dismissed L-1B Case: Information Technology

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identifying data deletedt~
prevent clearly unw~
invasionofpersonalpnvacy
.PUBLICCOpy
U.S, DepartIllel1t;()fH~iiiehl~dSecurity
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. A3000
Washington, DC 20529
u.S. Citizenshtp
and Immigration
Services
File: LIN 0523251618 Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER Date: MAR 062007
IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:
Petition: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(l5)(L) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(l5)(L)
IN BEHALF OF BENEFICIARY:
INSTRUCTIONS:
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.
~~~~
Administrative Appeals Office
www.uscis.gov
LIN 0523251618
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DISCUSSION: The Director , Nebraska Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The
matter is now beforethe Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAOwilldismiss the appeal.
The petitioner filed this non immigrant petition seeking to employ the beneficiary in the position of principal
consultant to be employed at a new office in the Un ited States as an L-1B nonimmigrant intracompany
transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (the Act), 8 U .S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a Delaware corporation and is engaged in the
business of information technology consulting. The petitioner claims a qualifying relationship with the
foreign entity, Solidsoft , Ltd., of the United Kingdom, as a subsidiary.
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the position offered
requires an employee with specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has such knowledge.
On appeal , counsel for the petitioner asserts that the petitioner has satisfied the criteria for establishing that
the beneficiary has specialized knowledge . Specifically , counsel asserts that the beneficiary has specialized
knowledge of the petitioner's processes relating to Microsoft BizTalk and the petitioner's consulting
methodologies as these relate to de veloping and delivering integration solutions on the Microsoft platform. In
~ upp ort of the appeal , counsel provided a brief and offered additional evidence .
To establish eligibility for the L-l nonimmigrant visa classification , the petitioner must meet the criteria
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically , a qualifying organi zation must have employed the
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity , for one
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary 's application for admission into the United
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his
or her services to the same employer or a subs idiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive , or
specialized knowledge capac ity.
The regulation at 8 C.F .R. § 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be
accompanied by:
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (1)(1)(ii)(G) of this section.
(ii) E vidence that the alien will be employed in an executive , managerial , or specialized
knowledge capacity, including a detailed descr iption of the service s to be performed.
(iii) E vidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years pre ceding the filing of
the petition.
{iv) Evidence that the alien 's prior year of employment abroad was in a po sition that was
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien 's prior
education, training, and employment qualifies him/her to perform the intended
services in the United States; however , the work in the United States need not be the
LIN 0523251618
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same work which the alien performed abroad.
In addition , the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(3)(vi) states that if the petition indicates that the beneficiary
is coming to the United States in a specialized knowledge capacity to open or to be employed in a new office ,
the petitioner shall submit evidence that:
(A) Sufficient physical premises to house the new office have been secured;
(B) The business entity in the United States is or will be a qualifying
organization as defined in paragraph (l)(1)(ii)(G) of this section; and
(C) The petitioner has the financial ability to remunerate the beneficiary
and to commence doing business in the United States .
At issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary will be employed in a
, ,
capacity which involves specialized knowledge or that he possesses spec ialized knowledge.
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.c. § 1184(c)(2)(B) , provides:
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L) , an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company.
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(1)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as:
[S]pecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product,
service, research , equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its application in
international markets , or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's
processes and procedures.
In a letter dated July 28 , 2005 attached to the initial petition', the petitioner describes its proposed business
operation in the Un ited States as follows :
[The petitioner] will offer the u.s. marketplace the same Information Technology consulting
services that it currentl y offers clients throughout Europe, i.e., assisting customers in creating
business processes and integration solutions 'based upon the Microsoft technology platform.
The brand equity of [the foreign entity] will be leveraged to maximum effort in order to build
upon [the foreign entity's] worldwide reputation .
As the Company already has seen in Europe , there are no other companies currently operating
in the Mid-West that has the same focus on Microsoft BizTalk as [the petitioner].
