dismissed L-1B Case: Information Technology

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
Oifice ofAdministmtive Appeals MS 2090 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
File: SRC 04 224 5 1219 
 Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER 
 Date: 
 JAM 0 5 2010 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 10 l(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
\ ~dief, Administrative Appeals Office 
I 
SRC 04 224 51219 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa and the 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant visa petition to employ the beneficiary in the United States as an L-1B 
intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 101(a)(lS)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act ("the Act"), 8 U.S.C. 5 1 lOl(a)(lS)(L). The petitioner, an information technology consulting 
company, states that it is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the beneficiary's foreign employer,- 
located in Bangalore, India. The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary in the position of technical consultant 
for a period of three years. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge or that he has been or would be employed in a position requiring specialized 
knowledge. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and forwarded 
the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner assert that the director's decision was 
based on an improper standard for specialized knowledge and ignored policy guidance set forth in a 1994 legacy 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) memorandum regarding the interpretation of "specialized 
knowledge" under the 1990 statutory definition. Counsel submits a brief in support of the appeal. 
To establish L-1 eligibility under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the petitioner must demonstrate that the 
beneficiary, within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, has 
been employed abroad in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a capacity involving specialized 
knowledge, for one continuous year by a qualifying organization. The petitioner must also demonstrate that the 
beneficiary seeks to enter the United States temporarily in order to continue to render services to the same 
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized 
knowledge. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
SRC 04 224 51219 
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(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himlher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
Under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, an alien is eligible for classification as a nonimmigrant if the alien, 
among other things, will be rendering services to the petitioning employer "in a capacity that is managerial, 
executive, or involves specialized knowledge." Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1184(c)(2)(B), 
provides the statutory definition of specialized knowledge: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special knowledge 
of the company product and its application in international markets or has an advanced level of 
knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines specialized knowledge as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
The sole issue addressed by the director is whether the petitioner established that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge and that he has been and will be employed in a capacity requiring specialized 
knowledge. 
The petitioner filed the Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker on August 18, 2004. In a letter 
dated August 12, 2004, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary would serve as a technical consultant 
"utilizing his specialized knowledge of [the petitioner's] proprietary software to assist in the implementation 
of our client's REVELEUS system." The petitioner further described the beneficiary's proposed duties as the 
following: 
[The beneficiary] will be engaged in the continued development and implementation of the 
REVELEUS System for our client, the American Stock Exchange, at their offices in New 
York. [The beneficiary] has been engaged in the development of this system in India, and 
where he has utilized his knowledge of [the petitioner's] proprietary banking systems 
software, including PROMO TOR^^ and primesourcingTM, in the development and 
implementation of this system. The REVELEUS System is a pre-built, cross functional 
analytics built from our in-depth banking domain expertise that provides technology solutions 
for its first enterprise data warehouse. This system gives a powerful set of predefined stock 
SRC 04 224 51219 
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exchange analytics and a data model, which gives the exchange a significant jumpstart to 
analysis, empowering its business uses to run queries and reports in an efficient manner. [The 
beneficiary] will be responsible for setting up end to end BI solutions consisting of 
technology and business solutions, unified metadata framework and consulting and 
implementing services. The REVELEUS System uses [the petitioner's] proprietary software 
and project management information systems, including PROMO TOR^^ and 
~rime~ourcin~~~, in conjunction with American Stock Exchange corporate audit and 
compliance testing standards, software platforms and security management systems. 
The petitioner stated that the beneficiary has been employed as a technical consultant with the foreign entity 
since July 1999 and has been engaged in the development and implementation of software systems and 
products using the petitioner's PROMO TOR^^, Primesourcing and REVELEUS proprietary project 
management and information systems software methodologies and protocols. In addition, the petitioner 
indicated that the beneficiary has been involved in the implementation of information systems for the client, 
American Stock Exchange, including "design, development and documentation of functions specifications 
and software modules of these proprietary software products," and "responsibility for the documentation of 
technical design specifications and the diagnostic and evaluation testing of quality assurance and audit control 
software requirements." 
