dismissed L-1B Case: Information Technology

identifying data deleted to 
Prevent clt.ax4~. Warranled 
invasion of personal privacy 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
Office ofAdministrative Appeals, MS 2090 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 - 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
File: EAC 09 058 5 1530 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date: MAR 1 7 2010 
Petition: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 l(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 10 1 (a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
weny Rhew 
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office 
EAC 09 058 5 1530 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office ("AAO") on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the 
appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant visa petition seeking to employ the beneficiary as an L-1B intracompany 
transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
("the Act"), 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner, a Delaware corporation, claims to be a subsidiary of the 
beneficiary's foreign employer located in India. The petitioner states that it is an information technology solutions 
and services provider with clients in the avionics, defense, telecommunications and multimedia industries. The 
petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary in the position of electro-mechanical software engineer for a period of 
three years, and indicates that he will be assigned to work on a project for the petitioner's client, 
(hereinafter the "unaffiliated employer"). - 
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge or that he has been or will be employed in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. 
The director further found: (1) that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary would be principally 
supervised and controlled by the petitioning company while assigned to the unaffiliated employer's worksite; 
and (2) that the beneficiary's assignment to the worksite of an unaffiliated employer would be an 
impermissible arrangement to provide labor for hire under provisions of section 214(c)(2)(F) of the Act, as 
created by the L-1 Visa Reform Act of 2004. In denying the petition, the director determined that the claimed 
specialized knowledge is not specific to the petitioning organization. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director failed to 
acknowledge that the skills, processes and methodologies required to execute the assigned client project are 
proprietary to the petitioning organization, Counsel further asserts that the beneficiary's training is "more 
extensive than was acknowledged in the denial notice." Finally counsel asserts that the petitioner submitted 
sufficient evidence to establish that the beneficiary will be controlled by the petitioning company and not be 
the unaffiliated employer, including a letter from the client confirming this fact. Counsel submits a brief, but 
no additional evidence, in support of the appeal. 
To establish L-1 eligibility under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the petitioner must demonstrate that the 
beneficiary, within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, has 
been employed abroad in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a capacity involving specialized 
knowledge, for one continuous year by a qualifying organization. The petitioner must also demonstrate that the 
beneficiary seeks to enter the United States temporarily in order to continue to render services to the same 
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof' in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized 
knowledge. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
EAC 09 058 5 1530 
Page 3 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
I. Relevant Law 
Under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, an alien is eligible for classification as a nonimmigrant if the alien, 
among other things, will be rendering services to the petitioning employer "in a capacity that is managerial, 
executive, or involves specialized knowledge." Section 2 14(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 4 1 184(c)(2)(B), 
provides the statutory definition of specialized knowledge: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special knowledge 
of the company product and its application in international markets or has an advanced level of 
knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines specialized knowledge as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
Section 214(c)(2)(F) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 11 84(c)(2)(F) (the "L-1 Visa Reform Act"), in turn, provides: 
An alien who will serve in a capacity involving specialized knowledge with respect to an 
employer for purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L) and will be stationed primarily at the worksite of 
an employer other than the petitioning employer or its affiliate, subsidiary, or parent shall not be 
eligible for classification under section 101(a)(15)(L) if - 
(i) the alien will be controlled and supervised principally by such unaffiliated 
employer; or 
(ii) the placement of the alien at the worksite of the unaffiliated employer is 
essentially an arrangement to provide labor for hire for the unaffiliated 
EAC 09 058 5 1530 
Page 4 
employer, rather than a placement in connection with the provision of a product 
or service for which specialized knowledge specific to the petitioning employer 
is necessary. 
Section 214(c)(2)(F) of the Act is applicable to all L-1B petitions filed after June 6, 2005, including petition 
extensions and amendments for individuals that are currently in L-1B status. See Pub. L. No. 108-447, Div. I, 
Title IV, § 412, 118 Stat. 2809,3352 (Dec. 8,2004). 
Due to the nature of the L-1 Visa Reform Act, the two issues raised by the director - whether the petitioner has 
established that the beneficiary possesses the requisite "specialized knowledge" and whether the requirements of 
the L-1 Visa Reform Act have been satisfied - are independent but legally intertwined. Prior to evaluating 
whether the L-1 Visa Reform Act applies, an adjudicator must determine whether the beneficiary is employed in 
a specialized knowledge capacity. If the beneficiary is not employed in this capacity, the petition may be denied 
on this basis and there is no need to address the requirements of the L-1 Visa Reform Act. Because the director 
reviewed both issues, the AAO will nevertheless discuss both specialized knowledge and the elements of the L-1 
Visa Reform Act. Upon review, the AAO concurs with the director's decision to deny the petition. 
11. Specialized Knowledge 
The primary issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary has been or 
will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity and whether the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge. 8 C.F.R. $9 2 14.2(1)(3)(ii) and (iv). 
The petitioner filed the Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonirnmigrant Worker, on December 17, 2008. The petitioner 
indicated on Form 1-1 29 that the beneficiary will be employed in the position of electro-mechanical engineer. 
In a letter dated September 12, 2008, the foreign entity stated that the beneficiary has been employed by the 
petitioner's Indian parent company since July 2004 and currently holds the position of software engineer with the 
following duties: 
Tester - Writing test specification and stub, Unit testing of modules with LDRA tool, 
documenting results 
Reviewing 
Debugging problems that arise during testing for other members. 
Allocating work, tracking progress, performing configuration, interacting with client and making 
deliveries. in absence of team leader. 
The foreign entity stated that the beneficiary will continue to "work on projects . . . for our U.S. based clients" and 
"work on Projects conforming to the guidelines of our Specific Standards and provide deliveries to the Clients 
before deadlines." 
The foreign entity further described the beneficiary's experience and technical skill set as follows: 
EAC 09 058 5 1530 
Page 5 
[The beneficiary] is working as a Software Engineer with [the foreign entity], with a total 
experience of 4 years. He has been a part of 5 projects and has worked with software like C*, 
LDRA tool with Tasking C-166, GCC, GHS compiler C, LDRA tool with CAD-UL compiler 
RTRT testing tool, TI Code Composer Studio, DOORS (CM tool), Avionic testing equipment 
and simulators. 
The petitioner also provided a letter dated October 3 1, 2008 from its client, a supplier of systems and services to 
the aerospace, defense and homeland security markets. The unaffiliated employer explained that it contracted 
with the petitioner to provide technical support for a variety of commercial programs. The client indicated that the 
beneficiary specifically "would be providing technical support for the A330-200 MRTT [Multi Role Tanker 
Transport] program to provide new systems that are implemented in software." 
On December 23, 2008, the director requested additional evidence, including, inter aha, a more detailed 
description of any proprietary procedures used by the beneficiary, accompanied by documentary evidence to 
support the petitioner's claims. The director requested that the petitioner use specific terminology and examples in 
explaining how the knowledge possessed by the beneficiary is not general knowledge held commonly throughout 
the industry. The director further instructed the petitioner to explain in more detail exactly what is the equipment, 
system, product, technique, research, or service of which the beneficiary has specialized knowledge, and how the 
beneficiary's knowledge will be used on the proposed project. 
