dismissed L-1B Case: Information Technology

identifying data deleted to 
prevent clearly unwarranted 
invasion of persod privBCY 
PUBLIC COPY 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. A3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
PETITION: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1 101(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: SELF-REPRESENTED 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
Thls is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any fbrther inquiry must be made to that office. 
-___- - - -- -7 
-</ 
R&-P. Wiemann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
SRC 05 153 51243 
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DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The matter 
is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. 
The petitioner appears to be an Indian corporation registered to do business in the State of North Carolina and 
claims to be engaged in the business of information processing, manufacturing, sales and service. It seeks to 
temporarily employ the beneficiary as an application programmer at its branch office in the United States and 
filed a petition to classify the beneficiary as a nonimmigrant intracompany transferee with specialized 
knowledge. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that the beneficiary possessed the 
requisite specialized knowledge nor that the intended employment required specialized knowledge, and 
subsequently denied the petition. 
On appeal, the petitioner asserts that no other outside employee could successfully fill the beneficiary's 
position. In support of this contention, the petitioner provides additional details regarding the beneficiary's 
position and qualifications. 
To establish L-1 eligibility, the petitioner must meet the criteria outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 8 1101(a)(15)(L). Specifically, within three years 
preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, a qualifying organization must 
have employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized 
knowledge capacity, for one continuous year. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States 
temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof 
in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of th~s section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himlher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
This matter presents two related, but distinct, issues: (1) whether the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge; and (2) whether the proposed employment is in a capacity that requires specialized knowledge. 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 11 84(c)(2)(B), provides the following: 
SRC 05 153 51243 
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For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
In a letter dated May 6, 2005, the petitioner explained that the purpose of the beneficiary's transfer to the 
United States was to employ him on the company's Migration and Conversions Project. The petitioner 
further explained that the purpose of the petitioner's on-site team, of which the beneficiary would be a part, 
was to execute various porting, migration and upgrade projects. Additionally, the petitioner noted that the 
team would interface with the U.S. team and would coordinate activities with the Indian company for the 
successful execution of the project designed and developed using Mainframe technology. 
With regard to the beneficiary, the petitioner stated that he joined the Indian branch of the company in May 
2001 as an application programmer in the capacity of team leader. It fwther stated that the beneficiary 
obtained a Bachelor of Engineering in Electronics and Communication from Kuvempu University, India, in 
1995. With regard to his proposed duties in the United States, the petitioner stated: 
As an Application Programmer, [the beneficiary] will be the key member of the initial 
[Indian] onsite team at Charlotte. He will be primarily responsible for understanding the 
Migration applications, [the U.S. parent company's] business process, creating solutions 
architecture using his porting skills and will be instrumental in dissemination of the 
requirements and processes from [the U.S. parent company] to the delivery team in India. He 
will be utilizing his knowledge of Mainframe technologies such as COBOL. PL/l, DB2, JCL, 
CICS, VSAM, MVSlOS390, VM along with some [petitioner] and [non-petitioner] processes 
and tools that are imperative for the execution of the project. 
In order to qualify for the position, the individual must have a strong background in [the 
petitioner's] Porting Methodology and knowledge of working with migration and conversion 
applications that will utilize the [petitioner's] Porting skills. Also, the individual must have a 
strong background in porting/migrating Mainframe legacy applications and Retail 
applications. In addition, the individual must have a solid background in various tools and 
processes that are imperative for the proposed job duties - WSAA, SCWB, CCCA, OPC and 
Relativity. These tools and processes have been discussed in details in the Specialized 
Knowledge paragraph. Also, as mentioned above, the Migration and Conversions project 
has been outsourced to the [petitioner] by the [U.S. parent company]. The project 
requirements have to be gathered and knowledge transfer has to be done to the delivery team 
in India. Therefore, it is important that the individual selected has to come from [the foreign 
office's] team in India. This individual should have a strong knowledge of the technical and 
deliverable capabilities of the team in India. Initially, this knowledge will be essential when 
scheduling work, estimating and guiding the team during knowledge transfer. Later, this 
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knowledge will be essential when working with the team for the delivery and execution of the 
project. 
With regard to the beneficiary's possession of specialized knowledge, the petitioner stated: 
[The beneficiary] has the specialized knowledge for the proposed job duties in the United 
States. This knowledge was achievedprimarily through his employment experience with [the 
petitioner abroad]. [The beneficiary] has been working with the Retail and Legacy 
applications since his employment with [the foreign office] for the past forty eight months. 
