dismissed L-1B Case: Information Technology

PUBLIC COPY 
identifying da& deleted to 
prevent dearly unwarranted 
invasion of pmonal privacy 
U.S. Department of Homelrnd Security 
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
FILE: EAC 04 1 14 52909 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date: ,~y 0 2007 
PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 
 1101(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned 
to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
' Administrative Appeals Office 
EAC 04 1 14 52909 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the 
appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seelung to employ the beneficiary in the position of 
technical consultant as an L-1B nonimmigrant intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge 
pursuant to 8 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
 Act), 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L). 
The petitioner claims that it is a subsidiary of 
 located in India. The petitioner 
states that it is an information technology business. The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary for a 
three-year period. 
The director denied the petition on April 12, 2004, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the 
position offered to the beneficiary requires someone with specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has 
such knowledge. 
On appeal, counsel contends that the decision is "arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion," and 
that Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) improperly applied the appropriate statute and regulation 
to the evidence in its denial of the petition. Counsel for the petitioner states that the petitioner has satisfied 
the factors utilized to determine specialized knowledge as outlined in two legacy Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) memoranda. See Memorandum from James A. Puleo, Acting Exec. Assoc. 
Comm., INS, Interpretation of Special Knowledge (March 9, 1994)("Puleo Memo"); Memorandum from 
Fujie Ohata, Assoc. Cornrn., INS, Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge (December 20, 2002)("0hata 
Memo"). Counsel asserts that the beneficiary qualified under the Puleo memo as the petitioner manufactures 
a "proprietary technology product," and the beneficiary is "familiar with the procedures in the use and service 
of the product," which enhances the petitioner's productivity and financial position, and the knowledge can 
only be gained through the employment with the petitioning company. Counsel also states that the 
beneficiary possesses the petitioner's proprietary technology and its "application to its client's internal 
systems." Counsel further asserts that the director erred in stating that the petitioning company is a 
consulting company since it is primarily a "developer of information technology products and customized 
services." Counsel cites to a previous decision where the AAO approved L-1B status for a technical 
consultant for the petitioning company. Counsel submits a brief and additional documentation in support 
of the appeal. 
To establish L-1 eligibility, the petitioner must meet the criteria outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 8 1101(a)(15)(L). Specifically, within three years 
preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, a qualifying organization 
must have employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized 
knowledge capacity, for one continuous year. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United 
States temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or 
affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall'be 
accompanied by: 
EAC 04 1 14 52909 
Page 3 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ 
the alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (I)(l)(ii)(G) of this 
section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or 
specialized knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services 
to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing 
of the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that 
was managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's 
prior education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the 
intended services in the United States; however, the work in the United States 
need not be the same work which the alien performed abroad. 
This matter presents two related, but distinct issues: (1) whether the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge; and (2) whether the proposed employment is in a capacity that requires specialized knowledge. 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1184(c)(2)(B), provides: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its application 
in international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the 
organization's processes and procedures. 
The petitioner filed the instant nonirnrnigrant petition on March 10, 2004, indicating that the beneficiary 
would be employed in the United States as a technical consultant. In a support letter dated March 3, 
2004, the petitioner stated that it wishes to transfer the beneficiary to the United States "utilizing his 
specialized knowledge of [the petitioner's] proprietary software to assist in the development of our 
client's Record Keeping System." The petitioner also indicated the company's business activities as the 
following: 
EAC 04 114 52909 
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The company's professional staff of over 1800 information technology professionals is 
engaged in the design and development of both proprietary and customized information 
technology systems to support the global banking and financial operations of leading 
international banking and financial organizations, as well as the development and 
marketing of specialized software products for the banking and financial services 
industry, including its flagship product, FLEXCUBETM, the company's proprietary 
banking system software. FLEXCUBE is the choice of more than 170 financial 
institutions worldwide. [The petitioner] also offers financial institutions customized 
solutions through its domain and technology Centers of Excellence, which encompass 
areas such as Business Intelligence, CRM, e-services, Integration Services, Insurance and 
Payment Systems. The company's technical consultants utilize [the petitioner's] 
solutions' proprietary project management and information systems methodologies 
PROMOTORTM and PrimeSourcing, as well as [the petitioner's] solutions' proprietary 
project and process database, "QuBase". 