The director also requested evidence pertaining to any pertinent training courses the beneficiary has completed 
during his employment with the organization, including evidence of the types of courses taken, the duration of the 
courses, the number of hours spent taking the courses each day and certificates of completion for the courses. 
The director requested that the petitioner identi@ the minimum amount of time required to train an employee to 
fill the proffered position, and to specify the number of similarly employed workers within the organization, the 
number of workers who have received similar training, and the number of employees deemed to qualify as 
"specialized knowledge" workers. Finally, the director requested a copy of the contract for services between the 
petitioner and the unaffiliated employer. 
In response, the foreign entity's managing director, submitted a letter dated February 2,2009, in 
which he stated that the purpose of the beneficiary's assignment is as follows: 
Our current requirement in the USA is to service requirements from [the unaffiliated employer] 
located in Vergennes, of quite a few components of the new aircraft being developed by Boeing 
(B787). Having built experience and expertise in these systems over the last 3 years in lndia 
whilst working on the system rigs provided by Boeing, it has now become imperative for us to 
deliver further services on the B787 systems at [the unaffiliated employer]. 
. . . .From a list of more than a dozen companies, [the petitioner] was chosen by [the unaffiliated 
employer] as a partner mainly due to [the petitioner's] capabilities and its demonstration of 
integrating with technologies in [the unaff~liated employer] quickly. 
submitted a second letter dated February 2, 2009 in which he further described the nature and 
objectives of the project to which the beneficiary will be assigned. Specifically, he stated: 
EAC 09 058 5 1530 
Page 6 
[The beneficiary] will be working on ARC (Air Refueling Computer) project for A330-200 
(Multi Role Tanker Transport) that provides new systems to perform state of the art Air-Air 
refueling. 
The system being built powers air refueling technologies long-term technology project system 
specifications/requirements necessary for interfacing with D-Six simulation environment. At its 
completion, the system is to allow air-refueling operator to use remote computer imagery rather 
than direct line-of-sight to connect to the aircraft receivers. The system is to provide high- 
definition stereoscopic imagery to the aircraft's boom operator. This advanced technology will 
give aircrew's wingtip-to-wingtip visibility behind their aircraft. 
The complexity of these technologies requires multidimensional testing capability that enables 
multiple tests to be run concurrently, combine multiple types of test, conduct simultaneous 
testing, change tests in real-time, etc. Only a few global leaders are engaged in this business and 
there are just a very negligible number of persons who have this expertise not only in our 
corporation but in the world. Air-Air refueling system is pioneered by only by very few players 
like Boeing, Airbus and [the petitioner] being one of the long-time supplier of systems we have 
developed unique skill set that are required to cany out such complex system development and 
validation. 
With respect to the beneficiary's specific involvement with the project,stated: 
[The beneficiary] has been involved in MRTT and ARC for the past two years working on this 
system for our client using ADA 95, Vision Click, McCabe, LabView, Raven Power PC Suite, 
Windriver Debugger and cutting-edge Vision ICE set up, BDI Abatron Emulator, NI CAN 
Analyzer, Oscilloscope, Mil STD- 1553 Bus Analyzer, AFUNC 429 Bus Analyzer, Processor 
MPC 555 and DO-178B Standard. Since [the beneficiary] has been a member of this project 
team for over 2 years, he has extensive understanding about the business and the processes of 
our client. Additionally he has been working with [the foreign entity] for more than 4 years and 
understands all other internal processes quite superbly. Moreover, he possesses a unique skill 
combination of system testing of MRTT and ARC, V&V of Integral Display units software for 
Eurocopter, IDS response to IDU Key panels and Display Mode Selector for setting parameters 
and determining operating modes, Hawk MFD and DMC, etc. His knowledge of our 
methodologies and processes for handling critical aircraft systems is rare and uncommon. 
He will be required to be in our new corporate office and work under the direct su~ervision of 
knowledge and experience of more than 4 years that is directly beneficiary to our key clients, 
[the beneficiary] is a natural employee to be in this position. [The beneficiary] is a highly 
competent technical professional with advanced skills who has gone on to gain vast and 
advanced business knowledge of the client and domain (especially in aircraft systems) 
knowledge. He has demonstrated acute capability of gathering and understanding the business 
EAC 09 058 5 1530 
Page 7 
requirements and converting them into technical requirements. He also has advanced technical 
knowledge and skills necessary to resolve aircraft issues related to application environments, 
which can be handled only in the USA. . . . [The beneficiary] is one of only very few persons on 
the team capable of handling all the responsibilities proficiently. In a practical sense, he will be a 
functional manager. 
Out of over 300 IT professionals at [the foreign entity], [the beneficiary] is one of only 10 
professionals who is knowledgeable and proficient in this technology and methodologies and 
their use in our business. [The beneficiary] does possess knowledge and experience that is not 
common and readily available in the U.S. market and this knowledge and experience is valuable 
to [the petitioner's] competitiveness in the marketplace. 
further emphasized that the beneficiary's combination of technical skills, experience in the 
"processes, procedures and methodologies of [the petitioner's] product and service delivery to clients," and years 
of experience in working on the project make the beneficiary a "key employee" who has enhanced the company's 
image, financial position, competitiveness and productivity. He further stated that the beneficiary holds 
knowledge that is "complex, sophisticated and obtainable after a lengthy training and experience using same." 
also indicated it would be "difficult, if not impossible, to gain this knowledge without considerable 
experience at our operations." 
With respect to the company's internal processes and methodologies, explained as follows: 
[The beneficiary] is very well versed in our design and architecture, testing concepts and 
processes, [the company's] Quality Management System Awareness, Avionics considering 
different fuel systems in use, various components of aircraft fuel systems and their interface with 
other aircraft systems, RBT techniques, etc. and [the company's] strategy and methodology. Our 
ability to implement successful programs helps companies increase efficiency, productivity and 
profitability by identifying trends and delivering solutions contained within their reservoir of 
data. The interoperability of this integrative technology is critical in the aviation industry. This 
methodology, designed and developed by [the foreign entity], is so powerhl and diversified in 
its data and reporting capabilities that users from different locations can use it accurately with 
timely data, easy access, virtual location capabilities and, above all, the security of the 
information that is accessed. This makes this tool and methodology of [the petitioning 
organization] very valuable (and in high demand) to the present and emerging aircraft refueling 
industry. The knowledge of [the beneficiary] is rare but that is not the only reason it is 
specialized. He is one of very few professionals who know the combination of technologies, 
methodology in aircraft refueling. [The petitioner] designls] and develops solutions for these 
companies using its home grown distinctive specialized variation and knowledge of these 
technologies and methodologies. 
In addition, explained that the beneficiary has helped the company define the technology, and 
"played a key role in the design, development and implementation of the process." He noted that the beneficiary's 
"pioneering effort and excellence with this technology led to her [sic] recognition and promotion to the role of 
EAC 09 058 5 1530 
Page 8 
Senior Software Engineer at our facility in India," and that his "prototype development efforts" have elevated the 
company's standing. 
further stated that the expertise the beneficiary gained "in the process of developing, modifying and 
integrating these technologies, methodologies and portals (as modified by [the petitioner]) is not available in the 
U.S. job market and involves our peculiar methodologies." Finally, with respect to the beneficiary's training, -1 
stated: 
Please note that eligible trainees on our MRTT and ARC technologies and methodologies 
typically have 2 or more years of industry experience with a good fundamental understanding of 
the application of cutting-edge technologies to the aviation industry. Graduates from this 
program are required to effectively and efficiently interact with end users and decision makers to 
understand their needs of the particular business, devise robust solutions that will aid the 
decision making process and provide insight into current operations. This training program 
rounds out the individual by exposing them to business communications and customer etiquette. 
