dismissed L-1B Case: Information Technology

identifying dzQ 6elel~d to 
prevent clweriy 2;-,aa:r i~n:cd 
invasion of ycss~l privacy 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
Office of Administrative Appeals, MS 2090 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
PUBLIC COPY @ 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
@'4MD +@ Services 
File: WAC 08 207 51286 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: JUN 0 4 2009 
IN RE: 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 l(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. 8 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
Appeals Office 
' 
 WAC 08 207 5 1286 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office ("AAO") on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the 
appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant visa petition to employ the beneficiary an L-1B intracompany transferee 
with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("the Act"), 
8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner, a New Jersey-based information technology company, claims to be a 
subsidiary of the beneficiary's foreign employer located in India. The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary as 
a consultant for a period of three years.' 
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge or that he has been or will be employed in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. 
In denying the petition, the director observed that the record consisted primarily of the unsupported assertions 
of the petitioner and counsel, and that such assertions were insufficient to establish the beneficiary's 
eligibility. 
On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the petitioner has satisfied the criteria for establishing that the 
beneficiary has been and will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity under the "broad definition," 
found at 8 C.F.R. 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D), and as defined in a 1994 legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) mem~randum.~ Specifically, the petitioner argues that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge of a 
client's database system, as well as Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) compliance controls and testing procedures which 
are "complex and unique" and necessary for the project on which the beneficiary will work in the United 
States. Counsel hrther asserts that the director has read the definition of "specialized knowledge" too 
narrowly and applied an incorrect evidentiary standard by requiring the petitioner to submit evidence beyond 
statements from the company's authorized representative. Counsel submits a brief and additional evidence in 
support of the appeal. 
To establish L-1 eligibility under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the petitioner must demonstrate that the 
beneficiary, within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, has 
been employed abroad in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a capacity involving specialized 
knowledge, for one continuous year by a qualifying organization. The petitioner must also demonstrate that the 
beneficiary seeks to enter the United States temporarily in order to continue to render services to the same 
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized 
knowledge. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
1 
 The petitioner indicated the beneficiary's job title as "Consultant" on Form 1-129 and requested that the 
petition be approved for a period of three years. In a letter dated July 17, 2008, the petitioner stated that the 
beneficiary would serve in the position of "Functional Analyst," and requested approval of the petition for two 
years. 
2 
See Memorandum from James A. Puleo, Assoc. Comm., INS, Interpretation of Special Knowledge, March 
4, 1994. (hereinafter "Puleo memorandum"). 
WAC 08 207 5 1286 
Page 3 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himlher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The primary issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary has been or 
will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity and whether the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge. 8 C.F.R. !j!j 214,2(1)(3)(ii) and (iv). 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. !j 11 84(c)(2)(B), provides: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
In a letter dated July 17, 2008, the petitioner described the petitioner's purpose for transferring the beneficiary to 
the United States as follows: 
[The petitioning organization] carries out risk management & compliance and Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act ("Sox") Compliance audits for Cummins, Inc. USA. These internal measures involve 
auditing and testing of internal controls for financial reporting of Principle [sic] Officers 
(CEOsICFOs) of the company filing annual reports with the Security & Exchange Commission 
("SEC"). The role of the auditor involves auditing and testing of various applications and 
infrastructure onsite at different locations in the US and around the world. [The beneficiary] has 
WAC 08 207 5 1286 
Page 4 
been carrying out these duties offshore and Cummins Inc. USA is now in need of onsite analysis 
and auditing of its internal controls. 
The petitioner describes the beneficiary's proposed duties in the United States as the following: 
planning Global Annual Audit Schedules for on-site and central ITGC testing for all in- 
scope sites; 
evaluating Risk Control Matrix yearly update for Tier-1 high impact applications and 
information assets; 
studying interface documentation for application risk and remediation; 
coordinating site IT leaders and IT champions for onsite and central testing; 
assisting client in evaluating their environment, processes and roles for implementation a 
scheme where there are separation of duties; 
carrying out testing of quarterly SOX controls, which include general user access and job 
scheduling; production data updates, job failure and production migration issues; and 
security baseline measures, data backup procedures and elevated access delineation; 
administering Movaris Certainty audit tool for enterprise financial controls, processes and 
people management for SOX compliance; and 
analyzing of historic data/GAP remediation of various controls and propose improvements 
to systems and processes. 
The petitioner indicated that the beneficiary has been employed by the foreign entity since February 26, 2007, 
where he has been performing essentially the same duties and "working exclusively on projects dealing with 
Cummins Inc. USA risk management/control audit as it relates to SOX compliance." 
The petitioner submitted an organization chart for the project "SOX Audits at Cummins" which indicates that the 
beneficiary reports to a U.S.-based project manager, and is one of nine consultants assigned to the project. The 
beneficiary and one other India-based employee perform "IT Audits" while the remaining seven consultants, four 
of which are in the United States, perform "Business Process Audits." 
The petitioner submitted copies of the beneficiary's educational and training qualifications and his resume in 
support of the petition. The beneficiary's qualifications included passing an examination as a Certified 
Information System Auditor (CISA) conducted by Information System Audit Control Association (U.S.A.). He 
also underwent five days training to become a Lead Auditor, Information Security Management System ISOIIEC 
27001 :2005, conducted by the British Standard Institute (BSI) Management Systems. The record shows that the 
beneficiary has completed a bachelor's degree in civil engineering and a master's degree in construction 
management and worked for the Department of Public Works in Maharastra, India as an junior engineer, assistant 
engineer and engineer from 1982 until 2005. According to the beneficiary's resume, he did not possess any prior 
experience in SOX compliance auditing prior to joining the foreign entity. The record shows that he underwent 
professional training in the information systems auditing field during 2005 and 2006. 