The petitioner described the duties to be performed by the beneficiary in the United States, and his 
qualifications to fill the position, as the following: 
In this position [technical consultant], he will be engaged in the continued development 
and implementation of the Record Keeping System for our client, Princeton Financial 
Systems Inc., at their offices in Princeton, NJ. [The beneficiary] has been engaged in the 
development of this system in India, and where he has utilized his knowledge of [the 
petitioner's] proprietary banking systems software, including PROMOTORTM and 
PrimeSourcingTM, in the development and implementation of this system. [The 
beneficiary] will review Princeton's current record system for completeness and 
adequacy and apply [the petitioner's] PrimeSourcingTM methodology to improve 
functionality of current system. The Record Keeping System uses [the petitioner's] 
proprietary software and project management information systems, including 
PROMOTORTM and PrimeSourcingTM, in conjunction with Princeton Financial Systems 
Inc.'s corporate audit and compliance testing standards, software platforms and security 
management systems. 
[The beneficiary] is well qualified to assume this specialized knowledge position with our 
organization. [The beneficiary] has been employed by [the foreign entity], in November 
2001, and has held the position of Technical Consultant since then. As Technical 
Consultant, [the beneficiary] has been engaged in the development and implementation of 
the company's software systems and products using [the petitioner's] PROMOTORTM 
and PrimeSourcing proprietary project management and information systems software 
methodologies and protocols. During this period, he has also been engaged in the 
development and implementation of Princeton Financial Systems Inc. information 
technology systems including Princeton Financial Systems Inc.'s Record Keeping 
Systems using PROMOTORTM and PrimeSourcing in conjunction with Princeton 
Financial Systems Inc.'s corporate audit and compliance testing standards, software 
platforms and security management systems. In his capacity as Technical Consultant, 
EAC 04 1 14 52909 
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[the beneficiary] has been involved in the design, development, and documentation of 
functions specifications and software modules of these proprietary software products, 
including responsibility for the documentation of technical design specifications and the 
diagnostic and evaluation testing of quality assurance and audit control software 
requirements. 
[The beneficiary] holds a Bachelor of Commerce degree from the University of Calcutta 
in India. Throughout two years of employment with [the foreign entity], [the beneficiary] 
has developed advanced and proprietary knowledge of [the petitioner's] products, 
software, management information systems, and specifications, as well as their 
application to our client's systems, which will assist the company's competitive position. 
He possesses knowledge of [the petitioner's] methods of operations, including activities 
with respect to client service, as well as an advanced and in-depth understanding of all 
aspects of the international commodities markets and structures. Through his experience 
with [the petitioner], [the beneficiary] has developed expertise in the business models and 
software and systems requirements of [the petitioner's] clients. He possesses knowledge 
and skills that are highly developed and complex, and that are not readily available in the 
United States market. The fact that he has been engaged in the development of the 
Record Keeping System at [the foreign entity] makes his knowledge of our company and 
our client's requirements truly specialized. 
The petitioner also submitted a letter from the foreign company confirming the beneficiary's employment 
as a technical consultant since November 2001, and copies of pay statements issued to the beneficiary 
from the foreign company from August 2003 until January 2004. In addition, the petitioner submitted the 
petitioning company's annual report for 2002 - 2003. 
The director issued a request for additional evidence on March 19, 2004, stating that the record does not 
show that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. The director requested: (1) an explanation as 
to whether the beneficiary participated on the same project he would work on in the United States, 
including the length of time, the specialized knowledge acquired when working on this project, and a 
contract or personnel records evidencing the beneficiary worked on this assignment; (2) a copy of the 
beneficiary's resume; (3) evidence verifying that the beneficiary's knowledge is uncommon, noteworthy, 
or distinguished by some unusual quality and is not generally known by others in the beneficiary's field 
or in the industry, or evidence that the beneficiary's advanced level of knowledge of the company's 
processes and procedures distinguishes him from those with elementary or basic knowledge; (4) evidence 
that the beneficiary possesses knowledge that is not commonly held throughout the industry but that is 
truly specialized or advanced, which may include knowledge that is valuable to the employer's 
competitiveness in the marketplace; andlor that he is qualified to contribute to the petitioner's knowledge 
of foreign operating conditions; (5) confirmation that the beneficiary has been utilized abroad on 
significant assignments that have enhanced the employer's productivity, competitiveness, image, or 
financial position, and that the knowledge possessed by the beneficiary can only be gained through prior 
experience with the foreign employer; (6) verification that the beneficiary possesses knowledge of a 
product or process that cannot be easily transferred or taught to another individual; (7) the number of L- 
1B nonimmigrant workers employed in the United States, including a brief job description for each 
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employee; (8) an explanation as to the manner in which the beneficiary has gained his specialized 
knowledge, including the total length of any classroom or on-the-job training courses completed and the 
minimum amount of time required to train a person to work in the position the petitioner is seeking to fill; 
and, (9) a statement discussing the type of training, both formal education and in-house training, needed 
for an individual to be able to adequately perform the duties of the proposed position, and the number of 
employees who have received such training. 
