dismissed L-1B Case: Information Technology

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N W., Rm. A3042 
Washington, DC 20529 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
c 
WAC 05 03 1 50688 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: 2 6 2005 
Petition: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section lOl(a)(lS)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the 
office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
dministrative Appeals Office 
WAC 05 090 5 1639 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, ~alifkrnia Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimrnigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to employ the beneficiary as an L-1B nonimmigrant 
intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a California corporation that provides 
various Internet-based information technology services. The petitioner claims to be an affiliate of the 
beneficiary's foreign employer, Circland Corp., located in Tokyo, Japan. The petitioner seeks to employ the 
beneficiary as its vice president of international operations for a one-year period. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish that the beneficiary would be 
employed in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. Counsel asserts that the director's decision was based on an 
improper understanding of the law and failed to consider all of the relevant evidence submitted. Counsel also 
emphasizes that certain findings by the director in the instant matter are contrary to a June 21, 2004 decision 
issued by the director for an L-1A nonimrnigrant intracompany transferee petition filed on behalf of the 
1 beneficiary by this petitioner. Counsel states that the director's decision is "in conflict" with two district 
court decisions and a 1988 Immigration and Naturalization Service (now Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (CIS)) policy memorandum. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
1 The director's decision in the matter of the beneficiary's L-1A nonimmigrant visa petition is also before the 
AAO on appeal and has been addressed in a separate decision. See WAC 04 154 50197. The AAO dismissed 
the appeal. 
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Page 3 
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The issue in this proceeding is whether the beneficiary will be employed by the United States entity in a 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 3 1184(c)(2)(B), provides the following: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
The petition was submitted on November 12, 2004. In an appended letter dated November 11, 2004, the 
petitioner asserted that the beneficiary was employed with the petitioner's affiliate in "executive/managerial 
employment" and provided a description of his duties in his role as president and chief executive officer of 
the foreign company. The petitioner described the beneficiary's proposed duties as vice president for 
international operations in the United States as follows: 
[The beneficiary] will launch the company's operations in the AsiaIPacific region including 
Japan. He will direct a corps of personnel who will ultimately take over the day-to-day 
operations of the company for international operations. 
He will manage and direct the international operations of the corporation; establish the 
company's international procedures guidelines and oversee their initial implementation; and 
devise marketing strategies and establish a network of corporate clients. He will make all 
executive decisions regarding new contracts, investments, bank credits, expenditures and 
advertising. In line with [the petitioner's] corporate culture, the company will engage in 
diversified ventures, including but not limited to corporate establishment and business 
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enabling services. [The beneficiary's] involvement is essential in directing this critical phase 
of our international operations. 
The petitioner further explained that the beneficiary had recently acquired a 50 percent interest in the U.S. 
company and since that time, the petitioner has shared with him its "trade secrets, client details and 
proprietary approaches to project development and client solutions. All of this information is specialized 
knowledge that is not available outside of [the petitioner]." The petitioner indicated that there was a long-term 
relationship between the petitioner, the beneficiary and the foreign entity. The petitioner also described a 
specific project which would require the employment of the beneficiary in a specialized knowledge capacity: 
We initially seek [the beneficiary's] immediate employment [on] the Circland Marketplace 
project, a directed joint venture project towards the development of a virtual on-line auction 
marketplace web site for Japanese companies to sell their products in the USA. The concept 
will be to expose successful and new Japanese products to American retailers and consumers 
for the first time. The project will implement [the petitioner's] proprietary methodology, 
services and designs for use by Japanese clients. 
In addition to the Circland Marketplace, we have identified a group of potent new customers 
now based in Hawaii that can immediately use our services for the development of 
information technology based progress for their high-end cosmetic lines. The principals are 
also from Japan, as we are most concerned that the inability of [the beneficiary] to meet and 
close a deal for our services will cost [the petitioner] this significant immediate opportunity. 
While we have prepared for this large client project intensive [sic], the actual project will not 
be feasible without [the beneficiary's] direct participation. 
Finally, the petitioner submitted a list of its specific "trade secrets," as referenced in its letter: 
1) Needs Assessment - Custom-developed and proprietary questionnaire for use in 
analyzing our client's needs and formulating a recommendation and proposal. 