At the conclusion of the training program at which the applicant must have demonstrated a 
thorough understanding of the technology, strategy and methodologies, they are assigned to 
work on a project. Since the technology and methodology are peculiar to [the petitioning 
organization], candidates who have not worked at [the petitioner's group of companies] are not 
able to perform the duties of the job offered. 
The petitioner submitted a separate letter from dated January 21,2009, in which he fiuther outlined 
the petitioner's requirements for the position and the beneficiary's qualifications as follows: 
For any skilled worker in the industry to work on [the MRTT and related projects], it requires at 
least 2 years of verification / development experience in safety critical domain, and it would take 
1 - 1.5 years of further training on system verification and technical tools (e.g. ADS2, HMPTT, 
TechSAT DataLoader etc.) 
[The beneficiary] has been working on Airbus 330 - MRTT (Multi Role Tanker Transport) 
project for the past 2 years. As he is associated with this project for so long he has gained a lot of 
knowledge durint the course of time. System verification is a complex activity and the skill 
levels needed are high-end. He is chosen for this project as he possesses the system verification 
skills and he is highly competent with his ability to work on technical tools like Raven Power PC 
Suite, Windriver Debugger, McCabe Code Coverage Suite. He has knowledge on processor 
MPC 555, Test set up - Vision ICE set-up, BDI Abatron Emulator, NI CAN Analyser, 
Oscilloscope, MIL STD-1553 Bus analyzer, ARINC 429 bus analyzer. 
Since this project is an ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) controlled, defense 
oriented, work has to be performed at clients place (US), and cannot be executed outside US. 
In a separate statement, the petitioner indicated that the beneficiary's daily duties in the United States will be: 
EAC 09 058 5 1530 
Page 9 
Develop System Verification Test cases, test Procedures, scenarios for verifying Boeing 
787 fuel systems for compliance against SRS and SRU. Provide technical consultancy to 
the team and the project. 
Discuss with the customers on technical issues coming from both [the unaffiliated 
employer] and Boeing. 
Ensuring software requirement and structural coverage (through documentation which 
includes Test case document and Scenario and dry run using Raven Power PC Suite, 
Windriver Debugger, McCabe Code Coverage Suite, GSIS - MRTT Test set, Vision ICE 
set-up, BDI Abatron Emulator, NI CAN analyzer, Oscilloscope, Mill STD 1553 Bus 
analyzer and ARINC 429 analyzer) leading to serve ready Mile stone. 
In addition to the above he will have to perform additional test on both LRU and Low 
Level and demonstrate compliance in front of DER/FAA in USA. 
The petitioner submitted a copy of the beneficiary's Time Log System updates to establish that he has been 
assigned to the Airbus A330 MRTT project since January 2007. The petitioner also provided a copy of the 
beneficiary's resume, which indicates that his contribution to the Airbus A330 MRTT project has included: 
"System Testing - Create scenario from requirement, write scripts, execute using Labview simulator, write test 
procedures, provide traceability, perform low level tests." According to the beneficiary's resume, he previously 
performed software testing duties for the EH-101 Integral Display Units for Eurocopter, and for the Hawk DMC 
and MFD (Multi-Function Display System). 
The petitioner attached explanations of some of the technologies required to perform the beneficiary's duties, 
including TechSAT Data Loader, Code Composer, RTRT 6.15, McCabe Code Coverage Suite, Windriver 
Debugger, HMPTT, and Avionics Development System 2nd Generation (ASD2) Tool, all of which are testing and 
debugging tools and environments. 
Finally, the petitioner submitted a chart outlining the classroom and on-the-job training the beneficiary has 
undertaken since joining the foreign entity in 2004. His classroom-based, instructor-led training included: 
Software Engineering, Testing Concepts & Procedures; [Company] Sofhvare Quality Management System 
Awareness; C++ and C++ Programming; Testing Concepts; UML Analysis and Design; Sample Project 
Artifacts; Overview of Safety Critical Domain; Safety Standards; LDRA Tool; Flow Chart Procedure, Soft 
Skills; Code Scrutiny; Appraisal Training, and Introduction to Project Management. The petitioner indicated that 
these courses were taken in June, July and August of 2004, but did not indicate the duration of any specific 
course. The beneficiary later attended courses in TLS and Programming in Ada in 2005. The chart indicates that, 
in 2007, the beneficiary received on-the-job training in Avionics Domain - Introduction; Aircraft Fuel System - 
An Overview; Requirements-based Testing; and Traceability Concepts and DOORS. Finally, the chart indicates 
that the unaffiliated employer provided the beneficiary with on-the-job training in McCabe Code Coverage Suite, 
Windriver Debugger and Raven Power PC Suite. 
With respect to the unaffiliated employer's project, the petitioner submitted a supply agreement between the 
foreign entity and the unaff~liated employer. Schedule 1 of the agreement indicates that the petitioner "is to 
provide design, development and testing services to [the unaffiliated employer] of real-time software projects 
which are principally embedded safety critical software projects." The agreement indicates that elements of work 
EAC 09 058 51530 
Page 10 
will be grouped together into packages, with each package having a separate quotation and agreed delivery date 
set forth on Schedule 4. The petitioner did not, however, submit the Schedule 4, for the MRTT project. Instead, 
the petitioner submitted a blank Schedule 4 "Work Package Agreement," which does not identifjr the 
descriptionJscope of work, the deliverables required from the unaffiliated employer, or any other project details. 
The director denied the petition on February 12, 2009, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the 
beneficiary has been or would be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity. The director acknowledged that 
the beneficiary may be required to utilize the petitioner's proprietary tools and methodologies to cany out his 
duties, but determined that the beneficiary has been and will be primarily engaged in work on the unaffiliated 
employer's systems and not on products that are specific to the petitioning company. 
The director acknowledged the training summary provided for the beneficiary, but noted that the petitioner failed 
to identifjr the duration of the courses or provide certificates of completion, and thus it could not be concluded 
that he underwent an extensive training program. Rather, the director noted that the beneficiary appears to be well 
versed in various computer hardware and software systems that are likely common among engineers in his 
industry, and has no more than three to four months of pertinent in-house training. The director further noted that 
the fact that the beneficiary has specific project experience is not sufficient to establish that he possesses 
specialized knowledge, as most employees within the petitioner's organization would possess knowledge that is 
peculiar to their specific project assignments. 
On appeal, the petitioner asserts that it believes that "there was a fundamental error from the onset about the 
nature of our business which may have influenced this negative outcome." The petitioner emphasizes that it is 
"not just a software company," but rather "provides a range of original electronic products including verification 
and validation systems and control units." The petitioner emphasizes that he beneficiary's job is to develop real 
time safety critical systems, a field that has "zero tolerance for errors." The petitioner asserts that "the expertise 
needed to successfully execute projects such as the beneficiary is involved in are not common." 