The petitioner indicated that the company develops both proprietary and customized information technology 
systems to support the global banking and financial industry, and development of specialized software 
projects for the industry. The petitioner stated that "the company's technical consultants utilize [the 
petitioner's] proprietary project management and information systems methodologies PROMOTOR and 
Primesourcing as well as [the petitioner's] proprietary project and process database, 'QuBase."' 
The petitioner summarized the beneficiary's qualifications as follows: 
Throughout his five years of employment with [the foreign entity], the beneficiary has 
developed advanced and proprietary knowledge of [the petitioner's] products, software, 
management information systems, and specifications, as well as their application to our 
client's systems, which will assist the company's competitive position. He possesses 
knowledge of [the petitioner's] methods of operations, including activities with respect to 
client service, as well as an advanced and in-depth understanding of all aspects of the 
international commodities markets and structures. Through his experience with [the foreign 
entity he] has developed expertise in the business models and software and systems 
requirements of [the company's] clients. He possesses knowledge and skills that are highly 
developed and complex and that are not readily available in the United States market. The 
fact that he has been engaged in the development of the REVELEUS System at [the foreign 
entity] makes his knowledge of our company and our client's requirements truly specialized. 
SRC 04 224 51219 
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The foreign entity also submitted a letter from , in support of 
the petition. explained that Reveleus is a division of the foreign entity, which provides 
"pre-built, cross-functional analytics built from our in-depth banking domain expertise." 
 He stated that 
Reveleus "provides the industry's only metadata-driven information management infrastructure, coupled with 
a suite of integrated analytical applications for the financial services industry." 
All employees at [the foreign entity] receive instruction in our proprietary systems and 
software, including Promotr and QuBase proprietary project management and information 
systems software methodologies and protocols. The length of initial training varies with the 
educational and experiential background of each employee. Beyond the initial training, each 
employee is assigned to a specialized aspect of the client's project. 
He explained that employees assigned to the Reveleus division become functional specialists, technical 
architects, project managers, business intelligence applications developers, or specialize in product quality 
assurance. emphasized that such specialization "permits an individual who is versed in one 
aspect of the Reveleus Suite to be able to provide support in that area across multiple Reveleus projects." He 
indicated that the beneficiary's training and experience is as a "Business Intelligence Applications Developer" 
specialized in Reveleus implementations. 
On August 30, 2004, the director issued a request for additional evidence (RFE), in which he instructed the 
petitioner to provide evidence that the beneficiary's knowledge is uncommon, noteworthy, or distinguished by 
some unusual quality and not generally known by practitioners in the field, and evidence to establish that the 
beneficiary's knowledge of the company's processes and procedures is apart from the elementary or basic 
knowledge possessed by others. Specifically, the director requested: (1) evidence relating to the unique 
methodologies, tools, programs or applications that the company uses and which describes in detail how these 
are different from those used by other companies; (2) an explanation describing exactly what is the 
equipment, system, product or technique of which the beneficiary has specialized knowledge; (3) a record 
from the foreign entity's human resource department detailing the manner in which the beneficiary has gained 
his specialized knowledge; (4) information regarding the minimum amount of time required to train an 
employee to fill the proffered position, the number of similarly employed and similarly-trained workers in the 
organization; and (5) a copy of the beneficiary's resume. 
In response, the petitioner submitted the beneficiary's resume and a training summary, apparently prepared by 
the beneficiary, which indicates that he completed various general technology courses, as well as 
approximately 15 courses which were described as Reveleus training, since joining the foreign entity in 1999. 