2) CPI e-Business Life Cycle Management - Another proprietary tool, also used in the 
needs assessment process to identify where a client is and what they need to do next. 
3) Twenty-two techniques in e-marketing - Also proprietary. Addresses both bringing 
customers to a web site and "closing" them once they are there. 
4) CPI e-tracking - Custom-developed and proprietary system for tracking a client's e- 
marketing campaigns. Records click-throughs, order ratios and profitability. 
5) CPI Tracking - Custom-developed and proprietary system for managing our client's 
projects. 
On December 21, 2004, the director requested additional evidence in order to establish that the beneficiary 
has specialized knowledge. The director cited the statutory definition of "specialized knowledge" and 
provided a list of seven characteristics of an employee who has specialized knowledge. The director 
instructed the petitioner as follows: 
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Special or Advanced Duties: Explain how the duties the alien performed abroad and 
those he or she will perform in the United States are different from those of other workers 
employed by the petitioner or other U.S. employers in this type of position. 
Petitioner's Product: Explain, in more detail, exactly what is the equipment, system, 
product, technique, or service of which the beneficiary of this petition has specialized 
knowledge, and indicate if it is used or produced by other employers in the United States 
and abroad. 
(Emphasis in original). 
In a response dated January 4, 2005, the petitioner explained that the petitioner is seeking to market its 
services to the Japanese business community and that the petitioner is already in negotiations with Japanese 
companies through the beneficiary's efforts. The petitioner repeated portions of the job description included 
in the initial filing, and provided the following additional information in an effort to explain how the 
beneficiary's duties are "special" or "advanced": 
[The petitioner] presently has no other staff member or person who can perform these duties 
effectively on our behalf. We have attempted to close deals with similar companies in the 
past without success. With the addition of [the beneficiary] to our team, we can engage in this 
line of business with confidence. Also, none of our competitors in this industry can provide 
service to this target client and business source since none of them, to our knowledge, have 
access to a qualified special knowledge person like [the beneficiary]. 
As a Director and senior executive Vice President of [the petitioner], [the beneficiary] will 
have authority to negotiate contracts in excess of $100,000, and to make acquisitions or sign 
commitments in excess of $100,000. He will become the face and identity of [the petitioner] 
within the Japanese business community both in the USA and in Japan. He will provide 
instant analysis of company problems or information technology solutions using [the 
petitioner's] proprietary methodology and our unique marketing materials. 
(Emphasis in original.) 
With regard to its products, the petitioner explained that it "has been a leader in the field of internet web 
design, marketing, internet commerce and related applications since 1994" and is a business partner of AT&T 
and IBM. The petitioner indicated that it has assisted in the establishment, creation and development of 
leading and award-winning web sites, and provided information from its Internet site regarding its e-Business 
Development, Project Development, and e-Marketing and Analysis services. The petitioner also noted that its 
partnerships with AT&T and IBM involve "both proprietary information and client trade classified or trade 
secret information regarding specific applications, uses and client web sites. Both AT&T and IBM limit the 
number of vendors which they accept as partners." 
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In his January 4, 2005 cover letter, counsel references a 1988 Immigration and Naturalization Service (now 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS)) memorandum and a 1987 U.S. District Court decision, IKEA, 
Inc. vs. DOJ F. Supp. , No. 87-2025 (D.D.C. Dec. 23 1987), to support his statement that the 
beneficiary meets the "customary requirements of holding specialized knowledge" including: (1) knowledge 
that is valuable to the petitioner's competitiveness in the marketplace; (2) he is uniquely qualified to 
contribute to the petitioner's knowledge of Japanese market conditions and market matters; (3) he is the chief 
executive of the foreign entity and is positioned to impact the petitioner's competitiveness, image and 
financial position; and, (4) he possesses knowledge that can only be gained through past experience with both 
the petitioner and the foreign entity. See Memorandum from Richard E. Norton, Associate Commissioner for 
Examinations, Immigration and Naturalization Services, to all Regional Service Center Directors, et al, 
Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge Under the L Class$cation, CO 214.2L-P (October 27, 1986)(Norton 
memorandum). The petitioner explains how the beneficiary meets each of these requirements, emphasizing 
that he is the president of the foreign entity and has personal contacts with a number of major Japanese 
corporations that will allow him to "open doors" for the petitioner in Japan, providing the petitioner with 
"immediate access to provide our IT solutions and internet technology to Japanese organizations in the USA 
subsidiary offices." The petitioner notes that it has been "locked out" of the Japanese market in the past due to 
"culture, language and our lack of recognition there." 
