sirloin, filet mignon, beef tenderloin, 
bottom sirloin, ribs and choice top sirloin." Counsel noted that it requires approximately 15 months for a 
trainee to acquire competency in customer service relative to each meat product. 
In response to the director's observation that much of the petitioner's training program is centered on the 
practical application of standard restaurant practices, counsel acknowledged that the petitioner must train its 
churrasqueiros on methods for proper food storage and handling and other restaurant practices. However, 
counsel asserted that the director failed to consider evidence already in the record, such as the petitioner's 
training materials regarding the gaucho culture, which, according to counsel, "is certainly not training that one 
would expect to find at 'any restaurant."' Counsel claimed that the petitioner' training is "far more involved 
and demanding" than what chefs or wait staff would normally receive, necessary, required and "unique in the 
industry." 
Finally, counsel asserted that the initial evidence sufficiently explained the economic disruption the petitioner 
would suffer without access to intracompany transferees, and "how such business injury satisfied the standard 
established in the applicable agency memo." Counsel stated that the evidence submitted proves that the 
knowledge at issue would be impossible to impart to individuals without significant business injury. 
The only new documentary evidence submitted in response to the notice of intent to revoke was the above- 
referenced updated training and development program for the position of churrasqueirolchef, dated May 
2007. This is a 22-page document which outlines the objectives, methodologies, and teaching resources used 
in the program, and provides an overview of the program's four modules. The petitioner notes that the 
duration of the program is typically 24 months but may vary depending upon the prior knowledge and 
experience of the trainee and the trainee's capacity and pace of learning. 
The timeline provided in the program indicates that a newly-hired trainee will devote one semester to "basic" 
skills, two semesters to "intermediate skills" and one semester to "advanced" skills, while an "advanced 
worker" might complete the training in 18 months. The training consists of seminars and courses in which 
the students learn theoretical components in the classroom, and on-the-job training in which the instructor 
demonstrates routines and techniques for trainees and then supervises practical work activities in the 
workplace. The program is divided into the following modules: 
General, which includes topics common to all of the foreign entity's workers. 
Specialist, which is comprised of specific training to improve skills and become an 
expert in the function of churrasqueirolchef.. 
EAC 07 013 52342 
Page 14 
Cultural, the training module covering cultural topics. 
Language, which is the English language skills training component. 
The topics of the training and development program include: 
Integration of New Workers 
Operation of Churrasqueira (meat delivery, storage, hygiene and handling techniques, 
preparation, grilling, and planning and organization). 
Product Knowledge (meats, seasoning, marinade, authentic gaucho dishes, side dishes, 
salad bar and dressings, desserts, drinks, wine). 
[The petitioner's] Customer Service standards (verbal communication and body language, 
appropriate meat serving techniques, customer service rules, greeting, personalized 
service, perception of guest needs, meat service, closure of interaction with guests, safety 
rules). 
Churrasqueira Cleanliness and Food Safety (hygiene, microbiology and food 
contamination, methods of food conservation, food safety). 
Personal Development (communication processes, team work, motivation, skill level). 
Work safety (fire extinguisher training, fire prevention, basic emergency procedures 
related to churrasqueira, accident prevention, first aid). 
Gaucho Culture (History of Rio Grade do Sul, Culture, Culinary, Attire, Tools and 
utensils, dances and literature). 
General Culture and Current Events (History of employment city, places of interest, 
general current events, novelties in gastronomy). 
English Course 
The training and development program outline goes on to describe the first five modules in more detail. 
D. Revocation 
After reviewing the petitioner's rebuttal evidence, the director revoked the approval of the petition on March 13, 
2008. The director determined that the evidence of record did not establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge or that he has been or would be employed in a position requiring specialized 
knowledge. 
Specifically, the director examined the record and noted that the petitioner had failed to document what 
portion of the beneficiary's training was classroom training and what portion was on the job training, and 
further noted that the petitioner provided no evidence that the beneficiary had in fact completed this training 
program. In this regard, the director further observed that, despite the petitioner's claim that it requires its 
chefs to complete two years of training, the beneficiary's resume shows that he began working as a 
churrasqueiro immediately upon commencing employment with the foreign entity, thus suggesting that the 
duties and skills required are actually typical in the petitioner's industry. The director found that the record 
contained insufficient evidence to demonstrate that an informally trained, newly-hired employee could not 
learn the techniques required for performance of the beneficiary's position in a short period of time. 
EAC 07 013 52342 
Page 15 
The director hrther noted that the petitioner had failed to address the queries regarding food handling and 
storage methods, as well as customer service procedures, and how those aspects of the petitioner's business 
are differentiated from other standards in the industry. In addition, the director observed that the petitioner 
had failed to respond to his request for information regarding the number of similarly employed workers, and 
the number of those workers who have received training comparable to that received by the beneficiary. The 
director therefore concluded that the petitioner had failed to document that the beneficiary possesses any 
advanced knowledge of the foreign operating procedures that would establish him as a "key employee." 
Finally, the director determined that "a restaurant offering culturally specific cuisine and service based on a 
theme does not in and of itself constitute uncommon service." The director noted that all properly trained 
chefs and servers must be capable of following an employer's methods and procedures for preparation and 
presentation. 
E. Appeal 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner restates the points raised in the response to the notice of intent to revoke, 
and continues to assert that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge and thus qualifies for the visa 
classification prescribed under section 101 (a)(l5)(L) of the Act. 
Counsel emphasizes that the petitioner will face "severe economic loss and disruption" if it is unable to 
transfer its trained churrasqueiros to the United States in L-1B classification. Counsel asserts that the 
petitioner has used the L-1B classification since 1997, employs eight to ten churrasqueiros in each of its ten 
U.S. restaurants, and will continue to have a critical need for "qualified and trained Brazilian churrasqueiros," 
as it grows and adds new restaurants. Counsel notes specifically that 213 L-1B petitions for churrasqueiros 
have been approved in the past, and contends that the revocation of the approval of the instant petition is 
arbitrary and capricious. Counsel states that the beneficiary is no less qualified than other churrasqueiros who 
have been granted L-1B status to work for the petitioner. Counsel further argues that the director's decision 
failed to address the other 2 13 petitions that have been approved. 
This appeal raises three different issues for consideration: (1) what is the appropriate standard that should be 
applied to determine "specialized knowledge," (2) whether the beneficiary in this matter possesses specialized 
knowledge, and has been and will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity; and (3) whether the 
director proper revoked the approval of the petition. 
III. Determining the Appropriate Standard for Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge 
The appropriate standard for determining specialized knowledge is the statutory definition of the term at 
section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, along with USCIS regulations and applicable precedent decisions. When a 
statute is ambiguous, Congress has left a gap for the agency to fill. See Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Res. DeJ: 
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984). In interpreting section 214(c)(2)(B), the AAO relies on existing 
USCIS regulations, the applicable precedent decisions, and the legislative history of the enabling and 
declaratory statutes, as an indication of Congressional intent. Additionally, the AAO follows internal agency 
memoranda. Such memoranda may aid in the interpretation of the specialized knowledge standard, but the 
memoranda are intended as internal guidelines for USCIS personnel and do not establish judicially 
EAC 07 013 52342 
Page 16 
enforceable rights. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000); see also Lou-Hewera v. 
Trominski, 231 F.3d 984,989 (5th Cir. 2000)(quoting Fano v. OrNeill, 806 F.2d 1262, 1264 (5th Cir.1987)). 
A. History of the Specialized Knowledge Defnition 
The AAO finds that the history of the L-1 B specialized knowledge category is critical to understanding the 
applicable standard in this case. 
The L-1 intracompany transferee visa classification was created by Congress through the Immigration Act of 
1970. Pub.L. 91-225, 5 3, 84 Stat. 117 (Apr. 7, 1970). Congress created the L-1 visa classification after 
concluding that "the present immigration law and its administration have restricted the exchange and 
development of managerial personnel from other nations vital to American companies competing in modern- 
day world trade." See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91-851 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750,2754, 
1970 WL 5815 (Leg. Hist.). To address the problem, Congress created the L-1 visa and noted that the 
"amendment would help eliminate problems now faced by American companies having offices abroad in 
transferring key personnel freely within the organization." See generally id. 