The exact length and content of the courses was not provided, but the beneficiary indicates that he completed 
six Reveleus courses in December 2000 and January 2001, and eight Reveleus courses in March and April 
2004. According to the beneficiary's resume, he has served as a team member on five Reveleus projects since 
September 1999. The beneficiary indicates that he is experienced in data modeling, data warehousing, and 
SRC 04 224 51219 
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data warehouse modeling, and technically proficient in technologies such as C++, C, POSIX Threads, 
Framework Design, OOAD, RDBMS, Network Programming, Solaris 8, HP-UX 11 .x, Unix 5.1, Oracle 9i, 
SQL Server 2000. 
In addition, counsel for the petitioner submitted a letter dated December 2,2004 in which he asserted that the 
examples contained in a 1994 legacy INS memorandum strongly support a conclusion in favor of 
determining that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. Counsel cited two examples and 
attempted to equate them to the current situation of the beneficiary. See Memorandum from James A. Puleo, 
Acting Exec. Assoc. Commr., Office of Operations, Immigration and Naturalization Serv., to All Dist. Dir. et 
al., Interpretation of Special Knowledge, 1-2 (March 9, 1994) Counsel concluded that the petitioner had met 
its evidentiary burden and that a favorable decision should be rendered. Counsel further stated: 
[Tlhe beneficiary has been engaged in the development and implementation of the company's 
software systems and products using [the petitioner's] proprietary project management and 
information systems software methodologies and protocols. During this period, he has also 
been engaged in the development and implementation of business intelligence and analytical 
applications for [the petitioner's] Reveleus Division. The beneficiary has been involved in the 
design, development and documentation of functions specifications and software modules of 
these proprietary software products, including responsibility for the documentation of 
technical design specifications and the diagnostic and evaluation testing of quality assurance 
and audit control software requirements. His duties are exactly those of the example in the 
Puleo Memo. The foreign parent manufactures a proprietary technology project. The 
beneficiary is familiar with the procedures in the use and service of the product, which has 
not only has enhanced the employer's productivity and financial position, but which can only 
be gained through experience with the employer. 
The director denied the petition on December 14, 2004, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that 
the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary will be employed in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge. The director determined that the beneficiary's duties appear to require 
knowledge that is common among technical consultants employed by the petitioner's organization and that is 
not significantly different from that held by other technical consultants working in the petitioner's industry. 
The director noted that the petitioner had not provided specific information regarding the number of 
employees within the company with similar training and experience, and it could not be concluded that the 
beneficiary's training has imparted to him knowledge which would be considered advanced or truly 
specialized, or otherwise noteworthy or uncommon within the organization. Citing to Matter of Penner, 18 
I&N Dec. 49 (Comm. 1982), the director noted that the specialized knowledge classification was not intended 
for "all employees with any level of specialized knowledge," but rather for "key personnel." 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director's decision "does not comply with nor utilize the 
definition of Specialized knowledge contained in the Immigration and Nationality Act as amended in 1990, nor 
does it conform with the March 9,1994 memo from James A. Puleo." Counsel further asserts that the director 
SRC 04 224 51219 
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erred by citing to Matter of Penner, noting that such decision was "overturned by Congressional amendment to 
the definition of Specialized Knowledge in 1990 and is no longer valid legal authority." Counsel asserts that there 
is no requirement that the beneficiary's knowledge be uncommon within the petitioning company, but only 
uncommon within the industry. Counsel emphasizes that "training in the petitioner's proprietary operations" 
cannot be considered common in the industry 
The Standard for Specialized Knowledge 
In determining what constitutes specialized knowledge, the standards by which the AAO is bound are those 
set forth in the statutory definition of specialized knowledge itself, as provided at section 214(c)(2)(B) of the 
Act, USCIS regulations, and applicable precedent decisions. When a statute is ambiguous, Congress has left 
a gap for the agency to fill. See Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Res. DeJ: Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984). 
In interpreting section 214(c)(2)(B), the AAO must rely on existing USCIS regulations, the applicable 
precedent decisions, and the legislative history of the enabling and declaratory statutes, as an indication of 
Congressional intent. 