On January 18, 2005, the director denied the petition determining that the beneficiary would not be employed 
in a specialized knowledge capacity for the United States entity. Specifically, the director observed: (1) the 
evidence of record indicates that the petitioner intends to employ the beneficiary in a managerial or executive 
capacity; (2) the petitioner did not establish that the beneficiary is required to employ the petitioner's 
proprietary processes or methodologies in order to perform his proposed duties; and, (3) the petitioner did not 
establish that the beneficiary has advanced knowledge of the petitioner's products, processes or services 
beyond "simple familiarity," as he had only been introduced to the petitioner's claimed proprietary 
methodologies months before the petition was filed. The director concluded: "Simply relying on the 
beneficiary's familiarity with the [foreign] organization, his innate talent, and his potential to contribute to the 
petitioner's growth is not sufficient to establish that he possesses specialized knowledge or has been and will 
be employed in a capacity involving specialized knowledge." 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner argues that the director's decision was based on an improper 
understanding of the law, fails to consider all of the relevant evidence submitted, and therefore constitutes an 
abuse of discretion. Counsel objects to the director's finding that the beneficiary's position does not require 
the application of the claimed specialized knowledge, stating: "It is illogical and disingenuous to conclude 
that someone who may direct and manage operations involving complex, unique and proprietary information 
and technology would not possess and utilize specialized knowledge.. ..It is fallacious to claim that someone 
directing the operation will not have special knowledge in that very operation." Counsel again cites the 1988 
Norton memoranda and IKEA, Inc. VS. DOJ and states that the beneficiary meets the criteria for specialized 
knowledge outlined in the referenced sources. Counsel contends that the director failed to address the 
evidence and apply the law to the facts presented. 
In addition, counsel asserts that in finding that the beneficiary will be a manager or executive, rather than a 
specialized knowledge employee, "the Director has decided the case in direct and legal contradiction of a 
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prior decision in the exact same case." Counsel refers to the director's denial of the beneficiary's previous L- 
1A nonimmigrant intracompany transferee petition on the grounds that the petitioner did not establish that the 
beneficiary would be employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. Counsel contends: "The legal 
concept of collateral estoppel must apply here. The Director cannot ignore the prior decision on the same facts 
involving the exact same parties, in order to now conclude the opposite findings." 
Counsel's assertions are not persuasive. The record as presently constituted is not persuasive in demonstrating 
that the beneficiary would be employed by the U.S. entity in a position requiring specialized knowledge. 
When examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed 
description of the services to be performed sufficient to establish specialized knowledge. Id. It is also 
appropriate for the AAO to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the beneficiary's 
knowledge of the business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making process. See 
Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. 117, 120 (Comrn. 1981) (citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 618 (R.C. 
1970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. 816 (R.C. 1971)).' As stated by the Commissioner in Matter of 
Penrzer, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 52 (Cornrn. 1982), when considering whether the beneficiaries possessed 
specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find that the occupations inherently 
qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have 
unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. Id. The Commissioner also provided the 
following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or her to 
produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed primarily 
for his ability to carry out a key process or function which is important or essential to the 
business' operation. 
Id. at 53. 