Discussions with senior Microsoft personnel in the region confirm that while Microsoft has
partners that can do BizTalk, they have no "go to" partners that have the in-depth knowledge
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and experience possessed by [the petitioner] and our team of highly skilled Consultants.
The petitioner also provided job descriptions for the beneficiary for both the position abroad and for the
proffered position in the United States. As these descriptions are clearly delineated in the petitioner's letter
dated July 28, 2005 , they will not be repeated here. '
On August 4,2005, the director requested additional evidence establishing that the beneficiary's knowledge is
indeed specialized. The director requested, inter alia, a description and evidence distinguishing the
beneficiary's knowledge from the knowledge possessed by other similarly employed persons and evidence
regarding any training provided to the beneficiary through which he acquired the purported specialized
knowledge.
In response, counsel to the petitioner provided a letter dated September 15, 2005 in which the beneficiary's
specialized knowledge was described as follows:
\ The Company chose [the beneficiary] for temporary transfer to the United States to assist
with the development of the new Mid-West office as a direct result of his employment with
the sending entity since November 2003, during which time he has developed uncommon
knowledge of BizTalk, specifically the Solidsoft software Iifecycle in relation to
Enterprise Application integration, that is not otherwise available in the general labor
market nor within the remainder of the Petitioner's own workforce.
Counsel further described the beneficiary as the foreign entity's only "subject-matter expert charged with
overseeing the Solidsoft software lifecycle in relation to Enterprise Application integration" and explained
. that the beneficiary "received extensive training and education with respect to BizTalk." Counsel, however,
failed to provide any details regarding this purported training or to explain how the beneficiary could have
been employed in a specialized knowledge capacity for more than one year when at least a portion of the
approximately 21 months separating the commencement of his employment and the filing of the instant
petition was spent receiving this "extensive training and education." Counsel also admitted that an
"individual can obtain BizTalk certification outside of employment with [the foreign entity]," but that the
foreign entity's application of this training in deploying BizTalk is "unique ."
Finally, counsel provided a combined job description for the beneficiary's position abroad as well as for the
. proffered United States position . This description , which is part of the record and which will not be repeated
here, prominently includes the application of the beneficiary's purported specialized knowledge , i.e.,
overseeing the Solidsoft software lifecycle in relation to Enterprise Application integration .
On September 20, 2005 , the director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that
the position offered requires an employee with specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has such
knowledge.
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the petitioner has satisfied the criteria for establishing that
the beneficiary has specialized knowledge. Specifically, counsel asserts that the beneficiary has specialized
knowledge of the petitioner's processes relating to Microsoft BizTalk and the petitioner's consulting
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methodologies as these relate to developing and delivering integration solutions on the Microsoft platform. In
support of the appeal , counsel provided a brief and offered additional evidence regarding the beneficiary's
training and his purported specialized knowledge.
Upon review, the petitioner's assertions are not persuasive in demonstrating that the beneficiary will be
employed in a specialized knowledge capacity as defined at 8 C.F.R . § 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(D) or that he has
specialized knowledge .
In examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAOwill look to the petitioner 's
description of the job duties. See 8.C.F.R. § 2l4.2(l)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed job
description of the services to be performed sufficient to establish specialized knowledge. In this case, while
the beneficiary's job description adequately describes his duties as a principal consultant, the petitioner fails to
establish that the position in the United States requires an employee with specialized knowledge or that he has
specialized knowledge .
Although the petitioner repeatedly asserts that the beneficiary 's proposed positron in the United States
requires "specialized knowledge" and that the beneficiary possesses such "specialized knowledge," the
petitioner has not adequately articulated any basis to support this claim. The petitioner has failed to identify
any specialized or advanced body of knowledge which would distinguish the beneficiary 's role from that of
other BizTalk proficient professionals employed by the petitioner , the foreign entity, or in the industry at
large. Going on record without documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of
proof in: these proceedings. Matter ofSoffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Cornm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure
Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972». Specifics are clearly an important indication of
whether a beneficiary's duties involve specialized knowledge; otherwise meeting the definitions would
simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations . See Fedin Bros. Co ., Ltd. v. Sava, 724, F. Supp. 1103
(E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905, F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990).