He has gained strong knowledge of using [the petitioner's] Porting Methodology, which is 
critical for the proposed job duties in the US. Apart from it, [the beneficiary] has also gained 
specialized knowledge of working with mainframe Legacy applications for over seven years 
with both [the petitioner] and companies outside [the petitioner]. Within [the foreign office], 
he has gained solid background working with both Legacy and Retail applications designed 
in [the petitioner's] Mainframe technologies, such as PL/l, COBOL, DB2, JCL, CICS, MVS, 
OS1390, REXX, Assembler and VM. This knowledge is critical for the proposed job duties 
in the US. 
The petitioner continued by providing detailed descriptions of the methodologies and processes described 
above. 
The director found the initial evidence submitted with the petition insufficient to warrant a finding that the 
beneficiary possessed the required specialized knowledge. Consequently, a detailed request for evidence was 
issued on May 19, 2005, which requested more detailed evidence that the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge that was uncommon, noteworthy or distinguished by some unusual quality and not generally 
known by practitioners in the field. Additionally, the director requested evidence that the beneficiary's 
knowledge of the processes and procedures of the company is apart from basic or elementary knowledge 
possessed by others in the company. Finally, the director requested information with regard to the 
beneficiary's training, in addition to a specific explanation as to why the beneficiary's knowledge was so 
uniquely different from other similarly trained persons in the industry, and specifically requested a statement 
describing the nature and extent of the beneficiary's role in creating andlor implementing the methodologies 
and processes of which he allegedly possessed specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner responded on June 1, 2005. In response to the director's request, the petitioner provided a 
lengthy but vague restatement of the beneficiary's duties, qualifications, and involvement with the 
previously-identified processes and methodologies, emphasizing that the beneficiary's forty-eight months of 
employment with the foreign entity largely contributed to his superior qualifications. With regard to the 
director's query about other similarly-trained employees in the company, the petitioner stated that presently, 
there were three other individuals in addition to the beneficiary who had similar backgrounds and training. 
The petitioner continued by stating that none of these employees were presently able to come to the United 
States, which was irrelevant in the long run because the beneficiary was the most experienced employee of 
the group. 
With regard to the beneficiary's training, the petitioner indicated that the beneficiary's specialized knowledge 
was acquired as a result of his extensive training. Specifically, the petitioner stated that the training schedule 
was as follows: 
Porting Methodology 
 4 weeks on-the-job training 
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Software ConJguration and Work Bench 
 4 weeks on-the-job training 
Relativity 2 weeks on-the-job training 
Mainframe Technologies (COBOL, PL/I, DB2 
 6 months classroom training and 
CICS, VSM, JCL, and IMS) 
 continuous on-the-job training 
Operations, Planning and Control 
 8 days on-the-job training 
COBOL and CICS Command Level Conversion 
 4 days on-the-job training 
Aid (CCCA) 
Websphere Studio Asset Analyzer (WSAA) 
 2 weeks on-the-job training 
Quality Management System (QMS) and Capability 
 5 days classroom training and 
Maturity Model (CMM) process 
 continuous on-the-job training 
The petitioner provided further detail regarding the training required to perform the duties of the beneficiary's 
position: 
A training, similar to the one discussed in the preceding paragraph is required to prepare an 
individual for the proffered position in the US. This training included critical training in [the 
petitioner's] processes, tools, methodology and Mainframe technologies. 
Preparing an individual for the above training does not alone justify that the individual will be 
capable of working for the proffered position in the United States. But, the training will 
prove very significant for the individual to perform the proposed job duties in the United 
States. It is imperative that the individual develops a practical knowledge of applying the 
tools, processes and methodology in the Mainframe Migration and Conversion applications, 
as it is a critical requirement for the proffered position in the United States. This practical 
knowledge can only be achieved if the individual has developed an extensive and strong 
interaction with the Migration and Conversion applications through [the petitioner]. 
The director determined that the record failed to establish that the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge. The director specifically noted that the petitioner had failed to show that the beneficiary's duties 
and training were significantly different from other similarly-qualified persons, or that the beneficiary's 
knowledge gained as a result thereof was uncommon or noteworthy in comparison. The director concluded 
that the evidence submitted did not establish that the beneficiary's knowledge was uncommon or distinct and 
distinguished from other practitioners in the field, and consequently denied the petition. 
On appeal, the petitioner submits a brief which essentially restates the previously submitted assertions, and 
resubmits all previously-filed documents which outline the nature of the beneficiary's duties and 
qualifications. The petitioner concludes that based on the totality of the evidence submitted, it is clear that 
only a person employed abroad by the foreign entity, and trained specifically in the petitioner's porting 
methodology, could fill the proposed position of the beneficiary. The petitioner further states that since the 
beneficiary has undergone this training and has in excess of forty-eight months of experience with the foreign 
office, the beneficiary thus possesses specialized knowledge. 