Here, the beneficiary's proposed job duties do not identify services to be performed by the beneficiary in a 
specialized knowledge capacity. For example, the beneficiary's responsibilities of establishing the company's 
operations in the AsiaIPacific region, managing and directing the international operations, devising marketing 
strategies, establishing and implementing international procedural guidelines, establishing a network of 
%lthough the cited precedents pre-date the current statutory definition of "specialized knowledge," the AAO 
finds them instructive. Other than deleting the former requirement that specialized knowledge had to be 
"proprietary," the 1990 Act did not significantly alter the definition of "specialized knowledge" from the prior 
INS interpretation of the term. The 1990 Committee Report does not reject, criticize, or even refer to any 
specific INS regulation or precedent decision interpreting the term. The Committee Report simply states that 
the Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of "[vlarying [i.e., not specifically incorrect] 
interpretations by INS," H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I), at 69, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. Beyond that, the 
Committee Report simply restates the tautology that became section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Id. The AAO 
concludes, therefore, that the cited cases, as well as Matter of Penner, remain useful guidance concerning the 
intended scope of the "specialized knowledge" L-IB classification. 
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clients, making decisions regarding contracts, investments, bank credits, expenditures and advertising, and 
researching potential markets are all tasks typically performed by any individual responsible for overseeing a 
start-up operation in a new market. The record is devoid of any documentary evidence that the beneficiary's 
proposed position would involve the application of special knowledge of the petitioning organization's 
product, service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests as required in the 
regulations. Counsel's blanket assertion that "someone who directs and manages a service that must 
encompass specialized knowledge, has a position that requires such specialized knowledge for execution" is 
not supported by evidence in the record. Without documentary evidence to support the claim, the assertions of 
counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not 
constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter of Laureano, 19 I&N 
Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). 
The AAO acknowledges that it is possible for an individual employed in a managerial role to meet the criteria 
for specialized knowledge capacity set forth at section 214(c)(2)(B). However, the petitioner has not 
established that the particular position offered to the beneficiary requires an individual with knowledge, 
experience or characteristics beyond possession of excellent business sense, outstanding marketing and sales 
skills, a network of existing business contacts in Japan, and knowledge of the Japanese language and culture. 
Counsel confirms that the beneficiary "isn't needed to create information technology, write code or to analyze 
a users needs or problems," but, rather, is needed to manage, direct, sell and market the petitioner's services. 
Again, there is no evidence that he would rely on "special" or "advanced" knowledge of the petitioner's 
products or processes in order to perform these duties. The beneficiary's claimed specialized knowledge must 
relate specifically to the petitioning company. 
Although the petitioner claims that the beneficiary possesses and would utilize knowledge of the petitioner's 
processes and methodologies, it has failed to specifically describe how he would utilize this knowledge, or 
adequately explain how the beneficiary gained his claimed specialized knowledge, other than vaguely noting 
that the petitioner "shared" its trade secrets with the beneficiary when he purchased a 50 percent interest in 
the petitioning company approximately seven months before this petition was filed. Going on record without 
supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these 
proceedings. Matter of Sofici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Crafr of 
Calfornia, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). There is no evidence that the beneficiary has ever utilized 
specialized knowledge of the petitioner's processes in the performance of his job duties with the foreign entity 
or that his knowledge extends beyond that of mere familiarity that could easily be transferred to another 
individual with a similar professional background. 
It is further noted that the beneficiary could not have gained the requisite specialized knowledge of the 
petitioner's processes and methodologies while employed with the foreign entity because the two companies 
had no common ownership and control, and no documented business relationship, prior to the beneficiary's 
purchase of stock in the petitioning company in March 2004. Based on the limited information available 
regarding the Japanese company, it appears to be engaged in the design, development and manufacturing of 
air purification appliances, while the petitioner specializes in web design, e-marketing, internet commerce and 
related e-business services. Although the petitioner claims that the beneficiary once "consulted" on a 
common project with the petitioner wherein he was introduced to its proprietary methodology, products and 
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services, this project and the beneficiary's role within it have not been adequately defined. Again, going on 
record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof 
in these proceedings. Matter of Sofici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. Even if the petitioner had established that the 
U.S. position requires an individual with specialized knowledge, the petitioner has not established that the 
beneficiary's education, training, or experience has equipped him with "special" or "advanced" knowledge of 
the petitioner's products, services, processes, or methodologies. See 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(3)(iv). 