The petitioner responded in a letter dated April 8, 2004. Counsel contended that the director's request for 
additional evidence was misplaced and erroneous and that the petitioner had previously submitted ample 
evidence with the initial petition that established the beneficiary's specialized knowledge. Counsel further 
asserted that the current standard for the interpretation of specialized knowledge is outlined in two legacy 
INS memoranda. See Memorandum from James A. Puleo, Acting Exec. Assoc. Comm., INS, Interpretation 
of Special Knowledge (March 9, 1994)("Puleo Memo"); Memorandum from Fujie Ohata, Assoc. Comm., 
INS, Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge (December 20, 2002)("0hata Memo"). Counsel stated that the 
Puleo memo instructs CIS "that the statutory and regulatory definitions are less stringent than the previous 
standard of proprietary knowledge." Thus, counsel asserted that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge 
since it has reached the higher standing of "proprietary knowledge of the company's products and services." 
Counsel also stated that the beneficiary's knowledge of the "proprietary technology and its applications to 
banlung requirements cannot be replicated easily to another individual." Furthermore, counsel reviewed the 
intent of the statute and stated the director erred by reading such a strict interpretation of the regulations and 
statute. 
The petitioner failed to submit documentation requested by the director such as documentation regarding the 
training required to fill the position of technical consultant and information regarding similarly employed 
individuals by the petitioning company. Failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line 
of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 
 103.2(b)(14). 
The director denied the petition on April 12, 2004, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the 
position offered to the beneficiary requires someone with specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has 
such knowledge. The director noted that the beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner's proprietary products, 
without any other documentation, is not sufficient to establish that the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge. The director noted that if the regulations were intended to be interpreted so broadly, any 
individual who has knowledge of a company's proprietary products will qualify for L-1B classification. The 
director also stated that the petitioning company does not develop its own software products, and the 
beneficiary "did not take part in the development" of the petitioner's proprietary products as described in the 
petition. The director noted that the beneficiary's duties do not appear to be significantly different from 
those of any other programmers employed by the petitioner, or different from the duties performed by other 
programmers in the computer industry. The director further stated that all programmers hired by the 
petitioner must undergo a three-month training course and therefore the training program is not 
specialized since it is offered to all programmers and not a select few who will obtain an advanced or 
specialized knowledge. 
On appeal, counsel contends that the decision is "arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion," and 
that CIS improperly applied the appropriate statute and regulation to the evidence in its denial of the 
EAC 04 1 14 52909 
Page 7 
petition. Counsel for the petitioner states that the petitioner has satisfied the factors utilized to determine 
specialized knowledge as outlined in two legacy INS memoranda. See Memorandum from James A. Puleo, 
Acting Exec. Assoc. Comm., INS, Interpretation of Special Knowledge (March 9, 1994)("Puleo Memo"); 
Memorandum fiom Fujie Ohata, Assoc. Cornrn., INS, Intelpretation of Specialized Knowledge (December 
20, 2002)("0hata Memo"). Counsel states that the beneficiary qualified under the Puleo memo as the 
petitioner manufactures a "proprietary technology product," and the beneficiary is "familiar with the 
procedures in the use and service of the product," which enhances the petitioner's productivity and financial 
position and can only be gained through the employment with the petitioning company. Counsel also asserts 
that the director erred in stating that the petitioning company is a consulting company since it is in fact 
foremost a "developer of information technology products and customized services." Counsel states that the 
director included facts that were not in the record such as the petitioning company provides a three-month 
training program to all of its employees. Counsel states, "nowhere in this petition is the length of any training 
program discussed." Counsel cites to a previous decision where the AAO approved L-1B status for a 
technical consultant for the petitioning company. 