On July 3 1,2008, the director requested additional evidence, including, inter alia, an explanation addressing how 
the beneficiary's duties are special or advanced compared to those of other workers employed by the petitioner or 
other U.S. employers in the same type of position, and an explanation addressing how the beneficiary's training or 
WAC 08 207 5 1286 
Page 5 
experience is distinguished from similarly employed workers in this particular field. The director requested that 
the petitioner submit "probative evidence" in support of its explanations. The director also requested information 
regarding the number of foreign national employed at the U.S. location where the beneficiary will be employed, 
including the job titles of each foreign national's position, the type of visa held, and information regarding any L- 
1B visa holders who have been transferred to the same location. Finally, the director requested that the petitioner 
specie the number of persons holding the same or similar positions in the United States. 
In a response dated September 10, 2008, counsel for the petitioner explained the corporate relationship between 
the petitioner and the U.S. client, Cummins, Inc., noting that there is some common ownership between the 
companies, although not enough to establish an "affiliate" relationship for L-1 purposes. Counsel stated: 
The work to be performed at the office in Columbus, Indiana relates to general risk 
managemenuinternal auditISOx compliance procedures that are used by all the companies in the 
KPITICummins group. These procedures are not known by other companies and are not widely 
disseminated. 
In response to the director's request that the petitioner explain how the beneficiary's duties are different from those 
of similarly-employed workers in the petitioning organization or employed by other U.S. employers, counsel 
stated: 
[Tlhe reason why [the beneficiary] was chosen to come to the United States and work at the 
Cummins office on this particular project is because [the petitioner] carries out risk management 
& compliance and Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("SOX") Compliance audits for Cummins Inc. USA. 
These internal measures involve auditing and testing of internal reporting of Principle [sic] 
Officers (CEOICFOs) of the company filing annual reports with the [SEC]. . . . [The beneficiary] 
has been carrying out these duties offshore and the project is now in need of onsite analysis and 
auditing of its internal controls. 
In addition, counsel responded to the director's request that the petitioner explain how the beneficiary's training or 
experience is uncommon, noteworthy or distinguished by some unusual quality: 
[Olver the past 18 months, Beneficiary has been working exclusively on projects dealing with 
risk management/control audit as it relates to SOX compliance. The fact that [the beneficiary's] 
work has centered specifically on IT risk management/control audits specifically for Cummins 
Inc., which is an affiliated company to [the foreign entity], inherently sets [the beneficiary] apart 
from practitioners in [the beneficiary's] field (i.e., Information Technology). The fact that [the 
beneficiary] has performed risk management/control audits at other Cummins sites, differentiates 
[the beneficiary] from other IT professionals at [the foreign entity], because other employees are 
not familiar with Cummins's internal audit processes and risk management procedures. Further, 
[the beneficiary1 is one of a few individuals within the KPIT/Cummins group of companies that 
has performed internal audits of the Petitioner's SOX procedures and analyzed them for gaps in 
compliance and developed internal means to comply with the SOX requirements. 
(Emphasis in original.) 
WAC 08 207 51286 
Page 6 
Counsel objected to the director's request for "probative evidence," noting that the director appeared to be 
applying a higher standard than "preponderance of the evidence." Counsel further objected to the director's 
statement in the RFE that USCIS requires information that would allow comparisons between the beneficiary's 
claimed knowledge and that of the general labor market. Counsel asserted that there is no requirement for testing 
the U.S. labor market and cited to a 2002 policy mem~randum.~ 
The petitioner also submitted a letter from the foreign entity's Manager-Resourcing 
 who 
further elaborated upon the beneficiary's "special or advanced duties" as follows: 
[The beneficiary] is involved in the project of Cummins SOX IT Audits since April 2007. [The 
foreign entity] is handling this assignment since 2004. These audit activities were divided in 2 
parts - "Onsite audits" and "Remote Testing" - [the beneficiary] was performing "Central 
Testing" from India office. Till 2007, assignment only involved [the foreign entity] to perform IT 
Compliance audits and Cummins had a full-time manager to monitor overall IT compliance 
process. Starting from 2007, the assignment scope is continuously changing and now [the 
foreign entity] has been given entire responsibility to monitor SOX IT Compliance - this includes 
scoping, scheduling, performing audits, reporting to Cummings/External Auditors and Guiding 
Cummins to improve control environment. In order to meet the increased expectations, we need 
to spend more time in managinglreporting the process. We need one more member onsite (US) 
to perform onsite audits. [The beneficiary] is the oldest team member and he knows all Cummins 
Process [and] People involved in compliance, hence [the foreign entity] decided to bring him 
onsite. 
stated that the beneficiary "has the best knowledge in the current team," and indicated that "if 
we bring a new person from US it will take at least a year for hirnlher to take full responsibility." Mr. 
emphasized that the client "does not want to bring a new person to perform onsite audits." 