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On review, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge. 
When examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii). As required in the regulations, the 
petitioner must submit a detailed description of the services to be performed sufficient to establish specialized 
knowledge. Id. 
In the present matter, the petitioner provided a lengthy but vague description of the beneficiary's employment 
in the foreign office, his intended employment in the U.S. office, and his responsibilities as an application 
programmer. Despite specific requests by the director, namely, what exactly set apart the beneficiary's 
knowledge from other similarly trained programmers in the field, the petitioner failed to provide such 
information. The petitioner has not sufficiently documented how the beneficiary's performance of the 
proposed job duties distinguishes his knowledge as specialized. Despite the petitioner's detailed discussion of 
the various projects that the beneficiary has worked on and the processes that he has been trained in, the 
record contains no definitive evidence supporting the contention that the beneficiary's knowledge is 
uncommon and more advanced than similarly trained professionals in the field. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(viii) states that the director may request additional evidence in 
appropriate cases. Although specifically and clearly requested by the director, the petitioner failed to provide 
documentary evidence to support its claims that the beneficiary obtained a specialized level of knowledge 
through his work with the petitioner abroad. While the petitioner provided a list of various processes and 
procedures in which the beneficiary was trained, no documentation was submitted that distinguishes the 
petitioner from other information technology companies, and neither has the petitioner submitted any 
evidence of what other programmers under its employ do on a daily basis. It seems unlikely that the 
beneficiary is the only programmer that is capable to work on the mentioned projects, or that the beneficiary 
handled them solely by himself. Although the petitioner asserts on appeal that the original petition and 
response to the request for evidence both provided sufficient evidence to establish the beneficiary's 
qualifications for the benefit sought, the fact remains that there is no other evidence to compare it against in 
terms of the qualifications of other programmers in the industry andlor employed by the petitioner. The 
failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the 
petition. See 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(14). In this case, the petitioner relies on the AAO to accept its 
uncorroborated assertions that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge, both prior to adjudication and 
again on appeal. However, these assertions do not constitute evidence. Going on record without supporting 
documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. 
Matter of Soflci, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 
I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
It is also appropriate for the AAO to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the 
beneficiary's knowledge of the business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making 
process. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. 1 17, 120 (Comm. 198 1) (citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 61 8 
(R.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. 816 (R.C. 1971)).' As stated by the Commissioner in 
Although the cited precedents pre-date the current statutory definition of "specialized knowledge," and 
counsel raises that very argument with regard to the director's reliance on Matter of Penner in support of the 
denial, the AAO finds them instructive. Other than deleting the former requirement that specialized 
knowledge had to be "proprietary," the 1990 Act did not significantly alter the definition of "specialized 
knowledge" from the prior INS interpretation of the term. The 1990 Committee Report does not reject, 
criticize, or even refer to any specific INS regulation or precedent decision interpreting the term. The 
SRC 05 153 51243 
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Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 52 (Comm. 1982), when considering whether the beneficiaries possessed 
specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find that the occupations inherently 
qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have 
unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. Id. The Commissioner also provided the 
following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or her to 
produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed primarily 
for his ability to carry out a key process or hnction which is important or essential to the 
business fm's operation. 
Id. at 53. 
In the present matter, the evidence of record demonstrates that the beneficiary is more akin to an employee 
whose skills and experience enable him to provide a specialized service, rather than an employee who has 
unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of an educated andlor skilled worker. Moreover, the 
petitioner's failure to submit a more detailed discussion of the beneficiary's day-to-day duties or the nature of 
the training he received creates a presumption of ineligibility. The petitioner acknowledged that it offered all 
its employees training similar to that received by the beneficiary. However, no specific details were provided, 
and no documentation that such training was actually offered to the beneficiary exists. More importantly, the 
petitioner on appeal asserts that the main requirement for the position in the U.S. is that the programmer be 
trained in the petitioner's porting methodology, which the petitioner acknowledges requires four weeks of on- 
the-job training. What remains unclear is why the beneficiary's knowledge is so specialized and unique, as 
alleged by the petitioner, despite the fact that his colleagues appear to have had the opportunity to attend the 
same training sessions. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to conclude that other similarly trained programmers 
have achieved or would achieve the same level of knowledge as the beneficiary by simply completing the 
same training, particularly the four weeks of on-the-job training in the petitioner's porting methodology. 