The petitioner asserts that the beneficiary possesses uncommon and unique specialized knowledge of the
organization's software lifecycle in relation to Enterprise Application integration. In support of this assertion ,
the petitioner relies heavily on the uniqueness of the petitioner's service to its customers and the beneficiary's
extensive training and experience. The petitioner also alleges that the ' beneficiary is the only person
employed by the foreign entity in "possession of such substantial experience in the organization's software
lifecycle in relation to Enterprise Application integration . However, despite these assertions, the record does
not reveal the material difference between the beneficiary's knowledge and the knowledge possessed by other
experienced and/or certifiedsoftware employees profic ient in BizTalk integrations employed by the foreign
entity, the petitioner, or in the industry at large. As admitted by counsel, BizTalk certification and experience
.is available to , and possessed by, people who are not employed by the foreign entity. The petitioner also
admits that Microsoft works with other partners in the United States "that can do BizTalk." While the
petitioner purports that its employees , and the beneficiary , are more highly skilled than these other providers ,
the petitioner never distinguishes the beneficiary's knowledge from that possessed by the foreign entity's other
employees or in the industry at large. Absent evidence to the contrary , the beneficiary's knowledge does not
appear to be advanced, noteworthy, or uncommon .
.Also, while the petitioner repeatedly points to the beneficiary's "extensive training and education with respect
LIN 0523251618
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to BizTalk" in asserting that his knowledge is specialized, the petitioner provided virtually no information
regarding this purported training. Moreover, since the beneficiary had only been employed by the foreign
entity for 21 months prior to the filing of the instant petition, it is unclear how the beneficiary could have
undergone an "extensive" training program imparting specialized knowledge in time for him to have been
employed in a specialized knowledge capacity for a twelve-month period prior to the filing of the instant
petition. Again, going on record without documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the
burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter ofSofJici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165.
If, in fact, the training program were an introductory session of nine months or less, this would likely be
insufficient to establish that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. The petitioner must establish
that the beneficiary's knowledge is specialized because he gained the knowledge through extensive training or
experience which could not easily be transferred to another employee. If the petitioner is capable of
transferring this knowledge to similarly experienced software professionals in nine months or less, the
knowledge would likely not be specialized. However, if the training program was more than nine months in
length, then the beneficiary would not have been employed in a specialized knowledge capacity for the
requisite one-year period before the filing of the instant petition and would likewise not be eligible for the L­
IB classification. Either way, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary is eligible for the
classification sought. J
The AAO does not dispute the likelihood that the beneficiary is a skilled and experienced software
professional who has been, and would likely be, a valuable asset to the petitioner. However, it is appropriate
for the AAO to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the beneficiary's knowledge
of the business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making process. Matter of Colley,
18 I&N Dec. 117, 120 (Comm. 1981)(citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 618(KC. 1970) and Matter of
LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. 816 (R.C. 1971)). As stated by the Commissioner in Matter of Penner, when
considering whether the beneficiaries possessed specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions
did not find that the occupations inherently qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." 18 I&N
Dec. 49, 52 (Comm. 1982). Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have unusual duties, skills, or
knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. Id. The Commissioner also provided the following clarification:
'u is noted that, on appeal, counsel to the petitioner offered an affidavit providing further information
regarding the beneficiary's purported specialized knowledge and materials describing his training and
experience. However, the petitioner was put on notice of required evidence and given a reasonable
opportunity to provide it for the record before the visa petition was adjudicated. The director specifically
requested information describing and distinguishing the beneficiary's specialized knowledge and evidence
concerning the beneficiary's training and experience. The petitioner failed to submit the requested evidence
and now submits it on appeal. The AAO will not consider this evidence for any purpose. See Matter of
Soriano, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988); Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533 (BIA 1988). Moreover, a
petitioner may not make material changes to a petition, or the beneficiary's job description, in an effort to
make a deficient petition conform to Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) requirements. See Matter of
Izummi, 22 I&N Dec. 169, 176 (Assoc. Comm. 1998). Therefore, the appeal will be adjudicated based on the
record of proceeding before the director.