On September 24, 2008, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner failed to 
establish that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has been or will be 
employed in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. In denying the petition, the director stated: 
The petitioner failed to provide corroborating evidence that the beneficiary would be 
employed in a position that primarily requires specialized knowledge of a product or service 
specific to the petitioner. Other than the unsupported assertions of counsel and the petitioner, 
there is nothing in the record to support the claim that the beneficiary possesses a specialized 
or advanced body of knowledge. Statements made by the petitioner are, for the most part, 
self-serving and provide little in the way of hard evidence. 
The director concluded that the duties to be performed have not been shown to require "a specialized 
knowledge of the petitioning company's product, processes or procedures that surpasses the ordinary or 
usual." 
Memorandum of Fujie Ohata, Assoc. Comm., INS, Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge (Dec. 20, 
2002)(hereinafter "Ohata memorandum"). 
WAC 08 207 51286 
Page 7 
The director acknowledged the petitioner's objection to the director's request for "probative evidence," and in 
response quoted the following excerpt from the Puleo memorandum, which discusses the burden of proof and 
evidentiary requirements for the L-1B visa classification: 
From a practical point of view, the mere fact that a petitioner alleges that an alien's knowledge is 
somehow different does not, in and of itself, establish that the alien possesses specialized 
knowledge. The petitioner bears the burden of establishing through submission of 
probative evidence that the alien's knowledge is uncommon, noteworthy, or distinguished by 
some unusual quality and not generally known by practitioners in the alien's field of endeavor. 
Likewise, a petitioner's assertions that the alien possesses an advanced level of knowledge of the 
processes and procedures of the company must be supported by evidence describing and setting 
apart that knowledge from the elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others. It is the 
weight and type of evidence which establishes whether or not the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge. 
Puleo memorandum at pg. 4. 
The director concluded that without producing probative evidence, the petitioner cannot establish that the 
beneficiary's knowledge is noteworthy, uncommon or distinguished by some unusual quality. 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner has satisfied the criteria for establishing that the beneficiary has 
been and will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity. Counsel cites heavily to the Puleo 
memorandum, and specifically, to several "characteristics" of specialized knowledge set forth in the 
memorandum. Counsel summarizes the beneficiary's experience with the foreign entity and the reason for his 
transfer to the United States and states that, as a result of such experience, he meets two of the characteristics 
outlined in the memorandum. Specifically, counsel asserts that the beneficiary possesses knowledge which 
normally can be gained only through prior experience with that employer, and that he has been utilized abroad 
in a capacity involving significant assignments which have enhanced the employer's productivity, 
competitiveness and image with its client. 
Counsel emphasizes that the USCIS Adjudicator's Field Manual's discussion of "Specialized Knowledge 
Capacity" cites to and quotes extensively from the Puleo memorandum, thus suggesting that the memorandum 
is to be given considerable weight in guiding adjudicators with respect to whether a foreign national possesses 
"specialized knowledge." Counsel goes on to state that "the text of the 1994 Puleo memorandum defining 
'specialized knowledge' as it appears in the USCIS Adjudicator's Field Manual is binding on USCIS Officers 
and must be followed. In support of this assertion, counsel states that "the Adjudicator's Field Manual would 
supersede all other USCIS policy materials, and USCIS correspondence addressing the issue of 'specialized 
knowledge,' including precedent decisions issued by the Administrative Appeals Office." 
Counsel further states that the regulatory definition of "specialized knowledge" at 8 C.F.R. fj 
214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) is a "broad definition" and that the legislative history of the L-1 category reflects that it was 
created for a "broad purpose," with the intent "to make it easy for multinational companies to transfer 
personnel where it relates to the expansion of commerce." Counsel submits that the beneficiary is a "key 
individual" who performs services that are directly related to the expansion of commerce, and therefore his 
WAC 08 207 5 1286 
Page 8 
knowledge of the petitioner's client's database system and SOX compliance procedures meets the definition of 
"specialized knowledge" intended by Congress. 
Counsel asserts that USCIS has read the regulatory definition of "specialized knowledge" too narrowly by 
requiring the petitioner to establish that the beneficiary's proposed position primarily requires "specialized 
knowledge" of a product or service specific to the petitioner. Counsel emphasizes that the regulatory 
definition is "fairly broad" and includes knowledge of the petitioning organization's product, service, research, 
equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in international markets. 
Finally, counsel asserts that the director applied an incorrect evidentiary standard in this case by contending 
that the petitioner "failed to provide corroborating evidence," and by finding that the petitioner's statements 
"are self-serving and provide little in the way of 'hard' evidence." Counsel cites to a 2005 memorandum from 
William Yates, Associate Director of Operations. Memorandum of William R. Yates, Assoc. Dir. Of 
Operations, USCIS, Changes to the L Nonimmigrant ClassiJication made by the L-1 Reform Act of 2004 (July 
28, 2005) ("the Yates memorandum") and to the Adjudicator's Field Manual in support of his claim that L-1 
petitioners are not required to submit extensive evidence of the alien's prior and proposed employment. 
Counsel asserts that the evidentiary requirements differ depending on the nature and size of the petitioner, and 
contends that "since Petitioner is a large established multi-national organization with offices around the 
world, the USCIS examiner should have accepted the statements made by the authorized representative in the 
supporting letter." Counsel notes that "since the director did not indicate how the statements made by the 
petitioner's authorized representative . . . were doubtful or inaccurate, no other documentation should have 
been required by the USCIS examiner to find that the Beneficiary possesses 'specialized knowledge."' 
