dismissed L-1B Case: Information Technology

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- . U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Mass. Ave. N.W. Rm. A3000 
Wash~ngton, DC 20529 
identifying data deleted to 
 . 
.prevent clearly unwarranted 
 U. S. Citizenship 
invasion of peftoaal privacy . and Immigration 
. 
I- 
FILE: ;SRC 04 224 5 1295 Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: 
., 
hN RE: 
PETITION: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1101(a)(15)(L) 
S 
t 
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, ON BEHALF,OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative AppealssOffice in your case. All docukeints havebeen returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
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Ar ' 
RobertdCh~e f 
Adm~nistrative ~~beals Office 
SRC 04 224 5 1295 
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DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The matter 
is now before the Administratwe Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal w~ll be dismissed. 
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The petitioner is engaged in the business of information technology and technology consulting. It seeks to 
temporarily employ the beneficiary as a technical consultant in the United States and filed a petition to 
classify the beneficiary as a nonimmigrant intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge. The director 
determined that the petitioner had neither established that the beneficiary possesses the requisite specialized 
knowledge nor that the intended employment requ~red specialized knowlefige. 
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 The petitioner subsequently filed an appkal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion, and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, cqunsel submits a brief and asserts that the denial: 
(1) was arbitrary, capricious, and constituted an abuse of discretion by the director; (2) was not in compliance 
with internal Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) memoranda instructing the service centers on the 
proper definition and application of specialized knowledge capacity; and (3) contains eqors in the law. 
To establish L-1 eligibility, the petitioner must meet the criteria outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L). Specifically, w~thin three years 
preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, a qualifying organization must 
have employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized 
knowledge capacity, for one continuous year. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States 
temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof 
in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual 
 filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
> 
,a 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which emplo')ed or will employ the alien 
are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
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(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(111) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment abroad 
with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
educatiori, training, and employment qualifies himlher to perform the intended services in 
the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the same work 
wh~ch the alien performed abroad. 
This matter presents two related, but distinct, issues: (1) whether the beneficiary possesses specialized 
 , 
knowledge; and (2) whether the proposed employment is in a capacity that requires specialized knowledge. 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1184(c)(2)(B), piovides the following: 
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For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized bowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. $214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
In a letter submitted with the petition dated August 12, 2004, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary has 
been employed for over three years by the foreign company. The petitioner further explained that the 
beneficiary, who received a Bachelor of Commerce from the University of Mumbai, began working for the 
foreign company in April 2001 as a technical consultant and has held such a position since that time. The 
petitioner alleges that based on his education and experience working in the foreign company, the beneficiary 
has an advanced level of knowledge in three of its proprietary software systems, namely, REVELEUS, 
PROMOTOR, and PrimeSourcing. Additionally, the petitioner indicates that the beneficiary will be engaged 
in the continued implementation and development of the REVELEUS system for the petitioner's client, the 
American Stock Exchange. With regard to the beneficiary's job duties, the petitioner stated: 
[The beneficiary] has been engaged in the development and implementation of the company's 
software systems and products using [the petitioner's] PROMOTORTM, PrimeSourcing, and 
REVELEUS proprietary project management and information systems software 
methodologies and protocols. During this period, he has also been engaged in the 
development and implementation of American Stock Exchange information technology 
systems including American Stock Exchange's REVELEUS Sy'item using PROMOTORTM 
and PrimeSourcing in conjunction with American Stock Exchange's corporate audit and 
compliance testing standards, software platforms and security management systems. In his 
capacity as Technical Consultant, [the beneficiary] has been involved in the design, 
development, and documentation of functions specifications and software modules of these 
proprietary software products, 'including responsibility for the documentation of technical 
design specifications and the diagnostic and evaluation testing of quality assurance and audit 
control software requirements. 