Congress did not define "specialized knowledge" in the Immigration Act of 1970, nor was it a term of art 
drawn from case law or from another statute. 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. 9, 14 (D.D.C., 
1990). 
The legislative history of the Immigration Act of 1970 does not elaborate on the nature of a specialized 
knowledge employee; instead the House Report references executives, managers and "key personnel." 
Regarding the intended scope of the L-1 visa program, the House Report indicates: 
Evidence submitted to the committee established that the number of temporary admissions 
under the proposed 'L' category will not be large. The class of persons eligible for such 
nonimmigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be carefully regulated and monitored by the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service. 
H.R. Rep. No. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2754. 
After the creation of the L-1B nonimmigrant classification, legacy INS developed a body of binding 
precedent decisions which attempted to clarify the meaning of "specialized knowledge," in the absence of a 
statutory definition. See Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 618 (Reg. Comm. 1970); Matter of Vaillancourt, 13 
I&N Dec. 654 (Reg. Comm. 1970); Matter of LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. 8 16 (Reg. Comm. 1971); Matter of 
Michelin Tire Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Comm. 1978); Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. 1 17 (Comm. 
198 1); Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comm. 1982); Matter of Sandoz Crop Protection Corp., 19 I&N 
Dec. 666 (Comm. 1988). 
As it gained administrative experience with the visa classification, the INS promulgated two successive 
definitions of the term by regulation. First, in 1983, the INS published a final rule adopting the following 
definition of "specialized knowledge" at 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(C) (1984): 
EAC 07 013 52342 
Page 17 
"Specialized knowledge" means knowledge possessed by an individual which relates directly 
to the product or service of an organization or to the equipment, techniques, management, or 
other proprietary interests of the petitioner not readily available in the job market. The 
knowledge must be relevant to the organization itself and directly concerned with the 
expansion of commerce or it must allow the business to become competitive in the market 
place. 
48 Fed. Reg. 4 1 142,4 1 146 (September 14, 1983). 
In 1987, less than four years later, the INS provided a modified definition at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) 
(1988) to "better articulate case law" relating to the term: 
"Specialized knowledge" means knowledge possessed by an individual whose advanced level 
of expertise and proprietary knowledge of the organization's product, service, research, 
equipment, techniques, management, or other interests of the employer are not readily 
available in the United States labor market. This definition does not apply to persons who 
have general knowledge or expertise which enables them merely to produce a product or 
provide a service. 
52 Fed. Reg. 5738,5752 (February 26, 1987). 
In 1990, Congress acted to end the agency's varying interpretations of the term "specialized knowledge." 
Through the Immigration Act of 1990, Congress provided a statutory definition of the term by adopting in 
part and modifying the 1987 INS regulatory definition. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-649, 
5 206(b)(2), 104 Stat. 4978, 5023 (1990). Congress adopted the "advanced knowledge" component of the 
INS definition but deleted the bright-line "proprietary knowledge" element and the requirement that the 
knowledge be of a type "not readily available in the United States labor market." 
In enacting these changes, Congress did not otherwise attempt to modify the agency's interpretation as to what 
constitutes specialized knowledge. In its effort to clarify the term specialized knowledge, Congress did, 
however, add an ambiguous and circular component to the definition by stating that an alien is considered to 
be serving in a "capacity involving specialized knowledge" if the alien has a "special knowledge" of a 
petitioner's product. 
Specifically, Congress enacted the following definition: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Section 2 14(c)(2)(B) of the Act, as created by Pub.L. No. 10 1-649, 5 206(b)(2). 
EAC 07 013 52342 
Page 18 
Regarding the new statutory definition, the legislative history indicates that Congress found the L-1 visa had 
allowed "multinational corporations the opportunity to rotate employees around the world and broaden their 
exposure to various products and organizational structures" and that it had been "a valuable asset in furthering 
relations with other countries." 
In light of this experience, the House Committee stated that the category should be "broadened" by making 
four enumerated changes: first, Congress allowed accounting firms to have access to the intracompany visa 
even though their ownership structure had previously precluded them from the classification; second, 
Congress incorporated the "blanket petition" available under current regulations into the statute for maximum 
use by corporations; third, Congress changed the overseas employment requirement from a one-year period 
immediately prior to admission to one year within the three years prior to admission; and fourth, Congress 
expanded the period of admission for managers and executives to seven years to provide greater continuity for 
employees. H.R. Rep. 101-723(1) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 671 0, 6749, 1990 WL 200418 
(Leg. Hist.). 
In a separate paragraph, outside of the previous paragraph discussing the enumerated provisions that 
"broadened" the L-1 classification, the House Report discussed the new definition of "specialized 
knowledge." The paragraph stated in its entirety: 
One area within the L visa that requires more specificity relates to the term "specialized 
knowledge." Varying interpretations by INS have exacerbated the problem. The bill therefore 
defines specialized knowledge as special knowledge of the company product and its 
application in international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge of processes and 
procedures of the company. The time limit for admission of an alien with specialized 
knowledge is five years, approximately the same as under current regulations. 
Id. 
In 1991, the INS proposed and adopted "a more liberal interpretation of specialized knowledge" based on the 
new statutory definition. Closely following the definition provided by Congress, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 
214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines specialized knowledge as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
See 56 Fed. Reg. 61 1 1 1 (December 2, 1991)(Final Rule). 
Since Congress enacted the statutory definition of "specialized knowledge," the agency has issued a number 
of internal agency memoranda discussing the term specialized knowledge, including the above referenced 
1994 Puleo Memorandum, 2002 Ohata Memorandum, and 2004 Ohata Memorandum, the latter of which 
applies specifically to chefs and specialty cooks seeking L- 1 B status. 
EAC 07 013 52342 
Page 19 
The Puleo Memorandum of 1994 is often cited as the key agency document relating to the adjudication of L- 
1B specialized knowledge visa petitions. Addressed to the various directors of the INS operational 
components, the internal agency memorandum noted that the 1990 Act statutory definition was a "lesser, but 
still high, standard" compared to the previous regulatory definition and declared that the memorandum was 
issued to provide guidance on the proper interpretation of the new statutory definition. 
The memorandum advised INS officers to apply the common dictionary definition of the terms "special" and 
"advanced," since the statute and legislative history did not provide insight as to the interpretation of 
specialized knowledge. Looking to two different versions of Webster's Dictionary, the memorandum defined 
the term "special" as "surpassing the usual; distinct among others of a kind" or "distinguished by some 
unusual quality; uncommon; noteworthy." Puleo Memorandum at p. 1. The memorandum relied on the same 
dictionaries to define "advanced" as "highly developed or complex; at a higher level than others" or "beyond 
the elementary or introductory; greatly developed beyond the initial stage." Id. at p.2. 
The Puleo Memorandum provided various scenarios, hypothetical examples, and a list of six "possible 
characteristics" of aliens that would possess specialized knowledge. Adding a gloss beyond the plain 
language of the statute or the definitions of "special" and "advanced," the memorandum surmised that 
specialized knowledge "would be difficult to impart to another individual without significant economic 
inconvenience." Id. at p.3. The memorandum also stressed that the "examples and scenarios are presented as 
general guidelines for officers" and that the examples are not "all inclusive." Id. at pp. 3-4. 
The Puleo Memorandum concluded with a note about the burden of proof and evidentiary requirements for 
the classification: 
From a practical point of view, the mere fact that a petitioner alleges that an alien's 
knowledge is somehow different does not, in and of itself, establish that the alien possesses 
specialized knowledge. The petitioner bears the burden of establishing through the 
submission of probative evidence that the alien's knowledge is uncommon, noteworthy, or 
distinguished by some unusual quality and not generally known by practitioners in the alien's 
field of endeavor. Likewise, a petitioner's assertion that the alien possesses an advanced level 
of knowledge of the processes and procedures of the company must be supported by evidence 
describing and setting apart that knowledge from the elementary or basic knowledge 
possessed by others. It is the weight and type of evidence, which establishes whether or not 
the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. 
Id. at p.4. 