Counsel concludes as follows: 
The USCIS examiner did not properly analyze the statements made by the Petitioner's 
authorized representative in the support letter, which described the "specialized knowledge" 
possessed by the Beneficiary. The Beneficiary did not articulate a basis as to why these 
statements were not true, show that adverse factors exist, or show how the statements did not 
meet the definition of "specialized knowledge" described in the Adjudicator's Field Manual. 
The USCIS examiner simply stated that the evidence was not sufficient, and that the 
statements made by the Petitioner's authorized representative in the support letter were self- 
serving. This is not a proper basis for denying the L-1B petition, and violates Chapter 32.2 of 
the USICS Adjudicator's Field Manual, which is binding. 
Upon review, counsel's assertions are not persuasive. The petitioner has not established that the beneficiary 
has specialized knowledge or that he has been or will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity as 
defined at 8 C.F.R. fj 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). 
The Standard for Specialized Knowledge 
WAC 08 207 5 1286 
Page 9 
Looking to the language of the statutory definition, Congress has provided USCIS with an ambiguous definition 
of specialized knowledge. In this regard, one Federal district court explained the infeasibility of applying a 
bright-line test to define what constitutes specialized knowledge: 
This ambiguity is not merely the result of an unfortunate choice of dictionaries. It reflects the 
relativistic nature of the concept special. An item is special only in the sense that it is not 
ordinary; to define special one must first define what is ordinary. . . . There is no logical or 
principled way to determine which baseline of ordinary knowledge is a more appropriate reading 
of the statute, and there are countless other baselines which are equally plausible. Simply put, 
specialized knowledge is a relative and empty idea which cannot have a plain meaning. C$ 
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 537 (1982). 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. 9, 14-1 5 (D.D.C., 1990).~ 
While Congress did not provide explicit guidance for what should be considered ordinary knowledge, the 
principles of statutory interpretation provide some clue as to the intended scope of the L-1B specialized 
knowledge category. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 1 1 2, 123 (1 987) 
(citing lrNSv. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207,94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)). 
First, the AAO must look to the language of section 214(c)(2)(B) itself, that is, the terms "special" and 
"advanced." Like the courts, the AAO customarily turns to dictionaries for help in determining whether a word in 
a statute has a plain or common meaning. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 109 F.3d 965, 967-68 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(using Webster's Dictionary for "therefore"). According to Webster's New College Dictionary, the word "special" 
is commonly found to mean "surpassing the usual" or "exceptional." Webster's New College Dictionary, 1084 
(3rd Ed. 2008). The dictionary defines the word "advanced" as "highly developed or complex" or "at a higher 
level than others." Id. at 17. 
Second, looking at the term's placement within the text of section 10 l(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the AAO notes that 
specialized knowledge is used to describe the nature of a person's employment and that the term is listed among 
the higher levels of the employment hierarchy together with "managerial" and "executive" employees. Based on 
the context of the term within the statute, the AAO therefore would expect a specialized knowledge employee to 
occupy an elevated position within a company that rises above that of an ordinary or average employee. See 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 14. 
Third, a review of the legislative history for both the original 1970 statute and the subsequent 1990 statute 
indicates that Congress intended for USCIS to closely administer the L-1B category. Specifically, the original 
drafters of section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act intended that the class of persons eligible for the L-1 classification 
would be "narrowly drawn" and "carefully regulated and monitored" by USCIS. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91- 
851 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750, 2754, 1970 WL 5815. The legislative history of the 1970 Act 
Although 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General was decided prior to enactment of the statutory definition of 
specialized knowledge by the Immigration Act of 1990, the court's discussion of the ambiguity in the legacy 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) definition is equally illuminating when applied to the definition 
created by Congress. 
WAC 08 207 51286 
Page 10 
plainly states that "the number of temporary admissions under the proposed 'L' category will not be large." Id. In 
addition, the Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended for "key personnel." 
See generally, id. The term "key personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "[olf 
crucial importance." Webster S New College Dictionary 620 (3rd ed., Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing 
Co. 2008). Moreover, during the course of the sub-committee hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically 
questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify under the proposed "L" category. In response 
to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that they understood the legislation would allow 
"high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, and that it would not include "lower 
categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." See H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration 
Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445, 91St Cong. 210,218,223,240,248 (Nov. 12, 1969). 
Neither in 1970 nor in 1990 did Congress provide a controlling, unambiguous definition of "specialized 
knowledge," and a narrow interpretation is consistent with so much of the legislative intent as it is possible to 
determine. H. Rep. No. 91-851 at 6, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2754. This interpretation is consistent with legislative 
history, which has been largely supportive of a narrow reading of the definition of specialized knowledge and the 
L-1 visa classification in general. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 15-16; Boi Na Braza 
Atlanta, LLC v. Upchurch, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 2372846 at "4 (N.D.Tex., 2005), affd 194 
Fed.Appx. 248 (5th Cir. 2006); Fibermaster, Ltd v. INS., Not Reported in F.Supp., 1990 WL 99327 (D.D.C., 
1990); Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Dept. of Justice, Civ. Action 00-2977-LFO (D.D.C. April 6, 2001)(on file with 
AAO). 