The petitioner further states: 
The skills needed for the design, development, verification and validation of Real Time Safety 
Critical Systems cannot be perfected only by training alone. One must be immersed in the 
projects that are verified and validated numerous times to fully understand the processes, 
procedures and technologies. 
KT1 and SAGEM are integral part of the Integrated Standby Systems. These are the earliest 
[company] projects that permitted the beneficiary to understand a lot low level verification and 
validation and adherence to the DO-178B standards. It was when he perfected this level of 
proprietary skills that he was embedded into the different lifecycles phases of developing 
Avionics systems. That was the EHlOl system which covered the Integrated Display Units 
present in the cockpit which involved performing verification and validation on simulated 
environment, 100% Code Coverage Analysis . . . to ensure a Level A critical system. The KT1, 
SAGEM and EHlOl systems dealt with various aircraft systems. The unique expertise of the 
beneficiary in these systems was deployed in the current EBAC system. EBAC is the Electric 
EAC 09 058 5 1530 
Page 11 
Brake System for the dreamliner aircraft. This is the first time an Electric Brake was being used 
for a commercial aircraft. Given the severity of the system, it was assigned criticality level 'A.' 
The Avionics domain itself is very niche domain and very few companies align themselves in 
this vertical i.e., Real Time Safety Critical. Because there are very few companies in this niche 
market, there are very few specialists who are involved in this very challenging work. 
The petitioner goes on to further discuss the beneficiary's role in the "EBAC development and implementation 
project for which we need him in the United States," and states that, if the beneficiary is unable to come to the 
United States, "the schedule for B787 will be affected and so will Boeing's clients worldwide." All other 
evidence in the record, except for the description of the beneficiary's proposed "daily duties" in the United States, 
indicates that the beneficiary has been and would be working on the Airbus A330 MRTT project. It is incumbent 
upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any 
attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent 
objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter ofHo, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). 
The petitioner emphasizes that "eligible trainees on our critical embedded safety technologies typically have 2 or 
more years of industry experience with a good fundamental understanding of technical and electro-mechanical 
functionalities and software experience on various platforms." The petitioner states that, because the technology 
and processes used in its project assignments are proprietary to the company, candidates who have not worked 
within the organization are not able to perform the duties of the job offered. The petitioner further states that not 
more than 20 individuals within its organization have the beneficiary's "unique skills set." 
Upon review, the petitioner's assertions are not persuasive. The petitioner has not established that the 
beneficiary has specialized knowledge or that he has been or will be employed in a specialized knowledge 
capacity as defined at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). 
The Standard for Specialized Knowledge 
Looking to the language of the statutory definition, Congress has provided USCIS with an ambiguous definition 
of specialized knowledge. In this regard, one Federal district court explained the infeasibility of applying a 
bright-line test to define what constitutes specialized knowledge: 
This ambiguity is not merely the result of an unfortunate choice of dictionaries. It reflects the 
relativistic nature of the concept special. An item is special only in the sense that it is not 
ordinary; to define special one must first define what is ordinary. . . . There is no logical or 
principled way to determine which baseline of ordinary knowledge is a more appropriate reading 
of the statute, and there are countless other baselines which are equally plausible. Simply put, 
specialized knowledge is a relative and empty idea which cannot have a plain meaning. CJ: 
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 537 (1982). 
EAC 09 058 51530 
Page 12 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. 9, 14- 15 (D.D.C., 1990).' 
While Congress did not provide explicit guidance for what should be considered ordinary knowledge, the 
principles of statutory interpretation provide some clue as to the intended scope of the L-1B specialized 
knowledge category. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987) 
(citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207,94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)). 
First, the AAO must look to the language of section 214(c)(2)(B) itself, that is, the terms "special" and 
"advanced." Like the courts, the AAO customarily turns to dictionaries for help in determining whether a word in 
a statute has a plain or common meaning. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 109 F.3d 965, 967-68 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(using Webster's Dictionary for "therefore"). According to Webster's New College Dictionary, the word "special" 
is commonly found to mean "surpassing the usual" or "exceptional." Webster's New College Dictionary, 1084 
(3rd Ed. 2008). The dictionary defines the word "advanced" as "highly developed or complex" or "at a higher 
level than others." Id. at 17. 
Second, looking at the term's placement within the text of section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the AAO notes that 
specialized knowledge is used to describe the nature of a person's employment and that the term is listed among 
the higher levels of the employment hierarchy together with "managerial" and "executive" employees. Based on 
the context of the term within the statute, the AAO therefore would expect a specialized knowledge employee to 
occupy an elevated position within a company that rises above that of an ordinary or average employee. See 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 14. 
Third, a review of the legislative history for both the original 1970 statute and the subsequent 1990 statute 
indicates that Congress intended for USCIS to closely administer the L-1B category. Specifically, the original 
drafters of section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act intended that the class of persons eligible for the L-1 classification 
would be "narrowly drawn" and "carefully regulated and monitored" by USCIS. See general& H.R. Rep. No. 91- 
85 1 (1 970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750,2754, 1970 WL 581 5. The legislative history of the 1970 Act 
plainly states that "the number of temporary admissions under the proposed 'L' category will not be large." Id In 
addition, the Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended for "key personnel." 
See generally, id. The term "key personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "[olf 
crucial importance." Webster S New College Dictionary 620 (3'* ed., Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing 
Co. 2008). Moreover, during the course of the sub-committee hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically 
questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify under the proposed "L" category. In response 
to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that they understood the legislation would allow 
"high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, and that it would not include "lower 
categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." See H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration 
Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445,9 1" Cong. 210,218,223,240,248 (Nov. 12, 1969). 
' Although 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General was decided prior to enactment of the statutory definition of 
specialized knowledge by the Immigration Act of 1990, the court's discussion of the ambiguity in the legacy 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) definition is equally illuminating when applied to the definition 
created by Congress. 
EAC 09 058 5 1530 
Page 13 
Neither in 1970 nor in 1990 did Congress provide a controlling, unambiguous definition of "specialized 
knowledge," and a narrow interpretation is consistent with so much of the legislative intent as it is possible to 
determine. H. Rep. No. 91-851 at 6, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2754. This interpretation is consistent with legislative 
history, which has been largely supportive of a narrow reading of the definition of specialized knowledge and the 
L-1 visa classification in general. See 17.56, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 15-16; Boi Na Braza 
Atlanta, LLC v. Upchurch, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 2372846 at *4 (N.D.Tex., 2005), afd 194 
Fed.Appx. 248 (5th Cir. 2006); Fibermaster, Ltd v. INS., Not Reported in F.Supp., 1990 WL 99327 (D.D.C., 
1990); Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Dept. of Justice, Civ. Action 00-2977-LFO (D.D.C. April 6, 2001)(on file with 
AAO). 
Further, although the Immigration Act of 1990 provided a statutory definition of the term "specialized 
knowledge" in section 214(c)(2) of the Act, the definition did not generally expand the class of persons eligible 
for L-1B specialized knowledge visas. Pub.L. No. 101-649, 9 206(b)(2), 104 Stat. 4978, 5023 (1990). Instead, 
the legislative history indicates that Congress created the statutory definition of specialized knowledge for the 
express purpose of clarifying a previously undefined term from the Immigration Act of 1970. H.R. Rep. 101- 
723(I) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6749, 1990 WL 20041 8 ("One area within the L visa that 
requires more specificity relates to the term 'specialized knowledge.' Varying interpretations by INS have 
exacerbated the problem."). While the 1990 Act declined to codify the "proprietary knowledge" and "United 
States labor market" references that had existed in the previous agency definition found at 8 C.F.R. 