Additionally, the petitioner has not submitted any evidence of the knowledge and expertise required for the 
proffered position that would differentiate the beneficiary from other managers employed within the 
petitioner's group or working for other employers within the jewelry industry. It is noted that the statutory 
definition requires the AAO to make comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized 
knowledge. As observed in 1756, Irzc. v. Attorney General, "[slimply put, specialized knowledge is a relative 
. . . idea which cannot have a plain meaning." 745 F. Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990). The term "specialized 
knowledge" is relative and cannot be plainly defined. The Congressional record specifically states that the L- 
1 category was intended for "key personnel." See gerzerally, H.R. REP. No. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. 
The term "key personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." 
Webster's I1 New College Dictionary 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). In general, all employees can 
reasonably be considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the 
overall economic success of an enterprise, there would be no rational reason to employ that person. An 
employee of "crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average 
employee. Accordingly, based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record 
related to that term, the AAO must make comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge 
employee and the general labor market, but also between that employee and the remainder of the petitioner's 
workforce. 
The petitioner attempts to differentiate the beneficiary's knowledge as special or advanced by claiming that 
the petitioner "has no other staff member or person" who can market its services and negotiate contracts with 
Japanese companies, and that to the best of its knowledge, none of its competitors are able to provide services 
to the Japanese business community. However, this claim is evidently based on the fact that the beneficiary is 
a successful Japanese businessman with knowledge of the Japanese language and culture, and a network of 
business associates in the market where the petitioner wishes to target its new international operations. The 
AAO does not disagree with the petitioner's assertion that the beneficiary will be "employed primarily for his 
ability to carry out a key process or function which is important or essential to the business firm's 
operations." However, the statute and regulations require the petitioner to demonstrate that the beneficiary 
possesses, and that the proposed employment requires, special knowledge of the petitioning organization's 
product, service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests, or an advanced level of 
knowledge or expertise in the organization's processes and procedures. The beneficiary's knowledge and 
expertise, while valuable to the petitioner, does not include the type of special or advanced knowledge of the 
petitioner's products, processes or other interests as required by the regulations. 
Even if the petitioner had established that the beneficiary's position requires specialized knowledge, the 
petitioner has provided no basis for comparing the beneficiary to other employees within the company. 
Although the petitioner has not provided evidence of the knowledge, training, and experience possessed by its 
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other workers, it has not shown that the beneficiary's knowledge could be considered "advanced" based on 
his limited exposure to the petitioner's processes in the months between his acquisition of an interest in the 
petitioner in March 2004 and the filing of this petition in November 2004. 
It is noted that counsel states on appeal: "In fact, at no point has the director suggested that the business of the 
organization does not involve the delivery of goods or services [sic] which inherently include specialized 
knowledge [sic]." Counsel states "all individuals from the end provider to the executives must have a current 
grasp and working understanding of the operations involving complex, unique and proprietary information 
and technology that is the core business of the petition." Contrary to counsel's assertion, the director did not 
specifically determine whether the services provided by the petitioner inherently involve specialized 
knowledge. Specifically, the director stated: "The various processes and methodology may or may not involve 
specialized knowledge ...." Instead, the director focused on the petitioner's failure to establish that the 
position offered requires the application of knowledge of the petitioner's processes and whether the 
beneficiary possesses such knowledge. Upon review, the record does not establish that knowledge of the 
petitioner's products, processes or methodologies alone would constitute "specialized knowledge." The record 
indicates that the petitioner implements e-business solutions utilizing technologies that are standard and 
widespread in its industry, including IBM and AT&T technologies. The petitioner claims to have custom- 
developed and proprietary tools used to assess client needs and manage client projects, as well as its own 
internally developed "e-marketing techniques." However, every consulting company develops internal 
processes and tools utilized to carry out client projects. The petitioner has not provided any evidence to 
demonstrate that the petitioner's processes and methodologies are different or uncommon compared to those 
used by any other businesses in its industry, such that it would not be feasible to transfer the knowledge to a 
professional in the field in a relatively short period of time. 