The petitioner further stated: 
Throughout his three years of employment with [the foreign entity], [the beneficiary] has 
developed advanced and proprietary knowledge of [the foreign entity's] products, software, 
management 'information systems, and specifications, as well as their application to our 
client's systems, which. will assist the company's competitive position. He possesses 
knowledge of [the foreign entity's] methods of operations, including activities with respect to 
client service, as well as an advanced and in-depth understanding of all aspects of the 
international commodities markets and structures. Through his experience with [the foreign 
entity], [the beneficiary] has developed expertise in the business models and software and 
SRC 04 224 5 1295 
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systems requirements of [the foreign entity's] clients. He possesses knowledge and skills that 
are highly developed and complex, and that are not readily available in ,the United Stated 
market. The fact that he has been engaged in the development of the REVELEUS system at 
[the foreign entity] makes his knowledge of our company and our client's requirements truly 
specialized. 
A letter from the foreign entity, dated july 21, 2004, further reiterated these'claims. 
With regard to the beneficiary's proposed position in the United States, the petitioner in its August 12, 2004 
letter stated: 
[The beneficiary] will be engaged in the continued development and implementation of the 
REVELEUS System for our client, the American Stock Exchange, at their offices in New York. 
[The beneficiary] will be responsible for setting up end to end BI solutions consisting of 
technology and business solutions, unified metadata framework and consulting and , 
implementation services. The REVELEUS System uses [the petitioner's] proprietary 
software and project management information systems, including PROMOTORTM and 
PrimeSourcingTM, in conjunction with American Stock Exchange corporate audit and 
compliance testing standards, software platforms,and security management systems. 
The director found the initial evidence submitted with the petition insufficient to warrant a finding that the 
beneficiary possessed the required specialized knowledge. Consequently, a detailed request for evidence was 
issued on August 30, 2004, which specifically requested evidence that the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge of the petitioner's product, service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests 
and its application in international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the 
organization's processes and procedures, and that such knowledge was not general knowledge held commonly 
through the industry. Furthermore, the director requested additional information with regard to REVELEUS , 
and asked whether similar systems were used or produced by other employers in the United States and abroad. 
Finally, the director requested information regarding classroom training and/or on the job training received by 
the beneficiary and the amount of time necessary to receive such training, m addition to a copy of his resume 
and contract information and work history confirming the beneficiary's participation in the American Stock 
Exchange project. 
Counsel for the petitioner submitted a detailed response containing numerous arguments. Instead of 
supplying the information requested by the director, however, counsel contended that the director's requests 
for additional evidence were misplaced and erroneous and that the petitioner had previously submitted ample 
evidence with the initial petition that established the beneficiary's specialized knowledge. Counsel relied on a 
1994 memorandum to support his refusal to provide the requested evidence and refutes the director's requests 
by relying on individual passages from this memorandum. Specifically, counsel asserted that the examples 
contained therein strongly suppod a conclusion in favor of determining that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge. Counsel cited two examples and attempted to equate them to the current situation of 
the beneficiary. See Memo. from James A. Puleo, Acting Exec. Assoc. Comrnr., Office of Operations, 
Immigration and Naturalization Serv., to All Dist. Dir. et al., Interpretation of Special Knowledge, 1-2 
(March 9, 1994) (copy on file with Am. Immig. Law Assn.). Counsel concluded that the petitioner had met its 
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evidentiary burden and that a favorable decision should be rendered. Counsel did, however, provide a several 
page overview of the REVELEUS division, including its annual report describing all of its products. 
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The director determined that the record neither established that the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge nor that the intended position in the U.S. is one that requires specialized knowledge. The director 
specifically noted that the petitioner had refused to submit information with regard to the beneficiary's 
training or the training programs in general to educate an employee in the use of the named systems, and 
noted that counsel's response to the request for evidence did little to supplement the record. The director 
stated that,' although the beneficiary appears to have a working knowledge of the petitioner's systems based on 
his three-year employment with the petitioner, the evidence submitted did not establish that the beneficiary's 
knowledge was uncommon or distinct and failed to provide statistics to establish how uncommon this 
8 knowledge was. The director concluded that despite the director's request, the petitioner had failed to submit 
evidence establishing that a similarly qualified technical consultant could not also perform the duties of the 
position being petitioned for within a short period of time and consequently denied tlie pehtion. 