The Puleo Memorandum closes by noting that the document was "designed solely as a guide" and that 
specialized knowledge can apply to any industry and any type of position. 
B. The Standard for Specialized Knowledge 
The specialized knowledge classification requires USCIS to distinguish between those employees that possess 
specialized knowledge and those to do not possess such knowledge. Exactly where USCIS should draw that 
EAC 07 013 52342 
Page 20 
line is the question before the AAO. On one end of the spectrum, one may find an employee with the minimal 
one year of experience and the basic job-related skill or knowledge that was acquired through that 
employment. Such a person would not be deemed to possess specialized knowledge under section 
101 (a)(lS)(L) of the Act. On the other end of the spectrum, one may find an employee with many years of 
experience and advanced training who developed a proprietary process that is limited to a few people within 
the company. That individual would clearly meet the statutory standard for specialized knowledge. In 
between these two extremes would fall, however, the whole range of professional experience and knowledge. 
as a proper guide in determining whether knowledge is advanced or special. However, instead of memoranda, 
the AAO must look to the specific language of the statutory definition of specialized knowledge. 
The first question is always to inquire whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). "If the intent of 
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Id. 
As previously discussed, Congress spoke directly to the issue when it created a statutory definition for the 
term specialized knowledge. However, the definition is less than clear since it contains undefined, relativistic 
terms and elements of circular reasoning. 
As enacted by the Immigration Act of 1990, section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 3 1184(c)(2)(B), provides 
the statutory definition of specialized knowledge: 
For purposes of section lOl(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special knowledge 
of the company product and its application in international markets or has an advanced level of 
knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Looking to the plain language of the statutory definition, Congress has provided USCIS with an ambiguous 
definition of specialized knowledge. Although 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General was decided prior to enactment of 
the Immigration Act of 1990, the court's discussion of the ambiguity in the former INS definition is equally 
illuminating when applied to the definition created by Congress: 
This ambiguity is not merely the result of an unfortunate choice of dictionaries. It reflects the 
relativistic nature of the concept special. An item is special only in the sense that it is not 
ordinary; to define special one must first define what is ordinary. . . . There is no logical or 
principled way to determine which baseline of ordinary knowledge is a more appropriate reading 
of the statute, and there are countless other baselines which are equally plausible. Simply put, 
specialized knowledge is a relative and empty idea which cannot have a plain meaning. CJ 
Westen, The Empty Idea ofEquality, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 537 (1982). 
EAC 07 013 52342 
Page 2 1 
In effect, Congress has charged the agency with making a comparison based on a relative idea that has no plain 
meaning. To determine what is special, USCIS must first determine the baseline of ordinary. 
While Congress did not provide explicit guidance for what should be considered ordinary knowledge, the canons 
of statutory interpretation provide some clue as to the intended scope of the L-1B specialized knowledge 
category. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 1 12, 123 (1 987) (citing INS 
v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,107 S.Ct 1207,94 L.Ed2d 434 (1987)). 
First, it is instructive to look at the common dictionary definitions of the terms "special" and "advanced." 
According to Webster's New World College Dictionary, the word "special" is commonly found to mean "of a kind 
different from others; distinctive, peculiar, or unique." Webster's New World College Dictionary, 1376 (4th Ed. 
2008). The dictionary defines the word "advanced" as "ahead or beyond others in progress, complexity, etc." Id. 
at 20. 
Second, looking at the term's placement within the text of section 10 l (ax1 SXL), the AAO notes that specialized 
knowledge is used to describe the nature of a person's employment and that the term is listed among the higher 
levels of the employment hierarchy with "managerial" and "executive" employees. Based on the context of the 
term within the statute, the AAO would expect a specialized knowledge employee to be an elevated class of 
workers within a company and not an ordinary or average employee. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 
F.Supp. 9, 14 (D.D.C., 1990). 
Third, the legislative history indicates that the original drafters intended the class of aliens eligible for the L-1 
classification would be "narrowly drawn" and "carefully regulated and monitored" by USCIS. See generally H.R. 
Rep. No. 91-851 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750,2754, 1970 WL 5815. The legislative history of 
the 1970 Act plainly states that "the number of temporary admissions under the proposed 'L' category will not be 
large." Id. This legislative history has been widely viewed as supporting a narrow reading of the definition of 
specialized knowledge and the L-1 visa classification in general. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. 
at 15-16; Boi Na Braza Atlanta, LLC v. Upchurch, Not Reported in F.Supp2d, 2005 WL 2372846 at *4 
(N.D.Tex., 2005), afd 194 Fed.Appx. 248 (5th Cir. 2006); American Auto. Ass'n v. Attorney General, Not 
Reported in F.Supp., 1991 WL 222420 (D.D.C. 199 1); Fibermaster, Ltd. v. INS., Not Reported in F.Supp., 1990 
WL 99327 (D.D.C., 1990); Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Dept. of Justice, Civ. Action 00-2977-LFO (D.D.C. April 6, 
2001)(on file with AAO). 
Although the Immigration Act of 1990 provided a statutory definition of the term "specialized knowledge," the 
definition did not expand the class of persons eligible for L-1B specialized knowledge visas. Pub.L. No. 101-649, 
5 206(b)(2), 104 Stat. 4978, 5023 (1990). Instead, the legislative history indicates that that Congress created the 
statutory definition of specialized knowledge for the express purpose of clarifling a previously undefined term 
from the Immigration Act of 1970. H.R. Rep. 101-723(I) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6749, 
1990 WL 200418 ("One area within the L visa that requires more specificity relates to the term 'specialized 
knowledge.' Varying interpretations by INS have exacerbated the problem."). While the 1990 Act declined to 
extend the "proprietary knowledge" and "United States labor market" references that had existed in the agency 
definition, there is no indication that Congress intended to liberalize the L-1B visa classification. 
EAC 07 013 52342 
Page 22 
If any conclusion can be drawn from the ultimate statutory definition of specialized knowledge and the changes 
made to the legacy INS regulatory definition, the point would be based on the nature of the Congressional 
clarification itself Prior to the 1990 Act, legacy INS pursued a bright-line test of specialized knowledge by 
including a "proprietary knowledge" element in the regulatory definition. See 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(1Xii)@) 
(1988). By deleting this element in the ultimate statutory definition and further emphasizing the relativistic aspect 
of "special knowledge," Congress created a standard that requires USCIS to make a factual determination that can 
only be determined on a case-by-case basis, based on the agency's expertise and discretion. Rather than a bright- 
line standard that would support a more rigid application of the law, Congress gave legacy INS a more flexible 
standard that requires an adjudication based on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. CJ Ponce- 
Leiva v. Ashcroft, 33 1 F.3d 369,377 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Baires v. AVS, 856 F.2d 89,91 (9th Cir.1988)). 
Accordingly, as a baseline, the terms "special" or "advanced" must mean more than simply skilled or 
experienced. By itself, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically complex products will not 
equal "special knowledge." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 53 (Comm. 1982).~ Specialized knowledge 
requires more than a short period of experience, otherwise "special" or "advanced" knowledge would include 
every employee in an organization with the exception of trainees and entry-level staff. If everyone in an 
organization is specialized, then no one can be considered truly specialized. 
Considering the definition of specialized knowledge, it is the petitioner's fundamental burden to articulate and 
prove that an alien possesses "special" or "advanced" knowledge. Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
$ 1184(c)(2)(B). USCIS cannot make a factual determination regarding the beneficiary's specialized 
knowledge if the petitioner does not, at a minimum, articulate with specificity the nature of the claimed 
specialized knowledge, describe how such knowledge is typically gained within the organization, and explain 
how and when the beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
After articulating the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and type of evidence which 
establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized knowledge. As noted in the Puleo 
Memorandum, a petitioner's assertion that the alien possesses an advanced level of knowledge of the 
processes and procedures of the company must be supported by evidence describing and setting apart that 
knowledge from the elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others. Because "special" and "advanced" 
are comparative terms, the petitioner should provide evidence that allows USCIS to assess the beneficiary's 
knowledge relative to others in the petitioner's workforce or relative to similarly employed workers in the 
petitioner's industry. 
