dismissed L-1B Case: Import/Export

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. A3042 
Washington, DC 20529 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
c File: WAC 03 257 53419 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: m)V @ 8 2005 
IN RE: 
Petition: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
X 
Administrative Appeals Office 
WAC 03 257 53419 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to employ the beneficiary as an L-1B nonimmigrant 
intracompany transferee in a capacity involving specialized knowledge pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 3 1 10 1 (a)(] 5)(L). The petitioner is a corporation 
organized in the State of California that is engaged in the import, sales and marketing of Philippines-made 
house wares and accessories. The petitioner claims that it is the affiliate of Brakah International, located in 
Makati City, Philippines. The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary as its senior merchandiser for a two- 
year period at its new office in the United States. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish that the beneficiary will serve 
in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner disputes the director's 
decision and asserts that the director did not consider all of the evidence submitted in support of the 
beneficiary's claimed specialized knowledge qualifications. In support of these assertions, counsel submits a 
brief and additional evidence. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-12:) shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
WAC 03 257 53419 
Page 3 
education, training, and employment qualifies hirnher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 214.2(1)(3)(vi) states that if the beneficiary is coming to the Untied States in a 
specialized knowledge capacity to open or to be employed in a new office, the petitioner shall submit 
evidence that: 
(A) Sufficient physical premises to house the new office have been secured; 
(B) The business entity in the United States is or will be a qualifying organization as 
defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section; and 
(C) The petitioner has the financial ability to remunerate the beneficiary and to 
commence doing business in the United States. 
The primary issue in the present matter is whether the beneficiary will be employed in a capacity that involves 
specialized knowledge. 
Section 2 14(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1 184(c)(2)(B), provides: 
An alien is considered to be serving in a capacity involving specialized knowledge with respect 
to a company if the alien has a special knowledge of the company product and its application in 
international markets or has an advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the 
company. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) states: 
Specialized Knowledge means special knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning 
organization's product, service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests 
and its application in international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in 
the organization's processes and procedures. 
In a September 3, 2003 letter submitted with the initial petition, the petitioner described the beneficiary's 
proposed duties and specialized knowledge requirements of the United States position as follows: 
She will assist in sales and marketing for the company as well as maintaining the client and 
vendor relations of the company. Moreover, she will handle the design and product 
development for [the petitioner] as well as conduct follow up requests for orders placed 
overseas with the company's international contractors and vendors. Specific duties will 
include planning the negotiation of contracts for sale with huge multinational companies and 
establishments and explaining to customers the various differences and qualities of each 
WAC 03 257 53419 
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product sold by [the petitioner] and as to how the materials and qualities are able to achieve 
the desired look and effect the customers want. 
Moreover, [the beneficiary's] job duties include educating [the petitioner's] customers 
regarding the nature of the indigenous products it sells. [The petitioner] will be showcasing 
indigenous materials from the Philippines such as abaca. Havana hemp, tuskig, raffia, capiz, 
coco twigs and shells, carugurnoy, tinalak, pineapple fiber and other products that comprise 
houseware and decorative articles not available in the United States. The indigenous nature 
and quality of those products necessitate the use of a technical expert who can readily explain 
to customers or give suggestions to clients on the proper usage of the materials desired. 
[The beneficiary's] expertise in abaca will be critical to the company and to how it would be 
able to explain in detail the nature of the indigenous fiber to customers who do not know 
anything about it. The nature of the fiber is important for design purposes, tensile strength, 
flame retardancy, health-related issues, and other government compliance issues. [The 
beneficiary's] intimate knowledge of the fiber is integral to the resolution of these issues. 
The knowledge [the beneficiary] possess [sic] regarding the nature and quality of the various 
products sold by [the petitioner] cannot readily be found in an employee in the United States. 
The products . . .are only found in the Philippines and more importantly, knowledge and 
familiarity with the products are not even found with every Filipino worker. The speciiic 
workers must have been worked around or has been involved in a very intimate way with the 
harvesting and production of the indigenous fibers and materials that are sold by [the 
petitioner]. [The beneficiary] has been involved in very intimate ways with the production 
and preparation of indigenous products found in the showroom of [the petitioner] as well as 
worked around them since 1992. 