Further, although the Immigration Act of 1990 provided a statutory definition of the term "specialized 
knowledge" in section 214(c)(2) of the Act, the definition did not generally expand the class of persons eligible 
for L-1B specialized knowledge visas. Pub.L. No. 101-649, tj 206(b)(2), 104 Stat. 4978, 5023 (1990). Instead, 
the legislative history indicates that Congress created the statutory definition of specialized knowledge for the 
express purpose of clarifying a previously undefined term from the Immigration Act of 1970. H.R. Rep. 101- 
723(1) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6749, 1990 WL 20041 8 ("One area within the L visa that 
requires more specificity relates to the term 'specialized knowledge.' Varying interpretations by INS have 
exacerbated the problem."). While the 1990 Act declined to codify the "proprietary knowledge" and "United 
States labor market" references that had existed in the previous agency definition found at 8 C.F.R. 
5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) (1988), there is no indication that Congress intended to liberalize its own 1970 definition of 
the L- 1 visa classification. 
If any conclusion can be drawn from the enactment of the statutory definition of specialized knowledge in section 
2 14(c)(2)(B), it would be based on the nature of the Congressional clarification itself. By not including any strict 
criterion in the ultimate statutory definition and further emphasizing the relativistic aspect of "special knowledge," 
Congress created a standard that requires USCIS to make a factual determination that can only be determined on a 
case-by-case basis, based on the agency's expertise and discretion. Rather than a bright-line standard that would 
support a more rigid application of the law, Congress gave the INS a more flexible standard that requires an 
adjudication based on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. C$ Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 33 1 F.3d 
369, 377 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89,91 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
To determine what is special or advanced, USCIS must first determine the baseline of ordinary. As a 
baseline, the terms "special" or "advanced" must mean more than simply "skilled" or "experienced." By 
WAC 08 207 5 1286 
Page 11 
itself, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically complex products will not equal "special 
knowledge." See Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 53 (Comm. 1982). In general, all employees can 
reasonably be considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the 
overall economic success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. 
An employee of "crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average 
employee. In other words, specialized knowledge generally requires more than a short period of experience; 
otherwise special or advanced knowledge would include every employee in an organization with the 
exception of trainees and entry-level staff. If everyone in an organization is specialized, then no one can be 
considered truly specialized. Such an interpretation strips the statutory language of any efficacy and cannot 
have been what Congress intended. 
Considering the definition of specialized knowledge, it is the petitioner's, not USCIS's, burden to articulate 
and establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" 
knowledge. Section 2 14(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 184(c)(2)(B). USCIS cannot make a factual 
determination regarding the beneficiary's specialized knowledge if the petitioner does not, at a minimum, 
articulate with specificity the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, describe how such knowledge is 
typically gained within the organization, and explain how and when the beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
Once the petitioner articulates the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and type of 
evidence which establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized knowledge. A 
petitioner's assertion that the beneficiary possesses advanced knowledge of the processes and procedures of 
the company must be supported by evidence describing and distinguishing that knowledge from the 
elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others. Because "special" and "advanced" are comparative 
terms, the petitioner should provide evidence that allows USCIS to assess the beneficiary's knowledge 
relative to others in the petitioner's workforce or relative to similarly employed workers in the petitioner's 
specific industry. 
Analysis 
As a preliminary matter, the AAO will address counsel's assertion the petitioner is not required to submit 
evidence of the beneficiary's eligibility for L- 1B classification beyond submitting a statement fiom an authorized 
company official. As noted above, counsel relies on the Adjudicator's Field Manual in support of his claim that 
L-1 petitioners, particularly those that are large, established companies, need not submit extensive evidence 
relating to the beneficiary's prior and proposed employment. The AAO acknowledges that there may be limited 
instances in which a statement from the petitioner alone is sufficient to establish a beneficiary's eligibility as a 
specialized knowledge employee. 
However, when the petitioner does not adequately articulate with specificity the nature of the claimed specialized 
knowledge or how such knowledge is typically gained within the organization, or if the petitioner's statements 
otherwise fail to establish the beneficiary's eligibility, the regulations state that the petitioner shall submit 
additional evidence as the director, in his or her discretion, may deem necessary. The purpose of the request 
for evidence is to elicit further information that clarifies whether eligibility for the benefit,sought has been 
established, as of the time the petition is filed. See 8 C.F.R. $9 103.2(b)(8) and (12). The regulation at 8 
C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3)(viii) provides that the petitioner shall submit "such other evidence as the director, in his 
WAC 08 207 51286 
Page 12 
or her discretion, may deem necessary." 
Contrary to counsel's argument on appeal, the director does not have to articulate a doubt regarding the 
accuracy or credibility of the petitioner's assertions in order to justify a request for corroborating evidence of 
eligibility or a request for additional explanation regarding the nature of the beneficiary's claimed specialized 
knowledge. The director in this matter simply found that the information provided by the petitioner in the 
form of statements from authorized officials of the organization insufficient to establish eligibility for L-1B 
classification, so he exercised his discretion to request additional evidence. 
Counsel essentially argues that if a large international corporation provides a job description for the 
beneficiary and states that a beneficiary has specialized knowledge and will be employed in a specialized 
knowledge capacity, the petition should be approved without additional evaluation unless USCIS has reason 
to believe that the petitioner's statements are inaccurate or fraudulent. Counsel's viewpoint does not allow for 
a situation in which the petitioner's opinion of what constitutes "specialized knowledge" simply does not 
comport with what the regulatory and statutory definitions, case law and policy guidance interpreting the term 
"specialized knowledge" require, or is simply not sufficiently detailed to establish eligibility by the 
preponderance of the evidence standard. 