On appeal, counsel submits a detailed! brief in support of the petitioner's assertions that the beneficiary 
possesses specialized knowledge. Counsel again relies on the language of the 1994 memorandum and 
attempts to individually refute many of the key points of the director's decision. Counsel concludes, without 
supporting documentation or persuasive argument, that the director's decision "does not comply with 
statutory, regulatory, nor internal agency memorandum of the definition of specialized knowledge." Counsel 
makes no attempt to overcome the reasons for the director's stated grounds for denial. 
On review, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge nor that the intended position requires an employee with specialized knowledge. 
When examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(3)(ii). As required in the regulations, the 
petitioner must submit a detailed description of the services to be performed sufficient to establish specialized 
knowledge. Id. 
In the present matter, the petitioner provided an abbreviated description of the beneficiary's employment in th; 
foreign entity, his intended employment in the U.S. entity, and his responsibilities as a technical consultant. 
Despite specific requests by the director, namely, whether the beneficiary had worked abroad on specific projects 
such as the American Stock Exchange project, the petitioner failed and/or refused to provide such information. 
The petitioner has not sufficiently documented how the beneficiary's performance of the proposed job duties 
distinguishes his knowledge as specialized. The petitioner, through counsel, repeatedly states throughout the 
record and agam on appeal that the beneficiary performs a multitude of complex and highly technical job duties 
for the petitioner, the nature of which are not fully understood by CIS. Counsel for the petitioner continually 
asserts that the beneficiary possesses specialized knqwledge as a result of his three years of experience as a 
technical consultant and that such knowledge is far beyond that commonly found throughout the industry. 
Counsel further alleges that the time the beneficiary devoted to the REVELEUS project and his time spent 
working as a Business Intelligence Applications Developer in the Reveleus Division during this period has 
further developed, his specialized knowledge. The record prior to adjudication, however, is devoid of 
evidence that would corroborate the contentions of counsel. Without documentary evidence to support these 
claims, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 
I&N Dec. 533,534 (BIA 1988); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503,506 (BIA 1980). 
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The director's request for evidence was extremely specific. In fact, the director's request directly quoted 
characteristics identified by the 1994 Puleo memorandum as indicative of an alien's specialized knowledge, 
which requested clarification that the beneficiary's claimed specialized knowledge was not merely general 
knowledge held commonly through the industry., The director, therefore, was clearly acting in accordance 
with the Puleo memorandum and afforded the petitioner all available measures to supplement the record with 
additional evidence. However, counsel maintained his position and belief that the director's reques't ran 
contrary to the 1994 memorandum. In addition to directly quoting points highlighted in the Puleo 
memorandum, the director's request advised the petitioner that examples of acceptable evidence included 
copies of certificates, personnel records, and/or ,letters from authorized representatives of the petitioner 
attesting to classroom and/or on the job training. Although specifically requested by the director, the record 
contains no evidence of the beneficiary's training, experience, daily duties, or level of expertise. The 
regulation at 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(3)(viii) states that the director may request additional evidence in appropriate 
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cases. Although specifically and clearly requested by the director, counsel for the petitioner refused to 
provide documentary evidence to support its claims that the beneficiary obtained a specialized level of 
knowledge through his training and work experience with the foreign entity. The failure to submit requested 
evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for4denying the petition. See 8 C.F.R. 8 
103.2(b)(14). 