The petitioner further stated that the beneficiary had been employed in a very similar capacity as a senior 
merchandiser and designer with the foreign entity since 1992 where she was responsible for design and 
product development tasks, follow-up of sample requests, pre-shipment inspection requirements, and 
explaining to customers the quality and nature of products sold by the company. The petitioner further stated 
that the beneficiary responded to inquiries regarding the tensile strength and durability of the abaca products, 
and was "intimately involved in the design concepts and production process with the customers." In addition, 
the petitioner claimed that beneficiary "collaborated on numerous design concepts and production processes 
with foreign interior designers, company executives, managers and business owners." The petitloner also 
emphasized the beneficiary's knowledge of U.S., Asian and European customs and shipping regulations, her 
bi-lingual abilities, and her knowledge of the import-export market, sources and suppliers. Finally, the 
petitioner stated that "the key element of these duties is the technical knowledge of the indigenous products 
sold by [the petitioner], knowledge gained only after a number of years of employment with a company who 
specializes in these products." 
On November 26, 2003, the director requested additional evidence to establish that the beneficiary has 
specialized knowledge. Specifically, the director requested: (1) the petitioner's organizational chart showing 
WAC 03 257 53419 
Page 5 
the location of the proposed position and number of employees the beneficiary will supervise; (2) California 
Employment Development Department Forms DE-6, Quarterly Wage Report, for all employees for the last 
two quarters; (3) information regarding the petitioner's foreign national employees, including their job titles 
and visa status; (4) information regarding the number of persons holding the same or similar positions at the 
petitioner's location; (5) an explanation as to how the duties the alien performed abroad and those she will 
perform in the United States are different or unique from those of other workers employed by the petitioner or 
other U.S. employers in this type of position; (6) an explanation as to how the beneficiary's training is 
exclusive and significantly unique in comparison to that of others employed by the petitioner or another 
person in this field; and (7) an explanation as to how the petitioner's business would be impacted if the 
petitioner is unable to obtain the beneficiary's services, and what alternative action will be taken to fill the 
responsibilities. 
In response, counsel for the petitioner submitted a letter dated December 2, 2003 in which he explained that 
some of the requested evidence could not be provided because the petitioner is a new company that does not 
currently have any existing payroll employees. The petitioner did, however, submit a proposed organizational 
chart indicating that the petitioner's organization will include an ownerlmanager, the beneficiary as senior 
merchandiser, a marketing department and an import/export department. In response to the director's request 
that the petitioner explain how the beneficiary's knowledge is "specialized" or "advanced" the petitioner 
repeated the job description described above. Counsel added that, since the products sold and marketed by the 
petitioner are only available in the Philippines, "the beneficiary has knowledge of a process arid various 
products of a sophisticated nature." Counsel hrther explained: 
[Olnly persons with vast experience abroad with the products and its olgins possess the 
knowledge and expertise to properly market, explain, educate, manage, and implement design 
concepts associated with the employer's products. The beneficiary possesses knowledge that 
is valuable and critical to the employer's competitiveness and survival in the market place. 
Furthermore, the beneficiary possess [sic] knowledge which can only be gained through prior 
experience with the petitioning employer because the producers of the products that the 
employer markets only cany contracts with the petitioning employer and the knowledge that 
the beneficiary has gained thru [sic] the years she has been employed with the petitioner 
abroad was only garnered by working specifically with those manufacturers. 
In response to the director's request for a description of the beneficiary's training and how it is different or 
unique, counsel stated that she has been employed by the foreign entity since 1992 where "she gained her 
technical and specialized knowledge about the unique nature and qualities of abaca fiber and the other 
indigenous products sold by [the foreign entity] and now [the petitioner]. Counsel also re-emphasized the 
beneficiary's knowledge of customs and shipping regulations, the import-export market, suppliers, and her 
ability to speak both English and Tagalog. Counsel further asserted "[the beneficiary's] job duties in the 
Philippines placed her intimately with the manufacturing process of the items being sold by the employer and 
her close contact and immersion into the production of abaca gave her a profound understanding and 
knowledge of the product that enables her to perform the proffered job duties in the U.S." Finally, Counsel 
stated that the beneficiary's services are "critical to the survival of the petitioner's business in the U.S. 
Without the presence of [the beneficiary], the company will be unable to provide a basic service to its 
WAC 03 257 53419 
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customers which is education and project management." Counsel also stated that it would be "close to 
impossible" to train a U.S. worker to fill the position, and that "a person can only be properly trained and 
educated to fill the position offered to [the beneficiary] after five years of immersion in the provinces of the 
Philippines and the abaca industry where the person will be educated in the origins, creation, preparation and 
manufacturing of the abaca fiber." 