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A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or her to
produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed primarily
for his ability to carry out a key process or function which is important or essential to the
business firm's 'operation.
!d. at 53.
It should be noted that the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the AAO to make
comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The term "specialized knowledge"
is not an absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed in 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General,
"[s]imply put, specialized knowledge is a relative .. . idea which cannot have a plain meaning." 745 F. Supp .
9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990) . The Congressional record specifically states that the L-l category was intended for "key
personnel." See gen erally, H.R. REp. No. 91-851 , 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750 . The term "key personnel "
denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance. " Webster's II New Colle ge
Dictionary 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001) . In general, all employee s can reasonably be considered
"important" to a petitioner 's enterprise. If an'employee did not contribute to the overall economic success of
an enterprise , there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. An employee of "crucial
importance" or "key personnel " must rise above the level of the petitioner 's average employee. Accordingly,
based on the definition of "specialized knowledge " and the congressional record related to that term , the AAO
must make comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge employee and the general labor
market, but also between the employee and the remainder of the petitioner 's workforce. While it may be
correct to say that the beneficiary in the instant case is a highly skilled and productive employee, this fa ct
alone is not enough to bring the beneficiary to the level of "key personnel."
Moreover, in Matter of Penner, the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of the
specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec . 49 (Comm. 1982). The decision noted that the 1970 House
Report, H.R. REP. NO. 91-851, stated that the number of admissions under the L-l classification "will not be
large" and that "[t]he class of persons eligible for such nonimmigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be
.carefully regulated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id. at 51. The decision further noted that
the House Report was silent on the subject of specialized knowledge, but that during the course of the sub­
committee hearings on the bill , the Chairman specifically questioned witne sses on the level of skill necessary
to qualify under the proposed "L" category. In response to the Chairman 's questions , various witnesses
responded that they und erstood the legislation would allow "high-level people ," " experts," individuals with '
"unique" skill s, and that it would not include "lowercategories" of workers or "skilled craft workers ." Matter
ofPenner, id . at 50 (c iting H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm. , Immigration Act of 1970: Hearings on
H.R. 445, 91
s1
Congo 210, 218, 223, 240, 248 (No vember 12, 1969)).
Reviewing the Congressional record , the Commissioner concluded in Matter of Penner that an expansive
reading of the specialized knowledge provision , such that it would include skilled workers and technicians , is
not warranted . The Commissioner emphasized that the specialized knowledge worker classification was not
intended for "all employees with any level of specialized knowledge. " Matter ofPenner, 18 I&N Dec. at 53 .
Or, as noted in Matter of Colley, "[mlost employees today are specialist s and have been trained and given
specialized knowled ge. However, in view of the House Report, it can not be concluded that all employees
with specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as
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intracompany transferees. " 18 I&N Dec. at 119. According to Matter ofPenner , "[s]uch a conclusion would
permit extremely large numbers of persons to qualify for the 'L-l' visa" rather than the "key personnel " that
Congress specifically intended. 18 I&N Dec. at 53 ; see also, 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F. .Supp. at
15 (concluding that Congress did not intend for the specialized knowledge capacity to extend to all employees
with specialized knowledge , but rather to "key personnel " and "executives.")