Looking to the language of the statutory definition, Congress has provided USCIS with an ambiguous definition 
of specialized knowledge. In this regard, one Federal district court explained the infeasibility of applying a 
bright-line test to define what constitutes specialized knowledge: 
This ambiguity is not merely the result of an unfortunate choice of dictionaries. It reflects the 
relativistic nature of the concept special. An item is special only in the sense that it is not 
ordinary; to define special one must first define what is ordinary. . . . There is no logical or 
principled way to determine which baseline of ordinary knowledge is a more appropriate reading 
of the statute, and there are countless other baselines which are equally plausible. Simply put, 
specialized knowledge is a relative and empty idea which cannot have a plain meaning. CJ: 
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 537 (1982). 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. 9, 14- 15 (D.D.C., 1990).' 
While Congress did not provide explicit guidance for what should be considered ordinary knowledge, the 
principles of statutory interpretation provide some clue as to the intended scope of the L-1B specialized 
knowledge category. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987) 
(citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207,94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)). 
- -- 
1 
Although 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General was decided prior to enactment of the statutory definition of 
specialized knowledge by the Immigration Act of 1990, the court's discussion of the ambiguity in the legacy 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) definition is equally illuminating when applied to the definition 
created by Congress. 
SRC 04 224 51219 
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First, the AAO must look to the language of section 214(c)(2)(B) itself, that is, the terms "special" and 
"advanced." Like the courts, the AAO customarily turns to dictionaries for help in determining whether a word in 
a statute has a plain or common meaning. See, e.g., In re A.H Robins Co., 109 F.3d 965, 967-68 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(using Webster's Dictionary for "therefore"). According to Webster's New College Dictionary, the word "special" 
is commonly found to mean "surpassing the usual" or "exceptional." Webster's New College Dictionary, 1084 
(3rd Ed. 2008). The dictionary defines the word "advanced" as "highly developed or complex" or "at a higher 
level than others." Id. at 17. 
Second, looking at the term's placement within the text of section 10 l(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the AAO notes that 
specialized knowledge is used to describe the nature of a person's employment and that the term is listed among 
the higher levels of the employment hierarchy together with "managerial" and "executive" employees. Based on 
the context of the term within the statute, the AAO therefore would expect a specialized knowledge employee to 
occupy an elevated position within a company that rises above that of an ordinary or average employee. See 
1 756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 14. 
Third, a review of the legislative history for both the original 1970 statute and the subsequent 1990 statute 
indicates that Congress intended for USCIS to closely administer the L-IB category. Specifically, the original 
draflers of section lOl(a)(15)(L) of the Act intended that the class of persons eligible for the L-1 classification 
would be "narrowly drawn" and "carefully regulated and monitored" by USCIS. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91- 
851 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750,2754, 1970 WL 5815. The legislative history of the 1970 Act 
plainly states that "the number of temporary admissions under the proposed 'L' category will not be large." Id. In 
addition, the Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended for "key personnel." 
See generally, id. The term "key personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "[olf 
crucial importance." Webster 's New College Dictionary 620 (3rd ed., Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing 
Co. 2008). Moreover, during the course of the sub-committee hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically 
questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify under the proposed "L" category. In response 
to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that they understood the legislation would allow 
"high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, and that it would not include "lower 
categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." See H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration 
Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445,91g Cong. 21 0,218,223,240,248 (Nov. 12, 1969). 
Neither in 1970 nor in 1990 did Congress provide a controlling, unambiguous definition of "specialized 
knowledge," and a narrow interpretation is consistent with so much of the legislative intent as it is possible to 
determine. H. Rep. No. 91-851 at 6, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2754. This interpretation is consistent with legislative 
history, which has been largely supportive of a narrow reading of the definition of specialized knowledge and the 
L-1 visa classification in general. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 15-16; Boi Na Braza 
Atlanta, LLC v. Upchurch, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 2372846 at "4 (N.D.Tex., 2005), afd 194 
Fed.Appx. 248 (5th Cir. 2006); Fibermaster, Ltd v. LNS., Not Reported in F.Supp., 1990 WL 99327 (D.D.C., 
1990); Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Dept. of Justice, Civ. Action 00-2977-LFO (D.D.C. April 6, 2001)(on file with 
AAO). 