 In this case, counsel insists that the AAO accept his uncorroborated assertions that the 
beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. As previous& stated, the assertions of counsel do not constitute 
evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. at 534; Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. at 506. doing 
on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of 
proof in these proceedings. ~attir of Sofici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of 
Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
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It is also appropriate for the AAO to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the 
beneficiary's knowledge of the business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making 
process. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. 117, 120 (Comm. 1981) (citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 618 
(R.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. 816 (R.C. 1971)).' As stated by the Commissioner in 
Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 52 (Comm. 1982), when considering whether the beneficiaries possessed 
, specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find that the occupations inherently 
qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have 
unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. Id. The Commissioner also provided the 
following clarification: 
1 
 Although the cited precedents pre-date the current statutory definition of "specialized knowledge," and 
counsel raises that very argument with regard,to the director's reliance on Matter of Penner in support of the 
denial, the AAO finds them instructive. Other than deleting the former requirement that specialized 
knowledge had to be "proprietary," the 1990 Act did not significantly alter the definition of "specialized 
knowledge" from the prior INS interpretation of the term. The 1990 Committee Report does not reject, 
criticize, or even refer to any specific INS regulation or precedent declsion interpreting the term. The 
Committee Report simply states that the Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of 
"[vlarying [i.e., not specifically incorrect] interpretations by INS," H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I), at 69, 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. Beyondrthat, the Committee Report simply restates the tautology that became section 
214(c)(2)(B)of the Act. Id. The AAO concludes, therefore, the cited cases, as well as Matter of Penncr, 
remain useful guidance concerning the intended scope of the "special~zed knowledge" L-1B classification. 
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A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowl'edge enable him or 
her to produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed 
primarily for his ability to carry out a key process or function which is important or 
essential to the business firm's operation. 
Id. at 53. In the present matter, the evidence of record demonstrates that the beneficiary is more akin to an 
employee whose skills and experience enable him to provide a specialized service, rather than an employee 
who has unusual duties, skills, or bowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. 
It should be noted that the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the AAO to make 
comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized 'knowledge. The term "specialized 
knowledge" is not an absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed in 1756, Inc. v. Attorney 
General, "[slimply put, specialized knowledge is a relative . . . idea which cannot have a plain meaning." 745 
F. Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990). The Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended 
for "key personnel." See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91;851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key 
personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." Webster's 11 New 
College Dictionary 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). . In general, all employees can reasonably be 
considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic 
success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. An employee of 
"crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average employee. 
Accordingly, based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record related to that 
term, the AAO must make comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge employee and 
the gkneral labor market, but also between that employee and the remainder of the petitioner's workfckce. 
Here, the petitioner's only contention that the beneficiary's knowledge is more advanced than other technical 
consultants is its assertion on appeal that the beneficiary's duties, as set forth in the petitioner's letter 
submitted with the initial petition, are directly akin to those set forth in the Puleo memoralidurn. Again, the 
petitioner has not provided any information pertaining to the duties and training of the beneficiary or of the 
other technical consultants employed by the petitioner. Nor did the petitioner distinguish the beneficiary's 
knowledge, work experience, or training from those of other employees. The lack of tangible evidence in the 
record makes it impossible to classify the beneficiary's knowledge of the REVELEUS and other software 
systems as advanced and precludes a finding that the beneficiary's role is of crucial importance to the 
organization. Simply going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for the 
purpose of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Sofici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. The 
claim that the beneficiary has been employed by the petitioner for over three years and that most of this penod 
was devoted primarily to work on the REVELEUS system does little to establish that the beneficiary is 
equipped with specialized knowledge, for the petitioner has provided no independent evidence that sets the 
beneficiary apart from all other employees who have gained a similar "expertise" after working for the 
petitioner for a three year period. 
Instead of providing relevant documentation in response to the director's request for evidence, the petitioner, 
through counsel, adamantly refused to address the director's requests or acknowledge any deficiencies in the 
record arid continually relies on the Puleo memorandum as a means for justifying this position. In reference to' 
the Puleo memorandum, counsel claims in the response to the request for evidence that the beneficiary's 
knowledge has enhanced the pehtioner's productivity and financial position. While the beneficiary's slulls and 
knowledge may contribute to the successfulness of the petitioning organization, this factor, by itself, does not 
constitute the possession of specialized 'knowledge. Therefore: while the beneficiary's contribution to the 
economic success of the corporation may be considered, the regulations specifically require that the beneficiary 
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possess an "advanced level of knowledge" of the organization's process and procedures or a "special knowledge" 
of the petitioner's product, service, research, equipment, techniques, or management. 8 C.F.R. 