It should be noted that the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the AAO to make 
comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The term "specialized 
knowledge" is not an absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed in 1756, Inc. v. Attorney 
General, "[slimply put, specialized knowledge is a relative . . . idea which cannot have a plain meaning." 745 
F. Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990). The Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended 
for "key personnel." See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key 
personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." Webster's II New 
College Dictionary 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). 
 In general, all employees can reasonably be 
considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic 
success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. An employee of 
"crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average employee. 
Accordingly, based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record related to that 
term, the AAO must make comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge employee and 
the general labor market, but also between that employee and the remainder of the petitioner's workforce. 
Committee Report simply states that the Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of 
"[vlarying [i.e., not specifically incorrect] interpretations by INS," H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I), at 69, 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. Beyond that, the Committee Report simply restates the tautology that became section 
214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Id. The AAO concludes, therefore, the cited cases, as well as Matter of Penner, 
remain useful guidance concerning the intended scope of the "specialized knowledge" L-1B classification. 
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Here, the petitioner's only contention that the beneficiary's knowledge is more advanced than other 
programmers in the field is its assertion that the beneficiary's experience, specifically his forty-eight months 
of work with the foreign office, has allowed him to gain an expertise in his field. Again, the petitioner has not 
provided any information pertaining to the exact day-to-day duties of the beneficiary as compared to the daily 
duties of other programmers, both working for the petitioner and in the industry in general. Nor did the 
petitioner distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge, work experience, or training from those of other 
employees. Moreover, there is no independent evidence corroborating the claims of the petitioner. Although 
documentation of the beneficiary's education is submitted, no documentation exists to establish that the 
beneficiary actually received the training claimed in the record. Ths lack of tangible evidence makes it 
impossible to classify the beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner's processes and methodologies, and more 
specifically the Migrations and Conversions Project, as advanced and precludes a finding that the 
beneficiary's role is of crucial importance to the organization. As previously stated, simply going on record 
without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for the purpose of meeting the burden of proof in 
these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. 
The claim that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge remains unsupported due to the failure to submit 
any documentation of the training he received or the manner in which the beneficiary, who holds degrees in 
engineering, essentially became an expert in the petitioner's technologies within a period of forty-eight 
months. In addition, although a limited discussion of the petitioner's products and services is submitted, it is 
somewhat hard to understand, thereby precluding the AAO from clearly understanding the actual role of the 
beneficiary in the petitioner's organization. While the beneficiary's skills and knowledge may contribute to 
the success~lness of the petitioning organization, this factor, by itself, does not constitute the possession of 
specialized knowledge. Therefore, while the beneficiary's contribution to the economic success of the 
corporation may be considered, the regulations specifically require that the beneficiary possess an "advanced 
level of knowledge" of the organization's process and procedures or a "special knowledge" of the petitioner's 
product, service, research, equipment, techniques, or management. 8 C.F.R. 4 2 14.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). As 
determined above, the beneficiary does not satisfy the requirements for possessing specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner's appeal essentially claims that the previously-submitted evidence clearly outlines the 
beneficiary's unique and uncommon knowledge, and thus qualifies the beneficiary as an intracompany 
transferee with specialized knowledge. Once again, the petitioner overlooks the fact that the beneficiary is 
undoubtedly one of many programmers in the workforce today. It is fair to conclude that most people 
employed in this line of work must also have an understanding of the basic premise of computer 
programming and engineering despite specializing in different areas. The petitioner does not, however, offer 
any evidence that the beneficiary has uncommon, advanced, or proprietary knowledge of the petitioner's 
unique processes or procedures.2 
Merely claiming that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge without distinguishing the beneficiary from 
other application programmers in the field is insufficient for satisfying the burden of proof in this matter. It 
2 
 While a beneficiary is no longer required to have proprietary knowledge, such knowledge can still be a basis 
for this determination. Although the fact that a beneficiary has experience with a proprietary product or 
procedure does not serve as prima facie evidence that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge, when 
such a claim is made, Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) must carefully evaluate the claimed 
knowledge and the depth of the beneficiary's experience in order to determine whether it rises to the level of 
specialized knowledge as contemplated by 8 C.F.R. 3 2 14.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). 
SRC 05 153 5 1243 
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appears that at best, the beneficiary is akin to a professional or skilled worker as opposed to an employee 
possessing specialized knowledge. 
Additionally, in Matter of Penner, the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of 
the specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. 49. The decision noted that the 1970 House Report, H.R. 