Considering the definition of specialized knowledge, it is the petitioner's burden to prove that an alien 
possesses "special" or "advanced" knowledge by a preponderance of the evidence. Section 214(c)(2)(B) of 
the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1184(c)(2)(B). The inherently subjective standard serves to make the L-IB classification 
more flexible and capable of responding to changing economic models. Depending on the facts of the 
specific case, a petitioner may put forward a novel argument that is based on the employer's specific situation. 
Or, as in the present case, a knowledgeable petitioner may choose to rely on aspects of the INS memoranda to 
frame his or her argument. Even though, as addressed further below, the Puleo memorandum does not 
constitute a binding legal "standard," it does describe possible attributes that would support a claim of 
specialized knowledge. However, the petitioner would be unwise to simply parrot the memorandum, without 
submitting supporting evidence, and expect USCIS to approve a petition. Or, as observed in the Puleo 
memorandum: 
. . . a petitioner's assertion that the alien possesses an advanced level of knowledge of the 
processes and procedures of the company must be supported by evidence describing and 
setting apart that knowledge from the elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others. It 
is the weight and type of evidence, which establishes whether or not the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge. 
Pursuant to section 291 of the Act, the petitioner bears the burden of proof in these proceedings. The 
petitioner must submit relevant, probative, and credible evidence that would lead the director to believe that 
the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not." Matter of E-M-, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 
1989). 
Here, the AAO finds that the director did not abuse his discretion by requesting evidence to establish that the 
beneficiary's duties are special or advanced in relation to others, or by inquiring as to how the beneficiary's 
experience or training differs from other similarly-employed workers within the petitioner's organization. 
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Page 13 
The AAO will now turn to the question of whether the petitioner established that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge and will be employed in a capacity requiring specialized knowledge. Upon review, 
even under counsel's more generous view of the appropriate evidentiary standard, the petitioner has not 
demonstrated that this employee possesses knowledge that may be deemed "special" or "advanced" under the 
statutory definition at section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. The decision of the director will be affirmed as it 
relates to this issue and the appeal will be dismissed. 
In examining the specialized knowledge of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's description of 
the job duties and the weight of the evidence supporting any asserted specialized knowledge. See 8 C.F.R. 
fj 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed job description of the services to be performed sufficient to 
establish specialized knowledge. At a minimum, the petitioner must articulate with specificity the nature of the 
claimed specialized knowledge. Merely asserting that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" 
knowledge will not suffice to meet the petitioner's burden of proof. 
The petitioner in this case has failed to establish either that the beneficiary's position in the United States or 
abroad requires an employee with specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge. 
Although the petitioner repeatedly asserts that the beneficiary has been and will be employed in a "specialized 
knowledge" capacity, the petitioner has not adequately articulated any basis to support this claim. The 
petitioner has failed to identify any special or advanced body of knowledge which would distinguish the 
beneficiary's role from that of other similarly experienced functional analysts1IT auditors employed by the 
petitioning organization or in the industry at-large. Going on record without documentary evidence is not 
sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Sofjci, 22 I&N Dec. 
158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 
1972)). Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties involve specialized 
knowledge; otherwise, meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. See 
Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724, F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905, F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
The petitioner's basic claim is undermined by the facts in the present case. The petitioner's fundamental claim 
is that the beneficiary possesses "special" knowledge of risk managemenuinternal audit/SOx compliance 
procedures that are used by all the companies in the KPITICummins group, and that such procedures are not 
known by other companies and are not widely disseminated. At the same time, the petitioner claims that the 
beneficiary's knowledge is "advanced" because he is the most experienced IT auditor assigned to the Cummins 
USA SOX Compliance project. However, if the same auditing and SOX compliance procedures are utilized 
organization-wide, it is unclear why the beneficiary's approximately 15 months of experience with a specific 
project within the organization would rise to the level of "advanced." The petitioning organization also provides 
SOX compliance consulting services to unrelated companies as part of its large selection of service offerings, and 
utilizes software developed by unrelated companies, such as the Movaris Certainty audit tool, to implement such 
projects. These types of SOX Compliance services are provided by other consulting companies that are unrelated 
to the petitioner. The petitioner has not differentiated its SOX Compliance processes and procedures from those 
utilized by the financial services consulting industry at large, or explained how the services and the knowledge 
required to provide such services varies from client to client within the petitioner's organization. 
Absent additional explanation regarding these factors, it cannot be concluded that the beneficiary's knowledge of 
WAC 08 207 51286 
Page 14 
the petitioner's SOX Compliance procedures is truly "specialized" or that his knowledge of such procedures is 
"advanced" compared to his similarly-employed peers within the petitioner's international organization. While 
counsel argues that the beneficiary's familiarity with a client's database and systems should be considered 
knowledge that is "specific to the petitioner's interests" and therefore "specialized," the AAO notes that such an 
interpretation would essentially open the classification to any information technology consultant who worked on 
any client project with on-site and off-shore components for at least one year. 
The beneficiary's familiarity with the client's systems and requirements, while valuable to the petitioner, 
cannot be considered knowledge specific to the petitioning organization and cannot form the basis of a 
determination that he possesses specialized knowledge. All information technology consultants within the 
petitioning organization would reasonably be familiar with its internal processes and methodologies for 
carrying out client projects. Similarly, most employees would also possess project-specific knowledge relative 
to one or more international clients, which the petitioner would equate to knowledge of the application of the 
petitioner's methodologies and processes in "international markets" and knowledge of its "other interests." 