On February 24, 2004, the director denied the petition determining that the petitioner had not established that 
the beneficiary would serve in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. The director specifically noted 
that the beneficiary's knowledge is general knowledge or expertise which enables her to provide a service. 
The director further noted that the petitioner did not establish that the beneficiary has an advanced level of 
knowledge of the processes and procedures of the petitioning organization. Finally, the director noted that the 
ability to speak two languages and "unsubstantiated knowledge of laws and customs regulations are not 
indicative of an uncommon or specialized knowledge." 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director failed to consider the information provided in 
response to the request for evidence and suggests that such failure is an abuse of discretion. Counsel further 
contends that it has provided sufficient explanation regarding the beneficiary's duties, their "specialized and 
unique nature" and the "uniqueness of the products it sells." Counsel contends that the beneficiary has 
"intimate knowledge" of the "complicated and unique nature of materials involved in the production of the 
petitioner's products" including knowledge of the fibers used as raw materials by the petitioner and its 
contractors in the Philippines. In support of these assertions, the petitioner submits a listing of products 
purportedly describing some of the goods sold by the petitioner, and a study describing the abaca a~gicultural 
industry in the Philippmes. Counsel contends that the beneficiary's knowledge of the abilities and limitations 
of the abaca suppliers and her existing relationships with them make her an "essential employee." 
On review, counsel has not demonstrated that the beneficiary possesses "specialized knowledge" as defined in 
section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. fj 1184(c)(2)(B), and the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). 
In examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's 
description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. tj 2 14.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed description 
of the services to be performed sufficient to establish specialized knowledge. Id. It is also appropriate for the 
AAO to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the beneficiary's knowledge of the 
business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making process. See Matter of C'olley, 18 
I&N Dec. 1 17, 120 (Comm. 198 1) (citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 61 8 (R.C. 1970) and Matter of 
LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. 816 (R.C. 1971)).' As stated by the Commissioner in Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 
1 Although the cited precedents pre-date the current statutory definition of "specialized knowledge," 
the AAO finds them instructive. Other than deleting the former requirement that specialized knowledge had 
to be "proprietary," the 1990 Act did not significantly alter the definition of "specialized knowledge" from the 
prior INS interpretation of the tern. The 1990 Committee Report does not reject, criticize, or even refer to 
any specific INS regulation or precedent decision interpreting the term. The Committee Report simply states 
that the Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of "[vlarying [i.e., not specifically 
incorrect] interpretations by INS," H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I), at 69, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. Beyond that, 
WAC 03 257 53419 
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49, 52 (Comm. 1982), when considering whether the beneficiaries possessed specialized knowledge, "the 
LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find that the occupations inherently qualified the beneficiaries for the 
classifications sought." Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have unusual duties, skills, or knowledge 
beyond that of a skilled worker. Id. The Commissioner also provided the following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose slulls and knowledge enable him or her to 
produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed primarily 
for his ability to carry out a key process or function which is important or essential to the 
business' operation. 
Id. at 53. 
In the instant matter, the petitioner has not provided a detailed description of the daily job duties to be 
performed by the beneficiary that would amount to her employment in a specialized knowledge capacity or 
employment beyond that of a skilled worker. Other than submitting a brief statement that the beneficiary 
would use her "intimate knowledge" of the products sold by the petitioner's organization to market abaca 
products and other products from the Philippines in the United States, the petitioner has not identified any 
aspect of the beneficiary's position that involves special knowledge of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests. Furthermore, while the petitioner 
repeatedly refers to the "petitioner's" products and the beneficiary's experience in the "design and production 
process" it is clear from the record that neither the petitioner nor the foreign entity are involved in design, 
manufacture or production of any products. The foreign entity is described as a "buying office" and both 
entities were formed to represent foreign buyers interested in buying products from manufacturers in the 
Philippines and in other Asian countries. Counsel's additional statement that the beneficiary's prior work 
experience with the foreign company and familiarity with existing suppliers makes her an "essential 
employee" is also insufficient. The limited descriptions provided do not specifically identify the beneficiary's 
job duties, nor do they demonstrate advanced knowledge or skills possessed by the beneficia~y. The 
petitioner is obligated to clearly define the beneficiary's unusual duties, skills, or knowledge. There is nothing 
in the record to suggest that the beneficiary's duties are different or uncommon compared to similarly 
employed workers in the industry. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient 
for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Sof)ci, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 
(Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
The petitioner's claims that the beneficiary has an "intimate knowledge" of the raw materials used by the 
petitioner's suppliers does not establish that the beneficiary would be employed in a position involving 
specialized knowledge. As noted above, the beneficiary will be employed as a merchandiser responsible for 
marketing products manufactured by overseas suppliers. The beneficiary will not be involved in the design or 
manufacturing process, and is not involved in sourcing raw materials for the manufacturing of products. The 
the Committee Report simply restates the tautology that became section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Id. The 
AAO concludes, therefore, the cited cases, as well as Matter of Penner, remain useful guidance concerning 
the intended scope of the "specialized knowledge" L-1B classification. 