5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) (1988), there is no indication that Congress intended to liberalize its own 1970 definition of 
the L- 1 visa classification. 
If any conclusion can be drawn from the enactment of the statutory definition of specialized knowledge in 
section 214(c)(2)(B), it would be based on the nature of the Congressional clarification itself. By not including 
any strict criterion in the ultimate statutory definition and further emphasizing the relativistic aspect of "special 
knowledge," Congress created a standard that requires USCIS to make a factual determination that can only be 
determined on a case-by-case basis, based on the agency's expertise and discretion. Rather than a bright-line 
standard that would support a more rigid application of the law, Congress gave the INS a more flexible standard 
that requires an adjudication based on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. CJ: Ponce-Leiva v. 
Ashcroft, 33 1 F.3d 369,377 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89,91 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
To determine what is special or advanced, USCIS must first determine the baseline of ordinary. As a 
baseline, the terms "special" or "advanced" must mean more than simply "skilled" or "experienced." By 
itself, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically complex products will not equal "special 
knowledge." See Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 53 (Comm. 1982). In general, all employees can 
reasonably be considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the 
overall economic success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. 
An employee of "crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average 
employee. In other words, specialized knowledge generally requires more than a short period of experience; 
otherwise special or advanced knowledge would include every employee in an organization with the 
exception of trainees and entry-level staff. If everyone in an organization is specialized, then no one can be 
considered truly specialized. Such an interpretation strips the statutory language of any efficacy and cannot 
have been what Congress intended. 
EAC 09 058 51530 
Page 14 
Considering the definition of specialized knowledge, it is the petitioner's, not USCIS's, burden to articulate 
and establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" 
knowledge. Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1184(c)(2)(B). USCIS cannot make a factual 
determination regarding the beneficiary's specialized knowledge if the petitioner does not, at a minimum, 
articulate with specificity the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, describe how such knowledge is 
typically gained within the organization, and explain how and when the beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
Once the petitioner articulates the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and type of 
evidence which establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized knowledge. A 
petitioner's assertion that the beneficiary possesses advanced knowledge of the processes and procedures of 
the company must be supported by evidence describing and distinguishing that knowledge from the 
elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others. Because "special" and "advanced" are comparative 
terms, the petitioner should provide evidence that allows USCIS to assess the beneficiary's knowledge 
relative to others in the petitioner's workforce or relative to similarly employed workers in the petitioner's 
specific industry. 
Analysis 
Upon review, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary possesses knowledge that may be 
deemed "special" or "advanced" under the statutory definition at section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. The 
decision of the director will be affirmed as it relates to this issue and the appeal will be dismissed. 
In examining the specialized knowledge of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's description of 
the job duties and the weight of the evidence supporting any asserted specialized knowledge. See 8 C.F.R. 
5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed job description of the services to be performed sufficient to 
establish specialized knowledge. Id. At a minimum, the petitioner must articulate with specificity the nature of 
the claimed specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner in this case has failed to establish either that the beneficiary's position in the United States or 
abroad requires an employee with specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge. 
Although the petitioner repeatedly asserts that the beneficiary has been and will be employed in a "specialized 
knowledge" capacity, the petitioner has not adequately articulated any basis to support this claim. The 
petitioner has failed to identify any special or advanced body of knowledge which would distinguish the 
beneficiary's role from that of other similarly experienced software engineers working with safety-critical 
embedded systems employed by the petitioning organization or in the avionics industry at-large. While the 
AAO acknowledges that the petitioner's field of expertise is much narrower than general "software consulting," 
the fact that the company's services are highly specialized, "safety critical," or targeted at a certain industry or 
industries, without more, is insufficient to establish that any individual employee within the company 
possesses or is required to utilize specialized knowledge. Other engineers working with developing or testing 
embedded software for aircraft systems would be expected to possess the same knowledge of aircraft systems and 
industry standards. The foreign entity has acknowledged that as many as ten companies in India "have built an 
expertise in the field of software development and system testing in the avionics domain, particularly in the 
safety-critical arena." The foreign entity further indicated that "more than a dozen" Indian companies were 
considered as potential contractors for the unaffiliated employer's aviation industry projects. 
EAC 09 058 51530 
Page 15 
Furthermore, although the director found that certain tools used by the beneficiary to carry out his duties, 
including TechSat DataLoader, Code Composer, RTRT 6.15, McCabe Code Coverage Suite, and Windriver 
Debugger are proprietary to the petitioning company, this finding was incorrect. These technologies are described 
in an attachment to the beneficiary's resume, and, based on the descriptions provided, are testing and debugging 
tools and environments developed by other companies and used industry-wide by testing engineers. In fact, the 
beneficiary's training records indicate that he received on-the-job training in McCabe Code Coverage Suite, 
Windriver Debugger and Raven Power PC Suite directly from the unafiliated employer, and not from the 
petitioning company. The beneficiary's technical skills, as listed in his resume, are in technologies which are 
common in his specific software development field, and have not been shown to involve any systems or 
technologies that are specific to the petitioner's group of companies. An experienced software engineer with a 
background in developing and testing avionics systems would be expected to possess a similar skill set. 
Counsel and the petitioner assert, however, that the position requires project-specific knowledge that the 
beneficiary gained in India, as well as experience with the petitioner's processes and procedures, and therefore 
could not be performed by the typical skilled engineer. 
Specifically, the petitioner has stated that the skills, processes and methodologies required to execute the 
assigned client project are proprietary to the petitioning organization, but it has neither further elaborated 
upon nor documented the petitioner's own internal methodologies or unique processes. For example, the 
petitioner stated that the beneficiary "is very well versed in our design and architecture, testing concepts and 
processes, [company] Software Quality Management System Awareness . . . and [the company's] strategy and 
methodologies." The petitioner offered no explanatory information regarding its design and architecture, 
testing processes or quality management system or other methodologies sufficient to establish that mere 
familiarity with these internal procedures, systems and standards would rise to the level of specialized 
knowledge. Going on record without documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the 
burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter 
of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Specifics are clearly an important 
indication of whether a beneficiary's duties involve specialized knowledge; otherwise, meeting the definitions 
would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. See Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724, F. Supp. 1103 
(E.D.N.Y. 1989), afd, 905, F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
Moreover, the petitioner did not attempt to explain how its processes and methodologies differ significantly 
from those utilized by other companies that offer similar services, nor has it established that the beneficiary 
has received extensive training in the company's tools, methodologies and procedures. Therefore, it cannot 
be concluded that the petitioner's processes are particularly complex or different compared to those utilized by 
other companies in the industry, or that it would take a significant amount of time to train an experienced 
avionics software engineer who had no prior experience with the petitioner's family of companies. The record 
shows that the beneficiary completed a training course in the company's Software Quality Management 
System in July 2004, but the petitioner has failed to provide any information regarding the content or duration 
of such training or information regarding the Quality Management System itself. The majority of the 
beneficiary's training appears to have involved general domain knowledge and technical skills pertinent to 
software development and testing, rather than indoctrination of any specific methodologies or processes 
specific to the petitioner's group of companies. All engineering consulting firms develop internal tools, 
methodologies, procedures and best practices for documenting project management and software quality 
EAC 09 058 5 1530 
Page 16 
assurance activities. The petitioner cannot establish that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge by 
relying on his experience with unidentified and undocumented internal processes and methodologies. The 
petitioner has not demonstrated that its "proprietary" methodologies and tools, while highly effective and 
valuable to the petitioner, are more than customized versions of standard practices used in the industry. 