However, the fact that the beneficiary possesses very specific experience with a particular international 
client's project does not establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is indeed special or advanced. 
In addition, even assuming arguendo that the beneficiary's familiarity with the client's systems could be 
considered "specialized knowledge," the petitioner claims that it has provided some form of SOX compliance 
services to Cummins, Inc., since 2004. In light of this information, it is unclear how the beneficiary, who has 
worked as a team member on a single project for the unaffiliated employer for approximately 15 months, is 
considered to have "advanced" knowledge of the petitioner's processes and methodologies relative to the 
unaffiliated employer's projects. 
All employees can be said to possess unique skills or experience to some degree. Moreover, any proprietary 
qualities of the petitioner's process or product do not establish that any knowledge of this process is 
"specialized." Rather, the petitioner must establish that qualities of the unique process or product require this 
employee to have knowledge beyond what is common in the industry. This has not been established in this 
matter. The fact that other workers may not have the same level of experience with the petitioner's 
methodologies as applied to one component of a specific client project is not enough to establish the 
beneficiary as an employee possessing specialized knowledge. While the AAO acknowledges that there will 
be exceptions based on the facts of individual cases, an argument that an alien is unique among a small subset 
of workers, (i.e., one of only two IT auditors assigned to a small client project team) will not be deemed 
facially persuasive if a petitioner's definition of specialized knowledge is so broad that it would include the 
majority of its workforce. 
The foreign entity's representative also asserts that it would take at least one year for "a new person" to take 
full responsibility for the U.S. client's onsite IT audit. Although the petitioner claims that this knowledge can be 
acquired only through at least one year of training and experience with the petitioner's organization, the AAO 
notes that, based on a review of his resume, the beneficiary in this case came to the foreign entity with 
absolutely no work experience in SOX Compliance, IT audits or IT consulting. The beneficiary's work 
experience was in computer system and network administration as an assistant engineer for the Department of 
Public Works in Maharastra, India, and as a junior civil engineer with the same employer. Therefore, it 
appears based on the evidence in the record that the beneficiary joined the foreign entity as "a new person" in 
WAC 08 207 5 1286 
Page 15 
the field of IT auditing for SOX Compliance. The petitioner has not indicated that he received any specific 
formal or on-the-job training upon joining the company in either the petitioner's internal policies and 
procedures or in the subject matter related to his project assignment. Despite his lack of company-specific 
training or experience, the beneficiary was hired by KPIT-India and immediately assigned to the role of 
Consultant/IT Auditor for the Cummins Inc. SOX Compliance project, performing the same duties that are 
proposed in the United States. 
This fact directly undermines the petitioner's claims. It is apparent that the beneficiary did not have one year 
of experience prior to his overseas assignment to consultant/IT audits for the Cummins lnc. SOX Compliance 
project. The minimal evidence submitted suggests that the petitioner's employees are not required to undergo 
any extensive training in the company's processes and methodologies. 
 Rather, it is evident that the 
beneficiary was hired by the foreign entity directly following completion of training in information 
technology and immediately assigned to work on the offshore component of the Cummins Inc. SOX 
Compliance project in a role identical to the one he has been offered in the United States. There is no 
indication that the beneficiary not been fully performing the duties of the position since the date he was hired 
by the foreign entity. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by 
independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice 
unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 
I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). 
The petitioner has not specified the amount or type of training its technical staff members receive in the 
company's tools and procedures and therefore it cannot be concluded that its processes are particularly 
complex or different compared to those utilized by other companies in the industry, or that it would take a 
significant amount of time to train an experienced information technology consultant who had no prior 
experience with the petitioner's family of companies. Going on record without supporting documentary 
evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJicci, 
22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of Cal$ornia, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. 
Comm. 1972)). 
Further, since it appears the beneficiary was able to assume such a role on the Cummins Inc. project with no 
prior work experience within the company or even in the field of SOX compliance, then it is reasonable to 
question to what extent the knowledge required to perform the duties is truly specific to the petitioning 
organization, and not general knowledge the beneficiary gained while completing professional training in 
information technology auditing prior to joining the foreign entity. 
Based on the petitioner's representations, its internal processes and tools, while highly effective and valuable 
to the petitioner, are simply customized versions of standard practices used in the industry that can be readily 
learned on-the-job by employees who otherwise possess the requisite technical background in information 
technology auditing. For this reason, the petitioner has not established that knowledge of its processes and 
procedures alone constitutes specialized knowledge. 
It is appropriate for USCIS to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the 
beneficiary's knowledge of the business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making 
process. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. at 120 (citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. at 61 8 and Matter of 
WAC 08 207 5 1286 
Page 16 
LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. at 8 16). As stated by the Commissioner in Matter of Penner, when considering 
whether the beneficiaries possessed specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find 
that the occupations inherently qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." 18 I&N Dec. at 52. 
Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled 
worker. Id. 
The AAO acknowledges that the specialized knowledge need not be narrowly held within the organization in 
order to be considered "advanced." However, it is equally true to state that knowledge will not be considered 
"special" or ''advanced" if it is universally or even widely held throughout a company. If all similarly 
employed workers within the petitioner's organization receive essentially the same training, then mere 
possession of knowledge of the petitioner's processes and methodologies does not rise to the level of 
specialized knowledge. The L-1B visa category was not created in order to allow the transfer of all 
employees with any degree of knowledge of a company's processes. If all employees are deemed to possess 
"special" or "advanced" knowledge, then that knowledge would necessarily be ordinary and commonplace. 