IV. The Beneficiary's Employment in a Specialized Knowledge Capacity 
In examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's 
3 The AAO notes that Matter of Penner and other precedent decisions that predate the 1990 Act are not 
categorically superseded by the statutory definition of specialized knowledge. The AAO generally presumes 
that Congress is knowledgeable about existing law pertinent to the legislation it enacts. See Goodyear Atomic 
Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 184-85 (1988). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that 
the AAO's reliance on such authority is appropriate. Brazil Quality Stones v. ChertoJ; 53 1 F.3d 1063, 1070 
n.10 (9th Cir., July 10,2008). 
EAC 07 013 52342 
Page 23 
description of the job duties and the weight of the evidence supporting any asserted specialized knowledge. See 8 
C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(3Xii). The petitioner must submit a detailed job description of the services to be performed 
sufficient to establish specialized knowledge. Id. In this case, the petitioner fails to establish that the 
beneficiary's position abroad or in the United States requires an employee with specialized knowledge or that 
the beneficiary has specialized knowledge. 
A. Job Duties and Training 
The AAO acknowledges that the petitioner has provided an amply detailed description of the beneficiary's 
intended employment in the U.S. entity, and his responsibilities as a churrasqueiro. Specifically, the petitioner, 
through its own assertions and through statements from experts in the hospitality industry, asserts that the main 
functions of the beneficiary's proposed position are three-fold: (I) culinary duties, including selecting, butchering, 
preparing, and cooking meats; (2) service functions, including serving tables and engaging customers in 
conversation regarding the meat they are serving and the cultural background of Southern Brazil; and (3) 
dramaturgy, involving the serving of food to customers in a dramatic and theatrical manner, resulting in a 
memorable experience for the customer. 
However, the petitioner has not sufficiently documented how the beneficiary's performance of the proposed job 
duties distinguishes his knowledge as specialized. The petitioner repeatedly states throughout the record that the 
beneficiary has noteworthy and in-depth knowledge of the foreign entity's and the petitioner's operational 
processes, and that his role in the petitioner's restaurant is consequently a key role that no similarly qualified chef 
in the United States could perform. Counsel further asserted in his letter dated November 3, 2006 that the 
beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge as a result of his nearly three years of work experience in the 
foreign company and his successful completion of the required two years of training to become a 
churrasqueiro. 
While training materials and manuals have been provided by the petitioner, the petitioner did not provide 
documentation to confirm the beneficiary's completion of such training for the record. Without documentary 
evidence to support the claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. 
Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533,534 (BIA 1988); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503,506 
(BIA 1980). 
Although counsel refers to numerous exhibits contained in the record, the documentation provided is 
insufficient to warrant a conclusion that the beneficiary possesses the requisite specialized knowledge 
required by the regulations. For example, the documents outlining the petitioner's Training and Development 
program, which it contends summarizes the twenty-four month training program its gaucho chefs are required 
to complete, is provided in support of counsel's allegation that the beneficiary's knowledge is specialized. 
These voluminous training manuals, however, do not establish that the beneficiary actually completed the 
required training. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of 
meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soflci, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) 
(citing Matter of Treasure Craft of Cal@rnia, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1 972)). 
Furthermore, although the petitioner claims that the alleged specialized knowledge can only be acquired 
through completion of its internal training program, the director noted that the beneficiary in this case, 
EAC 07 013 52342 
Page 24 
according to his resume, immediately assumed the position of churrasqueirolgaucho chef upon joining the 
foreign entity in November 2003. Despite his lack of training in the petitioner's processes and procedures, the 
beneficiary was hired by the foreign entity to perform precisely the same duties he would be performing in the 
United States. 
This fact directly undermines the petitioner's claims. There is no evidence that the beneficiary completed two 
years, or even 18 months, of training before assuming the duties of churrasqueiro with the foreign entity. 
Although the petitioner has indicated that some portion of its training program is conducted on-the-job, it has 
declined to specify at what point a trainee is actually able to carry out the job duties of a churrasqueiro. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to question whether the petitioner's churrasqueiros in general, and the beneficiary 
specifically, have historically been required to complete the allegedly mandatory 18 month to two-year period 
of training. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent 
objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the 
petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 
582,591-92 (BIA 1988). 
As noted above, according to the beneficiary's resume, he had one year of experience as a churrasqueiro and 
two years of experience as a gaucho assistant, or passador, and waiter, at unrelated Brazilian churrascaria 
restaurants where he gained experience in both cooking and serving aspects of churrasco meats. The 
beneficiary also indicates in his resume that he is fluent in the English language. Given that the majority of 
the petitioner's training program is focused upon learning skills needed to prepare and serve churrasco meats, 
along with English language courses, it appears that the beneficiary's existing skills and experience were 
sufficient to allow him to commence employment with the foreign entity as a churrasqueiro. 
If an experienced employee such as the beneficiary, who performed similar duties with comparable 
restaurants in Brazil, can assume the position of churrasqueiro for the petitioner's organization without first 
undergoing additional training, then it significantly undermines the petitioner's claim that its methods, 
processes and procedures for operating a churrascaria restaurant are significantly different from those of 
other restaurant chains in the industry. The facts also undercut the petitioner's claim that familiarity with its 
procedures alone constitutes specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner's primary argument that the position of churrasqueiro requires specialized knowledge is 
centered on a two-fold claim: (1) knowledge of the company's processes and procedures is unavailable in the 
United States and can only be gained with the foreign entity; and (2) the knowledge cannot be easily 
transferred to a U.S. worker without significant economic hardship and interruption of business. The AAO 
notes that these criteria are examples provided in the Puleo Memorandum of situations in which a petitioner 
may be able to establish that a given position requires specialized knowledge. 
It should be emphasized that the Puleo Memorandum specifically disallows a test of the U.S. labor market in 
making a determination as to whether the beneficiary's knowledge is specialized. However, the Puleo 
Memorandum allows USCIS to compare the beneficiary's knowledge to the general United States labor 
market and the petitioner's workforce in order to distinguish between specialized and general knowledge. The 
Acting Associate Commissioner notes in the memorandum that "officers adjudicating petitions involving 
EAC 07 013 52342 
Page 25 
specialized knowledge must ensure that the knowledge possessed by the beneficiary is not general knowledge 
held commonly throughout the industry but that it is truly specialized." Puleo memo, supra. 
A comparison of the beneficiary's knowledge to the knowledge possessed by others in the field is therefore 
necessary in order to determine the level of the beneficiary's skills and knowledge and to ascertain whether 
the beneficiary's knowledge is advanced. In other words, absent an outside group to which to compare the 
beneficiary's knowledge, USCIS would not be able to ensure that the knowledge possessed by the beneficiary 
is not general knowledge held commonly throughout the industry but that it is truly specialized. Id. The 
analysis for specialized knowledge requires a review of the knowledge possessed by the United States labor 
market, but does not consider whether workers are available in the United States to perform the beneficiary's 
job duties. Furthermore, in this case, the petitioner makes the specific claim that the knowledge possessed by 
its Brazilian churrasqueiros is unavailable in the United States, so discussion of this issue is warranted. 
A review of the petitioner's statements and the statements of the experts raises the question of whether the 
beneficiary's qualifications are so uncommon and specialized that similar knowledge could not be imparted to 
a U.S. worker without undue economic hardship to the petitioner. As discussed by the director in the notice 
of revocation, there is no documentary evidence that definitively indicates why a U.S. worker meeting all of the 
petitioner's requirements as an ideal candidate for gaucho chef, would be unqualified for selection as a trainee for 
the petitioner's U.S. entity. In fact, the petitioner disregarded the director's request for clarification on this issue 
entirely. Failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for 
denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2@)(14). 
In support of the petition, the petitioner submitted a document entitled "Program for Integration and Training 
of New Employees." One subheading in this document, entitled "Ideal Profile for New Employees," lists the 
petitioner's ideal candidates for employment within its restaurants. The list states as follows: 
Personal aspects: 
EAC 07 013 52342 
Page 26 
- Be humble 
8. Show good awareness skills. 
9. Show initiative. 
10. Be able to accept responsibilities. 
The list also includes a section entitled relational aspects and professional aspects, noting that it is desirable for 
passador and server candidates to have prior experience and knowledge. 