Furthermore, the petitioner has not clearly specified the amount or type of training its technical staff members 
receive in the company's internal tools, methodologies and procedures, and therefore, it cannot be concluded 
that its processes are particularly complex or different compared to those utilized by other companies in the 
industry, or that it would take a significant amount of time to train an experienced engineer who had no prior 
experience with the petitioner's group of companies. The petitioner refers to a "training program" that 
employees must undergo before they can work on the MRTT project, but does not identify the specific 
components of the program, the amount of time it takes to complete it, or the number of employees who have 
received the training. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for 
purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165 (Comm. 
1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
Moreover, although the petitioner states that it offers a training program specific to the "MRTT and ARC 
technologies and methodologies," it states elsewhere that "[flor any skilled worker in the industry to work on 
[the MRTT and related projects], it requires at least 2 years of verification I development experience in safety 
critical domain, and it would take 1 - 1.5 years of further training on system verification and technical tools (e.g 
ASD2, HMPTT, TechSAT Dataloader etc.)." This statement implies that there is no company-specific training 
requirement for the proffered position and that "any skilled worker" with the required system verification 
experience and technical skills would be qualified for the position. 
Overall, the minimal evidence submitted suggests that the petitioner's employees are not required to undergo 
any extensive training in the company's processes and methodologies. The petitioner indicates that the 
beneficiary completed 21 classroom-based courses, the majority of which do not appear to be clearly 
associated with the petitioner's claimed internal or proprietary tools and processes. The petitioner has not 
provided certificates of completion or other evidence indicating the content and length of his classroom 
training, so it cannot be concluded that such training imparted him with specialized knowledge. Again, going 
on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of 
proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. However, it is evident that courses in C++ 
programming, UML analysis and design, LDRA tool, soft skills, programming in Ada, and TLS did not 
constitute training in the petitioning company's processes and procedures. 
The petitioner argues that the most important component of the beneficiary's purported specialized knowledge 
is his existing knowledge of the unaffiliated employer's MRTT project gained over a period of two years, and 
his "extensive understanding about the business and the processes of our client." Generally, a beneficiary's 
familiarity with the unaffiliated employer's systems and requirements, while valuable to the petitioner, cannot 
be considered knowledge specific to the petitioning organization and cannot form the basis of a determination 
that he possesses specialized knowledge. While the petitioner suggests on appeal that the ARC technology 
itself is proprietary to the petitioning organization, the AAO finds insufficient evidence to support that claim. 
As noted above, the petitioner has submitted a copy of its general supply agreement with the unaffiliated 
employer, but has failed to provide the specific Schedule 4lWork Package Agreement, specific to the MRTT 
EAC 09 058 51530 
Page 17 
project. According to a letter from the unaffiliated employer, it has contracted with the petitioner "to provide 
technical support" for MRTT and other programs. A review of the detailed duties described in the 
beneficiary's resume suggests that he has been involved in testing activities for the A330 MRTT system, 
rather than developing the system or system components. letter dated January 2 1, 2009 further 
confirms this conclusion, as he stated that the beneficiary "is chosen for this project as he possesses the 
system verification skills" and is "highly competent" in working with various testing tools. 
The petitioner has not clearly identified the project deliverable or the services to be provided to the 
unaffiliated employer, and thus has not supported a conclusion that the contract requires it to provide a 
product or service that involves the petitioner's own internally-developed technologies or systems. In fact, 
according to the terms of the supply agreement, "all original works of authorship and all other items, 
including any source code, in any form? prepared by [the petitioning organization) . . . pursuant to this 
Agreement are works that have been specifically ordered and commissioned by [the unaffiliated employer]" 
and all intellectual property rights are owned by the unaffiliated employer. The omission of the actual work 
package agreement for the contract to which the beneficiary is assigned makes it impossible to affirmatively 
determine whether the services to be provided require the application of specialized knowledge specific to the 
petitioning organization. Again, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient 
for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165 
(citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
All software engineers within the petitioning organization would reasonably be familiar with its proprietary 
internal processes and methodologies for carrying out client projects. Similarly, most employees would also 
possess project-specific knowledge relative to one or more international clients, which the petitioner would 
equate to specialized knowledge. The fact that the beneficiary possesses very specific experience with a 
particular international client project does not establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is indeed special or 
advanced. Any experienced software engineer within the petitioning organization would reasonably be 
familiar with its internal processes and methodologies for carrying out client projects. Similarly, most 
employees would also possess project-specific knowledge relative to one or more international clients and the 
client's products or systems. 
All employees can be said to possess unique skill or experience to some degree. Moreover, the proprietary 
qualities of the petitioner's process or product do not establish that any knowledge of this process is 
"specialized." Rather, the petitioner must establish that qualities of the unique process or product require this 
employee to have knowledge beyond what is common in the industry. This has not been established in this 
matter. The fact that other workers may not have the same level of experience with the petitioner's 
methodologies as applied to one component of a specific client project is not enough to establish the 
beneficiary as an employee possessing specialized knowledge. 
It is appropriate for USCIS to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the 
beneficiary's knowledge of the business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making 
process. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. at 120 (citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. at 618 and Matter of 
LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. at 816). As stated by the Commissioner in Matter of Penner, when considering 
whether the beneficiaries possessed specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find 
that the occupations inherently qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." 18 I&N Dec. at 52. 
EAC 09 058 51530 
Page 18 
Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled 
worker. Id. 
The AAO acknowledges that the specialized knowledge need not be narrowly held within the organization in 
order to be considered "advanced." However, it is equally true to state that knowledge will not be considered 
"special" or "advanced" if it is universally or even widely held throughout a company. If all similarly 
employed workers within the petitioner's organization receive essentially the same training, then mere 
possession of knowledge of the petitioner's processes and methodologies does not rise to the level of 
specialized knowledge. The L-1B visa category was not created in order to allow the transfer of all 
employees with any degree of knowledge of a company's processes. If all employees are deemed to possess 
"special" or "advanced" knowledge, then that knowledge would necessarily be ordinary and commonplace. 
The petitioner states that the beneficiary is one of only 10 or 20 IT professionals within its organization "who 
is knowledgeable and proficient in this technology and methodologies and their use in our business." Given 
that the petitioner provides services to clients in several different industries, and has six or more different 
ongoing projects for the unaffiliated employer alone, it is unsurprising that the number of employees assigned 
to the MRTT contract or similar contracts is limited to 10 to 20 employees. However, as noted above, the 
petitioner's attempts to distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge as advanced relative to a specific client project 
are unpersuasive. Again, all of the foreign entity's technical employees would reasonably have project- 
specific knowledge in addition to knowledge of the company's proprietary tools and processes for 
implementing projects. By this logic, any of them would qualify for L-1 B classification if offered a position 
working on the same project in the United States. All employees can be said to possess uncommon and 
unique skill sets to some degree; however, a skill set that can be easily imparted to another similarly educated 
and similarly experienced software engineer is not "specialized knowledge." While the AAO acknowledges 
that there will be exceptions based on the facts of individual cases, an argument that an alien is unique among 
a small subset of workers, (i.e., one of only ten software engineers assigned to a small client project team) will 
not be deemed facially persuasive if a petitioner's definition of specialized knowledge is so broad that it 
would include the majority of its workforce. The petitioner must establish that qualities of the processes, 
procedures, and technologies require this employee to have knowledge beyond what is common in the 
industry. This has not been established in this matter. 