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Further, although the Immigration Act of 1990 provided a statutory definition of the term "specialized 
knowledge" in section 214(c)(2) of the Act, the definition did not generally expand the class of persons eligible 
for L-1B specialized knowledge visas. Pub.L. No. 101-649, !$ 206(b)(2), 104 Stat. 4978, 5023 (1990). Instead, 
the legislative history indicates that Congress created the statutory definition of specialized knowledge for the 
express purpose of clarifying a previously undefined term from the Immigration Act of 1970. H.R. Rep. 101- 
723(I) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6749, 1990 WL 200418 ("One area within the L visa that 
requires more specificity relates to the term 'specialized knowledge.' Varying interpretations by INS have 
exacerbated the problem."). While the 1990 Act declined to codify the "proprietary knowledge" and "United 
States labor market" references that had existed in the previous agency definition found at 8 C.F.R. 
!$ 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) (1988), there is no indication that Congress intended to liberalize its own 1970 definition of 
the L- 1 visa classification. 
If any conclusion can be drawn from the enactment of the statutory definition of specialized knowledge in section 
2 14(c)(2)(B), it would be based on the nature of the Congressional clarification itself. By not including any strict 
criterion in the ultimate statutory definition and further emphasizing the relativistic aspect of "special knowledge," 
Congress created a standard that requires USCIS to make a factual determination that can only be determined on a 
case-by-case basis, based on the agency's expertise and discretion. Rather than a bright-line standard that would 
support a more rigid application of the law, Congress gave the INS a more flexible standard that requires an 
adjudication based on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. CJ: Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 33 1 F.3d 
369, 377 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89,91 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
To determine what is special or advanced, USCIS must first determine the baseline of ordinary. As a 
baseline, the terms "special" or "advanced" must mean more than simply "skilled" or "experienced." By 
itself, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically complex products will not equal "special 
knowledge." See Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 53 (Comm. 1982). In general, all employees can 
reasonably be considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the 
overall economic success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. 
An employee of "crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average 
employee. In other words, specialized knowledge generally requires more than a short period of experience; 
otherwise special or advanced knowledge would include every employee in an organization with the 
exception of trainees and entry-level staff. If everyone in an organization is specialized, then no one can be 
considered truly specialized. Such an interpretation strips the statutory language of any efficacy and cannot 
have been what Congress intended. 
Counsel asserts that the precedent decision cited by the director was improperly applied, since that decision 
interpreted a pre-1990 definition of specialized knowledge and was superseded by the Immigration Act of 
1990. The AAO notes that precedent decisions that predate the 1990 Act are not categorically superseded by 
the statutory definition of specialized knowledge. 
 The AAO generally presumes that Congress is 
knowledgeable about existing law pertinent to the legislation it enacts. See Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 
486 U.S. 174, 184-85 (1988). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently concluded that the AAO's 
reliance on such authority was appropriate. Brazil Quality Stones v. Chert08 --- F.3d ---, 2008 WL 2675825 
SRC 04 224 51219 
Page 10 
n. 10 at *4 (9th Cir., July 10, 2008). 
Although the cited precedent pre-dates the current 1990 Act, the AAO finds it instructive. 
 While the 
underlying definition of specialized knowledge that was discussed in the decision is now superseded by the 
statutory definition, the general issues and the case facts themselves remain cogent as examples of how the 
INS applied the law to the real world facts of individual adjudications. For example, USCIS must distinguish 
between skilled workers and specialized knowledge workers when making a determination on an L-1B visa 
petition. The distinction between skilled and specialized knowledge workers has been a recurring issue in the 
L-1 B program and is discussed at length in INS precedent decisions, including Matter of Penner. See 18 I&N 
Dec. at 50-53 (discussing the legislative history and prior precedents as they relate to the distinction between 
skilled and specialized knowledge workers). 