On review, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary would be employed in the United 
States organization in a specialized knowledge capacity. In examining the specialized knowledge 
capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 
C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed description of the services to be performed 
sufficient to establish specialized knowledge. Id. 
Although the petitioner repeatedly asserts that the beneficiary's proposed U.S. position requires specialized 
knowledge, the petitioner has not adequately articulated any basis to support this claim. The petitioner has 
provided a description of the beneficiary's proposed responsibilities as a technical consultant, but the 
description does not mention the application of any specialized or advanced body of knowledge which would 
distinguish the beneficiary's role from that of other technical consultants employed by the petitioner. Going 
on record without documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these 
proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of 
California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Cornrn. 1972)). Based upon the lack of supporting evidence, the MO 
cannot determine whether the U.S. position requires someone who possesses knowledge that rises to the level 
of specialized knowledge as defined at 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). 
The petitioner has repeatedly asserted that the beneficiary possesses knowledge of the petitioner's proprietary 
products such as PROMOTORTM and PrimeSourcing, and QuBase, and thus the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge. According to the petitioner's support letter dated March 3, 2004, it appears that 
once the beneficiary commenced his employment with the foreign company, he immediately began 
working as a technical consultant "engaged in the development and implementation of the company's 
software systems and products." This fact provides further evidence that the petitioner does not utilize a 
proprietary system that greatly differs from the systems used by technical consultants in the information 
technology industry since the beneficiary immediately began working with the petitioner's products upon 
commencement of his employment with the petitioner. Thus, the AAO cannot conclude that the 
beneficiary has an "advanced knowledge" of the petitioner's proprietary software over and above from 
other employees of the petitioner or other employees in the computer industry. 
EAC 04 1 14 52909 
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In addition, there is no evidence in the record that the beneficiary has received specific in-house training 
that would have imparted him with the claimed "advanced7' knowledge of the company's processes, 
procedures and methodologies. In the request for evidence, the director specifically requested that the 
petitioner submit documentary evidence to establish that the beneficiary possessed, specialized 
knowledge above that which is normally possessed by other technical consultants employed by the 
foreign organization. The petitioner failed to submit this documentation in its response. Failure to submit 
requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 
C.F.R. $ 103.2(b)(14). Without specific information of the training courses completed by the beneficiary 
at the foreign company, if any, the AAO cannot determine if this training provided the beneficiary with an 
advanced knowledge or if it is reasonable to believe that a technical consultant with a background in 
related technologies may learn the petitioning company's specific project methodologies and processes 
with little to no training. The AAO withdraws the director's statement in its denial decision asserting that 
the petitioner provides a three month training course to its technical consultants. In reviewing the record, 
there is no information regarding a three month training course and thus the AAO will withdraw this 
specific statement made by the director in her decision. 
In addition, the petitioner did not submit any documentation to evidence that the beneficiary received 
additional training that was not provided to other technical consultants employed by the foreign company. 
The petitioner did note that the beneficiary has worked with the U.S. client on the same project and his 
experience and knowledge of the client's requirements are "truly specialized." Knowledge related to a 
specific clients' project cannot be considered "specialized knowledge" specific to the petitioning 
company. The beneficiary's familiarity with the U.S. clients' project requirements is undoubtedly 
valuable to the petitioner, but this knowledge alone is insufficient to establish employment in a 
specialized knowledge capacity. If the AAO were to follow the petitioner's logic, any technical 
consultant who had worked on a client project team within the petitioner's organization would be 
considered to possess "specialized knowledge." 
Counsel repeatedly asserts that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge due to the nature of the 
petitioner's "proprietary technology product." The petitioner did not submit evidence describing in detail the 
petitioner's proprietary products and how they differ from other information technology products utilized by 
the banlung industry. Despite the director's request for evidence, the petitioner failed to submit any evidence 
to establish the purported proprietary nature of the petitioner's "proprietary technology product" or that the 
beneficiary's knowledge is uncommon, noteworthy, or distinguished by some unusual quality and is not 
generally known by others in the beneficiary's field or in the industry. Mere assertions are not enough to 
meet the petitioner's burden of proof. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not 
sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N 
Dec. at 165. 