The AAO does not dispute the possibility that the beneficiary is a skilled employee who has been, and would 
be, an asset to the petitioner. However, as explained above, the record does not distinguish the beneficiary's 
knowledge as more advanced than the knowledge possessed by other people employed by the petitioning 
organization or by workers employed elsewhere. The beneficiary's duties and technical skills demonstrate 
that he possesses knowledge that is common among software engineers in the avionics industry. Furthermore, 
it is not clear that the performance of the beneficiary's duties would require more than basic proficiency with 
the company's internal processes and methodologies. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the 
beneficiary's training, work experience, or knowledge of the company's processes is more advanced than the 
knowledge possessed by others employed by the petitioner, or that the processes used by the petitioner are 
substantially different from those used by other engineering services providers in the petitioner's industry. The 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary's knowledge is any more advanced or special than the 
knowledge held by a skilled worker. See lMatter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 52. 
EAC 09 058 51530 
Page 19 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, supra at 16. The record does not establish that the 
beneficiary has specialized knowledge or that the position offered with the United States entity requires 
specialized knowledge. 
Based on the evidence presented and applying the statute, regulations, and binding precedents, the petitioner 
has not established that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge or that he has been or would be employed 
in the United States in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. For this reason, the appeal will be 
dismissed. 
111. L1A Visa Reform Act 
The remaining issue addressed by the director is whether the petitioner has satisfied the requirements of the L-1 
Visa Reform Act prohibiting placement of L-1 B beneficiaries at the worksites of unaffiliated employers. 
One of the main purposes of the L-1 Visa Reform Act amendment was to prohibit the outsourcing of L-1 B 
intracompany transferees to unaffiliated employers to work with "widely available" computer software and, 
thus, help prevent the displacement of United States workers by foreign labor. See 149 Cong. Rec. S11649, 
*S11686, 2003 WL 22143105 (September 17, 2003); see also Sen. Jud. Comm., Sub. on Immigration, 
Statement for Chairman Senator Saxby Chambliss, July 29, 2003, available at 
<http://judiciary.senate.gov/member~statement. cfm?id =878&wit_id=3355> (accessed on September 5, 
2008). 
If a specialized knowledge beneficiary will be primarily stationed at the worksite of an unaffiliated employer, 
the statute mandates that the petitioner establish both: (1) that the beneficiary will be controlled and 
supervised principally by the petitioner, and (2) that the placement is related to the provision of a product or 
service for which specialized knowledge specific to the petitioning employer is necessary. Section 
214(c)(2)(F) of the Act. These two questions of fact must be established for the record by documentary 
evidence; neither the unsupported assertions of counsel or the employer will suffice to establish eligibility. 
Matter of Soflci, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998); Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. at 534. 
If the petitioner fails to establish both of these elements, the beneficiary will be deemed ineligible for 
classification as an L-1B intracompany transferee. As with all nonimmigrant petitions, the petitioner bears 
the burden of proving eligibility. Section 29 1 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 3 136 1; see also 8 C.F.R. $ 103.2(b)(l). 
A. Threshold Question: Worksite of Beneficiary 
As a threshold question in the analysis, USCIS must examine whether the beneficiary will be stationed 
primarily at the worksite of the clientlunaffiliated company. Section 214(c)(2)(F) of the Act. The petitioner 
indicated on the Form 1-129 petition that the beneficiary will be employed at its own offices located in 
Edison, New Jersey. In response to Question 13 on the Form 1-129 Supplement L, the petitioner answered 
"No" when asked: "Will the beneficiary be stationed primarily offsite (at the worksite of an employer other 
EAC 09 058 51530 
Page 20 
than the petitioner or its affiliate, subsidiary, or parent)?" 
However, the documentary evidence in the records supports a finding that the beneficiary will be stationed at 
the unaffiliated employer's worksite located in Vergennes, Vermont. The record contains a letter of 
deputation from the foreign entity addressed to the beneficiary, which indicates that his assignment is to the 
unaffiliated employer in Vergennes for a period of one year to work on the MRTT project. The petitioner also 
submitted a letter from the unaffiliated employer inviting the beneficiary "to visit our [company] facility in 
Vergennes, VT to continue his work on the MRTT project, which may take an additional 6-8 months to 
complete." 
The director determined that the beneficiary will be stationed primarily at the worksite of the 
client/unaffiliated employer and therefore the provisions of Section 214(c)(2)(F) are applicable. The petitioner 
has made no objection to this determination. 
The petitioner therefore must establish both: (1) that the beneficiary will be controlled and supervised 
principally by the petitioner, and (2) that the placement is related to the provision of a product or service for 
which specialized knowledge specific to the petitioning employer is necessary. Section 214(c)(2)(F) of the 
Act. 
B. Control and Supervision of Beneficiary 
Under section 214(c)(2)(F)(i) of the Act, the petitioner must establish that the beneficiary will be controlled 
and supervised principally by the petitioner, and not by the unaffiliated employer. 
At the time of filing, the petitioner submitted a letter dated 
Subcontracts Administrator of the unaffiliated employer, who 
Projects and in charge of the operation of the petitioner's U.S. office. 
project according to the needs of [the unaffiliated employer]." 
"delegates the staff to the project according to their skills set and monitors the progress and delivery of the 
In the request for evidence issued on December 23, 2008, the director requested that the petitioner submit a 
copy of the contract for services between the petitioner and the employer where the beneficiary will be 
primarily stationed. The director advised that, if the contract does not contain information specific to the 
terms and conditions of the alien's employment, the petitioner should submit an addendum to the contract, 
signed by representatives of the petitioner and the unaffiliated employer, which establishes the following: (1) 
who retains authority to hire and fire the person performing the duties of the position; who is responsible for 
administering the alien's time and pay; (3) to what degree the beneficiary will be controlled and supervised by 
the offsite employer compared to the petitioner; and (4) the number of the petitioner's employers currently at 
the unaffiliated employer's worksite and a description of the supervision and management structure for such 
employees; and (5) the means by which the company will supervise and control the beneficiary and his work 
at the unaffiliated employer's worksite. 
In response, counsel for the petitioner stated that "the beneficiary will be supervised and controlled 100 per 
cent by the employer and not the client" and that "the employer retains authority to hire, fire, control and 
EAC 09 058 5 1530 
Page 2 1 
direct the work of the beneficiary." Counsel stated that "[the unaffiliated employer] has also confirmed this." 
noted that the company does not currently have any employees at the client's worksite. 
With respect to the beneficiary's supervisionstated: 
[The beneficiary] will report to his, who is based in India. 
will monitor the progress of the project and the daily worklduties of [the 
beneficiary] through the Daily reports and weekly reports he receives from [the beneficiary]. 