The petitioner's statements and the experts' testimonials indicate that the company screens large numbers of rural 
residents from southern Brazil who can realistically covey the gaucho experience. The petitioner states that the 
employees hired are selected to ensure that they already possess some elements of the "special knowledge of the 
petitioning organization's service and techniques, i.e., the gaucho lifestyle of southern Brazil." The petitioner 
claims that it completes and refines the "special knowledge" already held by these carefully selected rural 
southern Brazilians and imparts each employee with unique techniques during its two-year training program. 
However, there is nothing in the detailed listing of the "Ideal Profile for New Employees" that corroborates the 
petitioner's claim that it only hires rural southern Brazilians who have been raised in the gaucho culture and 
traditions. Rather, the ideal new employee appears to be a well-groomed young man of a certain height, with 
pleasant looks and a polite disposition, rather than a person who has been raised in the Brazilian gaucho culture. 
Regardless, the AAO notes that a candidate's existing knowledge of the southern Brazilian style of cooking meat 
or the Brazilian gaucho culture could not be considered specialized knowledge specific to the petitioner's 
organization. 
With this established, the AAO can next look to the training requirements of the beneficiary's proposed position. 
As noted above, the training program involves basic, intermediate and advanced skills. The training topics 
includes the operation of churrasqueira, product knowledge, customer service standards, food safety, and English 
language skills. Counsel claims that to forego the transfer of employees from the foreign parent and instead train 
United States chefs or similarly skilled workers to fill the gaucho chef positions at the petitioner's restaurants 
would result in undue economic hardship to the petitioner, thus obviating the guidance set forth in the 2004 Ohata 
Memorandum. The AAO disagrees. 
The petitioner indicates that even if a new employee has worked in the industry previously, he must still undergo 
the petitioner's exclusive training. The petitioner notes that an "advanced worker" might complete the training in 
18 months rather than 24 months. It is unclear what, if anything, would prohibit a U.S. employee fiom 
undergoing the same training program. The petitioner has failed to discuss why the cost of on-the-job training for 
a U.S. worker in one of its U.S. restaurants would result in financial hardship, since it is evident that the petitioner 
employs many gaucho chefs throughout its various U.S. locations. In fact, as of the date the petition was filed, 
the record indicates that the petitioning organization operated more restaurants in the United States than it did in 
Brazil. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting 
the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soflci, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. The petitioner has failed to 
adequately show that it would be financially burdened by training local employees in any of its U.S. locations in 
lieu of transferring employees fiom its parent in Brazil, particularly since it appears that much of the training is 
provided on-thejob. 
EAC 07 013 52342 
Page 27 
Furthermore, the AAO notes that a significant component of the training program involves learning the English 
language, which hrther undermines the petitioner's claim that it would be a hardship to train U.S. workers to 
serve as churrasqueiros. Rather, it is apparent that it would take significantly less time to train an English- 
speaking U.S. worker than it would to train a Portuguese-speaking Brazilian to perform the same duties. 
It is evident upon review of the totality of the evidence that the petitioner has a preference for hiring young 
Brazilian men as churrasqueiros to add to the authenticity of their restaurants. Based on the submitted expert 
opinion letters, the AAO has no doubt that the petitioner's practice of hiring Brazilian churrasqueiros contributes 
to the petitioner's success in the industry. However, the AAO cannot conclude that being Brazilian equates to 
having specialized knowledge. The petitioner has not established how the training program, which consists 
primarily of general cooking methods, food safety and handling skills, customer service skills, and English 
language skills, imparts its workers with specialized knowledge exclusive to the petitioning organization, or how 
its processes and procedures differ in any significant way from those of other churrasqueiro restaurants. Unless 
the petitioner can successfully establish this claim, it cannot be concluded that familiarity and experience with the 
foreign entity's processes and procedures alone constitutes specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner indicates that what sets its restaurants apart from its competitors are the "ancillary duties" 
performed by its churrasqueiros. It does not claim that its gaucho chefs qualifL as possessing specialized 
knowledge based solely on their culinary skills and knowledge. Such ancillary duties include "guest service" and 
"entertainment duties," and the petitioner claims that it is the combination of culinary, guest service and 
entertainment duties that makes the knowledge specialized and impossible to transfer. The petitioner notes that it 
combines traditional gaucho meat preparation with the "espeto corridor" serving style and churrasqueiros who 
"entertain and perform guests, explaining the history and traditions of southern Brazil." 
Again, the petitioner's training materials do not support its claims that the position requires and involves the 
application of specialized knowledge. The petitioner does not claim that its cooking or serving styles differ 
significantly from those used by other churrascaria restaurants. An employee's knowledge of minor variances in 
style or manner of operations cannot be considered specialized. Although the skills needed to prepare a certain 
type of cuisine are typically acquired through a period of hands-on training, they are nevertheless common in the 
petitioner's industry and specific culinary specialty. The petitioner's cooking methods, the types of meat served, 
and the continuous tableside serving style are typical in restaurants serving this type of cuisine. The evidence 
submitted shows that the cultural component of the churrasqueiro training, which the petitioner claims makes its 
restaurants and workers unique, is quite brief in relation to the amount of time the petitioner claims to devote to 
training its workers in how to speak English and how to cook and serve meat, duties that have not been shown to 
require specialized knowledge. 
Specifically, the record shows that during the first and second semesters of the training program, its trainees 
complete the "gaucho culture" training module, which includes the following topics: History of Rio Grande do 
Sul, Culture, Culinary, Attire, Tools and Utensils, and Dances and Literature. The training documentation 
submitted consists of: (1) a four-page document summarizing the history of the Rio Grande do Sul; (2) a chart 
listing demographic characteristics of the Rio Grande state; (3) a four-page description of the typical garb of the 
region; (3) a dictionary definition of the term "gaucho"; (4) a onepage description of "gaucho implements"; (5) a 
one-page description of "gaucho cuisine"; (6) a two-page document brief describing nine types of traditional 
dances; (7) a one-page traditional Brazilian fable; and (8) a list of 18 questions and answers regarding the gaucho 
EAC 07 01 3 52342 
Page 28 
culture. The list of questions is introduced as follows: "In order for you to delight our clients by demonstrating 
your knowledge about the gaucho culture, we have prepared a list of the most frequent questions asked in the 
dining room, with answers." 
While knowledge specific to Brazilian gaucho culture is not widely known by skilled chefs, the petitioner has not 
established that this knowledge is so complex that it couldn't be mastered within a reasonable period of time by an 
employee who was otherwise trained in the churrasqueiro method of cooking and tableside service. Based on the 
evidence submitted, the petitioner's churrasqueiros are provided with a short course on culture which involves 
tasks as simple as memorizing a set of eighteen questions and answers. It is unclear how the petitioner could 
establish that general knowledge of Brazilian culture and history constitutes specialized knowledge specific to its 
organization. 
B. Expert Opinion Letters 
The AAO acknowledges counsel's contention that the director did not acknowledge the opinion evidence 
submitted by As a matter of discretion, USCIS may accept 
expert opinion testimony.4 However, USCIS will reject an expert opinion or give it less weight if it is not in 
accord with other information in the record or if it is in any way questionable. temational, Inc., 
ultimately responsible for making the final determination 
regarding an alien's eligibility for the benefit sought; the submission of expert opinion letters is not presumptive 
evidence of eligibility. Id.; see also Matter of V-K-, 24 I&N Dec. 500, n.2 (BIA 2008) ("[Elxpert opinion 
testimony, while undoubtedly a form of evidence, does not purport to be evidence as to 'fact' but rather is 
admissible only if 'it will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."'). 
Upon review, the opinion submitted letters will be given limited evidentiary weight in this proceeding. 
Although the authors are well-credentialed in the restaurant industry and/or Brazilian culture, none of the 
three letters speak directly to the critical question in this case - the purported special or advanced nature of 
this individual beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner's products, methods and processes. 