Accordingly, the director's citation of a precedent that predates the Immigration Act of 1990 is not 
objectionable, as long as the director's decision is narrowly tailored to address issues that were not directly 
superseded by the statutory definition. If the director were to apply the precedent decision in support of a 
"proprietary knowledge" requirement or a reference to "knowledge not available on the U.S. labor market," 
then the use of the precedent would be objectionable. The director, however, did not do so in this case. 
According to the reasoning of Matter of Penner, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically 
complex products, by itself, will not equal "special knowledge." USCIS must interpret specialized knowledge 
to require more than fundamental job skills or a short period of experience. An expansive interpretation of 
specialized knowledge in which any experienced employee would qualify as having special or advanced 
knowledge would be untenable, since it would allow a petitioner to transfer any experienced employee to the 
United States in the L-1B classification. The terms special or advanced must mean more than experienced or 
skilled. In other terms, specialized knowledge requires more than a short period of experience, otherwise 
"special" or "advanced" knowledge would include every employee with the exception of trainees and recent 
recruits. 
Considering the definition of specialized knowledge, it is the petitioner's, not USCIS's, burden to articulate 
and prove that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" knowledge. Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 
8 U.S.C. !j 1 184(c)(2)(B). USCIS cannot make a factual determination regarding the beneficiary's specialized 
knowledge if the petitioner does not, at a minimum, articulate with specificity the nature of the claimed 
specialized knowledge, describe how such knowledge is typically gained within the organization, and explain 
how and when the beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
Once the petitioner articulates the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and type of 
evidence which establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized knowledge. A 
petitioner's assertion that the beneficiary possesses advanced knowledge of the processes and procedures of 
the company must be supported by evidence describing and distinguishing that knowledge from the 
elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others. Because "special" and "advanced" are comparative 
terms, the petitioner should provide evidence that allows USCIS to assess the beneficiary's knowledge 
SRC 04 224 5 1219 
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relative to others in the petitioner's workforce or relative to similarly employed workers in the petitioner's 
specific industry. 
Analysis 
Upon review, the petitioner in this case has failed to establish either that the beneficiary's position in the 
United States or abroad requires an employee with specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has 
specialized knowledge. 
In examining the specialized knowledge of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's description of 
the job duties and the weight of the evidence supporting any asserted specialized knowledge. See 8 C.F.R. 
5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed job description of the services to be performed sufficient to 
establish specialized knowledge. At a minimum, the petitioner must articulate with specificity the nature of the 
claimed specialized knowledge. Merely asserting that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" 
knowledge will not suffice to meet the petitioner's burden of proof. 
In the present matter, the petitioner provided an abbreviated description of the beneficiary's employment in the 
foreign entity, his intended employment in the U.S. entity, and his responsibilities as a technical consultant. 
Despite specific requests by the director for evidence that would support a finding that the beneficiary's 
knowledge and experience is uncommon or noteworthy, the petitioner has not suficiently documented how the 
beneficiary's performance of the proposed job duties distinguishes his knowledge as specialized. The petitioner, 
through counsel, repeatedly states throughout the record and again on appeal that the beneficiary performs a 
multitude of complex and highly technical job duties for the petitioner, the nature of which are not fully 
understood by USCIS. Counsel for the petitioner continually asserts that the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge as a result of his five years of experience as a technical consultant and that such knowledge is far 
beyond that commonly found throughout the industry. Counsel further alleges that the time the beneficiary 
devoted to the REVELEUS project and his time spent working as a Business Intelligence Applications 
Developer in the Reveleus Division during this period has further developed his specialized knowledge. The 
record prior to adjudication, however, is devoid of evidence that would corroborate the assertions of counsel. 