A 1994 Immigration and Naturalization Service (now CIS) memorandum written by the then Acting
Associate Commissioner also directs CIS to compare the beneficiary's knowledge to the general United States
labor market and the petitioner's workforce in order to distinguish between specialized and general
knowledge. The Associate Commissioner notes in the memorandum that "officers adjudicating petitions
involving specialized knowledge must ensure that the knowledge possessed by the beneficiary is not general
knowledge held commonly throughout the industry but that it is truly specialized." Memorandum from James
A. Puleo, Acting Associate Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Interpretation of
Specialized Knowledge , CO 214L-P (March 9, 1994). A comparison of the beneficiary's knowledge to the
knowledge possessed by others in the field is therefore necessary in order to determine the le vel of the
beneficiary 's skills and knowledge and to ascertain whether the beneficiary 's knowledge is advanced. In other
words, absent an outside group to which to compare the beneficiary 's knowledge , CIS would not be able to
"ensure that the knowledge po ssessed by the beneficiary is truly specialized." Id. The analysis for specialized
knowledge therefore requires a test of the knowledge possessed by the United States labor market , but does
not consider whether workers are available in the United States to perform the beneficiary 's job duties.
As explained above, the record does not distinguish the beneficiary 's knowledge as more advanced than the
knowledge possessed by other experienced software professionals with a background in BizTalk integrations.
As the petitioner has failed to document any advanced or uncommon qualities to the beneficiary's knowledge
of BizTalk or the processes surrounding its application, the petitioner's claims are not persuasive in
establishing that the benefic iary, while highly skilled , would 'be a "key" employee. There is no indication that
the beneficiary has knowledge that exceeds that of any experienced and/or certified BizTalk proficient
professional, or that he has received special training in the company's methodologies or processes which
would separate him from any other software professional employed with the petitioner or with the foreign
entity.
The legislative history of the term "specialized .knowledge" provides ample support for a restnctive
interpretation of the t erm. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn " class of individuals possessing specialized
knowledge. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, supra at 16. .
Accordingly , it is concluded that the beneficiary would not be employed in the United States in a capacity
involving specialized knowledge and that he does not possess specialized knowledge . .For this reason , the
appeal will be dismissed .
Beyond the decision of the director, a related matter is whether the petitioner has established that the
beneficiary's prior year of employment abroad involved specialized 'knowledge as required by 8 C.P .R. §
214.2(l)(3)(iv).
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As explained above , the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is specialized as
defined by the statute and regulations or that the beneficiary will be employed in the United States in a
specialized knowledge capacity. Likewise, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary has been
employed abroad in a specialized knowledge capacity. The petitioner has failed to identify any specialized or
advanced body of knowledge which would distinguish the beneficiary 's role from that of other BizTalk
proficient professionals employed by the foreign entity or in the industry at large. Going on record without
documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings .
Matter ofSoffici , 22 I&N Dec . at 165 (Comm. 1998). The petitioner has not established that the beneficiary's
knowledge as applied abroad was noteworthy, uncommon, or advanced.
Moreover, as indicated above , the record indicates that the beneficiary had only been employed by the foreign
entity for 21 months before the filing of the instant petition. The petitioner alleges both that the beneficiary
has undergone "extensive" training and that he has been employed in a specialized knowledge capacity for at
least one year in the United Kingdom. However, it is unclear how the beneficiary could have undergone an
"extensive" training program imparting specialized knowledge in time for him to have been employed in a
specialized knowledge capacity for a twelve-month period prior to the filing of the instant petition. Given
that the petitioner has failed to explain the length of this training program or to aver exactly when , in view of
this training and his relatively short period of employment abroad, the beneficiary acquired the "specialized
knowledge," the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary had been employed abroad in a position
involving specialized knowledge for at least one year prior to the filing of the instant petition. Going on
record without documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these
proceedings . Id. For this additional reason , the petition may not be approved .
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner did not establish that sufficient physical premises to house
the new office have been secured as required by 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(3)(vi)(A) .