Contrary to the assertions of the petitioner, there is no evidence on record to suggest that the processes 
and technology pertaining to technical consultant positions within the U.S. company are different from 
those applied for other companies providing software development and consulting services to the banking 
industry. Moreover, there is no evidence on record to suggest that the computer programming processes 
pertaining to the banking industry, specifically, are different from those applied for any computer 
programming position. While individual companies will develop a computer system tailored to its own 
. EAC 04 114 52909 
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needs and internal quality processes, it has not been established that there would be substantial differences 
such that knowledge of the petitioning company's processes and quality standards would amount to 
"specialized knowledge." 
It is also appropriate for the AAO to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the 
beneficiary's knowledge of the business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making 
process. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. 1 17, 120 (Comm. 1981) (citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 
61 8 (R.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. 8 16 (R.C. 1971)).' As stated by the Commissioner 
in Matter of Penner, when considering whether the beneficiaries possessed specialized knowledge, "the 
LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find that the occupations inherently qualified the beneficiaries for 
the classifications sought." 18 I&N Dec. at 52. Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have unusual 
duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. Id. The Commissioner also provided the 
following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or 
her to produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed 
primarily for his ability to cany out a key process or function which is important or 
essential to the business' operation. 
Id. at 53. 
In Matter of Penner, the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of the 
specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comm. 1982). As noted previously, although the 
definition of "specialized knowledge" in effect at the time of Matter of Penner was superseded by the 
1990 Act to the extent that the former definition required a showing of "proprietary" knowledge, the AAO 
finds that the reasoning behind Matter of Penner remains applicable to the current matter. The decision 
noted that the 1970 House Report, H.R. No. 91-851, stated that the number of admissions under the L-1 
classification "will not be large" and that "[tlhe class of persons eligible for such nonimmigrant visas is 
narrowly drawn and will be carefully regulated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id. at 5 1. 
The decision noted that the House Report was silent on the subject of specialized knowledge, but that 
I 
 Although the cited precedents pre-date the current statutory definition of "specialized knowledge," the 
MO finds them instructive. Other than deleting the former requirement that specialized knowledge had 
to be "proprietary," the 1990 Act did not significantly alter the definition of "specialized knowledge" 
from the prior INS interpretation of the term. The 1990 Committee Report does not reject, criticize, or 
even refer to any specific INS regulation or precedent decision interpreting the term. The Committee 
Report simply states that the Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of "[vlarying 
[i.e., not specifically incorrect] interpretations by INS," H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I), at 69, 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. Beyond that, the Committee Report simply restates the tautology that became 
section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Id. The AAO concludes, therefore, that the cited cases remain useful 
guidance concerning the intended scope of the "specialized knowledge" L-1B classification. The AAO 
supports its use of Matter of Penner, as well in offering guidance interpreting "specialized knowledge." 
Again, the Committee Report does not reject the interpretation of specialized knowledge offered in 
Matter of Penner. 
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 EAC 04 1 14 52909 
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during the course of the sub-committee hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically questioned 
witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify under the proposed "L" category. In response to the 
Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that they understood the legislation would allow 
"high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, and that it would not include "lower 
categories" of workers or "slulled craft workers." Matter of Penner, id. at 50 (citing H.R. Subcomm. No. 
1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445, 91st Cong. 210,218,223,240,248 
(November 12, 1969)). 
Reviewing the Congressional record, the Commissioner concluded in Matter of Penner that an expansive 
reading of the specialized knowledge provision, such that it would include skilled workers and 
technicians, is not warranted. The Commissioner emphasized that the specialized knowledge worker 
classification was not intended for "all employees with any level of specialized knowledge." Matter of 
Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 53. Or, as noted in Matter of Colley, "[mlost employees today are specialists and 
have been trained and given specialized knowledge. However, in view of the House Report, it can not be 
concluded that all employees with specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are 
eligible for classification as intracompany transferees." 18 I&N Dec. at 119. According to Matter of 
Penner, "[sluch a conclusion would permit extremely large numbers of persons to qualify for the 'L-1' 
visa" rather than the "key personnel" that Congress specifically intended. 18 I&N Dec. at 53; see also, 
1756, Inc., 745 F. Supp. at 15 (concluding that Congress did not intend for the specialized knowledge 
capacity to extend to all employees with specialized knowledge, but rather to "key personnel" and 
"executives.") 