Without documentary evidence to support these claims, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the 
petitioner's burden of proof. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter of Ramirez- 
Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503,506 (BIA 1980). 
The director's request for evidence was extremely specific. In fact, the director's request directly quoted 
characteristics identified by the 1994 Puleo memorandum as indicative of an alien's specialized knowledge, 
which requested clarification that the beneficiary's claimed specialized knowledge was not merely general 
knowledge held commonly throughout the industry. The director, therefore, was clearly acting in accordance 
with the Puleo memorandum and afforded the petitioner all available measures to supplement the record with 
additional evidence. In addition to directly quoting points highlighted in the Puleo memorandum, the 
director's request advised the petitioner that examples of acceptable evidence included copies of certificates, 
personnel records, andlor letters from authorized representatives of the petitioner attesting to classroom and/or 
SRC 04 224 51219 
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on the job training. Although specifically requested by the director, the record contains little evidence of the 
beneficiary's training, experience, daily duties, or level of expertise, and no information that would allow 
USCIS to determine whether the beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner's processes and procedures is 
advanced, or whether knowledge of the petitioner's products alone would constitute specialized knowledge. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(3)(viii) states that the director may request additional evidence in 
appropriate cases. Although specifically and clearly requested by the director, counsel for the petitioner failed 
to provide documentary evidence to support its claims that the beneficiary obtained a specialized level of 
knowledge through his training and work experience with the foreign entity. The failure to submit requested 
evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. See 8 C.F.R. 5 
103.2(b)(14). In this case, counsel requests that the AAO accept his uncorroborated assertions that the 
beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. As previously stated, the assertions of counsel do not constitute 
evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. at 534; Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. at 506. Going 
on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of 
proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of 
Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
The petitioner's claim that the beneficiary is qualified for the benefit sought appears to be based primarily on 
the fact that the beneficiary works on a proprietary product as a member of the Reveleus division of the 
company. Therefore, the AAO must determine whether knowledge of and experience with the petitioner's 
proprietary product and related project tools such as Promotor and QuBase, constitutes specialized 
knowledge. While the current statutory and regulatory definitions of "specialized knowledge" do not include a 
requirement that the beneficiary's knowledge be proprietary, the petitioner cannot satisfy the current standard 
merely by establishing that the beneficiary's purported specialized knowledge is proprietary. The knowledge 
must still be either "special" or "advanced." 
Reviewing the precedent decisions that preceded the Immigration Act of 1990, there are a number of 
conclusions that were not based on the superseded regulatory definition, and therefore continue to apply to the 
adjudication of L-1B specialized knowledge petitions. In 1981, the INS recognized that "[tlhe modern 
workplace requires a high proportion of technicians and specialists." The agency concluded that: 
Most employees today are specialists and have been trained and given specialized knowledge. 
However, in view of the [legislative history], it can not be concluded that all employees with 
specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
intracompany transferees. The House Report indicates the employee must be a "key" person 
and associates this employee with "managerial personnel." 
Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. at 1 19-20. 
It should be noted that the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the AAO to make 
comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The term "specialized 
knowledge" is not an absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed in 1756, Inc. v. Attorney 
SRC 04 224 51219 
Page 13 
General, "[slimply put, specialized knowledge is a relative . . . idea which cannot have a plain meaning." 745 
F. Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990). The Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended 
for "key personnel." See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key 
personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." Webster's NNew 
College Dictionary 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). In general, all employees can reasonably be 
considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic 
success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. An employee of 
''crucial importance1' or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average employee. 
Accordingly, based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the Congressional record related to that 
term, the AAO must make comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge employee and 
the general labor market, but also between that employee and the remainder of the petitioner's workforce. 