4 Letters may generally be divided into two types of testimonial evidence: expert opinion evidence and 
written testimonial evidence. Opinion testimony is based on one's well-qualified belief or idea, rather than 
direct knowledge of the facts at issue. Black's Law Dictionary 1515 (8th Ed. 2007) (defining "opinion 
testimony"). Written testimonial evidence, on the other hand, is testimony about facts, such as whether 
something occurred or did not occur, based on the witness' direct knowledge. Id. (defining "written 
testimony"); see also id at 15 14 (defining "affirmative testimony"). 
Depending on the specificity, detail, and credibility of a letter, USCIS may give the document more or less 
persuasive weight in a proceeding. The Board of Immigration Appeals (the Board) has held that testimony 
should not be disregarded simply because it is "self-serving." See, e.g., Matter of S-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 1328, 
1332 (BIA 2000) (citing cases). The Board also held, however: "We not only encourage, but require the 
introduction of corroborative testimonial and documentary evidence, where available." Id. If testimonial 
evidence lacks specificity, detail, or credibility, there is a greater need for the petitioner to submit 
corroborative evidence. Matter of Y-B-, 21 I&N Dec. 1136 (BIA 1998). 
EAC 07 013 52342 
Page 29 
For example, speaks generally about the petitioner's successful business model and 
employment model, and concludes that the churrasqueiro position is the most critical position in the 
company. He also expresses his opinion that it would be impossible to train U.S. workers to replace Brazilian 
churrasqueiros "because they possess advanced knowledge of [the petitioner's] system and methods, as well 
as providing the Brazilian authenticity required to validate the concept to its guests, that is simply unavailable 
in the United States." He concludes that the petitioner would experience a substantial revenue loss if the 
petitioner were prohibited from transferring such employees from Brazil. As discussed above, the petitioner 
has not established that churrasqueiros in general, or the beneficiary in particular, possess advanced 
knowledge, or that the knowledge of the petitioner's system and methods alone constitutes specialized 
knowledge. Therefore, conclusion amounts to a statement that only a Brazilian can provide 
the petitioner's guests with an authentic Brazilian experience. While this is likely an accurate statement, an 
alien cannot qualify for this classification based primarily upon his or her nationality.- 
conclusions are not based on a review of the immigration statute or the applicable regulations. 
provided an even more detailed letter discussing the petitioner's business model and the role of the 
churrasqueiros within it. He concluded that the petitioner's system and method for creating an authentic 
experience of Brazilian culture and cuisine "is so advanced and unusual as to be proprietary to [the 
petitioner]." As discussed, a review of the petitioner's training material fails to establish that the company's 
system and methods are significantly different from those of other churrascarias, and the AAO can find no 
rationale for concluding that the culture and cuisine of Southern Brazil could somehow be "proprietary" or 
specific to one company., like, does not indicate that his opinion is based on a 
review of the immigration statute or the applicable regulations. 
Finally, the letter from indicates that he supports the petitioner's request for a "Visa of Cultural 
Exchange." He makes no reference to the beneficiary's specialized or advanced knowledge, nor does he 
indicate that his opinion is based on the applicable statute and regulations pertaining to specialized knowledge 
intracompany transferees. Unlike other nonimmigrant visa classifications, such as the Q-1 cultural exchange 
visitor, the L-1B specialized knowledge visa has no cultural component. C' 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(q). 
Again, the AAO may, in its discretion, use as advisory opinion statements submitted as expert testimony. 
However, where an opinion is not in accord with other information or is any way questionable, the AAO is 
not required to accept or may give less weight to that evidence. Matter of Caron International, 19 I&N Dec. 
791. Since the opinions offered here do not address the individual beneficiary's claimed specialized 
knowledge, the opinions are not found to be persuasive on this point. 
Overall, the submitted evidence does not establish that knowledge of the petitioner's food preparation, service and 
"entertainment" techniques alone constitutes specialized knowledge or that they are so complex that could not be 
readily transferred to employees outside the organization. 
C. Special or Advanced Level of howledge or Expertise 
The petitioner must establish that the beneficiary possesses special knowledge or an advanced level of knowledge 
or expertise in the organization's processes and procedures and that the position requires such knowledge. See 8 
C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). 
EAC 07 0 13 52342 
Page 30 
As noted above, the petitioner was instructed in the notice of intent to revoke to submit evidence that the 
beneficiary's advanced level of knowledge of the company's processes and procedures distinguishes him from 
others with only basic or elementary knowledge. The director also requested that the petitioner explain how the 
beneficiary's job duties are different from the tasks performed by other gaucho chefs within the company, and to 
indicate how many other chefs have received training similar to that received by the beneficiary. The director 
noted in the notice of intent to revoke that the specialized knowledge worker classification was not intended for 
all employees with any level of specialized knowledge, but rather to facilitate the admission of "key personnel" 
for companies who require an employee with advanced knowledge to perform duties in the United States. The 
director observed that most employees in the workforce receive training specific to their employment, and 
emphasized that it is not sufficient to merely asserts that an employee has been working for a number of years and 
therefore possesses specialized knowledge. 
In response, counsel for the petitioner objected to the reference to specialized knowledge employees as "key 
personnel," and argued that that the statutory definition, regulations and interpretive memoranda released 
since 1990 contain no references to "key personnel" or any similar requirements based on such a standard. 
Counsel stated that churrasqueiros are in fact key personnel within the petitioner's business, but that USCIS 
cannot require the petitioner to submit evidence that the beneficiary "is among the few 'key personnel' within 
the company." 
Counsel further objected to the director's requests for evidence as to how the beneficiary's duties differ from 
other churrasqueiros, noting that there is no requirement that the beneficiary's specialized knowledge be 
narrowly held within the company. Citing to the Puleo Memorandum, counsel stated that the petitioner only 
needs to establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is advanced. The petitioner declined to submit the 
majority of the requested evidence, resting on its objections to the rationale underlying the director's request. 
Counsel's argument, essentially, is that all churrasqueiros working for the petitioner's organization should be 
deemed to have advanced knowledge of the company's policies and procedures, and thus, specialized knowledge. 
Neither counsel nor the petitioner claims that the instant benejciary's knowledge is advanced compared to 
similarly employed workers in the organization. In fact, very little specific information regarding the beneficiary 
and his individual qualifications for the position have been offered. 
Counsel's arguments on these points are not persuasive. While the phrase "key personnel" derives from the 
legislative history surrounding the creation of the L-1 visa category in 1970, the AAO disagrees with counsel's 
suggestion that Congress had a clear intent to liberalize the general scope of the specialized knowledge 
classification with the Immigration Act of 1990. The AAO notes that the 1990 Committee Report does not take 
issue with the specifics of previous INS interpretations and does not state an intent to "broaden" the "narrow 
class" of aliens that Congress initially stated would be eligible for the classification. The 1990 Committee Report 
does not reject, criticize, or even refer to any specific INS regulation or precedent decision interpreting the term. 
There is nothing in the legislative history to indicate that Congress intended to specifically liberalize the 
specialized knowledge classification. See supra, pp. 17-8. 
As observed above, the AAO notes that the precedent decisions that predate the 1990 Act are not categorically 
superseded by the statutory definition of specialized knowledge, and the general issues and case facts themselves 
EAC 07 013 52342 
Page 3 1 
remain cogent as examples of how the INS applied the law to the real world facts of individual adjudications. 
USCIS must distinguish between skilled workers and specialized knowledge workers when making a 
determination on an L-1B visa petition. The distinction between skilled and specialized workers has been a 
recurring issue in the L-1B program and is discussed at length in the INS precedent decisions, including Matter of 
Penner. See 18 I&N Dec. at 50-53 (discussing the legislative history and prior precedents as they relate to the 
distinction between skilled and specialized knowledge workers). 
According to the reasoning of Matter of Penner, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically complex 
products, by itself, will not equal "special knowledge." 18 I&N Dec. at 52-3. USCIS must interpret specialized 
knowledge to require more than fundamental job skills or a short period of experience. An expansive 
interpretation of specialized knowledge in which any experienced employee would qualifL as having special or 
advanced knowledge would be untenable, since it would allow a petitioner to transfer any experienced employee 
to the United States in L-1B classification. For the term to have any meaning, the term "special" or "advanced" 
must indicate something more than experienced or skilled. In other terms, specialized knowledge requires more 
churrasqueiro with the foreign entity. 