For this reason, will work in our India office matching operational times of our 
US office. The Onsite manager for our U.S. office, will travel to US office to 
monitor the work of the employees and liaise with our client. . . regarding any issues, updates 
and progress. 
The petitioner submitted a project organizational chart indicating that serves as a project 
manager responsible for three projects undertaken for the unaffiliated employer, including FQMS, EBAC and 
MRTT. 
The petitioner also submitted the supply agreement between the unaffiliated employer and the foreign entity. 
Section 3 of the agreement addresses staffing and indicates that the foreign entity "shall assign appropriately 
qualified Staff to perform the Service," while the unaffiliated employer has the option, upon notice "to specify 
appropriate qualifications required of [the foreign entity's] staff to perform the Service," and "to approve the 
assignment of any Staff to perform the Service." The foreign entity may make employee substitutions and 
withdrawals; however the foreign entity cannot make substitutions or withdrawals of key individuals over the 
valid objections of the unaffiliated employer. The foreign entity may also employ subcontractors for the 
execution of the agreement if it seeks and obtains prior written approval from the unaffiliated employer. 
According to the terms of the agreement, the foreign entity's employees are expected to comply with the 
unaffiliated employer's security requirements, codes of practice and rules while on-site, and the unaffiliated 
employer "shall be empowered to remove any [petitioning company] representative from [the unaffiliated 
employer's] site without recourse or explanation." 
In addition, the petitioner attached an addendum to the agreement, dated January 20,2009, which is signed by 
both the foreign entity and a representative of the unaffiliated employer. According to the addendum, the 
foreign entity's head of human resources is the person authorized to recruit or terminate the services of an 
employee engaged in a project for the unaffiliated employer, while R. Palanivel is authorized to administer 
time and pay, and to assign and monitor employees' duties. The agreement further indicates that the project 
manager receives the project requirements from the unaffiliated employer, communicates the requirements to 
the petitioner's staff, receives reports from staff, and provides the unaffiliated employer with the status of the 
project. 
The director denied the petition determining that the supply agreement submitted does not demonstrate that 
the beneficiary would be supervised and controlled principally by the petitioning company. The director 
emphasized that the agreement allows the unaffiliated employer to determine the necessary qualifications of 
the petitioner's employees assigned to the project, to approve the removal or replacement of any employee, 
EAC 09 058 51530 
Page 22 
and to remove employees at will. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the employer has shown the beneficiary will be controlled by 
his employer and not by the client, and that the client has equally acknowledged this fact in a separate 
document already submitted. 
In its letter submitted on appeal, the petitioner further states: 
Although we have to work closely with [the unaffiliated employer] . . . to develop these 
critical technologies over the years, they have never had to control our employees. They 
cannot control our employees because they do not have the technology and do not know the 
products that we deploy to develop the critical systems. If they had the technologies, they will 
not need our services. If they do not know the technologies, it is clearly evident that they 
cannot control what our employees do. 
Upon review, the petitioner's assertions are not persuasive. 
The major deficiency in the evidence submitted is the lack of a "scope of work" specific to the services the 
beneficiary will be performing for the client in the United States. As noted above, the general Supply 
Agreement signed by the petitioner and the unaffiliated employer in 2006 specifically states that individual 
Work Package Agreements will be prepared for projects and that the scope of work applicable to each project 
will be set forth therein. Without this critical information, the AAO cannot determine whether the petitioner 
had any separate agreements in place pertaining to the work to be performed by the petitioner's employees 
while at the client's worksite. Furthermore, the petitioner's claim that the unaffiliated employer does not have 
the technical knowledge to oversee the petitioner's employees is unsupported by the record absent the formal 
description of the actual services to be provided under the agreement. Going on record without supporting 
documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. 
Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 
I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
Based on the foregoing, the petitioner has failed to meet its burden of establishing that the beneficiary would 
be controlled and supervised principally by the petitioning company and has not satisfied the requirements of 
section 214(c)(2)(F)(i) of the Act. For this additional reason, the petition must be denied. 
C. Necessity of Specialized Knowledge Specific to the Petitioning Employer 
The second issue under the L-1 Visa Reform Act analysis is whether the petitioner has established that the 
beneficiary's placement is related to the provision of a product or service for which specialized knowledge 
specific to the petitioning employer is necessary. Section 2 14(c)(2)(F)(ii) of the Act. As discussed below, the 
petition also fails to meet the requirements of this section of the Act. 
In denying the petition, the director concluded that the placement of the beneficiary at the worksite of the 
unaffiliated employer is to work on and maintain the client's systems, and not primarily to work "on processes 
that are specific to your company." The director observed that the "beneficiary's value to the client project 
appears directly and primarily related to his continuing to gain knowledge of [the unaffiliated employer's] 
EAC 09 058 51530 
Page 23 
internal processes and methodologies," and that "a majority of the beneficiary's purported specialized 
knowledge hinges upon his acquired knowledge of [the unaffiliated employer's] internal processes." 
The petitioner's arguments with reference to the beneficiary's specialized knowledge have been discussed at 
length above and will not be repeated here. 
The petitioner's assertions are not persuasive. The petitioner has not established that the beneficiary's 
placement at the unaffiliated employer's worksite is related to the provision of a product or service for which 
specialized knowledge specific to the petitioning employer is necessary. Section 214(c)(2)(F)(ii) of the Act. 
The petitioner must demonstrate in the first instance that the beneficiary's offsite employment is connected 
with the provision of the petitioner's product or service which necessitates specialized knowledge that is 
speciJic to the petitioning employer. If the petitioner fails to prove this element, the beneficiary's employment 
will be deemed an impermissible arrangement to provide "labor for hire" under the terms of the L-1 Visa 
Reform Act. 
As discussed above, the petitioner has not submitted a copy of the Statement of Work governing the services 
to be provided by the beneficiary at the unaffiliated employer's worksite. The information contained in the 
record indicates that the petitioner is providing "technical support" for the MRTT system being developed by 
the unaffiliated employer for Airbus, and that such support includes ongoing testing and verification of the 
system. There is insufficient evidence to establish that the client contracted with the petitioner to implement 
any system, product, processes, or tools of the petitioning company within the scope of the services to be 
performed at the client's worksite. While it may be common in the petitioner's industry for multiple 
companies to work on different aspects of a specialized product, component or system, it has not been 
established in this case that the client chose to contract the petitioning company specifically to provide a 
product or service that is not available elsewhere. The foreign entity indicated that it was chosen by the 
unaffiliated employer as the subcontractor for several projects among a dozen or so Indian companies with 
similar capabilities. 
While it is possible that the beneficiary here possesses knowledge that is directly related to both the petitioner 
and the unaffiliated employer's product or service, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to establish that the 
position for which the beneficiary's services are sought is one that requires knowledge specific to the 
petitioner. Here, the petitioner has failed to provide corroborating evidence demonstrating that the 
beneficiary's placement with the unaffiliated employer is related to the provision of a product or service for 
which specialized knowledge specific to the petitioning employer is necessary. For this additional reason, the 
petition cannot be approved. 
The petition will be denied and the appeal dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an 
independent and alternative basis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving 
eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. 
Here, that burden has not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.