Here, the petitioner's only contention that the beneficiary's knowledge is more advanced than other technical 
consultants is its assertion on appeal that the beneficiary's duties, as set forth in the petitioner's letter 
submitted with the initial petition, are directly akin to those set forth in the Puleo memorandum. Again, the 
petitioner has not provided any information that would allow the AAO to compare the beneficiary's 
experience and training to that of other technical consultants employed by the petitioner. The lack of tangible 
evidence in the record makes it impossible to classify the beneficiary's knowledge of REVELEUS and other 
software systems as advanced and precludes a finding that the beneficiary's role is of crucial importance to the 
organization. Simply going on record w-ithout supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for the 
purpose of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. The 
claim that the beneficiary has been employed by the petitioner for five years and that most of this period was 
devoted primarily to work on the REVELEUS system does little to establish that the beneficiary is equipped 
with specialized knowledge, for the petitioner has provided no independent evidence that sets the beneficiary 
apart from all other employees who have gained a similar "expertise" after working for the petitioner for 
similar period of time. 
The record contains little explanation or documentary evidence regarding the REVELEUS product, or what 
sets this product apart from similar products developed by other companies in the petitioner's field. Similarly, 
the petitioner did not attempt to explain or document how its processes and methodologies differ significantly 
from those utilized by other companies offering software consulting services and solutions in the same field. 
The petitioner has not specified the amount or type of training its technical staff members receive in the 
company's products, tools and procedures and therefore it cannot be concluded that its processes are 
particularly complex or different compared to those utilized by other companies in the industry, or that it 
would take a significant amount of time to train an experienced information technology consultant who had 
no prior experience with the petitioner's family of companies. Finally, the petitioner has not articulated or 
documented how specialized knowledge is typically gained within the organization, or explained how and 
when the beneficiary gained such knowledge. Again, going on record without supporting documentary 
evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Su~cici, 
22 I&N Dec. at 165. 
SRC 04 224 51219 
Page 14 
Overall, the record does not establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is substantially different from the 
knowledge possessed by other employees of the petitioning organization. The fact that the beneficiary and a 
select group of workers possess a very specific set of skills does not alone establish that the beneficiary's 
knowledge is indeed special or advanced. All employees can be said to possess uncommon skill sets to some 
degree; however, a skill set that can be easily imparted to another similarly educated and generally 
experienced technical consultant is not "specialized knowledge." Rather, the petitioner must establish that 
qualities of the processes, procedures, or products require this employee to have knowledge beyond what is 
common in the industry. This has not been established in this matter. The fact that other workers outside of 
the petitioning organization may not have very specific knowledge regarding the petitioner's enterprise is not 
relevant to these proceedings if this knowledge gap could be closed by the petitioner by simply revealing the 
information to a newly hired, generally experienced and educated worker. Furthermore, based on the 
petitioner's representations, each technical consultant within the petitioner's organization is expected to 
develop a specialization. Given this scenario, it appears that any technical consultant employed by the 
petitioner's group of companies would be deemed to have specialized knowledge. An expansive interpretation 
of specialized knowledge in which any experienced employee would qualifL as having special or advanced 
knowledge would be untenable, since it would allow a petitioner to transfer any experienced employee to the 
United States in L-1B classification. 
The petitioner must establish that qualities of the particular process or product require an individual to have 
knowledge beyond what is common among its workforce, or to establish that the beneficiary has advanced 
knowledge of the product. This has not been established in this matter. While the AAO does not discount the 
fact that the beneficiary is a skilled technical consultant and that he is qualified for the position offered, the 
petitioner did not distinguish the beneficiary in terms of his training and experience and the record remains 
devoid of information that would support a conclusion that the beneficiary possesses knowledge beyond what 
is ordinary among the petitioner's workforce. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary's 
knowledge is any more advanced or special than the knowledge held by a skilled worker. See Matter of 
Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 52. 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, supra at 16. The record does not establish that the 
beneficiary has specialized knowledge or that the position offered with the United States entity requires 
specialized knowledge. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
appeal will be dismissed. 
ORDER: 
 The appeal is dismissed.