It is also appropriate for the AAO to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the 
beneficiary's knowledge of the business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making 
process. Matter of Colley, 1 8 I&N Dec. 1 1 7, 120 (Comm. 198 1 ) (citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 6 1 8 
(R.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. 816 (R.C. 1971)). As stated by the Commissioner in Matter 
of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 52 (Comm. 1982), when considering whether the beneficiaries possessed 
specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find that the occupations inherently 
qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have 
unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. Id. The Commissioner also provided the 
following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or her to 
produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed primarily 
for his ability to carry out a key process or function which is important or essential to the 
business' operation. 
Id. at 53. In the present matter, the evidence of record demonstrates that the beneficiary is more akin to an 
employee whose skills and experience enable him to provide a service, rather than an employee who has 
unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. 
EAC 07 013 52342 
Page 32 
Here, the petitioner continually claims that the beneficiary is a key employee and is of crucial importance to 
the petitioner's business. However, the petitioner has not provided any information pertaining to other gaucho 
chefs employed by the petitioner, despite the director specific request for such information in the notice of 
intent to revoke. Failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be 
grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(14). 
Nor did the petitioner distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge, work experience, or training from the other 
employees. Without such evidence, the AAO cannot conclude that the beneficiary's knowledge is "advanced" 
and, for the reasons discussed above, cannot accept the blanket assertion that all gaucho chefs employed by 
the foreign entity possess "advanced knowledge" of the petitioner's processes and procedures. 
In fact, the record shows that the petitioner employs at least ten to twelve gaucho chefs in each of its multiple 
U.S. locations, all of whom work together as a team. Although the petitioner acknowledges that it does have 
competitors, it fails to reasonably distinguish the beneficiary from other "Americanized" gaucho chefs or 
steak house chefs working in the United States. The lack of evidence in the record makes it impossible to 
classi@ the beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner's operation and cooking process as specialized, 
particularly since there are so many competitors in the industry serving churrasca. The AAO, therefore, is 
precluded from finding that the beneficiary's role is "of crucial importance" to the organization. Again, 
simply going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the 
burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soflci, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. 
Finally, the AAO acknowledges counsel's assertion that, according to the 2004 Ohata Memorandum 
pertaining to specialized knowledge chefs, the petitioner needs to establish that the beneficiary's skill set "is 
so complex that it contributed directly to the success of the foreign entity," or that all of the company's chefs 
"must undergo rigorous in-house training in order to satisfactorily perform their job duties." Counsel stated 
that the memorandum also requires the petitioner to submit evidence that the company now wishes to 
replicate its success in the United States by transferring such personnel to the United States in order to 
establish "substantially similar operations." Counsel asserted that the petitioner meets these requirements as 
the petitioner's chuwasqueiros possess complex skills that contribute to the success of the company in Brazil 
and that they are key to the continued successful replication of the Brazilian business concept in the United 
States. 
Applying the guidance in the internal agency memorandum to the facts of this case, the petitioner has not 
established that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that he has been or would be employed in 
a capacity requiring specialized knowledge. Since the petitioner has not documented the beneficiary's 
completion of its internal training program, it has not shown that "all of its chefs must undergo rigorous in- 
house training in order to satisfactorily perform their duties." As discussed, the beneficiary in this matter, 
based on the evidence of record, joined the foreign entity as a churrasqueiro after serving in similar positions 
with unrelated entities. There is no evidence that he spent any period of time as a trainee. 
Furthermore, the facts of this case can be distinguished from the hypothetical example provided in the Ohata 
Memorandum, which refers to a petitioner seeking to replicate the success of a foreign entity in the United 
States by transferring the beneficiary and using the person to establish a substantially similar operation. The 
EAC 07 0 13 52342 
Page 33 
petitioner was established in the United States in 1997, ten years prior to the filing of this petition, and since 
that time, it has opened ten restaurants in the United States. Meanwhile, since its establishment in 1979, the 
foreign entity has opened four restaurants in Brazil It is reasonable to conclude that the petitioner has already 
replicated the success of the foreign entity in the United States and does not require the services of the instant 
beneficiary to "establish" its U.S. operations. 
Nor has the petitioner established that the beneficiary's skill set is so complex that he contributed directly to 
the success of the foreign entity. The example provided in the Ohata Memorandum noted that such an alien 
might include one who "designed a pastry menu and a method of pastry presentation that earned the entity an 
international reputation." The petitioner has not established that the beneficiary has any particular skill or 
accomplishment not possessed by other churrasqueiros working for the foreign entity. The petitioner's 
conclusory assertion that all gaucho chefs are important and contribute to the success of the foreign entity is 
simply not comparable to the hypothetical facts set forth in the memorandum. The record of proceeding 
contains little evidence or argument relative to the instant beneficiary himself and the impression created is 
that any Brazilian churrasqueiro working for the foreign entity would be equally qualified for the proffered 
position. 
It appears that the petitioner's business thrives on providing a feeling of authenticity to its customers. The 
AAO cannot ignore the fact that its practice of only hiring Brazilians to serve as gaucho chefs undoubtedly 
contributes to this authenticity. However, without clearly showing that the actual job of a gaucho chef could 
not be performed by a similarly qualified chef in the United States (for example, there are many Brazilian 
restaurants operating in the United States and therefore there are undoubtedly similarly qualified chefs 
employed therein), the fact that the petitioner desires to employ native "gauchos" from Southern Brazil is 
insufficient to qualify the beneficiary for an L-1B visa. While the beneficiary's ethnic background, skills and 
knowledge may contribute to the success of the petitioning organization, the combination of these factors does 
not constitute the possession of specialized knowledge. 
In the present matter, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary's training, work experience, or 
knowledge in the churrasca cooking style is more advanced than the knowledge possessed by others employed by 
the petitioner, or in the industry. It is clear that the petitioner considers the beneficiary to be an important 
employee of the organization. The AAO, likewise, does not dispute the fact that the beneficiary's knowledge has 
allowed him to competently perform his job in the foreign entity. However, the successful completion of one's 
job duties does not distinguish the beneficiary as an employee possessing advanced knowledge of the petitioner's 
processes and procedures, nor does it establish employment in a specialized knowledge capacity. 
Nor does the record establish that the proposed U.S. position requires specialized knowledge. While the 
position of gaucho chef may require a comprehensive knowledge of the manner in which to prepare, cook and 
serve meats in the traditional barbeque style native to Southern Brazil, the petitioner has not established that a 
gaucho chef must possess "specialized knowledge" as defined in the regulations and the Act. 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 16. Based on the evidence presented, it is 
EAC 07 013 52342 
Page 34 
concluded that the beneficiary does not possess specialized knowledge, nor would the beneficiary be 
employed in a capacity requiring specialized knowledge. For this reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
V. ffGross Error" and Revocation 
Since the issue of specialized knowledge in this matter has been addressed, the remaining issue in this matter 
is whether the approval of the initial petition constituted gross error. Under USCIS regulations, the approval 
of an L-1B petition may be revoked on notice under six specific circumstances. 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(9)(iii)(A). 
To properly revoke the approval of a petition, the director must issue a notice of intent to revoke that contains 
a detailed statement of the grounds for the revocation and the time period allowed for rebuttal. 8 C.F.R. 
8 2 14.2(1)(9)(iii)(B). 
In the present matter, the director provided a detailed statement of the grounds for the revocation. Referring 
to the eligibility criteria at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(ii), the director reviewed the rebuttal evidence and 
concluded that the petitioner had not established that the beneficiary's position as a churrasqueiro, required 
specialized knowledge to the extent that it qualified for approval under the L-IB category. The director 
subsequently revoked the approval on the basis of 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(9)(iii)(A)(5): "Approval of the petition 
involved gross error." 