No. 91-851 stated that the number of admissions under the L-1 classification "will not be large" and that 
"[tlhe class of persons eligible for such nonimmigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be carefully regulated 
by the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id. at 5 1. The decision further noted that the House Report 
was silent on the subject of specialized knowledge but that, during the course of the sub-committee hearings 
on the bill, the Chairman specifically questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify under the 
proposed "L" category. In response to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that they 
understood the legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, and 
that it would not include "lower categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." Id. at 50 (citing H.R. 
Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445, 91 st Cong. 210, 21 8, 
223,240,248 (November 12, 1969)). 
Reviewing the Congressional record, the Commissioner concluded in Matter of Penner that an expansive 
reading of the specialized knowledge provision, such that it would include skilled workers and technicians, is 
not warranted. The Commissioner emphasized that that the specialized knowledge worker classification was 
not intended for "all employees with any level of specialized knowledge." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 
53. Or, as noted in Matter of Colley, "[mlost employees today are specialists and have been trained and given 
specialized knowledge. However, in view of the House Report, it can not be concluded that all employees 
with specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
intracompany transferees." 18 I&N Dec. at 1 19. According to Matter of Penner, "[sluch a conclusion would 
permit extremely large numbers of persons to qualify for the 'L-1' visa" rather than the "key personnel" that 
Congress specifically intended. 18 I&N Dec. at 53; see also 1756, Inc., 745 F. Supp. at 15 (concluding that 
Congress did not intend for the specialized knowledge capacity to extend to all employees with specialized 
knowledge, but rather to "key personnel" and "executives."). 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawnt' class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc., 745 F. Supp. at 16. Based on the evidence presented, it is concluded that the 
beneficiary does not possess specialized knowledge; nor would the beneficiary be employed in a capacity 
requiring specialized knowledge. For this reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the minimal documentation of the parent company's and the U.S. entity's 
structure and relationship raises the issue of whether there is a qualifying 
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(G). The petitioner, 
is an Indian-based company which claims 
dated May 6, 2005, the petitioner claims 
record, however indicates that the beneficiary is being transferred to work in North Ca 
 specifically to 
work with a-n-site team. There is no evidence in the record to show that 
 is sending the 
beneficiary to work for the U.S.-based parent company; rather, it appears that the beneficiary is merely 
being transferred to work for a branch of the Indian entity in the United States. 
In defining the nonimmigrant classification, the regulations specifically provide for the temporary admission 
of an intracompany transferee "to the United States to be employed by a parent, branch, affiliate, or 
SRC 05 153 5 1243 
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subsidiary of [the foreign firm, corporation, or other legal entity]." 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(1)(i) (emphasis 
added). The regulations define the term "branch as "an operating division or office of the same organization 
housed in a different location." 8 C.F.R. !j 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(J). CIS has recognized that the branch office of a 
foreign corporation may file a nonimmigrant petition for an intracompany transferee. See Matter of Kloetti, 18 
I&N Dec. 295 (Reg. Comm. 198 1); Matter of Leblanc, 13 I&N Dec. 8 16; Matter of Schick, 13 I&N Dec. 647 
(Reg. Comm. 1970); see also Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 54 (stating that a Canadian corporation may 
not petition for L-1 B employees who are directly employed by the Canadian office rather than a United States 
office). When a foreign company establishes a branch in the United States, that branch is bound to the parent 
company through common ownership and management. A branch that is authorized to do business under 
United States law becomes, in effect, part of the national industry. Matter of Schick, 13 I&N Dec. at 649-50. 
Probative evidence of a branch office would include the following: a state business license establishing that 
the foreign corporation is authorized to engage in business activities in the United States; copies of Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) Form 1120-F, U.S. Income Tax Return of a Foreign Corporation; copies IRS Form 
941, Employer's Quarterly Federal Tax Return, listing the branch office as the employer; copies of a lease for 
office space in the United States; and finally, any state tax forms that demonstrate that the petitioner is a 
branch office of a foreign entity. In this matter, there is no evidence that thehe Indian entity which 
employed the beneficiary abroad, is authorized to lawfully do business in the United States, or, more 
specifically, in North Carolina. Additionally, there is no evidence that the beneficiary would be working on 
the payroll of 
 the American parent company. 
 Going on record without supporting documentary 
evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Sofici, 
22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. 
Comm. 1972)). Therefore, it cannot be concluded that a qualifying relationship exists between the petitioner 
and a qualifying organization in the United States. For this additional reason, the petition may not be 
approved. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D: Cal. 2001), affd. 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a challenge only 
if she shows that the AAO abused it discretion with respect to all of the AAO's enumerated grounds. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. at 1043, afd. 345 F.3d 683. 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit 
sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1361. Here, that burden has 
not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.