The beneficiary's job description does not distinguish his knowledge as more advanced or distinct among 
other technical consultants employed by the foreign or U.S. entities or by other unrelated companies. The 
statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the AAO to make comparisons in order to 
determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The term "specialized knowledge" is not an absolute 
concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed in 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, "[slimply put, 
specialized knowledge is a relative . . . idea which cannot have a plain meaning." 745 F. Supp. 9, 15 
(D.D.C. 1990).~ The Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended for "key 
personnel." See generally, H.R. REP. No. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key personnel" 
denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." Webster's II New 
2 
 Again, Congress' 1990 amendments to the Act did not specifically overrule 1756, Inc. nor any other 
administrative precedent decision, nor did the 1990 amendments otherwise mandate a less restrictive 
interpretation of the term "specialized knowledge." The House Report, which accompanied the 1990 
amendments. stated: 
One area within the L visa that requires more specificity relates to the term "specialized 
knowledge." Varying interpretations by INS have exacerbated the problem. The bill 
therefore defines specialized knowledge as special knowledge of the company product 
and its application in international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge of 
processes and procedures of the company. 
H.R. REP. No. 101-723(I), 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710,6749, 1990 WL 200418. 
EAC 04 1 14 52909 
Page 11 
College Dictionary 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). 
 In general, all employees can reasonably be 
considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall 
economic success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. An 
employee of "crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average 
employee. Accordingly, based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record 
related to that term, the AAO must make comparisons not only between the claimed specialized 
knowledge employee and the general labor market, but also between that employee and the remainder of 
the petitioner's workforce. 
Further, the Puleo memo cited by counsel allows CIS to compare the beneficiary's knowledge to the 
general United States labor market and the petitioner's workforce in order to distinguish between 
specialized and general knowledge. The Associate Commissioner notes in the memorandum that "officers 
adjudicating petitions involving specialized knowledge must ensure that the knowledge possessed by the 
beneficiary is not general knowledge held commonly throughout the industry but that it is truly 
specialized." Memo, supra. A comparison of the beneficiary's knowledge to the knowledge possessed by 
others in the field is therefore necessary in order to determine the level of the beneficiary's skills and 
knowledge and to ascertain whether the beneficiary's knowledge is advanced. In other words, absent an 
outside group to which to compare the beneficiary's knowledge, CIS would not be able to "ensure that the 
knowledge possessed by the beneficiary is truly specialized." Id. The analysis for specialized knowledge 
therefore requires a test of the knowledge possessed by the United States labor market, but does not 
consider whether workers are available in the United States to perform the beneficiary's job duties. 
The record does not distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge as more advanced than the knowledge 
possessed by other programmers within the petitioning company or within the information technology 
industry. As noted above, based on the fact that the beneficiary immediately began working on 
assignments with the petitioning company utilizing its banking products, it appears that any individual 
with experience in the information technology industry may work with the petitioner's products and learn 
its specific requirements fairly quickly. Thus, it appears that the petitioner's products are based on 
information technology systems that are common in the industry. In addition, the petitioner did not 
indicate a training program required of its technical consultants and thus it appears any individual with an 
information technology background may fill the position of technical consultant. Since the petitioner did 
not indicate a specific training program or the minimum requirements to fill the position of technical 
consultant, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary's knowledge is any different than the 
knowledge held by a trained technician or a skilled worker. See Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 52. If 
the AAO were to follow the petitioner's reasoning, then any employee who has worked with the 
petitioning company possesses specialized knowledge. However, based on the intent of Congress in its 
creation of the L-1B visa category, as discussed in Matter of Penner, even showing that a beneficiary 
possesses specialized knowledge does not necessarily establish eligibility for the L-1B intracompany 
transferee status. The petitioner should also submit evidence to show that the beneficiary is being 
transferred to the United States as a crucial employee. 