Along with the initial petition, the petitioner attached a copy of a "REGUS Business Centre Service
Agreement" as evidence that it has secured sufficient physical premises to house the new office. This
Agreement appears to give the petitioner the use of one "workstation" in the business center. This Agreement
does not appear to be a lease for physical premises, does not include a description of the "workstation," does
not reveal its duration, and omits most of the attached Terms of Business which have been incorporated into
the Agreement. Importantly , Term #18 does appear at the bottom of the Agreement in very fine print and
states in pertinent part the following :
Your Agreement is the commercial equivalent of an Agreement for accommodation in a
\
hotel. The whole of the business center remains our property and in our possession and
control. You acknowledge that your Agreement creates no tenancy interest , leasehold estate
or other real property interest in your favor with respect to the accommodation. We are
giving you just the right to share with us the use of the business center so that we can provide
the services to you.
In view of the above, the record establishes that the petitioner has not secured sufficient physical premises to
house the new office . First, the petitioner has not secured "physical" premises. Although the record
establishes that the petitioner has acquired some right to use a workstation in a business center, it is clear that
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this right does not include the right to possession of any physical space. Therefore, the petitioner is ineligible
for the benefit sought for this reason.
Second, even assuming that the petitioner has acquired physical premises ,'the record establishes that these
. i
premises will not be sufficient for the new office . As e xplained in the letter dated October 19, 2005, the
petitioner intends to staff its "Chicago office" with six individuals. However, as the Agreement only covers
one "work station," it is unclear how this single workstation could serve six software professionals. Therefore,
the petitioner is also ineligible for the benefit sought for this reason.
Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that it has secured sufficient physical premises to house the
new office, and the petition may not be approved for this additional reason .
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner did not establish that it has a qualifying relationsh ip with
the foreign entity , Solidsoft, Ltd.
The regulation at 8 C.F .R. § 214.2(l)(3)(i) states that a petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be accompanied by: .
(i) . Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ
the alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (1)(1)(ii)(G) of this
section.
8 C.F.R. § 214 .2(i)(1)(ii)(G) defines a "qualifying organizat ion" as a firm , corporation , or other legal entity
which "meets exactly one of the qualifying relationships specified in the definitions of a parent, branch , affiliate
or subsidiary specified in paragraph (l)(1)(ii) of this section ." A "subsidiary" is defined, in part, as a legal entity
which "a parent owns, directly or indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the entity."
The regulation and case law confirm that ownership and control are the factors that must be examined in
determining whether a qualifying relationship exists between United States and foreign entities for purposes
of this visa classification. Matter ofChurch Scientology International , 19 I&N Dec. 593 (BIA 1988) ; see also
Matter ofSiemens Medical Systems , Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986); Matter ofHughes, 18 I&N Dec . 289
(Comm. 1982). In the context of this visa petition , ownership refers to the direct or indirect legal right of
possession of the assets of an entity with full power and authority to control; control means the direct or
indirect legal right and authority to direct the establishment , management , and operations of an entity . Matter
of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 595.
In the initial petition, the petitioner asserts that it is 100 % owned by the foreign entity. In support of this
assertion, the petitioner provides a copy ?f its articles of incorporation and registration to do business in
Illinois. However , the petitioner provided no evidence of ownership or control of the United States operation.
The petitioner did not provide copies of stock certificates , stock ledgers , shareholder agreements , or any other
evidence of the ownership or control of the pet itioner. Therefore , as the petitioner has not p rovided any
evidence of its ownership and control , the petitioner has not e stablished that it has a qualifying relationship
with the foreign entity , and the petition may not be approved for this add itional reason.
An application or petition that fails to comply with the techn ical requirements of the law may be den ied by
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the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial .decision. See
Spencer Enterpris es, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D . Cal. 2001) , ajfd, 345 FJd 683 ·
(9th Cir. 2003) ; see also Dar v.INS , 891 F.2d997 , 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews
appeals on a de novo basis).
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons , with each considered as an independent and
alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a pet ition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can
. succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's
enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc ., 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043.
In visa petition proceedings , the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here , that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the
appeal will be dismissed .
ORDER: The appeal is d ismissed.