The term "gross error" is not defined by the regulations or statute. Furthermore, although the term has a 
juristic ring to it, "gross error" is not a commonly used legal term and has no basis in jurisprudence. See 
Black's Law Dictionary 562, 710 (7th Ed. 1999)(defining the types of legal "error" and legal terms using 
ttgrosstt without citing "gross error"). The word "gross" is commonly defined first as "unmitigated in any 
way: UTTER," as in "gross negligence." Webster's I1 New College Dictionary 491 (2001). 
AS the term "gross error" was created by regulation, it is most instructive to examine the comments that 
accompanied the publication of the rule in the Federal Register. The term "gross error" was first used in the 
regulations relating to the revocation of a nonimmigrant L-1 petition. In the 1986 proposed rule, an L-1 
revocation would be permitted if the approval had been "improvidently granted." 5 1 Fed. Reg. 1859 1, 18598 
(May 21, 1986)(Proposed Rule). After receiving comments that expressed concern that the phrase 
"improvidently granted" might be given a broader interpretation than intended, the agency changed the final 
rule to use the phrase "gross error." 52 Fed. Reg. 5738, 5749 (Feb. 26, 1987)(Final Rule). As an example of 
gross error in the L-1 context, the drafter of the regulation stated: 
This provision was intended to correct situations where there was gross error in approval of the 
petition. For example, after a petition has been approved, it may later be determined that a 
qualifying relationship did not exist between the United States and the foreign entity which 
employed the beneficiary abroad. 
Id. Accordingly, upon review of the regulatory history and the common usage of the term, the AAO 
interprets the term "gross error" to be an unmitigated or absolute error, such as an approval that was granted 
contrary to the requirements stated in the statute or regulations. This view of "gross error" is consistent with 
the example provided in the Federal Register. See 52 Fed. Reg. at 5749. 
EAC 07 013 52342 
Page 35 
Upon review, the present petition was properly revoked as the prior petition was approved in gross error. On 
appeal, counsel provides several arguments challenging the director's basis for revocation. First, counsel 
contends that the director's decision to revoke the approval of the petition was arbitrary and capricious in that 
the director erroneously relied upon the consular officer's recommendation. Second, counsel argues that the 
director failed to consider the prior approval of more than 213 L-1B petitions filed by the petitioner for other 
churrasqueiro positions. The AAO will address each of these contentions individually. 
Counsel's primary assertion is that the director's primary basis for revocation of the approval of the petition 
was based upon the consular officer's referraL5 Specifically, counsel contends that a consular officer is not 
permitted to question the validity of an approved petition without material evidence. Counsel relies upon 
conditions outlined in the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) and contends that "a consular officer's disagreement 
with DHS's interpretation of law or fact is not sufficient reason to ask DHS to reconsider its approval of the 
petition." See 9 FAM 41.54 N3.2-2. Counsel contends that the interview between the beneficiary and the 
consular officer in Brazil lasted only a few minutes; therefore, the consular officer could not possibly have 
obtained sufficient material evidence upon which to recommend revocation of the petition's approval. 
Counsel's assertion is not persuasive. The AAO has no jurisdiction to review the actions of the Department of 
State consular officer. Once the consular officer returns an approved petition to USCIS for review, the 
director may either affirm the approval or initiate revocation proceedings. In his brief, counsel cited the FAM 
as an authority supporting the petitioner's argument. It must be noted that the FAM is not binding upon 
USCIS. See Avena v. INS, 989 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1997); Matter ofBosuego, 17 I&N Dec. 125 (BIA 1979). 
The FAM provides guidance to employees of the Department of State in carrying out their official duties, 
such as the adjudication of visa applications abroad. The FAM is not relevant to this proceeding. 
Upon receipt of the petition from the consular officer, the director was obligated to review the petition and 
supporting documentation in order to determine whether the approval should be affirmed. The director's 
decision to instead initiate revocation proceedings in this matter was well within the scope of his authority 
and therefore, appropriate. Prior to revocation of the petition's approval, the director properly issued a detailed 
notice of intent to revoke, which thoroughly outlined the numerous deficiencies the director noted upon 
reconsideration of the petition. The director's notice was not based on the conclusions reached by the consular 
officer or on statements made by the beneficiary during his brief interview, but based on a thorough review of 
the record of proceeding in its entirety. 
The director provided a detailed analysis regarding the basis for possible revocation and provided the 
petitioner with the opportunity to rebut his findings. As discussed above, however, the petitioner failed to 
respond to the majority of the director's specific requests, and merely provided generic outlines and 
5 According to the consular officer's memorandum dated June 2 1,2007, a copy of which was provided to the 
petitioner, the beneficiary indicated to the officer during his interview that his job was that his skills are 
knowing how to select and season meats and how to work with a lot of energy. He indicated that he learned 
the trade at home in the south of Brazil. Based on this information, the officer determined that the beneficiary 
did not appear to possess specialized knowledge, an essential element that must be established to warrant 
approval of the L-1B nonimmigrant petition. 
EAC 07 013 52342 
Page 36 
conclusory statements in response to the notice of intent to revoke. Upon a thorough review of the record, the 
AAO concurs with the director's conclusion that the petitioner failed to overcome the bases for revocation. 
See 8 C.F.R. $ 103.2(b)(14). 
The petitioner's second contention on appeal is that the director ignored the fact that the petitioner previously 
obtained approval for 213 petitions filed on behalf of gaucho chefs. Counsel specifically refers to a 2004 
USCIS memorandum to support his assertion that it is USCIS policy that prior approvals should be given 
deference. See Memorandum of William R. Yates, Associate Director for Operations, USCIS: The 
SigniJicance of a Prior CIS Approval of a Nonimmigrant Petition in the Context of a Subsequent 
Determination Regarding Eligibility of Petition Validity (April 23, 2004)("Yates Memorandum"). The 
memorandum provides that exceptions to this policy should be made where: (1) it is determined that there 
was a material error with regard to the previous petition approval; (2) a substantial change in circumstances 
has taken place; or (3) there is new material information that adversely impacts the petitioner's or 
beneficiary's eligibility. Id. 
The Yates Memorandum to which counsel refers applies solely and specifically to matters relating to an 
extension of nonimmigrant petition validity involving the same parties (petitioner and beneficiary) and the 
same underlying facts. The instant petition is a petition for a new employment rather than an extension 
petition, and the petitioner has never filed an L-1B petition on the beneficiary's behalf in the past. 
The director's decision does not indicate whether he reviewed the prior approvals of the other nonimmigrant 
petitions. It must be emphasized that each petition filing is a separate proceeding with a separate record. See 
8 C.F.R. $ 103.8(d). In making a determination of statutory eligibility, USCIS is limited to the information 
contained in that individual record of proceeding. See 8 C.F.R. $ 103.2(b)(16)(ii). As the director properly 
reviewed the record before him, it was impracticable for the director to provide the petitioner with an 
explanation as to why the prior approvals were erroneous, as counsel suggests. 
As noted above, USCIS must make a determination regarding specialized knowledge on a case-by-case basis. 
In this matter, the petitioner has provided very little evidence specific to the beneficiary, his training or his 
qualifications, and instead relies on blanket assertions that all of its churrasqueiros meet the requirements for 
employment in a specialized knowledge capacity. If the previous nonimmigrant petitions were approved 
based on the same broad, unsupported assertions that are contained in the current record, the approvals would 
constitute material and gross error on the part of the director. The AAO is not required to approve 
applications or petitions where eligibility has not been demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that 
may have been erroneous. See, e.g. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 597. It 
would be absurd to suggest that USCIS or any agency must treat acknowledged errors as binding precedent. 
Sussex Engg. Ltd. v. Montgomery, 825 F.2d 1084, 1090 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988). 
Despite any number of previously approved petitions, USCIS does not have any authority to confer an 
immigration benefit when the petitioner fails to meet its burden of proof in a subsequent petition. See section 
291 of the Act. 
Furthermore, the AAO's authority over the service centers is comparable to the relationship between a court 
of appeals and a district court. Even if a service center director had approved the nonimmigrant petitions on 
behalf of the beneficiary, the AAO would not be bound to follow the contradictory decision of a service 
EAC 07 013 52342 
Page 37 
center. Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS, 2000 0 282785 (E.D. La.), afd, 248 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 
2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 51 (2001). 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.