Finally, counsel's reliance on the Norton memorandum is misplaced. It is noted that the memorandum was 
intended solely as a guide for employees and will not supercede the plain language of the statute or the 
regulations. Therefore, by itself, counsel's assertion that the beneficiary's qualifications are analogous to the 
examples outlined in the memorandum is insufficient to establish the beneficiary's qualification for 
classification as a specialized knowledge professional. Specifics are clearly an important indication of 
whether a beneficiary's duties encompass specialized knowledge; otherwise meeting the definition would 
simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. See, e.g., Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103 
(E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). As discussed, the petitioner has not submitted probative 
evidence to establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is uncommon, noteworthy, or distinguished by some 
unusual quality and not generally known in the beneficiary's field of endeavor. 
Counsel cites an unpublished decision of a federal district court in the District of Columbia to stand for the 
proposition that the beneficiary meets the "customary requirements" for classification as a specialized 
knowledge employee. The record does not support counsel's claim, as counsel has shown that the facts of 
this case are analogous to those in the unpublished decision. The assertions of counsel do not constitute 
evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 
503,506 (BIA 1980). 
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Furthermore, in contrast to the broad precedential authority of the case law of a United States circuit court, the 
AAO is not bound to follow the published decision of a United States district court in cases arising within the 
same district. See Matter of K-S-, 20 I&N Dec. 715 (BIA 1993). The reasoning underlying a district judge's 
decision will be given due consideration when it is properly before the AAO; however, the analysis does not 
have to be followed as a matter of law. Id. at 719. In addition, as the published decisions of the district courts 
are not binding on the AAO outside of that particular proceeding, the unpublished decision of a district court 
would necessarily have even less persuasive value. 
Counsel asserts that the director's decision is "in conflict" with the decisions in Matter of Colley, 18 I&N 
Dec. 1 17, 119 (Cornrn. 1981), and Ikea US, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22,24 (D.D.C. 1999). 
Counsel provides neither evidence nor arguments to support these claims, and fails to identify how the 
director misapplied the law to the facts in this matter. 
The Ah0 acknowledges counsel's claim that the doctrine of collateral estoppel must apply in this case. 
Counsel notes that in a previous decision to deny the petitioner's request to classify the beneficiary as an L- 
1A nonimmigrant intracompany transferee, the director found that "the preponderance of the beneficiary's 
duties will be directly performing the services of the business," rather than managerial and executive duties. 
In the instant matter, the director determined that "the duties described by the petitioner certainly appear [to] 
reflect the duties of an executive or manager." Counsel states that the director's decision is "inherently and 
facially indefensible" given the previous decision of the director. 
The Administrative Appeals Office, like the Board of Immigration Appeals, is without authority to apply the 
doctrine of estoppel so as to preclude a component part of CIS from undertaking a lawful course of action that 
it is empowered to pursue by statute or regulation. See Matter of Hernandez-Puente, 20 I&N Dec. 335, 338 
(BIA 1991). Estoppel is an equitable form of relief that is available only through the courts. The jurisdiction 
of the Administrative Appeals Office is limited to that authority specifically granted to it by the Secretary of 
the United States Department of Homeland Security. See DHS Delegation Number 0150.1 (effective March 
1, 2003); see also 8 C.F.R. $ 2.1 (2004). The jurisdiction of the AAO is limited to those matters described at 
8 C.F.R. 5 103.l(f)(3)(E)(iii) (as in effect on February 28, 2003). Accordingly, the AAO has no authority to 
address the petitioner's estoppel claim. 
Although the AAO will not address the petitioner's estoppel claim, it must be emphasized that that each 
petition filing is a separate proceeding with a separate record. See 8 C.F.R. $ 103.8(d). In making a 
determination of statutory eligibility, CIS is limited to the information contained in that individual record of 
proceeding. See 8 C.F.R. 3 103.2(b)(16)(ii). As the director properly reviewed the record before him, it was 
impracticable for the director to address the previous decision on the beneficiary's eligibility for classification 
as an L-IA intracompany transferee in a managerial or executive capacity. 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F. Supp. at 16. Based on the foregoing, the record does 
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not establish that the beneficiary would be employed by the U.S. entity in a specialized knowledge capacity. 
For this reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 3 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
director's decision will be affirmed and the petition will be denied. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.