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beneficiary's knowledge of the characteristics of abaca fibers and other indigenous material from the 
Philippines will likely contribute to both her success in the proposed position and the petitioner's overall 
profitability. The beneficiary's knowledge in these particular areas, however, does not appear to exceed that 
of a skilled worker. Although requested by the director, counsel has not provided any evidence that the 
beneficiary completed any special training in the materials used in the products sold by the petitioner's 
organization. The petitioner merely states that she gained her "technical and specialized knowledge about the 
unique nature and qualities of abaca fiber" because she has worked for the foreign entity since 1992. The 
record establishes that the beneficiary was hired by the foreign entity in the position of "senior merchandiser 
and designer" in 1992, and since that time, she has been performing essentially the same duties that she will 
perform in the United States. There is no evidence in the record describing the beneficiary's prior work 
experience. The fact that the foreign entity hired the beneficiary as a "senior merchandiser" and expected her 
to perform the described duties without prior training or experience in the field raises questions regarding the 
petitioner's claim that it would take five years to hire a United States worker to perform the same job duties. 
Additionally, the petitioner has not submitted documentation explaining how the howledge and expertise 
required for the beneficiary's position would differentiate her knowledge from others employed in a similar 
position by the petitioner's organization or other employers in the industry. It is noted that the statutory 
definition requires the AAO to make comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized 
knowledge. As observed in 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1990), "[slimply put, 
specialized knowledge is a relative . . . idea which cannot have a plain meaning." The term "specialized 
knowledge" is relative and cannot be plainly defined. The Congressional record specifically states that the L- 
1 category was intended for "key personnel." See generally, H.R. Rep. No. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. 
The term "key personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." 
Webster's 11 New College Dictionary at 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). In general, all employees can 
reasonably be considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the 
overall economic success of an enterprise, there would be no rational reason to employ that person. An 
employee of "crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average 
employee. Accordingly, based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record 
related to that term, the AAO must make comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge 
employee and the general labor market, but also between that employee and the remainder of the petitioner's 
workforce. 
Here, counsel has indicated that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge as a result of her work 
experience with the foreign company and her knowledge of both the foreign entity's suppliers and the 
products sold by the petitioner and the foreign entity. The petitioner has not indicated that the beneficiary 
received any special training which would give her knowledge that is more specialized or advanced than that 
of the petitioner's other employees. Nor has the petitioner established that she performed any duties which 
could be considered "special" or "advanced." Although requested by the director, the petitioner did not 
describe how her duties are different or unique from those of other workers employed by the foreign entity. 
Further, the AAO notes that the petitioner's business plan includes a job description for the petitioner's 
ownerimanager which is essentially identical to that provided for the beneficiary. Therefore, the AAO must 
conclude that, while it may be correct to say that the beneficiary is an experienced or educated employee in 
WAC 03 257 53419 
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the petitioner's products and business, this fact alone is not enough to bring the beneficiary to the level of 
"key personnel." 