8 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). As determined above, the beneficiary does not satisfy the requirements for possessing 
specialized knowledge. - , 
Additionally, in Matter of Penner, the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of 
the specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. 49. The decision noted that the 1970 House Report, H.R. 
No. 91-851 stated that the number of admissions under the L-1 classification "will not be large" and that 
"[tlhe class of persons eligible for such nonimmigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be carefully regulated 
by the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id. at 5 1. The decision further noted that the House Report 
was silent on the subject of specialized knowledge but that, during the course of the sub-committee hearings 
on the bill, the Chairman specifically questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify under the 
proposed "L" category. In response to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that they 
understood the legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, and 
that it would not include "lower categories" of workers or "slulled craft workers." Id. at 50 (citing H.R. 
Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445,.91st Cong. 210, 218, 
223,240,248 (November 12, 1969)). 
Reviewing the Congressional record, the Commissioner concluded in Matter of Penner that an expansive 
reading of the specialized knowledge provision, such that it would include slulled workers and technicians, is 
not warranted. The Commissioner emphasized that that the specialized knowledge worker classification was 
not intended for "all employees with any level of specialized knowledge." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 
53. Or, as noted in Matter of Colley, "[mlost employees today are specialists and have been trained and given 
specialized knowledge. However, in view of the House Report, it can not be concluded that all employees 
with specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
intracompany transferees." 18 I&N Dec. at 119. According to Matter of Penner, "[sluch a conclusion would 
permit extremely large numbers of persons to qualify for the 'L-1' visa" rather than the "key personnel" that 
Congress specifically intended. 18 I&N Dec. at 53; see also 1756, Inc., 745 F. Supp. at 15 (concluding that 
Congress did not intend for the specialized knowledge capacity to extend to all employees with specialized 
knowledge, but rather to "key personnel" and "executives."). 
 I. 
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Counsel's main argument seems to focus on the desire of CIS to limit burdensome and irrelevant requests for 
evidence in specialized knowledge cases. CIS, however, is not prohibited, for example, from issuing a request for 
evidence that will establish a beneficiary's advanced knowledge of a petitioner's product or practices, nonetheless 
strivlng to phrase such requests narrowly and in a direct manner. In this case, the allegation that all of the 
director's requests were inappropriate and against policy is misplaced and does not absolve the petitioner from its 
obligation to clearly establish its qualifications for the visa classification sought. The pehtioner's burden was to 
establish that the beneficiary possessed the requisite specialized knowledge, and the petitioner ,was given ample 
opportunity to hish suppomng evidence in support of its contentions. The pehhon was denied because the 
record of proceeding did not contain sufficient evidence to meet that burden, and therefore the petitioner's reliance 
on the allegedly broad scope of the director's language in the request for evidehce and decision as a basis'to 
overturn the denial is misplaced and unpersuasive. As previously stated, failure to submit requested evidence 
that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 8 103.2(b)(.14). 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc., 745 F., Supp. at 16. Based on the evidence presented, it is concluded that the 
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beneficiary does not possess specialized knowledge; nor would the beneficiary be employed in a capacity 
requiring specialized knowledge. For this reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
Furthermore, the record also contains insufficient evidence to establish that the overseas company employed 
the beneficiary in a specialized knowledge capacity. Despite the director's specific request for evidence 
pertaining to the beneficiary's employment abroad and the training, skills, and duties entailed in such a 
position, the petitioner's counsel failed to address this request. Again, failure to submit requested evidence 
that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(14). 
Counsel's refusal to address such queries raises serious doubts regarding the claim that the foreign company 
employed the beneficiary in a capacity. See 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(iv). Furthermore, although the 
petitioner claims that the beneficiary was employed abroad for over three years, the petitioner failed to submit 
appropriate documentation to corroborate such a claim. The beneficiary's pay stubs for the period from 
January 2004 to June 2004, with the omission of March 2004, were submitted. However, this documentation 
does not establish that the petitioner employed the beneficiary for the requisite year. Going on record without 
supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for,purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these 
proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. For this additional reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
In vlsa petition proceedings: the burden of provini eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
director's decision will be affirmed and the petition'will be denied. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
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