The AAO does not dispute that the petitioner's organization has its own internal information systems, 
processes, and methodologies. However, there is no evidence in the record to establish that the beneficiary's 
knowledge of these systems, processes, and methodologes is particularly advanced in comparison to his 
EAC 04 114 52909 
Page 12 
peers, that the processes themselves cannot be easily transferred to its U.S. employees or to professionals who 
have not previously worked with the organization, that the US.-based staff does not actually possess the 
same knowledge, or that the U.S. position offered actually requires someone with the claimed "advanced 
knowledge." The petitioner has not submitted sufficient documentary evidence in support of its assertions or 
counsel's assertions that the beneficiary's slulls and knowledge of the foreign entity's processes, procedures, 
and methodologies would differentiate him from any other similarly employed software analyst'prograrnrner 
within the petitioner's group or within the industry. Simply going on record without supporting documentary 
evidence is not sufficient for the purpose of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of 
SofJi, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. 
Counsel's reliance on the Puleo and Ohata memoranda is misplaced. It is noted that the memoranda were 
intended solely as a guide for employees and will not supersede the plain language of the statute or 
regulations. Therefore, by itself, counsel's assertion that the beneficiary's qualifications are analogous to 
the examples outlined in the memoranda is insufficient to establish the beneficiary's qualification for 
classification as a specialized knowledge professional. While the factors discussed in the memorandum 
may be considered, the regulations specifically require that the beneficiary possess an "advanced level of 
knowledge" of the organization's processes and procedures, or a "special knowledge" of the petitioner's 
product, service, research, equipment, techniques or management. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). As 
discussed above, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary's knowledge rises to the level of 
specialized knowledge contemplated by the regulations. 
In sum, the evidence indicates that the beneficiary's duties and technical skills are based on knowledge 
that is common among computer systems professionals working in the beneficiary's specialty in the 
information technology field. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary's training, 
work experience, or knowledge of the company's processes is more advanced than the knowledge 
possessed by others employed by the petitioner, or that the processes and systems used by the petitioner 
are substantially different from those used by other large information technology consulting companies. 
The AAO does not dispute the fact that the beneficiary's knowledge has allowed him to successfully 
perform his job duties for the foreign entity. However, the successful completion of one's job duties does 
not distinguish the beneficiary as possessing special or advanced knowledge or as a "key personnel," nor 
does it establish employment in a specialized knowledge capacity. As discussed, the petitioner has not 
submitted probative evidence to establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is uncommon, noteworthy, or 
distinguished by some unusual quality and not generally known in the beneficiary's field of endeavor, or 
that his knowledge is advanced compared to the knowledge held by other similarly employed workers 
within the petitioner and the foreign entity. 
The petitioner noted that CIS approved other petitions that had been previously filed on behalf of the 
petitioner for other employees. The director's decision does not indicate whether he reviewed the prior 
approvals of the other nonimmigrant petitions. If the previous nonimmigrant petitions were approved 
based on the same unsupported and contradictory assertions that are contained in the current record, the 
approval would constitute material and gross error on the part of the director. The AAO is not required to 
approve applications or petitions where eligibility has not been demonstrated, merely because of prior 
approvals that may have been erroneous. See, e.g. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N 
Dec. 593, 597 (Comm. 1988). It would be absurd to suggest that CIS or any agency must treat 
EAC 04 1 14 52909 
Page 13 
acknowledged errors as binding precedent. Sussex Engg. Ltd. v. Montgomery, 825 F.2d 1084, 1090 (6th 
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988). 
The AAO's authority over the service centers is comparable to the relationship between a court of appeals 
and a district court. Even if a service center director had approved the nonimmigrant petitions on behalf 
of the beneficiary, the AAO would not be bound to follow the contradictory decision of a service center. 
Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS, 2000 WL 282785 (E.D. La.), affd, 248 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 
2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 51 (2001). 
Furthermore, the fact that the AAO may have approved a previous petition filed by the petitioner will not 
establish eligibility in the present matter. It must be emphasized that each petition is a separate 
proceeding with a separate record. See 8 C.F.R. Ij 103.8(d). In making a determination of statutory 
eligibility, CIS is limited to the information contained in the record of proceeding. See 8 C.F.R. 5 
103.2(b)(16)(ii). 
The legislative history of the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, supra at 16. Based on the evidence presented, it is 
concluded that the beneficiary has not been employed abroad and would not be employed in the United 
States in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. For this reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with 
the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not sustained that burden. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.