Similarly, the petitioner has not submitted documentation explaining how the knowledge and expertise 
required for the beneficiary's position would differentiate her knowledge from others employed in a similar 
position by other employers in the industry. Counsel repeatedly emphasizes that the beneficiary will educate 
the petitioner's customers about the "indigenous" products its sells and states that these products are not 
available in the United States, thereby suggesting that its U.S. clientele are likely unfamiliar with the products 
and therefore require the beneficiary's claimed expertise. Although counsel concedes that the beneficiary's 
howledge of processes and products is not unique to the foreign company, counsel claims that there are no 
other companies selling such products in the continental United States. Many of these statements are 
contradicted by the information contained within the petitioner's business plan, which was submitted with the 
initial petition. The business plan indicates that most of the foreign entity's and petitioner's existing 
customers are major US.-based retailers, who are assumed to be familiar with the products the petitioner will 
be importing for them. The business plan indicates that the existing buyers will be the company's primary 
focus. The business plan states that the petitioner believes that it is the first company to open a showroom in 
the United States specializing in Philippines-made products, but there is nothing in the record to indicate that 
such products are not available in the United States from overseas suppliers. In fact, the petitioner indicates in 
its business plan that there are "thousands" of United States-based importers of Asian-made products in the 
gifts, house wares and decorative accessories market. Although the petitioner states that it will focus on 
products made of "natural materials" and focus on the "middle to high end market, the petitioner has not 
substantiated its claim that the types of products it sells are uncommon in the U.S. market, and that the 
beneficiary's knowledge can thus be differentiated fi-om other similarly employed workers in the industry. 
Again, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the 
burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Sof$ci, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. 
Finally, the AAO notes that the petitioner's business plan indicates that it intends to establish sales agents 
agreements with "several qualified free-lance independent merchandisers or buyers with experience in this 
line of business." This statement further suggests that anyone with some experience in buying and importing 
similar products would be qualified to work for the petitioner, and contradicts counsel's statement that it 
would need to provide five years of training in the Philippines in order to prepare an individual to work as a 
senior merchandiser. Counsel nevertheless claims that only an employee who had years of experience with 
the foreign entity would be qualified for the position because the producers of the products have exclusive 
contracts with the petitioner's organization. Counsel did not provide any documentary evidence to support its 
claim regarding exclusive contracts, nor did it explain how the indigenous products sold by its suppliers are 
different from those sold by other suppliers. Without documentary evidence to support the claim, the 
assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The assertions of counsel do not 
constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter of Laureano, 19 I&N 
Dec. 1 (BIA 1983 ); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503,506 (BIA 1980 ). 
On appeal counsel asserts that the director abused his discretion by not specifically addressing in his decision 
the information provided by the petitioner in response to the director's request for evidence. This assertion is 
not persuasive. Upon review, the petitioner's response to the request for evidence included no supporting 
WAC 03 257 53419 
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documentation, and made essentially the same unsubstantiated claims contained in the statement 
accompanying the initial petition. In fact, much of the response was copied verbatim from the petitioner's 
original supporting letter. Counsel's assertion that the director did not consider all the evidence is unfounded. 
As previously cited by the director, in Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comm. 1982), the Commissioner 
held that "petitions may be approved for persons with specialized knowledge, not for skilled workers." In the 
instant case the petitioner has successfully demonstrated that the beneficiary is knowledgeable in buying and 
importing of decorative products from the Philippines. However, the plain meaning of the term "specialized 
knowledge" is knowledge or expertise beyond the ordinary in a particular field, process, or function. The 
petitioner has not furnished evidence sufficient to demonstrate that the beneficiary's duties involve knowledge 
or expertise beyond what is commonly held in her field. Contrary to counsel's arguments, mere familiarity, or 
even years of experience, with an organization's product or service, does not constitute specialized knowledge 
as defined by section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. The record as presently constituted is not persuasive in 
demonstrating that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge or that she would be employed primarily in a 
specialized knowledge capacity. For this reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has not submitted sufficient supporting documentation to 
establish that it has a qualifLing relationship with the foreign entity pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(G). 
The petitioner indicated on Form 1-129 that the companies are affiliates based on common ownership and 
control by LaLaine V. Abonal. The record establishes that this individual is the sole proprietor of the foreign 
entity. The petitioner submitted its articles of incorporation, which state that the corporation is authorized to 
issue 2,000 shares of stock. The petitioner did not submit any evidence to establish that this stock was issued 
to the claimed sole owner, and in fact submitted no other documentary evidence to establish who owns and 
controls the U.S. entity. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for 
purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter ofSofici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. For this 
additional reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
Another issue not addressed by the director is whether the petitioner has the financial ability to remunerate the 
beneficiary and to commence doing business in the United States as required by 8 C.F.R. Lj 214.2(1)(3)(vi). As 
the appeal will be dismissed, this issue need not be examined further. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the 
MO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afld. 345 5.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
director's decision will be affirmed and the petition will be denied. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.