The petitioner has not successhlly demonstrated that the beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner's processes 
and procedures gained during his 17 months of employment with the foreign entity is advanced compared to 
other similarly employed workers within the organization. As noted above, the petitioner's attempts to 
distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge as advanced relative to a specific client project are unpersuasive. All 
of the foreign entity's technical employees would reasonably have project-specific knowledge in addition to 
knowledge of the company's tools and processes for implementing projects. By the petitioner's logic, any of 
them would qualify for L-1B classification if offered a position working on the same project in the United 
States. 
According to the reasoning of Matter of Penner, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically complex 
products, by itself will not equal "special knowledge."5 An expansive interpretation of specialized knowledge in 
which any experienced employee would qualify as having special or advanced knowledge would be untenable, 
since it would allow a petitioner to transfer any experienced employee to the United States in L-1B classification. 
The term "special" or "advanced" must mean more than experienced or skilled. In other terms, specialized 
knowledge requires more than a short period of experience, otherwise, "special" or "advanced" knowledge would 
include every employee with the exception of trainees and recent recruits. 
The AAO does not dispute the possibility that the beneficiary is a skilled employee who has been, and would 
be, a valuable asset to the petitioner. However, as explained above, the record does not distinguish the 
5 
As observed above, the AAO notes that the precedent decisions that predate the 1990 Act are not categorically 
superseded by the statutory definition of specialized knowledge, and the general issues and case facts themselves 
remain cogent as examples of how the INS applied the law to the real world facts of individual adjudications. 
USCIS must distinguish between skilled workers and specialized knowledge workers when making a 
determination on an L-1B visa petition. The distinction between skilled and specialized workers has been a 
recurring issue in the L-1B program and is discussed at length in the INS precedent decisions, including Matter of 
Penner. See 18 I&N Dec. at 50-53. (discussing the legislative history and prior precedents as they relate to the 
distinction between skilled and specialized knowledge workers). 
WAC 08 207 51286 
Page 17 
beneficiary's knowledge as more advanced than the knowledge possessed by other people employed by the 
petitioning organization or by workers who are similarly employed elsewhere. The beneficiary's duties and 
technical skills, while impressive, demonstrate that he possesses knowledge that is common among IT 
auditors in the information technology consulting field. Furthermore, it is not clear that the performance of the 
beneficiary's duties would require more than basic proficiency with the company's internal processes and 
methodologies. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary's training, work experience, or 
knowledge of the company's processes is more advanced than the knowledge possessed by others employed 
by the petitioner, or that the processes used by the petitioner are substantially different from those used by 
other technology consulting companies. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary's 
knowledge is any more advanced or special than the knowledge held by a skilled worker. See Matter of 
Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 52. 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, supra at 16. 
Finally, regarding the petitioner's reliance, in part, on the Puleo memorandum, it must be noted that in making 
a determination as to whether the knowledge possessed by a beneficiary is special or advanced, the AAO 
relies on the statute and regulations, legislative history and prior precedent. Although counsel suggests that 
USCIS is bound to base its decision on the above-referenced Puleo and Ohata memoranda, the memoranda 
were issued as guidance to assist USCIS employees in interpreting a term that is not clearly defined in the 
statute, not as a replacement for the statute or the original intentions of Congress in creating the specialized 
knowledge classification, or to overturn prior precedent decisions that continue to prove instructive in 
adjudicating L-1B visa petitions. The AAO will weigh guidance outlined in the policy memoranda 
accordingly, but not to the exclusion of the statutory and regulatory definitions, legislative history or prior 
precedents.6 
6 
 USCIS memoranda articulate internal guidelines for agency personnel; they do not establish judicially 
enforceable standards. Agency interpretations that are not arrived at through precedent decision or notice- 
and-comment rulemaking - such as those in opinion letters, policy statements, agency manuals, and 
enforcement guidelines - lack the force of law and do not warrant Chevron-style deference. Christensen v. 
Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). An agency's internal guidelines "neither confer upon [plaintiffs] 
substantive rights nor provide procedures upon which [they] may rely." Loa-Herrera v. Trominski, 23 1 F.3d 
984, 989 (5th Cir. 2000)(quoting Fano v. O'Neill, 806 F.2d 1262, 1264 (5th Cir. 1987)). Agency policy 
memorandum and unpublished decisions do not confer substantive legal benefits upon aliens or bind CIS. 
Romeiro de Silva v. Smith, 773 F.2d 1021, 1024 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Prokopenko v. Ashcroft, 372 F.3d 
941, 944 (8th Cir. 2004). 
In contrast to agency memoranda, a legacy INS or USCIS decision is binding as a precedent decision once it 
is published in accordance with 8 C.F.R. 9 103.3(c). The INS precedent decisions relating to L-1B 
specialized knowledge are considered "interpretive rules" under the APA. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. 
US., 229 F.Supp.2d 1025, 1044 (E.D.Ca1. 2001), ajf'd 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); see also R.L. Inv. Ltd. 
Partners v. INS, 86 F.Supp.2d 1014 (D.Hawaii 2000). 
WAC 08 207 51286 
Page 18 
Therefore, based on the evidence presented and applying the statute, regulations, and binding precedents, the 
petitioner has not established that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge or that he has been or would be 
employed in the United States in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. For this reason, the appeal will 
be dismissed. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
appeal will be dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.